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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis introduces multilevel measures of women’s autonomy and examines its determinants 
within a developing country. Using a simple theoretical model, it is demonstrated that the 
earned income of women and the household composition (notwithstanding the family size) are 
the fundamental determinants of women’s autonomy at the household level. Therefore, the 
above two factors are considered as the valid threat options of a woman when determining her 
decision-making power relative to her husband in the household. This thesis also incorporates 
various co-determinants of women’s autonomy derived from sub-branches of sociology, 
demography, anthropology and household bargaining theory, which include household 
characteristics, individual embedded characteristics, geographic locations and cultural 
constraints commonly faced by women within this society.  
A woman’s autonomy is defined here as the relative decision-making power of a 
woman to her husband in household decision-making settings. Autonomy is measured as a 
multilevel concept formally known as, ‘no autonomy’, ‘partial autonomy’ and ‘strong 
autonomy’, based on direct measures derived from the country-wide household level survey 
data examined here. This multilevel autonomy covers almost all aspects of the decision-making 
process in the typical household. Explicitly, autonomy is classified into two main dimensions: 
‘Economic Decision-Making’ and ‘Family Planning Decision-Making’ in the household. 
Further, the above two dimensions include various sub-dimensions constituting the aggregate 
indices of economic and family planning decision-making autonomy. 
For empirical verifications of the theoretical propositions, we utilise data from 
‘Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement’ survey (PSLM) 2005-06 conducted by the 
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, which is comprised of a series of cross-sectional surveys over a 
period of five years. This survey includes interviews with 15,453 households corresponding to 
almost all of the socio-economic issues based on a two-stage stratified sampling design. This 
survey aims to provide detailed outcome indicators on education, health, population, welfare, 
water and sanitation and income and expenditure. Therefore, this data is claimed to provide a set 
of representative population-based estimates of social indicators and their progress under the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). 
Notwithstanding the conventional estimation techniques, this thesis cautiously devises 
an appropriate strategy of estimation for empirical analysis. For instance, the use of Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and Cumulative Approach Probability Models (Logit/multi-category Logit 
models) can be frequently observed on similar research topics where the variable of interest is 
categorical in nature. However when a dependent variable is categorical, the OLS method can 
no longer produce the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE); that is, OLS is biased and 
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inefficient. Similarly, Cumulative Approach Probability Models may also give biased and 
misleading results if the proportionality assumption is relaxed and adjacent categories are 
ignored in the categorical dependent variable. This study firstly utilises the most common 
technique, the Cumulative Approach (proportional odds model) probability models and 
evaluates the results by testing the proportionality assumption. Finally, the Adjacent Approach 
probability model is adopted by relaxing the proportionality assumption within the multilevel 
context of women’s autonomy.  
Finally, this thesis presents detailed analysis from both an overall perspective and with 
an urban and rural divide. Consistent with the theoretical model, overall results show those 
women earning an independent income display higher levels of economic decision-making 
autonomy compared to women without an independently earned income. Household size 
comprised of elderly persons including the relatives of a husband, appears to substantially 
decrease the economic decision-making autonomy of women at the household level. Conversely, 
another component of household size which looks at the increasing numbers of children has the 
effect of increasing women’s autonomy at the household level. Further, the gender of children 
does not appear significant on either dimension of women’s autonomy. The specific family 
formulation (nuclear versus extended family) significantly affects the decision-making power of 
corresponding women at the household level. These results are consistent with all sub-
dimensions of economic decision-making autonomy at the household level except for medical 
treatment and recreation and travel related decision-making aspects. In the context of family 
planning however, these results appear to be only partially significant.  
With regards to a woman’s individual characteristics, the overall evidence confirms that 
any level of education, as compared with no education, increases women’s autonomy but is 
insignificant in terms of monotonically increasing the level of autonomy. Similarly, the age of a 
woman is seen as an increasing indicator of autonomy. Interestingly, the education level of a 
husband does not correspond to increasing autonomy for a woman, however, her husband’s 
income level appears to be significant. Similarly, the family’s overall socioeconomic status is 
also positively and significantly associated with increasing autonomy. Further, results show that 
regions (urban/rural divide) have a modifying effect in the overall evidence on women’s 
autonomy. Furthermore, state/provincial fixed effects were also observed to be significant to 
varying degrees of autonomy. Women from the province of Punjab record the highest autonomy 
in economic decision-making spheres, however women from the NWFP (North West Frontier 
Province) reflect the highest degree of autonomy in family planning decision-making at the 
household level. The conclusions we reached from the empirical analysis reveal that social and 
cultural norms of society also play an important role in shaping women’s decision-making 
power within the household. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. Motivation 
The concept of women’s autonomy, apart from its inherently essential nature, has become the 
subject of research discussions among policymakers, academics, non-governmental 
organisations and researchers. Over the recent past, it has been observed that increased levels of 
women’s autonomy not only help to reduce fertility rates, but they also lead to an improvement 
in the health and educational well-being of children, through the distribution of resources.1 
Furthermore, women’s autonomy is also positively linked with socio-economic development 
through higher participation in the labour market.  
Besides policy goals, there has been debate in the socio-economic development 
literature on how to characterise, enumerate and increase women’s autonomy.2 Most of the 
debate centres on women’s participation in economic activities, control over financial resources, 
social norms and practices as the determinants of women’s autonomy in the household. 
Participation in economic activities and control over financial resources has increasingly 
become a focal point among many research studies as a dominant factor of empowering women 
(see footnotes 1 and 2). More than a century ago, Engels (1884) argued that increased women’s 
participation in the labour market is the major source of emancipation from the servitude of the 
patriarchal family. More recently, Anderson and Eswaran (2009) amongst others, provide 
convincing evidence of how a female’s valid threat options in terms of having an earned income 
                                                            
1 There is a great degree of consensus that increased female autonomy directly adds to the welfare of children and the 
household overall. For instance, Mukherjee (2013), and Grabowski and Self (2013), find that in India, women’s 
autonomy increases children’s wellbeing although there remains a gender bias towards boys and against girls. In a 
different context, Dyson and Moore (1983), Caldwell and Caldwell (1987), Mason (1996), Hogan et al. (1999) and 
Eswaran (2002), demonstrate the significant impact of women’s autonomy in reducing fertility rates and increasing 
children’s welfare. Amongst several others, Strauss et al. (2000) and Thomas (1990), conclude that in contrast to men, 
women allocate a greater proportion of their time and their earned or unearned income towards the family’s well-
being. Similarly, but within a different context, Lancaster et al. (2006) and Gitter and Barham (2008), show there is a 
non-monotonic association between women’s autonomy and children’s well-being.    
2 As also stated in Malhotra and Schuler (2005), literature has evolved numerous terminologies referring to female 
autonomy, for instance, Dyson and Moore (1983), Basu and Basu (1991) and Jeejebhoy and Sathar (2001), measure 
‘women’s autonomy’, Gage (1995) and Tzannatos (1999) measure ‘agency’, and ‘status,  Quisumbing et al. (2001) 
measure ‘women’s land rights’, Mason (1996) ‘domestic economic power, Beegle et al. (2001), Hoddinott and 
Haddad (1995), Quisumbing and de la Briere (2000) discuss ‘bargaining power’, Agarwal (1997), Beegle et al. (1998) 
and Pulerwitz et al. (2000) use ‘power’, Malhotra et al. (1995) refers to ‘patriarchy’, and the World Bank (2001a; 
2000b) refers to  ‘gender equality’ or ‘gender discrimination’. Sen (1993) defines empowerment as ‘altering relations 
of power … which constrain women’s options and autonomy and adversely affect health and well-being.’ Batliwala’s 
(1994) definition is ‘how much influence people have over external actions that matter to their welfare.’ Keller and 
Mbwewe (1991) also cited in Rowlands (1995) describe it as ‘a process whereby women become able to organize 
themselves to increase their own self-reliance, to assert their independent right to make choices and to control 
resources which will assist in challenging and eliminating their own subordination.’ 
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increases her levels of autonomy in the household. More recently, Eswaran, Ramaswami and 
Wadhwa (2013) consider family status and caste as the most important factors in determining 
women’s autonomy in India. In a slightly different context however, Chen (2013) observes that 
the immigration effect of a male spouse, subject to the negative shock, appears irrelevant to a 
female spouse’s bargaining power in the household. Apart from this anecdotal evidence, many 
case studies including those of the World Bank (1995), Acharya and Bennet (1982) based on 
Nepal, Finalay (1989) based on the Dominican Republic, Safa (1992) based on the Caribbean, 
Ecevit (1991) based on Turkey, Anderson and Eswaran (2009) in Bangladesh, Rahman and Rao 
(2004) in India, Ashraf and Ashraf (1993), Kozel and Alderman (1990), Azid et al. (2001) and a 
few other studies based on Pakistan, argue that women’s employment outside of the household 
increases her decision-making power in the household. DFID (2007) finds that economically 
empowered women tend to have greater bargaining power over spending decisions regarding 
children’s health and educational wellbeing. Similarly, Blumberg and Coleman (1989), Rahman 
and Rao (2004) and Agarwal (1997), emphasise that women’s control over resources such as 
land and credit in the developing countries enhances their power in the household. Further, 
Boserup (1970), Dyson and Moore (1983), and Anderson and Eswaran (2009), point out that 
land-holding or participation in small enterprises helps to increase women’s autonomy. 
Furthermore, Folbre (1984) and Kabeer (1999) prove there is a positive association between a 
woman’s premarital asset holdings and her post-marriage empowerment. Amongst others, 
Hashmi et al. (1996) concludes that access to credit and having independent savings, along with 
additional factors of social norms, cultural and religious factors, are the key determinants of 
female autonomy within the household decision-making process.  
The evidence arising from these studies can be distinguished into economic and non-
economic literature, the latter includes studies within the areas of sociology, demography and 
anthropology, and is dependent on the identified channels which increase women’s household 
empowerment. Blood and Wolf (1960) developed a theory commonly known as resource 
control theory in the context of sociological applications to explain the connections between 
access to resources and women’s empowerment. More recently, authors such as Blumberg and 
Coleman (1989), Kabeer (1997), Malhotra and Mather (1997) and Mizan (1994), to name a few, 
use a slightly modified theory of resource control to identify similar channels (access to 
resources) in determining women’s autonomy. On the other hand, the economic perspective of 
the household theory of decision-making which is based on standard methods of 
microeconomics, introduces a variety of bargaining models to identify women’s autonomy in 
the household. Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) can be considered 
the pioneering economists with the greatest contribution to identifying female bargaining power 
in the household. The bargaining models relate to women’s autonomy and their threat options in 
the household decision-making processes. More specifically, increasing threat options allows a 
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woman to retain her well-being in the event of a marital breakdown, either within cooperative or 
non-cooperative situations. Further, the threat options may be based on a variety of distribution 
factors associated with an individual’s characteristics and resources, which all add to their 
bargaining power (McElroy,1990; Sen, 1990; Kabeer, 1994).  
Interestingly, some researchers on this subject including Agarwal (1997), Kabeer (1997), 
Malhotra and Mather (1997) and Mizan (1994), and more recently Eswaran and Malhotra 
(2011), all raise a common question on the theoretically established link between access to 
resources, threat options and women’s autonomy. In other words, they pose a challenge to the 
applications of sociology resource control theory and the bargaining theory of threat options, by 
identifying the intervening factors of context specific and cultural norms as important 
determinants of women’s autonomy in the household. Consequently, the above resource control 
theory was criticised on several fronts. For example, it does not appear to support the contextual 
assessment of women’s empowerment regarding their access to resources. Jejeebhoy and Sather 
(2001), Kabeer (1997), Malhotra and Mather (1997) and Mizan (1994) fail to witness any 
improvement in women’s status with an increased access to resources. Similarly, Agarwal 
(1997) argues that social factors hinder the application of bargaining theory where threat options 
are used, leading towards their autonomy. Further, the bargaining models largely ignore the 
implications of those social norms in the analytical cooperative and non-cooperative models of 
decision-making. In fact, the strong cultural traits prevalent in the developing countries may 
directly or indirectly influence women’s decision-making power in the household.  
Another motivation for this research is due to constraints we observed on women’s 
autonomy in Pakistan. Historically, Pakistani society within a social and cultural context, is 
patriarchal and highly gender stratified; men and women perform separate roles with the 
artificial gender division of labour defining the home as the women’s sphere, thus confining 
them to the specific responsibilities and reproductive roles within that domain. Men, on the 
other hand, have been assigned the role of breadwinner outside the home, in the outside world, a 
world from which women in general are banished.3 Consistent with these observations, a strong 
commitment to family life and family values are the key features of the social organisation of 
Pakistani society. Essentially, the family formation is patrilineal and marriage considered the 
starting point with marriages often arranged within a kin-group. After marriage, a young woman 
supposedly comes under the control of her mother-in-law and husband. She has little 
participation in domestic decision-making and a limited degree of freedom to move or travel 
independently. Reproduction of the patrilineal lineage, particularly the number of sons, is 
                                                            
3 As observed by Bari (2000) and Khan (1999), amongst others. 
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probably the most important means available to a woman in securing a position within her 
husband’s home.4 
Traditionally, one of the most obvious manifestations of gender stratification in 
Pakistan is the institution of ‘purdha’ (a covering of the head, face or whole body), which 
differentiates the role and space of women from men. Many observers have pointed out 
different reasons and implications of ‘purdha’ with regard to women’s liberty in Pakistan.5 
However, beyond these characteristics of gender differentiation, studies have identified further 
key factors responsible to restricting women inside the household. These factors include forms 
of social exclusion such as socioeconomic status, the urban/rural divide and ethnicity. 6 
Furthermore, most traditional customs rely on the authority of the male and his power over 
females, linked to patriarchal structures which remain stronger in tribal and rural more than 
urban settings. Urban middle-class women to some extent have greater access to education and 
employment, however, rural women are far more restricted with fewer educational and working 
opportunities available to them. This is further evident when we look at the socio-economic 
development within different states of Pakistan. For example, the state of Punjab is considered 
to have a relatively better outlook in terms of development and opportunities for women, 
compared with the other three major states of Pakistan. 
The current study aims to fill in the gaps within the existing literature on the topic of 
women’s autonomy in various aspects, from measurement, to the methods of empirical analysis. 
More specifically, this thesis contributes to the existing literature along the following lines: a) 
we measure autonomy on a multilevel scale referred to as ‘no autonomy’, ‘partial autonomy’ 
and ‘strong autonomy’, against direct measures of women’s autonomy within the context of 
economic and family planning related decision-making in households; b) we identify household 
composition as the fundamental determinant of women’s autonomy, an aspect which has been 
ignored in the existing literature (household composition is explained in terms of family 
formation and the size of the household which is further disaggregated into two categories, the 
inclusion of elderly persons and relatives of the husband living in the same household, and the 
number of children); c) we evaluate the role of different varieties of determinants classified as 
threat options and the common determinants of women’s autonomy on aggregated economic 
and family planning measures of autonomy, as well as disaggregated analysis including various 
sub-dimensions of autonomy in the household; d) we utilise a unique data set which is based on 
stratified sampling, including urban and rural regions, and is therefore representative of the 
whole country population; e) we use modified multinomial logit model settings for the empirical 
                                                            
4 As also pointed out in Jejeebhoy and Sathar (2001), Sathar and Kazi (2000), and Winkvist and Akhtar 
(2000). 
5 As mentioned in Hafeez (1998), Khan (1999), Cain et al. (1979), Sathar and Kazi (1997) and Donnan 
(1997).  
6 As pointed out in Donnan (1997) and Bari (2000).  
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analysis instead of commonly used ordered logit models for two reasons, firstly, women’s 
autonomy is measured on a multilevel scale and we intend to investigate the sensitivity of 
determinants among ‘no autonomy’, ‘partial autonomy’ and ‘strong autonomy’, secondly, we 
test the necessary assumption of proportionality required in simple ordered logit model settings, 
however, on violation, the above technique remains no more valid and so we move on to the 
multinomial logit model, and lastly, f) Pakistan is used as the case study, a country which has 
previously lacked any type of comprehensive research on the issue of women’s autonomy.  
The rest of the Chapter outlines the concept of autonomy and alternative terminologies 
used to define women’s autonomy, the scope of the research, and the objectives and scheme of 
this thesis.  
 
1.2. The Concept of Autonomy and Alternative Terminologies  
Women’s empowerment over time has been defined in several different ways depending on the 
specific context and research interest of various researchers. Therefore, we may trace this 
concept in various discussions and studies originating from specific global policymaking 
institutions, forums and organisations. 7 Similarly, feminists 8 also discuss and promote the 
empowerment of individuals and women’s organisations but in context specific aspects.  
Further, the concept of empowerment exists in social inclusion philosophy as a 
mechanism of civil society growth and development. 9 Bennett (2002) observes that 
empowerment and social inclusion are alike but separate in conceptual aspects. As stated in 
Malhotra and Schuler (2005), Bennett defines empowerment as, ‘the enhancement of assets and 
capabilities of diverse individuals and groups to engage, influence and hold accountable the 
institutions which affect them’, and social inclusion as, ‘the removal of institutional barriers and 
the enhancement of incentives to increase the access of diverse individuals and groups to assets 
and development opportunities.’ Similarly, Narayan (2002) and Ravallion and Chen (2003) 
argue that the process of systemic change is essential to sustain empowerment over time. Thus 
the process of social inclusion corresponding to development and economic growth involves 
institutional transformation and ‘rules of the game’ modifications over time. The literature on 
social inclusion theories, however, does not explicitly include the concept of women’s 
empowerment.   
We find further aspects centering on the main concept of women’s empowerment in 
various relevant contexts. For instance, Sen (1993) defines empowerment as ‘altering relations 
of power … which constrain women’s options and autonomy and adversely affect health and 
                                                            
7 In particular, these are the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (UNDAW), ESIM 
(2001), UNICEF (1999), Department for International Development (DFID, 2000), Everett (1991) and 
RESULTS (1997). 
8 For instance, see Sen and Grown (1987), Jahan (1995) and Kumar (1993). 
9 See Friedmann (1993) and Chambers (1997). 
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well-being’. Batliwala’s (1994) definition describes ‘how much influence people have over 
external actions that matter to their welfare.’ Keller and Mbwewe (1991) also cited in 
(Rowlands 1995) describe it as ‘a process whereby women become able to organize themselves 
to increase their own self-reliance, to assert their independent right to make choices and to 
control resources which will assist in challenging and eliminating their own subordination’. 
Another relevant concept derived from the human rights and feminist perspectives is 
human agency connected with the formulation of choices. This implies the choices made are 
based on self-interest. 10 Also cited in Malhotra et al. (2002), Kabeer (2001) gives an all-
encompassing definition of women’s empowerment which captures all the aforementioned 
contexts: ‘The expansion in people's ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this 
ability was previously denied to them’. 
However, from the practitioner’s perspective, for example Narayan (2002) in the World 
Bank’s Sourcebook on Empowerment and Poverty Reduction, it is pointed out that women’s 
empowerment encompasses some unique features differentiating them from other disadvantaged 
or socially neglected groups. Narayan further states that: i) women as a group need to be 
differentiated from other subsets of society, eg. the poor and ethnic minorities; ii) they also 
differ from other subsets in terms of their household and interfamilial relationships, and iii) 
several contemporary studies argue the need for systemic improvements in institutions and what 
are, essentially, patriarchal structures.11 
Awareness of these unique features has led to several developmental organisation 
agencies, activists and individual researchers to focus on conceptualising gender inequality and 
women’s empowerment issues. As a result, a diverse body of research has emerged on 
contextualising, measuring and relating women’s empowerment to other variables of interest. 
Furthermore, this research is emerging from the interstices of various disciplines including 
demography, sociology, economics, anthropology and public health studies. 
We therefore find several terminologies are used to conceptualise and gauge women’s 
empowerment in the household and society. It may be relevant to note that all those 
terminologies are context specific and dependent on the research interest of the authors. For 
example, as cited in Malhotra et al. (2002), women’s empowerment has been given a variety of 
different names, including women’s autonomy, agency, status, land rights, domestic economic 
power, bargaining power, patriarchy, gender equality and gender discrimination, within various 
studies.12 Correspondingly, we have found further common key terms all referring to women’s 
empowerment or autonomy, for example, option, choice, control and power.  
                                                            
10 As discussed in Sen (1999), Sen (1993), Kabeer (2001), Rowlands (1995), Nussbaum (2001) and 
Mosedale (2005). 
11 See Kabeer (2001), Bisnath and Elson (2000), Sen and Grown (1988) and Batliwala (1994). 
12 Dyson and Moore (1983), Basu and Basu (1991), Jeejebhoy and Sathar (2001), Gage (1995), Tzannatos 
(1999), Quisumbing et al. (2001), Mason (1996), Beegle et al. (2001), Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), 
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Within the literature, we find a great degree of consensus regarding the definition of the 
concept of empowerment. The common underlying definition of these terminologies refers to 
the ability of women to make decisions for themselves and/or for the well-being of their 
families. Within this thesis, we follow guidelines based on the standard household decision-
making theory which defines autonomy as a woman’s bargaining power relative to her 
husband’s in the household. 
 
1.3. Research Scope 
In addition to developing a theoretical model to highlight women’s threat options, this thesis 
also presents empirical analysis to verify the validity of some unique propositions. The focus of 
this thesis remains identification of the relevant determinants of women’s autonomy using 
extensive micro-level data from Pakistan. Most of the existing research on women’s autonomy 
concentrates on India and Bangladesh amongst few other developing countries. However, no 
comprehensive research on this important topic has been conducted using data from Pakistan. 
There are some minor studies which directly or indirectly focus on the context of Pakistan, but 
they have limited scope and methodological constraints.  
This thesis aims to bridge the gap in the literature by offering a comprehensive analysis 
on the multi-dimensional concept of women’s autonomy through the use of a sufficiently large 
data set which is based on household information representing the entire population of the 
country. This data allows us to measure autonomy based on the direct responses of participant 
women from the urban and the rural regions of all four states of Pakistan.  
 
1.4. Research Objectives  
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the relative importance of different 
determinants of women’s autonomy. Given the limitations of existing research on the 
subject we intend to introduce an encompassing framework of analysis embedded with 
cultural factors usually ignored in the past. Correspondingly, the research agenda of the 
thesis has two main aspects with reference to the characterisation of the determinants of 
women’s autonomy. These are: 
a) Identification of the relevant threat options as indicated in the bargaining models 
based on standard methods of household decision-making theory. As predicted 
within the theory, the threat options may allow a woman to exercise her 
bargaining power in various aspects of decision-making process in the household. 
Therefore more bargaining power leads to greater autonomy in the household. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Quisumbing and de la Briere (2000), Agarwal (1997), Pulerwitz et al. (2000), Malhotra et al. (1995),  and 
World Bank (2001a; 2001b). 
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b) We ask, given the threat options, what else could be more relevant in association 
with women’s autonomy in the household? This thesis identifies further relevant 
determinants, including cultural traits captured through the existing family 
formation systems, socio-economic status of the family and geographic fixed 
effects. 
 
In the light of these two aspects, this thesis specifically aims to contribute to the existing 
stream of literature on women’s autonomy, with the following sub-objectives: 
i) Present a comprehensive literature review by identifying commonalities, 
controversies and gaps in the existing literature on the subject of women’s 
autonomy. Further, classification of the literature based on the economic 
theory of household bargaining models and non-economic literature 
including sociology, anthropology and demography studies.   
ii) Construction of a framework of analysis consistent with the local socio-
economic settings based on separate sphere characteristics of household 
composition.   
iii) Characterising the multidimensional concept of women’s autonomy as 
aggregated and disaggregated concepts based on direct measures using 
extensive household level stratified data, representative of Pakistan’s entire 
population.     
iv) Review of the existing methods of estimations and presenting the modified 
version of multinomial logit models consistent with the requirement of 
empirical analysis. 
v) Finally, an empirical assessment of the results of women’s autonomy from 
the overall, urban and rural stratifications. 
 
1.5.  Organisation of Thesis 
This thesis is organised into several Chapters reflecting the importance and relevance of 
different concepts throughout the fulfilment of the scope of this research study. The next 
Chapter presents a review of the literature by classifying existing studies and highlighting 
the gaps in research on women’s autonomy. Chapter 3 illustrates a theoretical framework 
of analysis as motivation for the empirical analysis adopted in this thesis. Chapter 3 
further provides analysis based on simple simulations to determine the validity of threat 
options suggested in the framework of analysis. Relevant empirical conjectures are also 
specified. Chapter 4 discusses data sources, definitions and construction of variables to be 
used in the relevant empirical analysis. Chapter 5 presents descriptive evidence on the 
multidimensional, multilevel concept of women’s autonomy in association with identified 
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determinants. Methods of estimation are discussed in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 presents 
results and a discussion on the aggregated economic decision-making aspects of women’s 
autonomy from an overall, urban and rural perspective. Correspondingly, Chapter 8 
illustrates findings of the disaggregated analysis of economic decision-making 
dimensions of women’s autonomy. Chapter 9 discusses results of the aggregated family 
decision-making context of women’s autonomy from the overall sample, as well as from 
the urban and rural regions. Similarly, Chapter 10 presents the disaggregated results of 
family planning decision-making aspects of women’s autonomy. Lastly, Chapter 11 
summarises the overall findings of this thesis, identifies its limitations and outlines the 
scope for further research on this subject. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1.  Introduction  
This Chapter aims to provide a review of the existing research on the topic of women’s 
autonomy. Given its nature and scope, this issue has been discussed and analysed from a 
multidisciplinary perspective. Broadly, discussion on women’s autonomy can be classified into 
two main streams of literature, namely, ‘Family Economics’1 and other social sciences including 
Anthropology, Sociology and Demography studies. 
The household theory of economics provides a comprehensive analysis of family 
economics including intra-household allocations of resources, altruism in the family, household 
production and investment, investment in and financial transfers to children, matching in the 
marriage market, divorce and child support, non-altruistic family transfers, household 
formations and social interactions. In particular, the household decision-making theory provides 
a detailed analysis of the interactions between a husband and wife within various aspects of 
decision-making processes in the household. Further, this theory recognises women’s autonomy 
through her threat utility relative to her male partner in the context of cooperative and non-
cooperative interactions in decision-making processes in the household. Both Eswaran and 
Malhotra (2011), and Anderson and Eswaran (2009) show convincing evidence of women’s 
valid threat utility in asserting their bargaining power relative to their male partner’s in the 
household. More recently, Eswaran, Ramaswami and Wadhwa (2013) determined family status 
and caste as the most important factors in determining women’s autonomy in the household in 
India. However, in the context of a cooperative model context, Chen (2013) observes that the 
immigration effect of a male spouse subject to the negative shock appears irrelevant to women’s 
bargaining power in the household. Similarly, other disciplines including anthropology, 
sociology and demography highlight the concept of women’s autonomy within the context of 
gender inequality. Anthropology studies generally link development with improving levels of 
women’s autonomy in society. Further, the sociology theory of resource control emphasises 
women’s ownership rights as related to their autonomy within the household and society in 
                                                            
1 This concept may be traced back from Becker, Duesenberry, and Okun (1960) and Becker (1960). More 
recently, the term ‘family economics’ was coined by John F. Ermisch (2003). This branch of economics 
discusses family issues through the lens of standard analytical methods of microeconomics theory. 
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general. Demography studies identify the key relationship between women’s autonomy and the 
demographic processes  in society.  
Further studies measure women’s autonomy and present empirical evidence of its 
determinants within various contexts. The following discussion looks at the concept of 
autonomy from the household decision-making theory and discusses the empirical evidence of 
its determinants, which have appeared in various studies grouped within other social science 
fields. Finally, we comment on the main shortcomings observed within the existing literature, of 
which we attempt to address within this thesis. 
 
2.2. Economic Theory of the Household and Women’s Autonomy 
The economic theory of the household specifically regarding women’s autonomy can be 
classified into two models, unitary and non-unitary.  
 
2.2.1. Unitary Household Models  
The economic theory, specifically the microeconomics theory of the household, traditionally 
operated using unitary models of the household. Unitary models of the household assume a 
single decision-making agent with a single budget constraint corresponding to a single utility 
function and household member’s consumption is considered as an argument. Therefore, the 
unitary model treats the household as an aggregate in the context of standard demand theory 
with straightforward empirical implications. However, the unitary household models came 
under heavy attack on theoretical and empirical dimensions mainly because of aggregation 
issues of individual preferences. Large numbers of studies afterwards failed to find any support 
from the data on unitary models. Further, the unitary household models failed to address the 
intra-household inequality and household formation-related issues. Therefore, since the 1980s, a 
wide variety of non-unitary models have emerged in response to the above concerns. 
As appeared in Samuelson (1956), households maximize the single utility function 
subject to the pooled budget constraint and the baseline unitary model, which can be shown as: 
 
,
max ( , )
. .
h w
h w
c c
h h w w h w
U c c
s t p c p c y y y   
         (2.1 
 
According to this model, husband (h) and wife (w) each has an individual utility function that 
depends on their own consumption (c) of private goods with prices (p). This further shows that 
both individuals maximise the social welfare function of their own utilities subject to the single 
constraint resulting from pooling their incomes, hence the household income (y). 
Correspondingly the model solves the husband and wife demand functions hf and wf as: 
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The above demand functions of husband and wife clearly depend on the prices of private goods 
and the aggregate income of the household. Therefore, a change in income level has identical 
implications for each of the individual’s demand functions. On the other hand, if income and 
any change in the sources of income remain constant, there would be no effect on any of the 
individual’s level of demand or consumption. It also implies that any change in one’s sources of 
income has a similar effect on respective demand functions. Therefore, the assumption that 
pooling household income does not differentiate between partial effects of changes to an 
individual’s sources of income hence may be sharing equal amounts of utility from consumption 
in the household. This model gives the impression that a wife has an equal level of autonomy 
relative to her husband in the household.   
 
2.2.2. Non-Unitary Household Models  
The non-unitary models can be classified into two categories known as cooperative models and 
non-cooperative models. The cooperative models lead to a Pareto efficient outcome which is not 
assured in the non-cooperative models. 
 
2.2.2.1. Cooperative Models  
The cooperative models can be further classified as either Nash bargaining models, or collective 
models.  
 
Nash bargaining models: As appeared in Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney 
(1981), the Nash bargaining models were the first of the non-unitary household models. They 
recognise individual utility functions through the concept of threat points (T) which are external 
to the household (for example, divorce). Therefore the threat points correspond to the maximal 
utility of a husband and wife. Further, the threat options are a function of some vector 
distributional factors (Z). A typical household maximisation problem, subject to the pooled 
income constraint can be shown as:  
 
,
max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
. .
h w
h h h w w w
c c
h h w w h w
U c T z U c T z
s t p c p c y y y
       
   
      (2.3  
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As shown in this model, z includes both husband and wife incomes, therefore income pooling is 
no longer applicable. This is precisely where this set-up differs from the unitary household 
models.  
 
Collective Models: Chiappori (1988; 1992) demonstrates collective models as the generalised 
version of the Nash bargaining models. According to these models, a household maximises the 
weighted sum of a husband and wife utilities function, subject to the pooled budget constraint. 
The weighting depends on the vector distribution factors as mentioned in the above Nash 
bargaining settings. For example, a typical collective model can be shown as: 
 
,
max ( ) ( ) ( )
. .
h w
h h w w
c c
h h h h h w
U c z U c
s t p c p c y y y

   
        (2.4 
 
As depicted,  is the relative weight of the wife’s utility function and captures her bargaining 
power relative to her husband. Similar to the Nash bargaining models, the income pooling may 
not necessarily apply and demand may depend on distribution factors which includes individual 
incomes. However, the model implies that for any two distributional factors the following 
equality holds:  
 
1 1 1
2 2 2
h w
h w
c z c z z
c z c z z


                    (2.5 
 
It is relevant to note that the consumption decisions are influenced by the distribution factors, 
which in turn depend on the relative bargaining power between a husband and wife. This is how 
women’s autonomy may be linked with these models of household decision-making processes 
in the household.  
 
2.2.2.2. Non-Cooperative Models 
Lundberg and Pollak (2008) introduce the possibility of intra-household behaviour subject to 
the potential phenomena of domestic violence and child abuse in the household, and so relax the 
assumption of binding and enforceable contracts of cooperative models. Further, Lundberg and 
Pollak (1993) provide compelling arguments in favour of non-cooperative models by 
developing the ‘separate sphere’ model of households in particular. Furthermore, the above 
study emphasises that the threat point is in fact a non-cooperative equilibrium within the 
household. In this scenario of formulations, each individual maximises his/her utility in the 
absence of pooling their incomes. This is obviously a distinguishing feature of the non-
14 
 
cooperative models compared with the cooperative models discussed earlier. However, 
Chiappori and Donni (2009) mention that there is no difference between cooperative and non-
cooperative model equilibria if the consumption is absolutely private to the individuals in the 
absence of any externalities. Further, if there is an element of public goods consumption and 
externalities also prevail, then non-cooperative models will yield Pareto inefficient outcomes. In 
general, the non-cooperative models may reveal multiple equilibria with some that are Pareto 
efficient, and some that are not. Further, Lundberg and Pollak (1994) also discusses the non-
cooperative models by including cultural factors in which equilibrium is realised as being 
dependent on the resource control by a husband or wife. 
Further, the empirical evidence corresponding to the above taxonomy of household 
decision-making models can be classified into two main categories. One corresponds to the 
evidence in the context of unitary models of utility maximisation, subject to the pooled income 
of a husband and wife. Several empirical studies test whether income pooling exists or whether 
the demand of individuals depends on external distribution factors. The majority of the literature 
has rejected the hypothesis of income pooling as a single budget constraint of the household. 
Among others, Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) reject the hypothesis of income pooling in 
the study from the United Kingdom. In that study the authors investigated the impact of a policy 
change which gave child allowances directly to the mothers instead of the fathers, unlike past 
practice. The study witnessed a marked increase in the consumption expenditures of women and 
their children, and hence rejected the hypothesis of pooling. Similarly, Attanasio and Lechene 
(2002) from rural Mexico observed that a wife’s higher income share goes towards household 
expenditures and children’s welfare. This also implies that the hypothesis of income pooling is 
rejected. Further, Blundell et al. (2007) investigate this hypothesis in the case of married 
couples without children in the United Kingdom. More recently, Lundberg and Pollak (2008) 
consider the above empirical findings as the key reason for failed unitary models.   
The second category refers to the non-unitary models, including cooperative and non-
cooperative models respectively with efficient and inefficient Pareto outcomes. Bobonis (2009) 
considers two distribution factors including PROGRESA grant effects of a wife’s income, and 
the rainfall shock on joint household income, in association with a consumption basket of 
several goods. This study tests both dimensions of the Pareto efficiency outcomes and the 
hypothesis of income pooling. Regarding income pooling, the marginal effects of both of the 
above distribution factors should be identical. However, Bobonis (2009) observed the opposite 
effects of distribution factors on consumption expenditures. This further explains that a 
marginal effect by increasing one unit of grant to women increases expenditures on household 
services and children’s welfare; however, it has the opposite effect in the case of a rain fall 
shock. This clearly explains the rejection of the income pooling hypothesis, however, it supports 
the Pareto efficiency condition as specified above in Equation 2.5.  
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Udry (1996), however, finds evidence against the Pareto efficient outcome in plot-level 
agriculture from three different provinces of Burkina Faso in West Africa. Akresh (2008) 
extends Udry’s study and investigates the Pareto efficient outcome across time and the 
provinces of Burkina Faso. Akresh finds that the Pareto outcome varies across time and space. 
Therefore, two main studies, respectively Bobonis (2009) and Udry (1996) created differences 
which could be linked with the different settings of the aforementioned studies. These different 
settings respectively correspond to the production aspect (Udry) and expenditure aspect 
(Bobonis). Furthermore, Ashraf (2009) finds evidence against Pareto efficient outcomes from 
outside of the production context, by involving a random experiment from the Philippines. This 
study identifies a lack of inter-spousal information and communication as the reasons for an 
inefficient Pareto outcome.  
Anderson and Eswaran (2009) find in the case of Bangladesh that the employed status 
of a woman increases her threat utility and therefore increases her level of bargaining power 
relative to her husband. In another study, Eswaran and Malhotra (2011) emphasise a family’s 
evolutionary past, firmly convinced that more than just employment status is relevant to an 
increase in women’s household autonomy. More recently, Eswaran, Ramaswami and Wadhwa 
(2013) find that the cultural factors including family status and caste play a substantial role in 
determining women’s autonomy in the case of India. Grabowski and Self (2013) focus on 
various measures of women’s autonomy and find that increasing autonomy decreases the gender 
bias and hence increases the health and wellbeing of children. Similarly, Doss (2013) also 
points out various implications of women’s autonomy in association with different aspects from 
the developing countries.   
 
2.3. Non-Economic Literature on Women’s Autonomy  
Non-economic literature refers to the large number of sociology, anthropology and demography 
studies which have introduced ad hoc models to empirically investigate the concept of women’s 
autonomy. These studies have commonly established women’s autonomy as an endogenous or 
intermediary concept in association with other factors, depending on the specific context of each 
study. We attempt to maintain the natural classification of women’s autonomy, depicted as the 
dependent/intermediary variable, as the framework within which we discuss evidence from the 
existing studies. 
 
2.3.1. Women’s Autonomy as a Dependent Variable 
Studies considering women’s autonomy as dependent variables focus on searching for the 
appropriate factors which may determine and explain the process of women’s autonomy within 
different aspects of household decision-making. For instance, Hashmi et al. (1996) finds within 
Bangladesh, extending microcredit to women leads to an increase of their autonomy in the 
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household. Further, the above study claims that these empowered women then improve their 
families’ wellbeing. In contrast with this evidence, Goetz and Gupta (1996) find microcredit did 
not empower women in Bangladesh. This is because loans extended to women are mostly 
controlled by men, therefore loans remain an ineffective source to increasing women’s 
autonomy in Bangladesh. Similarly, Kabeer (1998) also finds that microcredit did not appear to 
increase women’s autonomy. According to this study, microcredit decreased women’s 
autonomy in general, due specifically to the hard trade-off between different dimensions of 
women’s autonomy. Similarly, Mayoux (2001) observes that women from relatively poor 
family backgrounds have no access to microcredit loans, hence the facility of microcredit has 
little association with women’s level of autonomy in the household. Further, a large number of 
studies2 indicate that working outside of the household for an independent income increases 
women’s autonomy in the household. Another strand of empirical studies3 observes that the 
social and financial status of a woman’s family influences the level of her household autonomy. 
However, some of the studies 4  have emphasised the individual characteristics of women, 
including age and education, as vital determinants of autonomy in the household. In a similar 
fashion, some studies consider inter-spousal level of education, skill and income level to be 
substantially associated with the relative power of women’s decision-making after marriage.  
 A study of the literature revealed most of them focused on women’s autonomy within a 
specific context of analysis. The cited studies are country specific, sector specific, time specific 
and/or specific regarding the dimension of autonomy. Furthermore, all these studies measure 
autonomy by using indirect measures at the level of the individual. For these reasons, it is 
inadvisable to make too many comparisons between them, and ultimately, conclusions. 
Conversely, we observed within these studies a set of common determinants with varying 
effects on autonomy, and contradictory conclusions regarding the effect of the relationship on 
determinants with autonomy measures. In addition, the determinants identified in these studies 
do not precisely account for the household formation aspect which may change the outcomes of 
corresponding studies dealing with different dimensions of autonomy in the household.  
 
                                                            
2 See Acharya and Bennet (1983), Ackerly (1995), Grasmuck and Espinal (2000), Kabeer (1997), 
Malhotra and Mather (1997), Tzannatos (1999) and Winter (1994). 
3 For example, see Frankenberg and Thomas (2001). 
4 For example, Frankenberg and Thomas (2001), Jejeebhoy (2000) and Kabeer (1997). 
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Table 2.1: Autonomy as an Outcome of Interest 
Authors Location Sample and Design Independent and Intermediary Variables 
Indicators of Autonomy as dependent 
variable  Findings 
 Acharya and 
Bennett (1983) 
 
Nepal  478 women and 443 
men in 7 villages 
Market labour versus 
unpaid family labour. 
Farm management, domestic, and 
resource allocation decisions. 
Positive. 
Ackerly (1995) Bangladesh 826 loans to 613 
women  
Loan characteristics. Women’s accounting knowledge. Positive. 
Goetz and Gupta 
(1996) 
Bangladesh 253 women and 22 
men  
Loan characteristics. Women versus men’s managerial control 
of loan. 
Microcredit programs are not 
necessarily empowering women. 
Hashemi et al. 
(1996) 
Bangladesh  1,248 women  Microcredit 
participation. 
Autonomy in household and community 
spheres (mobility). 
Microcredit empowers women.  
Schuler et al. 
(1996) 
Bangladesh  1,248 women  Microcredit 
participation. 
Incidences of domestic violence. Domestic violence is less common in 
communities where microcredit for 
women is available. 
Kabeer (1997) Bangladesh  60 women and 30 
men  
Factory wage work and 
women’s. 
A woman’s perceived status in the 
household. 
Greater status in the household as a 
result of factory work, but men ... 
women factory workers are low status. 
Kabeer (1998) Bangladesh  50 women and 20 
men 
Women’s involvement in 
loan market. 
Perceived changes in women’s self-
worth, agency, contribution to the 
household, and confidence in community 
interactions. 
Microcredit has decreased the trade-
offs that women have to make 
between dimensions of their well-
being. 
Frankenberg and 
Thomas (2001) 
Indonesia  5,168 couples Relative status of 
husbands and wives at 
marriage. 
Control over cash, spending, and use of 
time.  
Status influences (positive). 
Grasmuck and 
Espinal (2000) 
Dominican 
Republic 
126 men and 75 
women  
Women versus men’s 
financial contribution to 
household.  
Household expenditure decision-making. Both gender ideology and reliance of 
households on individual’s income are 
important to autonomy. 
Jejeebhoy (2000) India 1,842 women  Women’s and household 
characteristics. 
Role in economic decision-making. Some dimensions of autonomy are 
more closely-related than others. 
                               Continued… 
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Table 2.1 (…continued): Autonomy as an Outcome of Interest 
Authors Location Sample and Design Independent and Intermediary Variables 
Indicators of Autonomy as dependent 
variable  Findings 
Malhotra and 
Mather (1997) 
Sri Lanka 577 women.  Women’s and husband’s 
characteristics. 
Control over money matters and other 
important household matters. 
Work for pay and education increase 
decision- making. 
Mason (1998) Pakistan, 
India, 
Malaysia, 
Thailand, the 
Philippines 
Women in 26 
clusters. 
Social context in terms 
of gender and family 
systems, and women’s 
and household 
characteristics. 
Household expenditure decision-making. Social context has indirect and direct 
effects on women’s economic power. 
Mayoux (2001) Cameroon 13 focus groups and 
in-depth interviews 
with women in 4 
provinces. 
Microcredit 
participation. 
Control over income, and development 
of collective social and economic 
activities. 
Using existing forms of social capital 
to channel microcredit limits benefits 
to women, especially the poorest 
women. 
Tzannatos (1999) Multiple 
countries and 
regions 
ILO data from 1950s 
to 1990s. 
Economic growth—
change over time. 
Women’s labour market position.  A rapid improvement in women’s 
labour market position. 
UNDP Human 
Development 
Report 
(1995;1998) 
Worldwide Synthesised national-
level data from a 
variety of sources. 
 Gender Autonomy Measure . The GEM reflects economic and 
political decision-making. 
Winter (1994) Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, 
Costa Rica, 
Honduras, 
Venezuela 
Analysed 
employment and 
earnings data from a 
variety of  national 
household surveys in 
the 1980s. 
Employers’ policy 
interventions in women’s 
formal sector work. 
Women's labour market position. Overall, women's labour market 
position has improved. 
Sources: Summarised from relevant studies along the lines of Malhotra et al. (2002).  
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2.3.2. Women’s Autonomy as an Independent or Intermediary Variable 
As discussed earlier, women’s autonomy has also been considered one of the important determinants 
of fertility rates and other aspects related to family and children’s well-being. More precisely these 
aspects may include fertility in terms of the use of contraceptives, a child’s health and wellbeing, 
household consumption and well-being, reproductive health and investment in development, as 
dependent variables.  
 Regarding the fertility rate variable included in previous studies,5 Abadian (1996) finds that 
increasing women’s autonomy reduces the fertility rate. In a different context, Schuler and Hashmi 
(1994), and Schuler et al. (1997) observe a significant impact on women’s autonomy, namely, an 
increase in the use of contraceptives, as a result of the microcredit scheme. Dyson and Moore (1983) 
find instead that kinship patterns influence women’s autonomy and thus the fertility rate. Similarly, 
Gage (1995) observes that women’s individual socio-economic status as well as autonomy is strongly 
linked to fertility rates. Along similar lines, Govindasamy and Malhotra (1996) find that freedom of 
mobility and women in dominant positions result in higher contraceptive use. Amongst others, 
Jejeebhoy (1995) investigates the wider set of data and finds that increasing women’s education levels 
decreases fertility by promoting women’s autonomy. Similarly, Kishore (2000a) and Kirtz et al. (2000) 
also observe increasing autonomy levels leads to decreasing rates of fertility. However, Schular et al. 
(1995a; 1995b) find microcredit has an insignificant effect on women’s autonomy and is therefore 
irrelevant to the fertility rate as evidenced in Bolivia.  
 In a different context, Basu and Basu (1991) find that increasing women’s autonomy leads to 
decreasing child mortality rates. Desi and Alva (1998) find similar results but highlight the greater 
role of maternal education in determining women’s autonomy and decreasing child mortality rates. 
Interestingly, Haddad and Hoddinot (1994) witness that increasing women’s income share in the 
aggregate income of the household produces a better physical outcome for sons (height and weight) 
but not for daughters. Kishore (1992) observes that female participation in the labour force has a 
positive impact on female longevity levels. Further, Kishore (1993) finds kinship structure and female 
labour force participation important in gender differentials of early childhood mortality. In the same 
vein, Rao (1998) refers to the finding that a woman’s autonomy in terms of income, education and 
increasing number of children reduces the incidence of household violence against her. 
 Some studies focus on the role of women’s autonomy within the context of domestic 
consumption patterns and the well-being of the household. For instance, Hoddinott and Haddad 
(1995), Pitt and Khandker6 (1998) respectively find that women’s share of income increases the share 
of the budget spent on food, and credit to women increases non-land assets held by women, further 
                                                            
5 For example, see Dyson and Moore (1983), Govindasamy and Malhotra (1996), Jejeebhoy (1995), Malhotra et 
al. (1995), Mason and Smith (2000),  Gage (1995), Kishor (2000a), Kritz et al. (2000), Mason and Smith (2000), 
Schuler and Hashmi (1994), Schuler et al. (1997) and Schular et al. (1995a; 1995b). 
6 Quisumbing and de La Briere (2000) also find similar results.  
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improving children’s educational well-being. Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) observe that women’s 
control over resources leads to an increase in expenditures on children’s welfare, however, boys 
remain the preferred gender. In a different context, Thomas (1990; 1997) finds that women spend 
more on human capital investments, for instance, favouring better nutrition and improving children’s 
health. In another context of women’s autonomy, Beegle et al. (2001) and others7 observe greater 
chances of getting prenatal and delivery care, subject to improved education levels and social status of 
women. Regarding women’s role in the development process, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2001) 
observe that women are more likely to participate if the leader of the council is a woman, and where 
care is taken that the infrastructure is relevant to the particular needs of rural women.  
 This section on the review of literature has observed that women’s autonomy, directly or 
indirectly, influences various aspects of well-being in the household and society. In general, we found 
the majority of literature witnessed a positive association between women’s autonomy and children’s 
welfare. Additionally, a large number of studies also found that women’s independent income 
increases their level of autonomy but reduces the fertility rate. It was also observed that increasing 
women’s autonomy can play a vital role in increasing investment and economic development. 
 
                                                            
7 See Wolff et al. (2000) and Hindin (2000). 
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Table 2.2: The Role of Autonomy on Other Outcomes of Interest
Authors Location Sample and Design 
Indicators of Autonomy (as 
Independent or Intermediary 
Variable(s)) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) Findings 
FERTILITY AND CONTRACEPTIVE USE 
Abadian (1996) 54 countries Variety of UN and World 
Bank surveys. 
Relative autonomy. Total fertility 
rate. 
Autonomy has a negative impact on 
fertility. 
Dyson and 
Moore (1983) 
India Indian census data from 
1971.  
Women’s social and economic 
autonomy.  
Fertility. Kinship patterns influence women’s 
autonomy and fertility levels. 
Gage (1995) Togo 3,360 women from the 
1988 Demographic Health 
Survey. 
Women’s individual socio-economic 
status and autonomy.  
Contraception 
use. 
Women’s autonomy increases 
contraceptive use. 
Govindasamy 
and Malhotra 
(1996) 
Egypt 7,857 women from the 
1988 Egypt Demographic 
Health Survey. 
Freedom of movement, weight of wives 
opinion in household and control of 
household budget. 
Current 
contraceptive use. 
Freedom of mobility and influence in non-
reproduction dimensions result in higher 
contraceptive use.  
Jejeebhoy 
(1995) 
Worldwide Reviewed multiple 
studies.  
Education, kinship structures and 
women’s autonomy. 
Fertility. Kinship structures affect educational 
expansion. Education decreases fertility by 
promoting women’s autonomy.  
Kishor (2000a) Egypt 7,123 women from the 
1995-6 Egypt 
Demographic Health 
Survey.   
Women’s role in household decision-
making.  
Contraceptive 
use. 
Decision-making and freedom of 
movement have different effects on unmet 
needs.  
Kritz et al. 
(2000) 
Nigeria 4,870 women from a 1991 
survey of women’s status 
and fertility. 
Gender context of community, women’s 
role in household decision-making, 
individual socioeconomic status. 
Desire for 
children and 
contraceptive use. 
Gender equity by province positively 
affects reproductive behaviour. 
Malhotra et al. 
(1995) 
India Populations of 358 
districts from the 1981 
Indian census. 
Active discrimination towards women, 
marriage system, economic value of 
women. 
Total fertility 
rate. 
Each dimension of patriarchy has a 
relationship to fertility. 
             continued… 
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Table 2.2 (…continued): The Role of Autonomy on Other Outcomes of Interest 
Authors Location Sample and Design 
Indicators of Autonomy (as 
Independent or Intermediary 
Variable(s)) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) Findings 
Mason and 
Smith (2000) 
Pakistan, 
India, 
Malaysia, 
Thailand,  
Philippines 
Surveyed probability 
samples of women and 
conjugal couples in 26 
clusters of villages or 
urban neighborhoods. 
Women’s autonomy in economic and 
reproductive decision-making (eg. who 
decides the number of children), 
mobility. freedom from threat (eg. 
whether there is domestic violence 
against women), couple communication 
(eg. whether couple has discussed family 
planning). 
Desire for 
children and 
contraceptive use. 
Gender stratification does not influence 
spouses’ agreement about number of 
children to have but does influence use of 
contraception, so that in highly gender 
stratified communities, husbands’ 
preferences have a greater effect than 
wives’. 
Schuler and 
Hashemi (1994)  
Bangladesh Surveyed 1,248 women 
following ethnographic 
research in 6 villages. 
Autonomy in household and community 
spheres: mobility (eg. number of places 
woman goes alone); economic security 
(eg. investments); decision-making 
power (eg. ability to make large 
purchases and history of domestic 
violence); political and legal awareness 
(eg. knowledge of name of gov’t 
official); participation in public protests 
and political campaigning. 
Contraceptive 
use. 
Microcredit empowers women. Women 
who are empowered are more likely to use 
contraceptives. Credit participation and 
autonomy have independent effects on 
contraceptive use. 
Schuler et al. 
(1995a) 
Bolivia Surveyed 363 women 
vendors and producers 
who received microcredit 
and 295 who did not, and 
conducted in-depth 
interviews with 30 women 
and 8 men on 
contraception. 
Autonomy in household and community 
spheres (eg. whether woman holds office 
in trade association, receives household 
help from husband, tolerates violence, 
and participates in traditional support 
networks). 
Contraceptive 
and modern 
health services 
use. 
Microcredit has no effect on autonomy 
(except leadership in trade associations), 
decision-making, contraception or modern 
health services use, perhaps because these 
are not the right autonomy indicators for 
Bolivia. 
Schuler et al. 
(1995b) 
India Analysed 50 life histories 
of self-employed women 
in Ahmedabad, including 
32 members of SEWA, a 
women’s NGO. 
Autonomy in household and community 
spheres (same as for Schuler and 
Hashemi (1994) above, except that 
indicators of mobility were replaced with 
indicators of sense of self and vision of 
future, eg. saving for the future, and self-
efficacy). 
Contraceptive 
use. 
SEWA is empowering women, but it does 
not translate into greater contraceptive use. 
continued… 
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Table 2.2 (…continued): The Role of Autonomy on Other Outcomes of Interest 
Authors Location Sample and Design 
Indicators of Autonomy (as 
Independent or Intermediary 
Variable(s)) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) Findings 
CHILD HEALTH AND WELL-BEING  
Basu and Basu 
(1991) 
India Census data 1981 along 
with qualitative data from 
1988. 
Women’s labour force participation. Child mortality 
and sex ratio in 
child mortality. 
Women’s employment leads to decrease in 
female child mortality compared to male 
child mortality. 
Desai and Alva 
(1998) 
22 
developing 
countries 
Children under 5 years old 
from 22 Demographic 
Health Surveys. 
Education. Infant mortality, 
height for age, 
and child 
immunisation 
status. 
Child health does improve with maternal 
education, but mostly because education is 
a proxy for SES, not because it empowers 
women.   
Haddad and 
Hoddinott 
(1994) 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
 Wives versus husband’s share of cash 
income. 
Children’s height 
for age and 
weight for height. 
Increasing wives’ income share leads to 
better height for weight outcomes for sons 
but not daughters. 
Kishor (1992) India Indian census of 1961 and 
1981. 
Women’s economic worth (eg. labour 
force participation), kinship structure 
(eg. relative female migration), social 
stratification (eg. percentage of landless 
farm workers). 
Relative child 
survival. 
Increases in development are associated 
with decreases in relative female survival, 
perhaps by enabling parents to exercise 
preferences for sons.  
Kishor (1993) India Indian census of 1981. Women’s economic worth (eg. labour 
force participation), kinship structure 
(eg. relative female migration), social 
stratification (eg. percentage of landless 
farm workers). 
Gender 
differences in 
child mortality.  
Kinship structure (culture) and female 
labour force participation (economy) are 
both important to gender differentials in 
early childhood mortality. 
Kishor (2000b) Egypt 1995-6 Egypt 
Demographic Health 
Survey. 
32 indicators of behavioural and 
attitudinal factors grouped into 10 
dimensions of autonomy. 
Infant mortality 
and child 
immunisation 
status. 
Different dimensions are relevant to 
different development indices. 
Rao (1998) India 177 women potters and 
130 of their husbands, and 
interviewed 70 women 
and 30 men. 
Women’s characteristics (eg. education, 
number of living children, individual 
income) and household characteristics 
(eg. incidences of domestic violence 
against women, and net dowry). 
Children’s caloric 
consumption. 
Domestic violence against women 
negatively affects children’s caloric intake. 
Wife’s income, education, and greater 
number of male children reduces domestic 
violence. 
continued… 
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Table 2.2 (…continued): The Role of Autonomy on Other Outcomes of Interest
Authors Location Sample and Design 
Indicators of Autonomy (as 
Independent or Intermediary 
variable(s)) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) Findings 
Thomas, 
Contreras, and 
Frankenberg 
(1997) 
Indonesia 5,168 couples from the 
decision-making module 
in the 1997-8 Indonesia 
Family Life Survey. 
Assets brought into marriage by 
husbands and wives. 
Gender 
differentiation in 
child illnesses. 
Sons of women with higher assets at 
marriage are less likely than their sisters to 
experience respiratory disorders. 
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION AND WELL-BEING 
Hoddinott and 
Haddad (1995) 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
 Wives versus husband’s  share and 
control of cash income. 
Household 
consumption. 
Wive’s share of cash income increases 
budget share spent of food and decreases 
budget share spent on clothing, meals 
eaten out, alcohol and cigarettes. 
Pitt and 
Khandker 
(1998) 
Bangladesh Surveyed 1,528 
households in 87 villages. 
Amount of microcredit to women and 
men and women’s control of resources . 
Household 
consumption. 
Credit to women but not men increases 
non-land assets held by women, male and 
female labour supply and boys’ and girls’ 
schooling. The impact of female borrowing 
on total per capita expenditure is twice as 
large as the impact of male borrowing. 
Quisumbing and 
de la Briere 
(2000) 
Bangladesh Surveyed 826 households 
from 47 villages in 3 sites. 
Women’s assets at marriage and current 
assets. 
Expenditure 
shares of food, 
clothing, 
children’s 
education. 
Wife’s assets have a positive and 
significant effect on the share of 
expenditures on children’s clothing and 
education while husband’s current assets 
have a positive effect on food expenditure 
share. 
Quisumbing and 
Maluccio (1999) 
Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, 
Ethiopia, 
South Africa 
IFPRI surveys of 826 
households , 114 
households, 1500 
households and 500 
households.  
Women’s assets at marriage. Expenditure 
shares of food, 
education, health, 
children’s 
clothing and 
schooling, 
alcohol/tobacco.  
When women control more resources, 
expenditures on education increase, but not 
equally for girls and boys across nations. 
Effects on other expenditures vary by 
region. 
             continued… 
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Table 2.2 (…continued): The Role of Autonomy on Other Outcomes of Interest
Authors Location Sample and Design 
Indicators of Autonomy (as 
Independent or Intermediary 
Variable(s)) 
Dependent 
Variable(s) Findings 
Thomas (1990 
and 1997) 
Brazil Analysed data on 55,000 
households from the 
Estudio Nacional da 
Despesa Familiar 
(ENDEF) Survey. 
Male and female non-labour income, 
total income, and women’s control of 
income.  
Expenditure 
shares, nutrient 
intakes per capita 
in household, and 
child 
anthropometric 
outcomes. 
Women’s income is spent more on human 
capital investments and is associated with 
greater nutrient intake and better child 
health.  
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 
Beegle, 
Frankenberg 
and Thomas 
(2001) 
Indonesia Analysed data on about 
2,000 couples from the 
1997-8 Indonesia Family 
Life survey. 
Women’s characteristics (eg. individual 
assets, education, social status of family 
of origin, and education of father). 
Prenatal care and 
hospital delivery. 
Individual assets, education, and social 
status of a woman increase her chances of 
getting prenatal and delivery care. 
Wolff et al. 
(2000) 
Uganda Surveyed 1,356 women 
and their stable partners 
and conducted 34 focus 
groups with women and 
men in 2 districts. 
Negotiation and discussion of sex 
between partners. 
Condom use. The influence of marriage and women’s 
work varies by district, but education and 
urban residence consistently enhance 
women’s negotiating abilities. 
INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPMENT 
Chattopadhyay 
and Duflo 
(2001) 
India Surveyed 1/3 of all 
women councillors in 161 
village councils and 
interviewed villagers in 
one village from each of 3 
village council areas in 
Birbhum district, West 
Bengal. 
Women’s participation in village council 
(eg. questions, requests, and complaints 
from women at the village council). 
Public goods 
investment in 
roads, drinking 
water, fuel 
equipment, 
education, and 
health. 
Women are more likely to participate if the 
leader of the council is a woman and invest 
more in infrastructure that is directly 
relevant to rural women’s needs (water, 
fuel, health, roads, etc.); men invest more 
in education. 
Sources: Summarised from relevant studies along the lines of Malhotra et al. (2002). 
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2.4. Gaps in the Literature and Remedies  
Given the strengths and limitations of various studies included in the review on this subject, we may 
claim to improve on the existing literature in four main dimensions. These are: measurements of 
autonomy; framework of analysis; identification of appropriate determinants relevant with the 
autonomy and appropriate methods of estimations. 
A close look through the existing literature reflects that women’s autonomy has not been 
measured effectively to adequately gauge women’s decision-making power in the household. Most of 
the studies reviewed capture some portion of autonomy or attempt to measure it indirectly by using 
different proxies of autonomy. Therefore, forced measures of women’s autonomy have mostly 
appeared significantly correlated with a wider range of other factors (called determinants) as observed 
in several previous studies. However, the causal relationship (between autonomy and its determinants) 
remains ambiguous in adequately identifying appropriate determinants of women’s autonomy. The 
main reason for this limitation appears to be the data availability on that scale of issue. We overcome 
this issue, however, by using direct measures of women’s autonomy, captured as the involvement of 
women in various decision-making aspects in the household. 8  The data allows us to include a 
relatively wider range of decision-making aspects including economic decision-making and family 
planning decision-making, relative to other individuals in the household. Further, the data also allows 
us to investigate these measures at the household level instead of aggregated measures of autonomy 
which has frequently been used in the previous literature. 
Secondly, we attempt to introduce an encompassing framework of analysis by identifying the 
relevant threat options which may determine the level of women’s bargaining power in the 
household.9 For example, in addition to the earned income threat option of women, we introduce 
various formulations of household size which enormously influence the consumption and production-
related behaviours in the household. Further, along with the threat options we include determinants 
capturing cultural backgrounds including household formations and family status to investigate their 
role in determining women’s autonomy in the household. This aspect has seldom been discussed in 
the previous empirical literature on the subject. In the past, most of the studies we reviewed suffered 
in the helm of contextual debate. For instance, regarding the effect of microcredit extensions to 
women in Bangladesh, some of the studies show this as an effective determinant of women’s 
autonomy whereas some reflect it as irrelevant. Similarly, some of the studies appear to support the 
conclusion that earned income increases autonomy, whereas others consider cultural factors to be 
more relevant to women’s autonomy in the household.      
 Thirdly, we also improve on the existing methods of empirical analysis by incorporating the 
modified version of a multinomial logistic technique to investigate interesting research questions 
                                                            
8 Detailed discussion is provided in Chapter 4. 
9 See Chapter 3 which provides a complete framework of analysis. 
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which have not previously been addressed.10 Previous studies frequently use ordinary least squares 
methods or simple logit regression settings to estimate women’s autonomy, which is mostly a discrete 
or ordered variable. These methods of estimations are sensitive to the nature of the variable of interest 
and usually give misleading results if corresponding assumptions are violated. Further, the ordered 
nature of women’s autonomy index requires caution to ensure the partial effects of co-factors remain 
constant in ordered logistic estimations. However, we rarely find any study taking care of this aspect 
in estimations. This thesis, however, does take care of this aspect and presents detailed discussion by 
utilising appropriate methods of estimations in the empirical analysis. Fourth, we present empirical 
evidence on both aggregated and disaggregated levels of multidimensional autonomy for the overall 
sample as well as the urban and rural regions.11 
 
2.5. Concluding Remarks  
This Chapter has classified the existing literature on this subject into two main categories, respectively 
economics and other disciplines including demography, sociology and anthropology studies. 
Economic household decision-making theory highlights the concept of threat options linked with the 
bargaining power of spouses within various aspects of household decision-making. On the other hand, 
the other disciplines link women’s autonomy with resource asset controls and cultural factors 
prevalent in the specific context of analysis. 
 Correspondingly, over time the literature has offered mixed results on the determinants of 
women’s autonomy. In other words, we infer from these studies that women’s autonomy is a 
contextual phenomenon and consequently there may be a complex number of indicators determining 
women’s autonomy. This is largely due to the fact that most of the studies have relied on the indirect 
measures of women’s autonomy, a strong indication of the lack of sufficient data available to most 
researchers. We have an advantage by accessing large scale micro-data information, based on the 
direct responses of women from thousands of households, allowing us to better measure the decision-
making power of women in the household.  
 Additionally, we observe that most of the studies lack an appropriate theoretical framework of 
analysis, hence results are based on ad hoc formulations of empirical analysis. We overcome this issue 
by introducing an all-encompassing model based on the fundamental analytical method offered by 
microeconomics, along with other cultural factors derived from multiple approaches of various 
disciplines. This model provides us with a better understanding of the causal relationship of women’s 
autonomy with corresponding determinants. Furthermore, we observe that many studies have 
relatively obsolete methods of empirical analysis which may provide misleading results due to 
violating necessary assumptions depending on the ordinal or binary nature of measures of autonomy. 
We overcome this problem by using a modified version of multinomial logistic regression methods 
                                                            
10 Chapter 5 provides a detailed discussion. 
11 Correspondingly see Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10. 
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depending on the validity of parallel line assumptions which has been mostly ignored in the previous 
literature.  
 Furthermore, we observe that most of the previous literature provides partial details of 
autonomy with the limited scope of studies. However, in this thesis we utilise almost all possible 
dimensions of women’s involvement in household decision-making processes. Correspondingly, we 
present the aggregated and disaggregated analysis from the stratified sampling data information which 
depicts an entire population of one country. We also include the state fixed effects to examine their 
role in the multidimensionality of the concept of women’s autonomy. This thesis, unlike many other 
studies, provides empirical evidence from an overall sample perspective, as well as from an urban and 
rural regional perspective.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 discusses the relevant literature on the evolution of women’s empowerment 
throughout various countries, and demonstrates the lack of adequate explanations as to the 
determinants of women’s autonomy 1 . Despite the attempt of empirical literature to link 
women’s empowerment to specific variables as the leading factors influencing women’s 
autonomy, most of these studies present ad hoc models which demonstrate a lack of 
understanding of the issue in general and which fail to answer the most important question; 
what determines women’s autonomy? Therefore, the identification of appropriate determinants 
of women’s autonomy remains unresolved among policymakers and researchers. This thesis 
answers this question by addressing the fundamentals of household compositions by including 
family formation, household composition evolved over time subject to various factors which 
may influence women’s autonomy in the household. It is important to note that household 
composition as a hypothetical determinant of women’s autonomy has been ignored in the 
majority of existing theoretical and empirical research on this subject. This thesis attempts to 
incorporate the missing link of family evolution in terms of household composition in 
association with women’s autonomy.  
This Chapter presents a conceptual framework by identifying the appropriate channels through 
which women’s autonomy may evolve in household decision-making settings. Correspondingly, 
it also brings forward the motivation of further empirical evidence of the determinants of 
women’s autonomy. Section 3.2 presents the basic theoretical model of analysis and makes 
predictions based on relevant propositions and corollary. Section 3.3 discusses the relevancy of 
data consistent with the theoretical model followed by section 3.4 presenting relevant empirical 
conjectures. Lastly, section 3.5 presents the conclusion of the chapter.  
 
                                                            
1 Eswaran et al. (2013), Eswaran and Malhotra (2011) and Anderson and Eswaran (2009) are exceptions. 
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3.2. The Model 
Women’s autonomy is commonly defined as ‘an ability of women to make choices and 
decisions within the household relative to their male counterparts’.3 Therefore it is relevant to 
note that the whole question of women’s autonomy becomes irrelevant if the household is 
perceived as a monolithic unit with a single decision-maker. The above argument implies that 
the conventional unitary model of household decision-making does not help to explain the 
concept of women’s autonomy at the household level. Folbre (1986) and Sen (1990) among 
others have suggested that households may be better modelled as conflictual (a state of 
disharmony) instead of atomistic to explain the concept of women’s autonomy. Therefore, 
bargaining theory is observed in the context of household decision-making as the main 
contribution of economists4 to the literature on women’s autonomy. The bargaining theory 
reveals that women can be empowered by improving their threat options (utilities) which ensure 
wellbeing to the women when bargaining breaks down with their spouses’. Consequently, the 
standard bargaining models assume that women may improve their autonomy depending on the 
threat options they hold, relative to their husbands. 
Therefore, the question of what determines autonomy requires identification of 
appropriate threat options in the conflictual scenario between spouses in the household. For 
instance, divorce could be the possible threat option breaking down of bargaining between 
spouses. However Lundberg and Pollak (1993) argue that instead of divorce, non-cooperative 
behaviour within marriage may be the relevant threat scenario. This could be the most 
appropriate characterisation in the developing countries of south Asia in general, and Pakistan 
in particular. 
Likewise, Anderson and Eswaran (2009)5 successfully establish earned income as a 
valid threat option which increases the bargaining power of women relative to their spouses in 
the household. They show that increasing earned income relative to unearned income, provides 
greater autonomy to women, and therefore claim that earned income is a valid threat utility, one 
that increases a woman’s bargaining power relative to her husband in the household decision-
making process. Recently, Eswaran et al (2013) indicated family status plays a vital role in 
determining women’s autonomy unlike the earned status of women from India. However, the 
above studies ignore the relationship of family evolution (in terms of composition) to women’s 
autonomy; a link which this study considers a significant factor in determining women’s 
autonomy in the household. The family evolution, more specifically the family formation, 
makes the distinction between nuclear and extended family systems (or the joint family systems) 
                                                            
3 As appeared in Anderson and Eswaran (2009) and others explained in Chapter 2. 
4 For instance McElroy and Horney (1981), Manser and Brown (1980) pioneered the approach; Chiappori 
(1988, 1992) presents a different approach to collective decision-making. 
5 Anderson and Eswaran follow Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) separate sphere model of household 
decision-making. 
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and further the size of household. The size of the household is precisely classified into two 
major categories referring to children and elderly persons including relatives of the husband 
residing at the same house. The thesis captures this aspect of family formation by introducing 
the size of the household as a threat option relevant to the bargaining power between spouses in 
the household, thus distinguishing itself from the study of Anderson and Eswaran (2009). In 
particular, household size has a significant impact on the decision-making process between 
spouses in the areas of household production and consumption. Accordingly, the modified 
framework of analysis in the non-cooperative settings to identify the relevancy of the threat 
option of household size to spousal bargaining power is presented. 
The size of the household effectively defines the quantity and quality of the production 
of household public good. Household public good incorporates care of the elderly and children, 
and all other chores conventionally provided by women in developing South Asian countries. 
This explanation is emphasized in the special context of Pakistan which shares several 
commonalities with other regional states in South Asia. In general, Pakistan like other 
developing countries exhibits a conservative approach to the participation of women in the 
labour market. It implies that traditionally, women stay at home and men participate in the 
labour market outside of the household. For example activities accounting for round the clock 
time allow us to monitor how males and females allocate their time in or outside of the 
household. The Time Use Survey (TUS)7 (2009) from Pakistan provides useful information for 
the time allocation of both females and males in different categories, typically known as the 
‘System of National Accounts’ (SNA), Extended SNA and Non-SNA8.  
The survey finds that most of a female’s productive life time is spent in housekeeping 
activities, however, they make an important input to the wellbeing of the household members. 
Participation rates of females in taking care of children, the sick and elderly (irrespective of 
marital status), is distinctly higher than for males. Interestingly, females who were ‘currently 
married’ had the highest rates, more than two times that of their male counterparts. Further, a 
female reflects many folds higher participation in the core household chores than a male. For 
example, female’s participation rate above male’s in cooking is 76 per cent, 62 per cent in 
household cleaning, 61 per cent cleaning utensils, 28 per cent in caring of children, 30 per cent 
in washing and mending cloths. However 7 per cent in shopping, 4 per cent in cultural and 
socialising, 3 per cent in mass and media use, 5 per cent in learning respectively less than that of 
                                                            
7 This survey was conducted during 2007 and published in 2009. “The results are representative at 
national and provincial level with rural-urban breakdown”, Time Use Survey (2009).  
8 The SNA activities consist of primary and secondary production level activities. The primary activities 
include crop farming, animal husbandry, fishing, forestry, processing and storage, mining and quarrying. 
The secondary activities refer to construction, manufacturing and other activities such as trade, business 
and services. Extended SNA activities incorporate household maintenance, care of children, the sick and 
elderly and community services. The activities related to learning, social and cultural activities, mass 
media and personal care and self-maintenance are included as Non-SNA activities. 
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male’s participation rate. Furthermore, 21 per cent work in establishment, 8 per cent in primary 
production and 5 per cent in non-establishment work less participation respectively compared 
with that of male’s participation rate. Regarding female leisure activities, for example watching 
television, listening to music, reading the newspaper, sleeping, eating and socialising show rates 
1.2 times higher compared with males. This clearly indicates the classified role of a woman 
within the household in Pakistani society. This explanation also broadly relates with Lundberg 
and Pollak (1993) formulation of the separate sphere model of the household, which has been 
lately followed by Anderson and Eswaran (2009) in the context of Bangladesh. 
Therefore, based on the TUS, the use of a females and males time according to their 
respective activities, can be classified. A married woman may routinely use her time one of 
three ways. Firstly, by producing household goods through household keeping and taking care 
of children and other persons in the context of joint family system. This may include 
participation in unearned/unpaid work, for example working on farms or managing some 
business which is solely home based. Secondly, by working outside the household and earning 
an independent income. Therefore, by providing a credible means of committing her labour in 
the non-cooperative threat scenario, the introduction of an outside work opportunity for a 
woman impinges adversely on her spouse's threat utility. Further, the distinguishing feature of 
household size has important implications on the household public good production and so on 
her bargaining power as another threat utility on her spouse in the non-cooperative scenario. 
Thirdly, by taking part in leisure activities. Analogously, males tend to routinely use their time 
in only one of two ways, which is consistent with the cultural norms in other developing 
countries of South Asia. Firstly, by joining the labour market, he effectively cuts out his 
participation in public household production. Secondly, by taking part in leisure activities. 
Consistent with this is the model of Anderson and Eswaran (2009), modified by 
incorporating the household composition in terms of family formation and size of the household 
classified into children and other persons. It is relevant to note that the current settings of the 
model offers broader perspective in terms of introducing two additional threat utilities which 
may influence the bargaining power in favour of females relative to males in household 
decision-making processes.9  
The utility function of a woman can be assumed as:  
 
   1 2
1
, , ln ln ln lnf f f f f f f f f
zU x z l x n l b n
n
          
   (3.1 
 
                                                            
9 However for the purposes of simplicity and tractability, all notations and common explanations are 
identical to Anderson and Eswaran (2009). 
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where ,fx z and fl respectively denote women’s private consumption, household public 
consumption and leisure. The ‘ 1n ’ represents the number of children, 
1
( )zln n is therefore the 
per-household utility from public good ( )z  and 1
1
( )zn ln n  the total utility of the household 
from the public good. This specification assumes that individuals derive utility from living 
together (marriage and having children as captured by the multiplication of 1n ). However 
household size may also be assumed a drag on the public good and reduces utility which is 
captured by the 
1
( )zln n  term. Further the term  2ln b n captures the wife’s preference for 
joint family system where 2n precisely refers to the persons other than own children living at the 
house. You may notice later that (b-n2) determines the effectiveness of wife’s contribution to the 
public good which decreases as n2 increases. The wife derives disutility from joint family 
system and vice versa when 0f  . Further notice that the utility function is still linear in 
endogenous inputs ( , ,x z and )l  as 1' 'n  and 2' 'n  are exogenously determined.  
As explained previously, time allocation can be classified into housework tasks and 
working outside of the house for an independent income, correspondingly it can be denoted by 
1
fe  and 
2
fe hence leisure is given as
1 21f f fl e e   . The above utility function can be 
normalized as; 0 , , , 1f f f f     and 1f f f     10. 
Analogously the spouse’s utility function can be shown as: 
   1 2
1
, , ln( ) ln ln( ) lnm m m m m m m m m
zU x z l x n l n
n
         
   (3.2 
 
where mx denotes husband’s private consumption and ml  leisure. Husband’s leisure is the 
amount of time remaining after labour work, therefore 1m ml e  . The term  2ln n  captures  
husband’s preferences for the joint family systems. Like the wife’s utility function, when 
0m   ( 0m  ), the husband derives disutility (utility) from joint family system. Similarly 
the preference parameters can be normalised as, 0 , , , 1m m m m      and 1m m m     . 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the wife provides labour ( 1fe  ) and the husband provides 
income ( my ), towards the production of the household public good expenses. Correspondingly, 
                                                            
10 Notice that 1f f f f       (<1) when 0f  (<0). This means preference for joint family is 
treated as externality.  This is appropriate as the last term is exogenous and does not play any role in the 
optimal solution. 
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in non-cooperative scenarios where a husband and wife specialize in their traditional roles, it 
can be assumed that a wife provides labour (not income) and a husband provides a financial 
contribution (not labour) in the production of the household public good 11 . This clearly 
demonstrates that women and men operate in separate spheres 13  and financial resources 
generally fall in the hands of men. This appears most relevant to traditions in South Asia and 
Pakistan in particular, where men and women have separate responsibilities.  
The assumption is that production function for the household public good uses the 
wife's labour and the husband’s income ( my ) towards household expenses. For simplicity and 
tractability it is assumed the production function is linear in its inputs as shown in the following:  
 
1 1
2
( , ) ( ( ) ), 0
m f m f
z f y e y b n e b          (3.3 
 
It may be relevant to note that the second term in the above production function shows the 
wife’s effective contribution to the production of household public good in the context of the 
joint family system. The above also amounts the availability of net consumption for the husband 
and wife in the joint family system. This specification assumes that the wife’s contribution to 
the public good is decreasing in the non-children family members. The more the non-children 
family members, the less valuable is her contribution to the public good. .     
 
According to standard bargaining models, the allocation of resources is determined by 
the threat utilities of each individual. Similarly, the allocation of inputs is determined by the 
threat option which is defined by the non-cooperative outcome within marriage14 in this model. 
To reiterate a point made by Anderson and Eswaran (2009), divorce is not the relevant fall back 
option in developing countries of South Asia. Furthermore, this thesis posits that in developing 
countries, women tend to have children as an outcome of their marriage, to deter the threat of 
divorce from a male counterpart. This is the key reason for identifying children (as part of the 
total household size) as a threat option of women, in the non-cooperative scenario within 
marriage. It is also assumed that both husband and wife follow Nash conjectures which imply 
that partners make strategic decisions regarding their choices in the non-cooperative scenario.  
                                                            
11 As demonstrated in Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and also assumed in Anderson and Eswaran (2009). 
13 Lundberg and Pollak (1993) provide convincing arguments about the general validity of the separate 
sphere model. 
14 As mentioned in Anderson and Eswaran (2009) who follow Woolley (1988), Lundberg and Pollak 
(1993) and Chen and Woolley (2001). 
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Eliminating the wife's budget constraint by substituting  2f f f f fx w e R p   and 
1
2( )m fz y b n e   into her objective function, correspondingly wife’s optimization problem in 
this situation may be produced as:  
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 
1 2
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2 1 2
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(3.4 
 
where ' 'fp is the price of the wife’s private good consumption and ' 'fw is the implicit wage rate 
she earns in her independent income earning activity. ' 'fR denotes a wife’s endowments. 
Analogously eliminating the husband's budget constraint by substituting 
 m m m m
m
m
w e R yx p
  and 12( )m fz y b n e    in his objective function. Correspondingly, 
husband’s optimization problem can be shown as: 
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          (3.5 
 
where ‘ mp ’ is the price of the husband’s private good consumption, ‘ mw ’ is the wage rate in the 
labour market and ' 'mR denotes a husband’s endowments. 
The assumed utility functions for each individual (husband and wife), marginal 
consumption remains positive, implying not to be zero. Therefore, to avoid zero marginal 
utilities, it is assumed the implicit wage rate ' 'fw  and endowments ' 'fR of the wife are 
relatively small compared with the wage ‘ mw ’ rate and endowments ' 'mR of the husband. 
The first order conditions (FOCs) under Nash conjectures for the wife’s optimization 
problem are given as: 
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Similarly, the first order conditions under Nash conjectures for the husband’s optimization 
problem are given as: 
 
   1 12 0( )m m mm m m m m m f
U n
y w e R y y b n e
               (3.8 
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U w
e w e R y e
              (3.9 
 
In the fully interior Nash equilibrium, all variables of interest (decision-making) are 
strictly positive and the four first order conditions yield equations that turn out to be linear and, 
solved explicitly. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is the solution to FOCs, 3.6 to 3.9 
correspondingly for 1fe ,
2
fe , my  and me such as: 
  
      1 22 1 2 1 2 10f f f f f f m m fb n n e b n n e y e b n n                (3.6* 
 
 1 2 0 0f f f f f f f m m f f f fw e w e y e w R                (3.7* 
 
 1 20 0f f m m m m m m m m m me e y w e w R                 (3.8* 
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The solutions to the above system of equations are as follows:  
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(3.10 
37 
 
 
      
     
2 2 12
2 1
1
1
f m f m m f m f f m f
f
f f m f f f m
w R w b n b n n R
e
b n w n
      
     
                  
  (3.11 
 
        
   
1 2
1
1 1
1
m f f m m f m m f f
m
f f m f f f m
w n w R b n R w
y
w n
    
     
                
  (3.12 
 
        
   
2 2 1
1
1
1
f m m m f f m f m f m f f m f m
m
f m f m f f f m
w w w b n R b n R w w n
e
w w n
        
     
               
           
(3.13 
 
Each partner forms his/her best response function depending on the contribution of the 
other. Therefore, a wife’s best response function may include a desire to increase the size of the 
household by having more children, however, increasing the number of elderly persons and 
relatives of the husband may neutralise this effect. Similarly, a wife’s best response may be 
greater time allocation towards producing the household’s public good as well as participating 
in the labour market to earn an independent income, depending on a husband’s financial 
contribution towards the household public good production. The best response of the husband, 
which mainly includes the financial contribution towards the household public good, depends 
on the size of the household, the wife’s contribution to the public household good and her 
participation in the labour market for earned income. The above assumptions regarding 
preferences and the inputs of the household public good production, the household size, a 
husband’s financial contribution and wife’s time allocation can be transformed as strategic 
substitutes between the partners.  
In the above scenario it is expected that both increasing income and number of children 
would increase a wife’s utility in the non-cooperative equilibrium. However the household size 
in general may reflect an ambiguous relationship with a wife’s utility depending on the 
dominant component of the household size. Referring to the basic asymmetry in method, it is 
obvious that a wife’s utility also depends on her husband’s threat utility.  
The following four propositions and one corollary observe the effects of an increase in 
earned income, unearned income and household size in the context of children and non-children 
members’ s spousal threat utility in Nash equilibrium settings.  
 
38 
 
Proposition 1: In the equilibrium,15 an increase in the wife's unearned income is expected to: (a) 
increase the time she devotes to the production of the public good, (b) reduce the amount of 
time she devotes to earning independent income, (c) increase her consumption of leisure, (d) 
decrease her husband's contribution to the public good, and (e) reduce the amount of time her 
husband works.  
In the following we present the proofs of proposition 1 regarding the different effects of 
increasing unearned income ( fR ) as a wife’s best strategy.
16  
 
Proof of proposition 1: 
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Consistent with cultural norms, the results regarding increasing a wife’s unearned income 
increases her time allocation in household public good production. Correspondingly, the 
increasing unearned income may enhance a wife’s private consumption and lower the marginal 
                                                            
15 A fully interior Nash equilibrium is assumed in all propositions presented in this section.  
16 All results (proofs) of corresponding propositions based on a simple method which strictly follows 
specified constraints along with utility optimisation problems. 
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utility. Therefore the increasing unearned income predicts two distinct outcomes; increasing a 
wife’s contribution towards public good production and increasing her private consumption.  
Furthermore, increasing unearned income also provides sufficient reason for women to 
stay at home and not participate in the labour market for an independent income. It reinforces 
the common effect of having greater leisure time allocation in association with increasing 
unearned income. Increasing unearned income increases her threat utility also hence less 
motivation for working outside of the household for independent income.  For example, a large 
proportion of women is homestead or working as full time housewives in Pakistani society. 
Likewise, higher unearned income or endowments of a wife have almost identical effects on her 
male counterpart. This implies that a husband also provides less financial contribution in the 
household public good production at the cost of his wife’s endowments. Correspondingly, a 
husband tends to decrease his working hours in the labour market to contribute in the household 
public good production and increases his leisure allocation. Therefore, the above effects can be 
differentiated into income and substitution effects in the context of a partner’s revealed 
preferences. 
 
The following proposition 2 corresponds to the increase in a wife’s earned income.  
Proposition 2: Similar to proposition 1, an increase in a wife's implicit wage rate is expected to: 
(a) decrease the amount of time she devotes to the public good, (b) increase the amount of time 
she devotes to earning income, (c) increase her husband's contribution to the public good, (d) 
increase the amount of time the husband works in the labour market, and (e) decrease the 
husband's private good consumption. 
 
In the following we present the proofs of proposition 2 regarding different effects of increasing 
earned income ( fW ) as a wife’s best strategy.  
Proof of proposition 2: 
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c) 
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d) 
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e) 
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Results show that increasing a wife’s earned income motivates her to allocate more time for 
working outside of the household for an independent income. Conversely the above effect may 
reduce her leisure time thereby increasing marginal utility from leisure and potentially 
diminishing her input into production of the household public good. However, more time 
allocated working outside the household may reduce a wife’s time input in household public 
good production. Results also show that with increasing earned income the private consumption 
of a wife also increases, thus providing more freedom to make independent choices. 
As a result of this, a husband would allocate more time working in the labour market 
hence requires more input contribution in household public good production. He may also have 
less time available for leisure. As more time is required in household production and working in 
the labour market, the result may be a decrease in private consumption. Therefore, in the non-
cooperative situation an increase in the earned income of a wife not only increases her time 
allocation towards work in the labour market, but also increases her spouse’s time working in 
the labour market.  
 
The following proposition 3 presents the effects of increasing the size of a household. 
 
Proposition 3: In the equilibrium, an increase in the size of the household (own children) is 
expected to: (a) increase the amount of time a wife devotes to the public good, (b) decrease the 
amount of time she devotes to earning an independent income, (c) decrease the total amount of 
leisure time depending on the proportionate change in time allocated to the public good and 
earning an independent income, (d) decrease the wife's private good consumption (e) increase 
the husband’s contribution to the household public good production, (f) increase the amount of 
time the husband works in the labour market, (g) decrease the husband's private good 
consumption. 
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In the following, we present results of proposition 3 regarding effects of increasing size of the 
household ( 1n ) in association with spouses contributions to the household public good 
production, private consumption and leisure.  
 
Proof of proposition 3: 
a) 
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e) 
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The results depict that increasing the household size (children) requires a wife’s greater time 
allocation to produce household public good. Correspondingly it lowers the time availability to 
participate in the labour market to earn an independent income, and also lowers time for leisure. 
Further results show that by increasing the household size, a wife’s private consumption is 
adversely affected.  
Along similar lines, increasing the household size requires a greater financial 
contribution from the husband towards the household public good production. Correspondingly, 
he may be required to extend the amount of hours he spends in the labour market. Further 
results also indicate that increasing the household size decreases a husband’s private 
consumption and leisure. Therefore, in the situation of non-cooperation, increasing the 
household size in terms of increasing the number of children requires husbands to contribute 
more financial input in the household public good at the cost of his private consumption and 
leisure. The results are clearly supported by the common observation of South Asian countries 
where there is a high dependency ratio. Interestingly, in this situation it may not be necessary 
that leisure time of wife also increases subject to increasing the household size provided that she 
is not working in the labour market for independent income.  In the context of South Asian 
countries generally and Pakistan in particular, most of the responsibility is associated with a 
husband’s contribution where women are mostly homesteads.   
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Proposition 4: In the equilibrium, an increase in the size of the household 2( )n is expected to: 
(a) decrease the amount of time a wife devotes to the public good, (b) increase the amount of 
time she devotes to earning an independent income, (c) increase the husband’s contribution to 
the household public good production, (d) increase the amount of time the husband works in the 
labour market. 
 
In the following, we present results of proposition 4 regarding effects of increasing size of the 
household ( 2n ) in association with spouses contributions to the household public good 
production, private consumption and leisure.  
 
Proof of proposition 4: 
 
It is straight forward to show that 
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From the above four propositions, the following corollary is drawn.  
Corollary 1: (a) An increase in the wife's unearned income increases the threat utility of both 
spouses, while (b) an increase in the wife's earned income increases her threat utility but 
decreases the husband's threat utility and similarly (c) an increase in the household size (the 
number of own children) may increase or decrease threat utilities depending upon the values of 
preference parameters. ; and d) an increase in the non-children household size ( 2n ) component 
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increases wife’s threat utility when she has strongly negative preference for joint family system 
and decreases the husband’s threat utility when his preference for joint family system is 
negative or not strongly positive.  
In the following we present the results of this corollary in connection with the effects of 
increasing unearned income, earned income, and size of the household on spouses’ threat 
utilities. The results show that increasing unearned income increases a wife’s time input towards 
household production thereby increasing her consumption and leisure. Likewise, it increases a 
husband’s private consumption and leisure thereby decreasing his working time in the labour 
market. 
Proof of corollary 1: 
From equation 3.4: 
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Notice the term  2lnf b n  which implies that the wife derives negative utility from the drop 
in her ability to contribute to the public good. 
From the above equation 3.4, we can write as:  
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Similarly from equation 3.5,
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From the above equation 3.5, further we can write as:  
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Proof: a) an increase in the wife's unearned income increases the threat utility of both spouses.  
Therefore, 
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Alternatively,  
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Since all terms are positive therefore  0m
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   is true. 
Proof: b) an increase in the wife's wage rate increases her threat utility but decreases the 
husband's. 
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We know that the numerator of  2fe  is a smaller number than this and positive, 
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
  is 
therefore >0. 
Similarly husband’s reaction to increasing wife’s wage rate is:  
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Since all terms are negative, m
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Proof: c) an increase in the household size will increase threat utility of husband and wife when 
the utility from one child outweighs the disutility from having an additional child and vice versa.   
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in the above equation implies the utility from one unit of
1 0n  . As all other terms are negative and represent the disutility from increasing the size of 
the household (including children). Therefore, 
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 >0 reflects when the utility from a unit of 
1' 'n   outweighs the disutility from adding an extra child and vice versa. 
Further; 
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Similarly,  
or
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This gives the same interpretation as we have observed in the above. Moreover, the above 
expression has an ambiguous sign, it is reasonable to assume that it will be positive as a 
negative sign would mean that the size of the public good is insignificant as the second term is 
less than 1. Assuming 1ln( / ) 1z n  , which is not unreasonable as it requires the joint 
contribution of husband and wife to public good to be non-negligible.  
Given the increased earned income of a wife, it increases her private consumption 
thereby lowering the contribution towards household public good production. Consequently, the 
increased earned income of a wife increases her threat utility. However, this lowers the 
husband’s private consumption and leisure thereby increasing his financial contribution in 
household public good production. As a result, the increased earned income of a wife decreases 
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her husband’s threat utility. Further results depict that increasing the size of the household 
demands a greater input from the wife to contribute in the household public good production at 
the expense of working for an independent income. However, depending on her preferences, she 
may still be better off by having greater leisure time by not working outside of the household. 
Similarly, increasing the size of the household requires greater financial input from the husband 
to the production of household public good. Consequently the above effect decreases a 
husband’s leisure and private consumption. Therefore, in the non-cooperative scenario, 
increasing the household size may lead to a lower contribution by the wife to the household 
public good production, yet increase her earned income by working for an independent income 
without decreasing her leisure. The time taken off from the household public good production is 
offset by spending more time earning an independent income. Conversely, greater time and 
financial input is required from the husband towards household good production by lowering his 
leisure. Therefore, in this particular context, a wife is better off and a husband is worse off 
hence the wife may have a greater threat utility over her husband. Therefore, in the following 
we present the proof of last part of the corollary.  
 
Proof: d) an increase in the non-children household size ( 2n ) increase wife’s threat utility when 
she has strongly negative preference for joint family system and decreases the husband’s threat 
utility when his preference for joint family system is negative or not strongly positive.  
 
From equation 3.4, 
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Further from the above equation 3.43,
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As 2n  increases the contribution of wife to public good decreases, outside labour and leisure 
increases and so the threat utility increases given the woman’s negative preferences to live in 
the joint family system which is common in the society under investigation. On the same token 
threat utility may decrease mainly because an increase in 2n  decreases the value of here 
contribution to the public good which also result in a psychological cost captured by f . In 
other words 
2
fU
n

 <0 when f =1 (negative preference for joint family is strong), and may be 
positive when preference are weak. i.e. 
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Analogously,   
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   are negative except 2
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, the husband threat 
utility is decreasing in non-children household size unless the husband has strong positive 
preference for joint family system. The husband utility is therefore decreasing in 2n when his 
preference for joint family system is negative or positive but weak. 
 It is essential to note that all four propositions in the corresponding corollary depend on 
the assumption of separate spheres as expressed in Anderson and Eswaran (2009). This 
assumption emphasises the conventional role of a husband and wife consistent with the 
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experience of most developing countries and Pakistan in particular. This implies that in these 
societies women are more likely to be observed working in the home whilst men contribute 
financially by working in the labour market outside of the home. 
Furthermore, the motivation drawn from the above bargaining model is maintained and 
some propositions in line with the corollary on the effects of unearned, earned and household 
size on women’s autonomy in different aspects of the household decision-making process are 
tested empirically. The empirical exercise may provide further explanation as to why increasing 
the unearned income of a wife may increase her time input to produce more household public 
good and leisure, thereby increasing her threat utility in both conflictual and cooperative 
scenarios. Conversely, increasing the earned income of a wife requires sacrificing some leisure 
which also increases her threat utility as argued in the above. Qualitatively, earned income may 
have a strong effect on the corresponding threat utility as it increases a wife’s private 
consumption whilst decreasing her husband’s. If either type of income is normalised, equal 
amounts of utility are expected. Therefore, the bargaining set-up does not provide a clear cut 
answer to the question; which type of income increases the threat utility of women? A detailed 
explanation is included in the empirical analysis of Chapter 7. 
Similarly, regarding household size, the above simple bargaining model does not clearly 
define which component increases a women’s threat utility. For instance, the theoretical model 
provides a general impression of multiple impacts on the spouses’ utilities, which refer to the 
ambiguous effects of household size on a partner’s utility. This is because preferences of 
different components of the household vary between spouses depending on the conflictual 
scenario. Conventionally, it is likely that a woman may experience greater satisfaction from 
increasing the overall size of the household, not by increasing the number of her husband’s 
relatives, but by having more children. However, in some situations, other members of the 
household may also be more useful and contribute in terms of financial assistance or time 
allocation in the household public good production. Extensive analysis of these aspects is found 
in the empirical analysis in Chapter 7.  
Given the above propositions and corollary, consideration is given to the fall-back 
position within marriage, as opposed to divorce, proposed by Woolley (1988), Lundberg and 
Pollak (1993), and Chen and Woolley (2001). However, if the fall-back position is replaced by 
divorce, a wife’s threat utility remains higher relative to her partner’s, subject to increasing 
earned or unearned income and the constant of the partner’s in the bargaining model. 
Consequently, this explanation does not suggest which route would provide more autonomy to 
women. In the divorce option, unearned income may provide a greater threat utility compared 
with earned income. However, the comparative statics clearly reflect that it is the wife’s earned 
income that records a higher threat utility, also confirmed in above comparative analysis. The 
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following discussion is concerned with basic empirical relevancy consistent with the above 
theoretical model which identifies women’s autonomy in non-cooperative situations.  
 
3.3. Empirical Settings 
Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) data is used to investigate 
the above propositions and corollary and address other aspects of the theoretical model. It is 
relevant to note that the above data set, like many other existing data sets, does not capture the 
non-cooperative behaviour of respondents in the household. Presumably, where there is less 
likelihood of asymmetric information between a husband and wife, a cooperative outcome can 
be assumed. Moreover, it is assumed the non-cooperative outcome is the fall-back position that 
hinges on the cooperative outcome. Another level of difficulty which is also mentioned in 
Pollak (2005) is to identify which ingredient of the threat utility may be exercised by the wife in 
the non-cooperative situation. Therefore, this issue requires some assumptions to be made 
regarding the observed activities of a wife and husband in the cooperation outcome, in the event 
when cooperation breaks down. Potential threat options are identified and analysed with the 
help of data pertaining to the cooperative situation.  
The issue is addressed by considering the employed status of a wife constant in the 
situation of breakdown of the cooperation. This also establishes the fact that the wife who is 
employed has the skills to earn an independent income by working outside the household, yet 
remains within the structure of a marriage. Further, given the strong urban and rural regional 
divide, the above explanation appears relevant to both regions. For instance, corresponding to 
rural region a wife working as homestead may resume working on the neighbouring farms in 
event of bargaining breaks down with her husband. The other relevant aspect is family 
composition including the size of the household, gender of children, the presence of elderly 
family members and other relatives of the husband living in the same house. Children may 
provide extra utility to their mothers as a credible source of bargaining in the event of 
cooperation. This argument is equally valid in the event of non-cooperation if bargaining breaks 
down. This is due to the continuing financial responsibility of the husband towards the children 
in the event of divorce. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that family composition in terms of 
an increasing household remains a valid threat option of the wife in a non-cooperation situation 
between spouses.  
Finally the discussion shows that both a woman’s employment status and her family 
composition may provide credible threat options in both cooperative and non-cooperative 
situations, analysed by using the given data set. The following section presents empirical 
conjectures derived from this theoretical model and further conjectures that are analysed 
empirically in the coming Chapters. 
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3.4. Empirical Conjectures  
Empirical conjecture 1: Employed women (those in paid employment) show greater levels of 
autonomy compared with unemployed women (with unearned income).   
In general the above conjecture may be similar to Anderson and Eswaran’s (2009) investigation 
into rural Bangladesh which concluded that earned income was a valid threat utility which 
increased women’s autonomy in the household. However, this study differs from the above 
investigation in two distinct ways. This study delves deeper and investigates the above 
conjecture from a general perspective as well as a more detailed look at urban and rural Pakistan. 
The analysis is further replicated for various dimensions and sub-dimensions of women’s 
autonomy measured on three levels; ‘no autonomy’, ‘partial autonomy’ and ‘strong autonomy’. 
Direct measures of women’s autonomy are used, unlike most of the existing literature on the 
subject.  
 
Empirical Conjecture 2: This conjecture proposes a link between household composition and 
women’s autonomy. This study classifies household size into two main components, a) 
consisting of elderly persons and relatives of the husband and b) number of children. The 
following is tested: i) how the size of a household plays a role in determining women’s 
autonomy; ii) whether the household size (excluding children) may lower women’s autonomy; 
and iii) whether the presence of children increases the threat utility of women thereby increasing 
their autonomy in the household. The following two queries within each of these parameters are 
also considered. 
i) How the size of a household plays a role in determining women’s autonomy. 
ii) How elderly persons, including a husband’s relatives, tend to limit women’s autonomy.  
 
The above aspects of family composition further motivate the investigation of the role of family 
formation on women’s autonomy. Two possible outcomes facing a woman after marriage are 
considered. Firstly, whether she finds herself in a nuclear or extended family formation where 
her husband’s relatives also reside in the same household. In general, it is expected women from 
extended families will have less autonomy than women from a nuclear family system. Dixon-
Mueller (1989) observes that the extended family lifestyle affords a greater chance of control 
over women by others, especially control of new brides and young women who are at the 
bottom of the gender and age hierarchy. By contrast, in a nuclear family the decision-making is 
much more likely to rest in the hands of the male head, and the next in line is much more likely 
to be his wife. It is hypothesized that women from extended families are less likely to be 
autonomous as compared with women from nuclear family systems.  
Furthermore, even if women are not living in extended families, the intergenerational 
obligations often imply that aging parents live with their married children. Dyson and Moore 
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(1983) observe that patriarchal kinship structures emphasize the intergenerational 
responsibilities of males to their natal kin rather than those of females. It is also commonly 
observed that a husband's parents are more likely than the woman's kin to reside with the 
conjugal couple. In other words, patriarchal traditions are more likely to be enforced in 
households which contain a woman's in-laws.  
The upshot of the above discussion and available data readily allows the following sub-
conjectures to be investigated. 
 
ii-a)  The joint family set up lowers a woman’s autonomy in the household.  
ii-b)  The presence of a woman’s in-laws may also depreciate her autonomy.  
 
Regarding other components of the household size such as the presence of children, the 
following conjecture is empirically investigated.  
 
iii) A greater number of children in a household may increase a woman’s autonomy at the 
household level. 
 
A number of studies have shown that boys in particular increase women’s autonomy according 
to the given cultural norms of developing countries. This belief is re-examined in depth by 
investigating the relationship between the number of children and their gender, to women’s 
autonomy. The relative number of boys to girls and vice versa is also investigated.  
 
iii-a)  single child of either sex (boy/girl) 
iii-b)  only boys but no girl and vice versa 
iii-c)  equal amount of children (boys and girls)  
iii-d)  boys greater in number than girls and vice versa 
 
A wide variety of control variables are utilised while testing the above conjectures. These 
variables include individual characteristics of women and their male spouses, such as 
demographics, level of education and income. Family socio-economic conditions are included, 
if associated with autonomy, making the distinction between poor, middle and rich family 
backgrounds. Regional traits such as provinces/states are included; four provinces (states) 
dummies are utilised to observe if geographical location has any significance in explaining 
variations in women’s autonomy. 
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3.5. Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter presents a theoretical framework of analysis identifying the appropriate channels 
through which women’s autonomy evolves in household decision-making settings. 
Correspondingly the earned income status of women, as also pointed out in other relevant 
studies, has been proven as a credible threat option that increases women’s autonomy. Further 
the above framework of analysis identifies another threat option which has been ignored in the 
literature; the relevancy of household size to women’s autonomy. This threat option carries two 
main dimensions related to household composition. The first includes whether elderly persons 
and relatives of the husband live in the same household, the second dimension relates to the size 
of the household, specifically in terms of the number of children. Where the overall household 
size increases in terms of elderly persons and a husband’s relatives, a woman’s autonomy may 
decrease, however, where the overall household size increases due to the number of children, 
her autonomy may increase. Consistent with predictions of the theoretical model of analysis, the 
relevance of these threat options is demonstrated in the basic simulations exercise.   
Additionally, other relevant determinants, including individual characteristics, spousal 
education and income level, family socioeconomic status, different family formations and 
geographic locations, are also considered in the model of women’s autonomy. Finally, this 
Chapter provides empirical conjectures corresponding to the threat options and other relevant 
determinants for further empirical analysis in Chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA DISCUSSION AND CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES 
 
 
 
4.1.  Introduction  
Researchers have frequently echoed the importance of adequate data information on 
interdisciplinary research issues. For this reason, we accurately measure relevant data on a wide 
range of variables to investigate the empirical conjectures developed in Chapter 3. These variables 
include social and living standards, urban and rural regions of Pakistan, different measures of 
married women’s autonomy, employment status, individual demographic information, a partner’s 
characteristics, size of the household including children and other family background information of 
women from different states of the country. We believe that the data widely known as ‘Pakistan 
Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey’ (PSLM) provides sufficient information on all 
aspects of analysis highlighted in Chapter 3.  
This chapter is divided into two distinct sections; the first corresponds to sources and 
characteristics of data, the second refers to the construction of relevant variables for empirical 
analysis. 
  
4.2. Data Characteristics 
We use data from  the PSLM 2005-06 in this thesis. The PSLM is comprised of a series of cross-
sectional surveys approved in 2004 for the period of July 2004 to December 2009.1 This extensive 
information was gathered through district-level and national/provincial-level surveys conducted in 
alternate years. The first round of PSLM was conducted in 2004-05 in which data on social 
indicators was collected from 77,000 households at a district level. The second round of survey 
series conducted in 2005-06 included the detailed income/expenditure module. This survey aimed 
                                                            
1 Discussion closely follows from survey reports and Khan and Awan (2011). 
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to provide detailed outcome indicators on education, health, population welfare, water and 
sanitation and income and expenditure. It was of great importance because it provided policy 
makers with information that has guided the development of national objectives. Consequently, it 
pertains to one of the main mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the poverty reduction 
strategy and medium term development framework in the country. Further it provides a set of 
representative, population-based estimates of social indicators and their progress under the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (2010). We utilise second round survey data (PSLM 2005-06) in this 
study to analyse the determinants of women’s autonomy in Pakistan. The survey includes 
interviews of 15,453 households corresponding to almost all of the socio-economic issues through a 
two-stage stratified sample design.2 
It is important to note, this survey represents the total population including urban, rural and 
other specialised areas of the country. Table 4.1 presents the number of enumeration blocks and 
villages in urban and rural regions.  All urban areas comprising of cities and towns have been 
divided into small compact areas known as enumeration blocks (of which there are 26,698), 
identifiable through a geographical map. Each enumeration block comprises of around 200 to 250 
households and is further categorised into low, middle and high-income group, keeping in mind the 
socio-economic status of the majority of households within each block. The rural areas consist of 
around 50,588 villages, gathered from the sampling frame of the 1998 population census which lists 
all villages (mouzas/dehs). 
The larger cities with a population 0.5 million and above have been treated as an 
independent stratum. Each of these cities has been further sub-stratified into low, middle and high 
income groups. The remaining cities/towns within each defunct administrative division have been 
grouped together to constitute an independent stratum. The entire rural domain of the districts of 
Punjab, Sindh and NWFP (North-West Frontier Province)3 provinces has been considered as 
independent stratum, whereas in Balochistan province, the defunct administrative division has been 
treated as stratum. 
 
 
                                                            
2 However, the survey does have some limitations. The questions asked in the survey are sometimes unclear 
to the respondents, for example, the question ‘Who in your household decides whether you should have more 
children?’ By including the word ‘more’, the question does not identify women with children, from those who 
do not. Similarly, codes for questions about decisions regarding purchases and consumption of certain items 
were very ambiguous (too many categories and some overlaps between categories), which may have caused a 
bias in answers. Furthermore, we have no information in this survey about the dowry which is a significant 
feature of women’s autonomy in Pakistan. 
3 NWFP is recently renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 
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Table 4.1: Number of Enumeration Blocks and Villages as per Sampling Frame 
Province Number of Enumeration Blocks Number of Villages 
Punjab  14,549 25,875 
Sindh  9,025 5,871 
NWFP 1,913 7,337 
Balochistan  613 6,557 
A.J.K 210 1,654 
Northern Area 64 566 
FATA  2,596 
Islamabad 324 132 
Total 26,698 50,588 
Sources: Extracted from PSLM (2005-06) 
A two-stage stratified sample design has been adopted for this survey. Table 4.2 describes the 
distribution plan of primary sampling units (PSUs) and secondary sampling units (SSUs). The 
purpose of this classification is to capture the variability in the entire population from all regions, 
including both urban and rural. A sample size of 15,453 households gathered from 1109 sample 
PSUs (consisting of 531 from urban and 578 from rural areas) may be considered sufficient to 
produce reliable estimates across all provinces. 
 
Table 4.2: Profile of the Sample  
Provinces URBAN  RURAL  TOTAL 
Primary Sampling Units 
Punjab 240 244 484 
Sindh 140 132 272 
NWFP 88 119 207 
Balochistan 63 83 146 
Overall 531 578 1109 
Secondary Sampling Units/Households 
Punjab 2790 3892 6682 
Sindh 1666 2107 3773 
NWFP 1049 1901 2950 
Balochistan 735 1313 2048 
Overall 6240 9214 15453 
Sources: Extracted from PSLM (2005-06) 
 
Selection of Primary Sampling Units (PSUs): Enumeration blocks in the urban domain and 
mouzas/dehs/villages in the rural domain have been taken as primary sampling units (PSUs). In the 
urban domain, sample PSUs from each stratum have been selected by the probability proportional 
to size (PPS) method of sampling, using households in each block as a measure of size (MOS). 
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Similarly in rural areas, the population of each village has been used to determine MOS for a 
selection of sample villages using the PPS method of selection. 
 
Selection of Secondary Sampling Units (SSUs): Households within each sample PSU have been 
considered as SSUs. From each sample village and enumeration block, 16 and 12 households 
respectively have been selected by a systematic sampling scheme with a random start. 
The main focus of this study is to investigate the determinants of women’s empowerment. 
For purposes of analysis, data from the section on women and decision-making was merged with 
basic demographic, education and employment information. There were 25,651 women aged 15-49, 
although 1047 women were not present at home at the time of interview therefore; they are 
excluded from analysis. The main analysis has been restricted to currently married women, which 
reduces the data further to 15,506 women in total.  
We now discuss construction of the variables, including measures of autonomy, threat 
utilities and other control variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
4.3. Construction of Variables 
This section presents a discussion on the measures of women’s autonomy in two key dimensions; 
economic and family planning. Further we describe a wide set of other variables known as the 
determinants of autonomy, including some key control variables.  
 
4.3.1. Measures of Women’s Autonomy  
 
Economic Decision-Making Index (EDI):  
The EDI refers to women’s choices and decisions when selecting and purchasing essential 
household goods, not only for themselves, but also for children and other family members living in 
the same house. Consequently, it measures the relative degree of autonomy of women at the 
household level. The EDI comprises four main components which a household may typically show 
in their consumption basket. They are: regular food items; clothing and footwear; medical treatment 
and recreation and travelling.  
The PSLM survey recorded the direct responses4 of women on a scale of ‘1’ to ‘7’, 
consistent with the cultural hierarchy in decision-making regarding each of the above four 
                                                            
4 The questionnaire gave women the following decision-making options; 1 = woman herself (if a woman 
makes independent decisions), 2 = head/father of the household decides alone, 3 = head/father in consultation 
with his/her spouse, 4 = head/father in consultation with the woman concerned, 5 = head/father and spouse of 
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components of EDI. For simplicity and useful analysis, the seven options have been merged and 
recoded into three categories; now known as ‘0’, ‘1’ and ‘2’, respectively known as ‘no autonomy’, 
‘partial autonomy’ and ‘strong autonomy’. The ‘no autonomy’ refers to zero involvement of women 
in making independent choices, ‘partial autonomy’ implies at least some part in the decision-
making process, and ‘strong autonomy’ corresponds to absolute independence in the decision 
making process. The four main components of EDI can then be assessed for the level of 
independence in women’s household decision-making against the three recoded categories above.  
In the next step, those four indices are collated into a single aggregate index called the economic 
decision- making index. This gives us a wide-ranging index with a minimum value of ‘0’ (‘no 
autonomy’) and a maximum value of ‘8’ (‘strong autonomy’). However, this wider range may 
reveal some complexities when interpreting the results. To avoid this, the index is further merged 
and recoded into four appropriate categories ranging from a minimum of ‘0’ (‘no autonomy’) to a 
maximum of ‘4’ ( ‘strong autonomy’). For example, if a respondent selects no autonomy in all 
dimensions, or partial autonomy in one out of four dimensions, her response is coded as ‘0’ and 
called ‘no autonomy’. Similarly if a respondent records a mixed combination of autonomy in four 
different dimensions, for instance falling in the range of ‘2’ to ‘3’, then ‘4’, and ‘5’ to ‘7’ we recode 
it as ‘1’ (minor autonomy), then ‘2’ (mid autonomy), and ‘3’ (more autonomy) respectively.  
Likewise, if the respondent shows full autonomy in all of the four dimensions, recoding it as ‘8’, her 
response has been recoded as the maximum of ‘4’ and called ‘strong autonomy’.  Finally, we 
collapse the five scale index into three categories of autonomy for the purposes of simplicity and 
consistency of analysis. The collapse is carried out as follows: the three varieties of autonomy 
(‘minor’, ‘mid’ and ‘more’) are merged into one category called ‘partial autonomy’ and the rest of 
the labels remain unchanged. This final index of economic decision-making autonomy ranges from 
the minimum of ‘0’ (‘no autonomy’) to a maximum of ‘2’ (‘strong autonomy’).  
  
Family Planning Decision Making Index (FDI):  
The FDI consists of two types of decision-making spheres in a family; the use of birth control 
measures and the decision to have more children. In this section we gauge women’s autonomy by 
focusing on the recorded responses of women to these decision-making spheres. The questionnaire 
provides women respondents with ‘7’ response options5 regarding the use of birth control measures, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the head in consultation with the woman concerned, 6 = head/father and other male members decide, 7 = 
other combinations of persons decide. 
5 These include; 1 = the husband alone, 2 = the woman herself, 3 = husband and woman jointly, 4 = mother of 
the woman or husband, 5 = nobody, 6 = menopausal/infertile, 7 = other. 
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and ‘8’ regarding the decision to have more children. The ‘8’th option hinges on the belief that it is 
‘in the hands of God’.  
 It is relevant to note that women who responded as ‘menopausal/infertile’ are dropped from 
the calculations, reducing the data to 15,302 observations. Similar to the EDI, we recode responses 
of the two FDI components to construct an index for efficient analysis. Initially the women’s 
responses regarding these decision-making spheres are coded into three categories, ‘0’, ‘1’ and ‘2’. 
These codes correspondingly referred to ‘no autonomy’, ‘partial autonomy’ and ‘strong autonomy’ 
in the decision-making process. The ‘no autonomy’ implies an absence of a say in decision-making 
with the decision possibly resting completely on the male partner or the mother-in-law. The ‘partial 
autonomy’ refers to some say in decision-making, such as a joint decision in consultation with other 
concerned family members. It may appear absurd that the mother-in-law is included in the decision-
making process but it is a frequently observed practice in developing societies. The third category 
of autonomy is ‘strong autonomy’ in which a woman makes the choice or decision independently.  
 Both the above components of FDI combine to arrive at a single aggregate index of family 
planning decision-making autonomy. This index varies from the minimum scale of ‘0’ (‘no 
autonomy’) to the maximum of ‘4’ (‘strong autonomy’). Along similar lines to the EDI, we 
reorganise the coding scheme to achieve four instead of five categories of family planning 
autonomy. Therefore we collapse ‘0’ and ‘1’ into ‘0’ (no autonomy) with the remaining categories 
left unchanged. Furthermore, to make this index consistent with the EDI, we merge the two middle 
categories into a recoded category of ‘1’ (‘partial autonomy’). As a result of this reorganization, the 
FPI becomes identical to the EDI, both measured on a scale of three levels with replicated 
meanings. 
 In the following section, we discuss the construction of potential determinants and other 
control variables included in the empirical analysis.  
 
4.3.2. The Determinants 
The theoretical framework as discussed in Chapter 3 identifies threat utilities as the main 
determinants of women’s autonomy in the context of Pakistan. These threat utilities include the 
employed status (earned income) and size of the household. In addition to women’s threat utilities, 
variables emphasised in the existing literature are also included as common determinants of 
women’s autonomy. These common determinants largely play the role of control variables in this 
thesis. Typically these variables include the individual characteristics of women’s partners, 
characteristics of the women’s family and some geographical divisions which may be relevant to 
consider in the empirical analysis. We discuss these determinants in detail.  
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Threat Options/Utilities  
A priori threat utilities (earned income and size of household) as defined above are prime 
determinants of women’s autonomy. Earned income means women who hold paid employment. 
PSLM data allows us to segregate women in paid employment from unpaid employment. Women 
who are self-employed, in independent businesses or associated with the private/public sector are 
classified as employed hence earning an independent source of income. Conversely women who are 
housewives, working at family farms or associated with a family business and are not paid for their 
services, are classified as unemployed. We construct a binary variable of employment status and 
code this as ‘1’ for employed and ‘0’ as unemployed for empirical analysis.  
As described in the previous Chapter, the size of the household has three dimensions. The 
first dimension includes all members of the household without distinguishing among children, 
elderly persons and relatives of the husband living in the same household. This is conventional in 
most developing countries and particularly in Pakistan where an unusually large household size is 
related to extended family systems. We construct this household size variable as, ‘below average’ 
(coded as ‘0’), ‘average’ (coded as ‘1’) and ‘above average’ (coded as ‘2’) measured as the most 
frequent value of data (Mode). The second dimension of the household size corresponds to any 
elderly persons and relatives of the husband. It is constructed along similar lines to the household 
size variable. The third dimension refers to the number of children in a household and is constructed 
slightly differently depending on the corresponding enquiry of research. The variable of number of 
children is classified by the child’s gender, coded as follows; ‘0’ (no boy), ‘1’ (one boy) and ‘2’ 
(two or more boys), and similarly for girls. It is also relevant to note that we further construct 
dummy variables of different combinations of boys and girls to test extra conjectures devised in the 
previous Chapter 3.  
 
Household Composition/Family Structure 
 Relevant to the household size variable we also include two different forms of family structure as 
determinants of women’s autonomy. These are the nuclear and extended family systems which are 
prevalent in Pakistan. We define the nuclear family or elementary family as a family group 
consisting of a husband, wife and their children. Similarly, the extended family or the joint family 
group is defined as including the extended nuclear family, consisting of grandparents, children, 
uncles, aunts and close relatives.  
PSLM data does not distinguish explicitly between these two types of family groups in the 
questionnaire. However, we construct this measure by classifying women according to these two 
family groups based on the above corresponding definitions of family types. This variable also 
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takes a binary formulation where ‘0’ refers to women from a nuclear family structure, and ‘1’ refers 
to those in an extended family group. Further, we also observe the presence of the mother-in-law as 
another variable which may influence women’s autonomy. 
 
Individual Characteristics 
Individual characteristics mainly include the level of education and age of women in this analysis. 
In Pakistan, we observe a greater proportion of women are illiterate or have never attended school, 
either before or after their marriage. Furthermore, we find women’s education profile varies 
between the rural and urban regions of Pakistan. PSLM data presents detailed information on the 
educational profile of respondents. Consistent with the prevailing education system, we categorise 
this variable into five levels of educational achievement. These are; ‘no education’(never attended 
school), ‘5-7 years education’, ‘8-9 years education’, ‘10-12 years education’ and ‘higher 
education’ (over 12 years), coded as ‘0’, ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ and ‘4’ respectively. The age of women 
respondents in the survey ranges from the minimum of 15 years to the maximum of 49 years. We 
divide this range into seven different categories with a gap of five years in each of the successive 
categories, coded from ‘0’ to ‘7’ respectively. 
 
Partner Profile  
The marriage market in Pakistan is relatively complex and involves several considerations in order 
to find an appropriate match. In general, we classify the marriage market into two categories, 
depending on the degree of involvement of other family members. These are commonly known as 
arranged marriages and by choice marriages. It is important to note that these marriages may occur 
within or out of the kinship domain.  
Arranged marriages, according to the norms of society, are naturally organised by the 
parents with the consent of the adult children being married. However parents’ opinions are final 
and may dominate the preferences of adults. In the arranged marriage system there exists the 
concept of exchange marriages frequently observed among conservative and tribal/rural family 
groups. This is formally known as Watta Satta (literally ‘give-take’) traditions. The fundamental 
consideration in these marriages is the public profile of the two families joining together through 
this relationship. The adult children’s characteristics are also considered in most cases. Unlike an 
arranged marriage, the marriage by choice may not necessarily occur within kinship lines. There is 
a greater chance that parents may not allow their adult children to make independent choices in 
selecting their marriage partners. Regardless of the above two structural marriage arrangements, the 
partner’s profile is an important consideration in that society. The educational level and income are 
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the most important elements of their profile. Therefore, we consider both of these elements in our 
analysis. 
With regard to the educational level variable of partners, we construct a classification along 
identical lines to that developed for women’s educational assessment. Likewise, the income level of 
the partner is classified into ‘low income’, ‘middle income’ and ‘high income’ brackets. This 
classification is based on the standard definition of income groups from the PSLM data. 
 
Family Financial Status  
Indeed, Pakistan, like many other developing countries exhibits different classes of society based on 
their financial status. It is usually observed that women from affluent family groups show greater 
autonomy compared with women from a relatively lower financial status. Therefore, we classify 
women’s family groups into ‘low income’, ‘middle income’ and ‘high income’. This classification is 
derived from the information given on household income in the PSLM survey. PSLM reports 
household income/consumption in quintiles for regions and corresponding states. PSLM groups the 
households with the lowest per capita consumption into the 1st quintile, those with a higher per 
capita consumption into the 2nd quintile, and so on. In the first instance, quintiles were derived 
separately for each of the eight major regions of interest (urban and rural regions within four 
provinces). There are three important points to be considered regarding the construction of 
quintiles. First, quintiles are labelled in such a way that households with the lowest per capita 
consumption appear in the 1st quintile and those with the highest consumption appear in the 5th 
quintile. Second, as these quintiles were derived separately for each of the eight regions, they may 
not be consistent and comparable across domains – for example households in the 2nd quintile of 
urban Punjab may show a different cut-off of income level compared with the same quintile of 
another province or state. Finally, quintiles were calculated by taking sampling weights into account 
to yield an equal number of individuals (not households) in all quintiles in each domain. We derive 
other quintiles by adopting the same procedure. In the final stage, we merged the first two quintiles 
as ‘low income’ group households and middle two quintiles as ‘middle income’ group and the 5th 
quintile as the ‘high income’ group households. 
 
Provinces/States and Regional Fixed Effects  
There are four main states also called provinces of Pakistan. We observe strong variations in 
culture, geography, language, living standards and economic well-being and other factors across all 
states. Therefore, we take account of these variations to observe their impact on women’s 
autonomy. Further, there exists an obvious division between the urban and rural settings of Pakistan 
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which has led to various changes in the lives of people from these regions. For instance it is 
generally believed that urban life is relatively fast-paced and provides ample opportunities to 
participate in the labour market, while rural regions provide limited opportunities. The basic 
differences between urban and rural life makes it essential to produce an empirical analysis of 
women’s autonomy for separate across rural-urban location.   
  
4.4.  Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter has presented discussion of the data and the construction of variables required for 
further empirical analysis. The characteristics of data including the methodology, sample size and 
relevancy have been discussed in detail, as well as the measures and determinants of women’s 
autonomy. The measures of autonomy are classified into economic decision-making and family 
planning within the household. Extended discussion has been provided on the nature and 
construction of these indices of autonomy including aggregated economic decision-making and 
aggregated family planning decision-making. Additionally, the indicators of sub-dimensions of 
autonomy are also pointed out. Furthermore, this Chapter provides a definition and construction of 
the determinants of autonomy, including employment status, individual demographic information, 
partner’s characteristics, size of the household including children, further family background 
information of women and geographical location. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EMPIRICAL SETTINGS AND METHODS OF ESTIMATION 
 
 
 
5.1.  Introduction  
There are a few alternative methods of estimation adopted by applied researchers in the field of 
social sciences. The use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Cumulative Approach 
Probability Models (Logit/multi-category Logit models) is commonly used where the variable 
of interest is categorical in nature. However, Park (2009) demonstrates that when a dependent 
variable is categorical, the OLS method can no longer produce the best linear unbiased 
estimator (BLUE); that is, OLS is biased and inefficient. Similarly, Cumulative Approach 
Probability Models may also give biased and misleading results if the proportionality 
assumption is relaxed and adjacent categories are ignored in the categorical dependent variable. 
Therefore, we cautiously devise an appropriate strategy of estimation in this thesis. We begin 
with the most frequently utilised technique on similar research topics, the Cumulative Approach 
(proportional odds model) Probability Models. We evaluate this approach on the common 
grounds of testing the proportionality assumption and the probability of interest depending on 
the construct of a categorical dependent variable. Finally, we adopt the Adjacent Approach by 
relaxing the proportionality assumption within the multinomial context of women’s autonomy. 
To the best of our knowledge, such a rigorous methodology has not previously been used in an 
empirical analysis on women’s autonomy. 
This chapter presents a discussion on empirical settings and methods of estimation 
consistent with the theoretical framework of analysis and the nature of variables respectively 
described in Chapters 3 and  4. The Chapter is divided into two sections. Section 5.2 discusses 
empirical settings by identifying the empirical equations of multi-dimensional women‘s 
autonomy. Section 5.3 presents a discussion on the methods of estimation adopted in this thesis. 
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5.2. Empirical Settings 
The following discussion specifies econometric models of women’s autonomy in economic 
decision-making and family planning decision-making in an overall context, as well as in urban 
and rural regions respectively. 
 
Economic Decision-Making Autonomy:  
The aggregate index of economic decision-making (EDI) consists of four components (sub-
dimensions) as noted in Chapter 4. We identify five different econometric models to estimate 
the effects of different determinants of EDI and corresponding sub-dimensions of economic 
decision-making autonomy. Therefore the empirical equation can be written as:  
 
2 9
1 1
i ij ij ik ik i
j k
EDI T X u 
 
           (5.1 
 
where ‘EDI’ denotes the aggregated index of women’s autonomy regarding the economic 
decision-making aspect, ‘T’ refers to the vector of threat utilities identified as the earned income 
of women and household size and ‘X’ shows a vector of other determinants (control variables). 
The control variables are education level and age structure of women, educational level and 
income of the partner, family financial health and province and state variables. The 
conventionally understood error term is ‘u’. Parameters associated with ‘T’ and ‘X’ show the 
marginal effects or measures odds ratios ( ' '  and ' ' ) associated with threat utility and 
control variables respectively. The subscript ‘i’ shows estimates for aggregate, urban and rural 
results, ‘j’ and ‘k’ refer to the number of variables included in the vector of threat utilities and 
control variables respectively.  
Similarly, we define empirical equations for the corresponding sub-dimensions of 
women’s autonomy in the economic decision-making aspect as follows.  
 
2 9
( )
1 1
EDI T X uF i ij ij ik ik i
j k
   
 
         (5.2 
 
2 9
( )
1 1
EDI T X uC i ij ij ik ik i
j k
   
 
         (5.3 
 
2 9
( )
1 1
EDI T X uM i ij ij ik ik i
j k
   
 
        (5.4 
71 
 
 
2 9
( )
1 1
EDI T X uR i ij ij ik ik i
j k
   
 
         (5.5 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, ,
F C M R
EDI EDI EDI and EDI represent decision-making in food, clothing and footwear, 
medical and recreational related decisions at the household level. All other notations have the 
same meanings as explained previously.   
 
Family Planning Decision-Making Autonomy: 
Similar to economic decision-making, we define empirical equations of family planning 
decision-making along with the sub-dimensions of autonomy as follows. It is relevant to note 
that the determinants remain unchanged in family planning decision-making autonomy as 
observed in economic decision-making.  
 
2 9
1 1
FDI T X ui ij ij ik ik i
j k
   
 
         (5.6 
 
Therefore, ‘FDI’ represents the aggregate index of family planning decision-making and the rest 
of the notations, variables and subscripts carry the same meanings as described previously.  
Similarly, we define empirical equations for the corresponding sub-dimensions of 
family planning decision-making autonomy as follows.  
 
2 9
( )
1 1
FDI T X uMC i ij ij ik ik i
j k
   
 
        (5.7 
 
2 9
( )
1 1
FDI T X uBC i ij ij ik ik i
j k
   
 
        (5.8 
 
( ) ( )
,
MC BC
FDI and FDI represent having more children and birth control related decisions-making 
women autonomy of family planning. The remaining notations, variables and subscripts carry 
the same meanings as defined above.  
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5.3. Methods of Estimation 
The appropriate method of estimation is crucially important in any empirical analysis. Most 
studies exploit different methods of estimation on related empirical investigations and lack 
consensus regarding the use of any single method of estimation. In this thesis, however, we try 
to utilise multiple relevant techniques to arrive at the most appropriate technique of estimation 
based on the nature of the relevant variables and in keeping with the research goals defined in 
Chapter 3. These methods mainly include descriptive and multinomial procedures. The 
following discussion looks at the relevant methods we adopt in the empirical investigation.  
 
5.3.1. Descriptive and Bivariate Method 
The descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis are presented as a pre-multivariate analysis in 
this thesis. Where appropriate, in the descriptive statistics, we utilise averages, standard 
deviations and frequency distribution to understand the behaviour of different variables included 
in the empirical analysis.  
Regarding bivariate analysis, we utilise the non-parametric test known as the chi-square 
test to observe the correlation between women’s autonomy and the corresponding determinants. 
As the autonomy measures are classificatory in nature, the above test may be considered the 
most appropriate test to gauge the association between those variables. The chi-square test can 
be written as: 
 
2
2
( exp )
exp
observerd frequencies ected frequencies
ected frequencies


        
 
The chi-square test assumes a random sample, frequency form, observations which are 
independent of each other, a sufficiently large sample size and observed frequencies equal to the 
expected frequencies. We formulate the null hypothesis as 
0 1 2 3
:H P P P   which 
describes that the proportion of women in each category of autonomy (defined in three levels) is 
the same in association with the corresponding determinants.  
 
5.3.2. Multivariate Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the autonomy measures are categorical in nature and can be strictly 
ordered across different levels of autonomy. The prime objective of this research is to 
investigate the relative importance of different determinants on women’s autonomy where 
autonomy is measured in adjacent categories, typically called ‘no autonomy’, ‘partial autonomy’ 
and ‘strong autonomy’. Specifically, we attempt to estimate the effect of different determinants 
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on adjacent categories of autonomy. Furthermore, we expect that coefficients of some 
determinants (also called factors) may revise their values across adjacent categories of 
autonomy as shown in the section on empirical settings. Ordered logit models may provide the 
most appropriate techniques, in keeping with the stated objectives of empirical analysis. 
Broadly, ordered logit models can be classified into three main approaches depending on the 
probabilities of interest and application of the proportional odd ratio. These approaches are 
commonly known as the cumulative, stage and adjacent approach. These approaches differ in 
terms of probabilities of interest and the type of odds ratio used. The Cumulative Approach 
considers only two categories of the ‘multiple category outcomes’ variable and is widely used in 
sociological research. The Stage Approach considers strict irreversibility in the adjacent 
categories of the outcome variable. However the Adjacent Approach allows analysis of adjacent 
categories and compares the probability of being at a given point compared to the probability of 
being at the next highest point. Therefore, the Adjacent Approach appears the most appropriate 
given the empirical design of this thesis. We also consider the widely used Cumulative 
Approach and comment on common mistakes committed by most of the previous studies on this 
topic.  
The following discussion details both the Cumulative Approach and the Adjacent 
Approach used for empirical analysis in this thesis by following Fullerton (2009) and Agresti 
(2007). 
 
5.3.2.1. The Cumulative Approach  
The cumulative approach is widely used in the field of sociological research. This approach 
splits the dependent variable into K-1 logit equations. For instance, the four category outcome 
variable (three categories of women’s autonomy in our case) corresponds to three binary logit 
equations, where in each equation the first category is coded as ‘1’, and the rest of the categories 
are grouped together and coded as ‘0’. In this case the probability of interest is the cumulative 
probability that is the probability of being less than or equal to a given category. This 
cumulative approach noted by Fullerton (2009)  is  comprised of three models based on the 
assumption of varying degrees of the proportional odds ratio. These models are formally known 
as Proportional Odds, Partial Proportional Odds and Proportional Odds with Partial 
Proportionality Constraints.   
 
Proportional Odds Model: 
The proportional odds model is frequently used in logit model for ordinal dependent variables 
and avoids assigning arbitrary scores for the categories. This model assumes that the cut points 
between categories are unknown. This model can be written as: 
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( )
log( (1 )
( )
p y k x
x k Kkp y k x
           (5.9 
 
where ‘k’ is a category, ‘x’ is a vector of independent variables, ‘τ’ is a cut point, and ‘β’ is a 
vector of logit coefficients. The signs (-, +) with the coefficient carry their usual meanings as an 
increase in ‘x’ may have a corresponding direction of effect on the dependent variable ‘y’.  The 
cut points are restricted in as τ1 < τ2 . . . < τK-1. Finally, the probability of interest for any 
given category (k) appears as:  
 
1
1
1
( ) 1,
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1,
1 ( ) ,
k k
k
F x k
p y k x F x F x k K
F x k K
 
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 


           
   (5.9 
 
where ‘F’ is the logistic cumulative density function (cdf), and all other notations carry the 
usual meanings as described earlier.  
The key assumption of the proportional odd model is that the coefficients (β’s) must 
remain unchanged across logit equations (specifically, across the categories). However the cut 
points (specifically the intercepts) change across the logit equations. It is essential to note that 
the proportional odds model gives biased results if the above assumption is violated. The 
assumption of proportionality can be tested by using the Wald test which tests the equality of β’s 
across the logit equations or categories as suggested in Brant (1990). However if the above 
assumption is violated, we may use the following alternatives. 
 
Partial Proportional Odds Model: 
The partial proportional odds model is an extension to the proportional odds model and used if 
the assumption of proportionality is violated. Therefore, the partial proportional odds model 
allows coefficients (β’s) to vary across the logit regressions. Accordingly, the probability of any 
given category (k) in the partial proportional odds model can be written as:  
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1 1 2 2
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1 1 1 1 2 2
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  
 
 
                
    (5.12 
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where ‘F’ is the logistic cumulative density function (cdf), β1 represents a vector of logit 
coefficients that is allowed to vary across logit equations, and  β2 denotes a vector of 
coefficients constrained to be constant across the corresponding logit equations, the other 
notations carry the stated interpretations as discussed.  
 
Proportional Odds with Partial Proportionality Constraints Model (POPPC):  
In case of violation of the proportionality assumption, Brant (1990) suggests the possibility of 
proportional odds with partial proportionality constraints for the coefficients. The coefficient 
may vary proportionally, which may be shown as: 
 
, (1 )k k k K               (5.13) 
 
In this model the logit coefficients (β’s) are allowed to change by a common factor k . 
Accordingly, the probability of any given category (k) can be shown, such as in the following 
equation: 
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  (5.12  
 
All notations in this equation carry the stated meanings except β3 which is s a vector of logit 
coefficients that do not vary, and x1, x2, and x3 are vectors of independent variables. It should be 
noted that the proportional odds model is a special case of the POPPC model where the 
proportional odds assumption holds for every independent variable.  
 
Generalized Ordered Model: 
The generalized ordered model is suggested as appropriate in Fu (2012), Maddala (1983), 
McCullah and Nelder (1989), where the proportionality assumption is still violated in the above 
models. The generalized model allows all coefficients to vary across logit equations. Therefore, 
in the generalised ordered model, the probability of any given category can be shown as:  
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In this model, all notations refer to the similar meanings as already explained. It should also be 
noted that both the partial proportional odds and POPPC models are special cases of the 
generalized ordered model where, (a) the proportional odds assumption holds for at least one 
variable, and (b) two or more variables change by a common factor (for the POPPC model. 
 
5.3.2.2. Adjacent Approach 
Unlike the Cumulative Approach, the Adjacent Approach allows us to estimate the probability 
of the adjacent category of the multi-category dependent variable. Therefore, when the 
categories are of a substantive nature as in this thesis, the use of the cumulative approach is not 
appropriate, as pointed out by Fullerton (2009). Similar to the cumulative approach, the adjacent 
approach also consists of four different types of logit models, discussed as follows. 
 
Adjacent Category Model: 
The adjacent category model is a constrained form of the multinomial logit model, noted by 
Goodman (1983). This model is relevant when the adjacent categories of the dependent variable 
are of particular interest. Similarly to the proportional odds model, the adjacent category model 
also assumes validity of the proportionality assumption. Among others, Fullerton (2009) notes 
the equation of the adjacent category can be written as: 
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k
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The equation for the probability of any given category in the adjacent category model form can 
be written as: 
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All notations carry the standard meanings and explanations as described in previous models (for 
the POPPC model). 
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Partial Adjacent Category Model: 
In the partial adjacent category model some of the coefficients are allowed to vary across the 
adjacent categories and the rest of the coefficients are constrained to be constant according to 
the proportionality assumption. Thus by modifying the above model, we can write the 
probability of any given category in the partial adjacent category model as: 
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All notations show similar meanings expect 1x and 2x where the corresponding coefficient 1
varies, however, 
2
 remains unchanged across the adjacent categories according to the 
proportionality assumption. 
 
Adjacent Category with Partial Proportionality Constraints: 
The ACPPC is another category of model within the Adjacent Category Approach which allows 
some coefficients to vary by a common factor ( ) through relaxation of the proportionality 
assumption. Accordingly the probability of a given adjacent category can be written as: 
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All notations show similar meanings and 1x ,  2x 3x where the corresponding coefficient 1
varies with the common factor, however, 
2
 varies freely across the logit equations and 
3

remains unchanged across the adjacent categories according to the proportionality assumption. 
 
Multinomial Model: 
The multinomial model is the final model in the classification of an adjacent approach of logit 
models. According to this model all coefficients vary freely across the logit models or adjacent 
categories of the dependent variable. Accordingly, the probability of the given category can be 
described as: 
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All notations are explained as in previous equations. The output of this model is typically shown 
in a series of comparisons or the adjacent comparisons. 
The multinomial logit (MNL), however, also suffers from potential problems 
specifically; the estimation of the MNL is subject to the so-called independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption—which roughly implies that it cannot matter 
for the results, which of the alternatives is chosen for the base category. Empirically, 
however, the IIA assumption is frequently violated—i.e., results tend to be sensitive to 
the specification of the base category. A remedy suggested for this is the multinomial 
probit model, which is not prone to the IIA criticism.  
It is important to note that the application of IIA property is neither relevant nor particularly 
restrictive in the context of current thesis. For example Jonathan and Rabinowitz (2008) through 
simulations show MNL (even in the absolutely unordered choice data) nearly always provides 
more accurate results than MNP, even when the IIA assumption is severely violated. The above 
study urges researchers to reconsider the applications of MNP models. Further Dow and 
Endersby (2004) also provide full length discussion on the advantages of MNL over the MNP. 
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5.4. Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter presents the empirical settings for further empirical analysis of women’s 
autonomy in the household, and corresponding methods of estimation adopted in this thesis. In 
the empirical settings, all relevant estimable models corresponding to aggregated economic 
decision-making autonomy and family planning decision-making autonomy, along with 
respective sub-dimensions, are presented. Furthermore, given the nature of the data and the 
main purpose of this study, an appropriate methodology of estimation is proposed by 
highlighting the limitations of conventional methods adopted in similar past research. This 
Chapter also presents a detailed discussion on the properties of alternative methods where 
corresponding necessary assumptions are satisfied. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This Chapter is made up of three sections. Section 6.2 describes the distribution of the 
multilevel measures of women’s autonomy for the overall sample and across four different 
states/provinces corresponding to the urban and rural regions of Pakistan. Section 6.3 presents 
evidence of the correlation between these regions and the varying levels of women’s 
multidimensional autonomy. Specifically it presents two-way ANOVA (analysis of variance) 
results to explain the relationship between regions and women’s autonomy. Finally, section 6.4 
presents a simple correlation or test of independence corresponding to each of the determinants 
on women’s autonomy in economic and family planning decision-making spheres, along with 
the corresponding sub-dimensions of women’s autonomy. 
 
6.2. Descriptive Evidence of Autonomy Measures 
Table 6.1 illustrates the proportional distribution of economic and family planning decision-
making of women’s autonomy across urban and rural regions of Pakistan. The lower to upper 
bounds are respectively characterised as ‘no autonomy’, ‘partial autonomy’ and ‘strong 
autonomy’ in decision-making at the household level. The data shows mixed results across 
different dimensions of economic decision-making and family decision-making, and the 
corresponding sub-dimension aspects of women’s autonomy. In terms of regional variation, 
women from urban regions show a relatively high proportion of upper bound autonomy (‘strong 
autonomy’) compared with women from rural regions.  
Overall data shows that a large proportion of women have ‘no autonomy’ in either 
economic decision-making or the family planning aspects of decision-making at the household 
level. These observations remain consistent across different sub-dimensions of autonomy, and 
across urban and rural regions of Pakistan. The overall index of economic decision-making 
shows 44 per cent of women have ‘no autonomy’, followed by 31 per cent with ‘partial 
autonomy’ and 25 per cent with ‘strong autonomy’ at the household level in the urban region. 
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Similarly, the rural region data shows 54 per cent with ‘no autonomy’, followed by 30 per cent 
with ‘partial autonomy’ and 16 per cent with ‘strong autonomy’. We observe similar trends in 
all sub-dimensions of autonomy, apart from decisions regarding food, clothing and footwear, 
where we find relatively higher proportions of women with ‘strong autonomy’ in the urban as 
well as rural regions of Pakistan.  
 
Table 6.1: Women’s Autonomy in Decision-making around Economic and Family Planning 
Aspects. 
Autonomy Indices 
Urban Rural 
No 
Autonomy 
(%) 
Partial 
Autonomy 
(%) 
Strong 
Autonomy 
(%) 
No 
Autonom
y (%) 
Partial 
Autonomy 
(%) 
Strong 
Autonomy 
(%) 
Indices of Decision-Making in Household Economics   
Food 2842 (48) 1180 (20) 1869 (32) 5644 (59) 1629 (17) 2360 (25) 
Clothing & 
Footwear 
2026 (34) 1422 (24) 2443 (41) 4898 (51) 2329 (24) 2406 (25) 
Medical Treatment 2549 (43) 2358 (40) 984 (17) 4896 (51) 3728 (39) 1009 (10) 
Recreation & travel 2855 (48) 2437 (41) 599 (10) 5210 (54) 3683 (38) 740 (8) 
Overall 2592 (44) 1826 (31) 1473 (25) 5133 (54) 2851 (30) 1521 (16) 
Indices of Decision-Making in Family Planning   
Use of 
Contraceptives  
1471 (25) 4100 (71) 243 (4) 3285 (35) 5847 (62) 372 (4) 
Additional Child 1688 (29) 3894 (67) 232 (4) 3663 (39) 5498 (58) 343 (4) 
Overall 1744 (30) 3837 (66) 233 (4) 3897 (41) 5323 (56) 380 (4) 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
Similar to the economic decision-making autonomy of women, the family planning aspect also 
reveals women’s autonomy is highly constrained in Pakistan. For example in the urban region 
almost 30 per cent of women identified with ‘no autonomy’, followed by 66 per cent ‘partial 
autonomy’ and only 4 per cent with ‘strong autonomy’. Compared to the rural region we 
observed 41 per cent, 56 per cent and 4 per cent respectively. These trends are also evident in 
the decision-making spheres regarding ‘contraceptive use’ and ‘having more children’, both in 
the urban and rural regions of Pakistan.  
 Furthermore, we investigate if there are any distributional differences among different 
levels of autonomy across the four different states and corresponding regions. Table 6.2 presents 
the distribution of autonomy across all four states and the corresponding urban and rural regions. 
The data shows that women from the province of Punjab appear relatively more autonomous in 
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economic decision-making compared to women from all other provinces. Similarly these trends 
also prevail in the sub-dimensions of economic decision-making. However, regarding the family 
planning decision-making aspects we observe mixed trends within the four states. Interestingly, 
data relating to the urban regions within the province of Baluchistan reveals a greater number of 
women with relatively stronger autonomy compared with other provinces, as well as the rural 
regions of Baluchistan. However, it is important to note that the province of Baluchistan is 
considered relatively conservative in allowing women greater independence to make household 
decisions.  
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Table 6.2: Women’s Autonomy in Economic and Family Planning Decision-making (Province/State level) 
  Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Economic Decision-Making Autonomy             
Aggregated  
No autonomy (%) 367 (15) 681 (20) 323 (21) 893 (38) 297 (27) 948 (39) 561 (70) 1122 (77) 
Partial autonomy (%) 1634 (67) 2202 (65) 1186 (76) 1453 (62) 745 (67) 1368 (57) 240 (30) 315 (21) 
Strong Autonomy (%) 420 (17) 513 (15) 42 (3) 6 (0.2) 71 (6) 103 (4) 5 (1) 29 (2) 
Sub-dimensions of Autonomy: 
Food  
No autonomy (%) 622 (26) 971 (29) 662 (43) 1420 (60) 910 (82) 1999 (83) 648 (80) 1254 (86) 
Partial autonomy (%) 586 (24) 751 (22) 410 (26) 588 (25) 75 (7) 168 (7) 109 (14) 122 (8) 
Strong Autonomy (%) 1213 (50) 1674 (49) 479 (31) 344 (15) 128 (12) 252 (10) 49 (6) 90 (6) 
Clothing & Footwear 
No autonomy (%) 440 (18) 857 (25) 454 (29) 1292 (55) 540 (49) 1564 (65) 592 (73) 1185 (81) 
Partial autonomy (%) 622 (26) 824 (24) 469 (30) 911 (39) 163 (15) 382 (16) 168 (21) 212 (14) 
Strong Autonomy (%) 1359 (56) 1715 (51) 628 (40) 149 (6) 410 (37) 473 (20) 46 (6) 69 (5) 
Medical Treatment 
No autonomy (%) 867 (36) 1475 (43) 628 (40) 1177 (50) 461 (41) 1099 (45) 593 (74) 1145 (78) 
Partial autonomy (%) 923 (38) 1151 (34) 687 (44) 1113 (47) 553 (50) 1180 (49) 195 (24) 284 (19) 
Strong Autonomy (%) 631 (26) 770 (23) 236 (15) 62 (3) 99 (9) 140 (6) 18 (2) 37 (3) 
Recreation & Travel 
No autonomy (%) 963 (40) 1588 (47) 743 (48) 1216 (52) 524 (47) 1230 (51) 625 (78) 1176 (80) 
Partial autonomy (%) 1008 (42) 1241 (37) 748 (48) 1115 (47) 508 (46) 1073 (44) 173 (21) 254 (17) 
Strong Autonomy (%) 450 (19) 567 (17) 60 (4) 21 (1) 81 (7) 116 (5) 8 (1) 36 (2) 
continue… 
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Table 6.2 (…continued) : Women’s Autonomy in Economic and Family Planning Decision-making (Province/State level) 
  Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Family Planning Autonomy 
Aggregated  
No autonomy (%) 453 (19) 923 (28) 263 (17) 493 (21) 106 (10) 446 (19) 528 (66) 1151 (79) 
Partial autonomy (%) 1861 (78) 2286 (68) 1202 (79) 1706 (73) 957 (88) 1856 (78) 218 (27) 294 (20) 
Strong Autonomy (%) 76 (3) 129 (4) 65 (4) 136 (6) 30 (3) 74 (3) 55 (7) 11 (1) 
Use of Contraceptives  
No autonomy (%) 512 (21) 993 (30) 291 (19) 580 (25) 109 (10) 480 (20) 559 (70) 1232 (85) 
Partial autonomy (%) 1800 (75) 2211 (66) 1165 (76) 1609 (69) 957 (88) 1825 (77) 178 (22) 202 (14) 
Strong Autonomy (%) 78 (3) 134 (4) 74 (5) 145 (6) 27 (2) 71 (3) 64 (8) 22 (2) 
More Children 
No autonomy (%) 611 (26) 1122 (34) 376 (25) 777 (33) 119 (11) 507 (21) 582 (73) 1257 (86) 
Partial autonomy (%) 1705 (71) 2098 (63) 1095 (72) 1424 (61) 944 (86) 1797 (76) 150 (19) 179 (12) 
Strong Autonomy (%) 74 (3) 118 (4) 59 (4) 133 (6) 30 (3) 72 (3) 69 (9) 20 (1) 
Source: Author's calculations 
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In Table 6.2 we observe that regions (urban and rural divide) and different states clearly show a 
skewed distribution of women’s autonomy in the household. We investigate the empirical 
relevance of states and regions to understand the role they play in the variations of autonomy by 
using a two-way ANOVA analysis.1  
Results of the ANOVA estimations are shown in Table 6.3. We observe a strong 
correlation between states and regions to the index of economic decision-making autonomy, as 
well as to the sub-dimensions of autonomy. Furthermore, we find consistently significant results 
corresponding to the interactive term of states and region (urban and rural) in distinguishing 
among different levels of autonomy in economic decision making aspect, apart from the 
recreation and travel related decision-making aspects of autonomy. Similar results are observed 
for the role of states, regions and the interactive variable of both variables regarding family 
planning and its sub-dimensions of autonomy. These results confirm why further empirical 
analysis of women’s autonomy must take into consideration the significance of states and 
regions.  
 
Table 6.3: Two-way ANOVA Results 
Autonomy Measures  
(outcome variable) 
Region Provinces 
Interaction 
(provinces*region)  
F-statistics 
(df) 
P-
value 
F-statistics 
(df) 
P-
value 
F-statistics 
(df) 
P-
value 
Economic Decision-making 
Autonomy 247.35 (1) 0.001 953 (3) 0.001 13.23 (3) 0.001 
Food 200.65 (1) 0.001 1563.37 (3) 0.001 38.36 (3) 0.001 
Clothing & Footwear 691.38 (1) 0.001 1686.61 (3) 0.001 87.03 (3) 0.001 
Medical Treatment 69.46 (1) 0.001 181.23 (3) 0.001 4.89 (3) 0.001 
Recreation & Travel 61.8 (1) 0.001 396.81 (3) 0.001 1.93 (3) 0.120 
Family Planning Decision-
making Autonomy 123.42 (1) 0.001 893.83 (3) 0.001 14.35 (3) 0.001 
Use of Contraceptives  142.39 (1) 0.001 807.35 (3) 0.001 10.56 (3) 0.001 
More Children 140.41 (1) 0.001 910.96 (0) 0.001 14.35 (3) 0.001 
Note: Observations 15524, RM 0.54 and Adjusted R-squared 0.17 
 
Table 6.3 illustrates the variables in women’s autonomy, in total and across states and regions. 
We further replicated the above analysis against the sub-dimensions of the two main aspects of 
autonomy at the household level in Pakistan. The following discussion presents the simple 
correlation analysis corresponding to each of the identified determinants and different 
dimensions of autonomy, before proceeding to the multivariate analysis in the coming Chapters. 
  
                                                            
1 The two-way analysis discussed in this section has a limited scope, therefore we do not intend to provide 
a full discussion regarding other assumptions and the statistical treatment required in the ANOVA setup. 
The main purpose of this analysis is to determine the relevance of states and regions to different levels of 
autonomy at the household level. 
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6.3. Bivariate Evidence of Autonomy and Determinants 
In this section, we present a proportional distribution2 and test of independence3 of each of the 
determinants across different levels of all dimensions of women autonomy discussed in the 
above.  
Table 6.4 at the end of this Chapter shows the results of the chi-square ( 2 ) test of 
independence association (measuring the association between nominal variables) of different 
determinants of economic decision-making autonomy (aggregated index) across urban and rural 
regions. We observe that the employment status of women is significantly associated with 
different levels of autonomy. Data analysis reveals 91 per cent of the total sample of women 
was classed as unemployed, a status that was inversely associated (in terms of percentage 
sample distribution) with increasing levels of autonomy. Correspondingly, the proportion of 
employed women with ‘partial autonomy’ was substantially higher, while decreases for the 
upper bounds of strong levels of autonomy. The household size indicates that women from 
smaller households have significantly higher levels of autonomy compared with those from 
larger than average households (52 per cent of the total sample). Consistent with this 
observation we observe that household size excluding children (refers to the number of elderly 
persons and/or relatives of the husband living at the same house) also exerts downward pressure 
on the autonomy of the woman within that particular household. Contrary to the above, we find 
that an increase in the number of children (regardless of the sex of the child) results in a higher 
proportion of women showing greater levels of women autonomy within the household.  
When considering family formation, we observe that women from nuclear family 
systems reflect greater proportions amongst the higher levels of autonomy relative to those 
belonging to extended family formations (87 per cent of the total sample). Interestingly, the 
presence of a mother-in-law in the household results in a lower proportion of women in the 
higher levels of autonomy. Age structure also presents interesting observations; the higher the 
age bracket, the greater the proportion of women with increased levels of autonomy. Similarly, 
women’s increasing educational levels also show a corresponding increase in the level of 
autonomy, relative to women with less or no education. For example, data shows that women 
with eight or more years of education will be proportionally stronger in the upper bounds of 
household autonomy. We also expect that the characteristics of a woman’s male counterpart, for 
instance his educational level and income status, will also influence her level of autonomy 
                                                            
2 Proportional distribution refers to the frequency of cases against each level of autonomy. These should 
be read from left to right within each row of the table.   
3 Association is statistically tested by utilising the Chi-square test of independence where the null 
hypothesis is that a corresponding determinant is independent of the autonomy variable. This test is 
commonly used when the measures are in nominal or categorical variables in nature. The 5 per cent level 
of significance has been chosen for decision-making. 
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within the household. Results show that a husband’s level of education and income status is 
positively associated with his wife’s autonomy at the household level.  
A more detailed analysis is provided in Appendix Tables 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.3 and 6.4.4.5 
The results detail descriptive evidence corresponding to sub-dimensions of women’s autonomy 
in association with the corresponding determinants. These sub-dimensions relate to autonomy 
around decisions regarding food, clothing and footwear, recreation and travel and medical 
treatment autonomy at the household level. Data shows that a relatively large proportion of 
women, along with given determinants, appear with higher levels of autonomy in clothing and 
footwear related decisions compared with other sub-dimensions of economic autonomy. We 
also note that medical treatment and recreation and independent travel are the most constrained 
aspects of women’s autonomy. These findings clearly indicate the presence of a conservative 
approach regarding the public exposure of women. Further, we observe that all of these 
determinants are significantly associated with all of the sub-dimensions of women’s autonomy 
in the context of economic decision-making. 
Along similar lines, we present descriptive evidence of the family planning context 
along with the corresponding determinants. Table 6.5 at the end of this Chapter shows how each 
of the determinants vary across different levels of autonomy. For instance, employed women are 
reflected in substantially higher proportions of those with ‘partial autonomy’ compared with 
women who are classed as unemployed. However, we observe a small number of employed 
women reflect ‘strong autonomy’ in family planning decision-making matters within the 
household. Corresponding to the size of a household, the data shows that women from relatively 
small households reflect more autonomy compared with women in larger households. These 
findings remain consistent with the other measure of household size, that is, the presence of 
only elderly persons or the relatives of the male partner in that household. The number of 
children, regardless of the child’s gender, appears to lead to greater autonomy of the woman 
within the household.  
Data also reveals that as the age of a woman increases, she has greater autonomy 
relative to the younger mothers in the sample. A woman’s level of education substantially 
increases her autonomy within the household as observed in the economic decision-making 
context. Her husband’s level of education, in contrast with the economic decision-making 
context, appears to play a greater role in the family planning context. Similarly, his income 
status appears to increase a woman’s autonomy within the household. Consistent with these 
observations, data also shows that women from more affluent families have greater autonomy 
compared with those from relatively poorer families.  
                                                            
5 All tables from Appendix Table 6.4.1 to Appendix Table 6.4.4 are presented in  Appendix-I: Descriptive 
Evidence 
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Appendix Tables 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 7  show respectively the descriptive evidence 
corresponding to the decision-making power of a woman regarding the use of birth control 
measures and choosing to have an additional child. Interestingly, the data shows that the 
majority of women reflect higher levels of autonomy in both of these aspects. Among other 
determinants, the earned income status and education level are observed to be highly associated 
with all sub-dimensions of family autonomy. Similarly, we witness that the increasing number 
of children also adds to women’s autonomy in all decision-making dimensions. Furthermore, 
we find all other determinants significantly associated with all dimensions of family planning 
autonomy, except the ‘presence of mother-in-law’, both regarding birth control measures and 
having an additional child and ‘family formulation’ in only one dimensions of having an 
additional child. 
 
6.4. Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter provides the backdrop for further discussion regarding the possible causal 
relations between women’s autonomy measures and the corresponding determinants. The 
discussion observes that women overall are generally constrained and presented with low 
degrees of autonomy in the household. Further, there exists a significant urban and rural divide 
with women from rural regions having less autonomy as compared to women from urban 
regions. The descriptive evidence also shows that women’s autonomy varies across the four 
different states of the country. The simple test of independence depicts a significant association 
between the identified determinants and all measures of autonomy. 
 
  
                                                            
7 Appendix Table 6.5.1 to Appendix Table 6.5.2 are presented in  Appendix-I: Descriptive Evidence 
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Table 6.4: Economic Autonomy and Determinants ( 2  results) 
Determinants Observations (%) 
Levels of Autonomy 
Significance 
(P-value) No  (%) 
Partial 
(%) 
Strong 
(%) 
Employment Status 
Unemployed 13879  (91) 35 58 7 
<0.001 
Employed 1440  (9) 17 70 13 
Household Size 
Below Average 5503  (36) 24 65 11 
<0.001 Average 1908  (12) 30 60 10 
Above Average 7908  (52) 41 54 5 
Household Size 
Excluding Children 
Below Average 5823  (38) 24 66 10 
<0.001 Average 2229  (15) 34 58 8 
Above Average 7267  (47) 41 54 5 
Number of Sons 
No son 3796  (25) 40 54 6 
<0.001 1 son 3727  (24) 34 58 8 
2 & more sons 7796  (51) 30 62 8 
Number of 
Daughters 
No daughter 4226  (28) 40 54 6 
<0.001 1 daughter 4087  (27) 33 59 8 
2 & more daughters 7006  (46) 29 62 9 
Family Formation 
Nuclear 1981  (13) 23 66 11 
<0.001 
Extended 13338  (87) 35 58 7 
Mother-in-Law 
Present 15168  (99) 33 59 8 
<0.001 
Not Present 151  (1) 57 36 7 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 781  (5) 52 46 2 
<0.001 
20-24 years 2504  (16) 45 52 3 
25-29 years 3184  (21) 36 57 7 
30-34 years 2655  (17) 33 60 7 
35-39 years 2642  (17) 26 63 11 
40-44 years 2086  (14) 25 64 11 
45-49 years 1467  (10) 27 62 11 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 10792  (70) 38 56 6 
<0.001 
5-years education 1649  (11) 25 64 11 
8-years education 741  (5) 22 64 14 
10-12yrs education 1095  (7) 22 65 13 
Higher education 1007  (7) 19 69 12 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 5113  (33) 37 58 5 
<0.001 
5-years education 2234  (15) 33 62 5 
8-years education 1566  (10) 32 60 8 
10-12yrs education 2225  (15) 32 61 7 
Higher education 2237  (15) 28 65 7 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 8595  (56) 37 57 6 
<0.001 Middle income 4526  (30) 29 65 6 
High income 464  (3) 20 69 11 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 5660  (37) 38 56 6 
<0.001 Middle income 3026  (20) 35 58 7 
High income 6633  (43) 29 61 10 
Source: Author's calculations 
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Table 6.5: Family Planning Decision-making Autonomy and Determinants ( 2  results) 
Determinants Observations (%) 
Levels of Autonomy 
Significance 
(P-value) No (%) 
Partial 
(%) 
Strong 
(%) 
Employment Status 
Unemployed 13879 (91) 29 67 4 
<0.001 
Employed 1440 (9) 21 76 3 
Household Size 
Below Average 5503 (36) 27 70 4 
<0.001 Average 1908 (12) 30 69 4 
Above Average 7908 (52) 41 67 4 
Household Size 
Excluding Children 
Below Average 5823 (38) 27 69 5 
<0.001 Average 2229 (15) 30 66 4 
Above Average 7267 (47) 29 68 3 
Number of Sons 
No son 3796 (25) 32 65 4 
<0.001 1 son 3727 (24) 28 68 4 
2 & more sons 7796 (51) 27 69 4 
Number of 
Daughters 
No daughter 4226 (28) 32 65 3 
<0.001 1 daughter 4087 (27) 27 70 3 
2 & more daughters 7006 (46) 27 68 4 
Family Formation 
Nuclear 1981 (13) 30 66 4 
<0.001 
Extended 13338 (87) 28 68 4 
Mother-in-Law 
Present 15168 (99) 28 68 4 
<0.001 
Not Present 151 (1) 27 68 5 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 781 (5) 34 62 4 
<0.001 
20-24 years 2504 (16) 30 66 4 
25-29 years 3184 (21) 27 69 4 
30-34 years 2655 (17) 28 69 3 
35-39 years 2642 (17) 27 70 4 
40-44 years 2086 (14) 28 68 4 
45-49 years 1467 (10) 30 67 4 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 10792 (70) 33 62 4 
<0.001 
5-years education 1649 (11) 20 77 3 
8-years education 741 (5) 18 79 2 
10-12yrs education 1095 (7) 19 78 3 
Higher education 1007 (7) 12 86 2 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 5113 (33) 36 60 5 
<0.001 
5-years education 2234 (15) 28 67 5 
8-years education 1566 (10) 27 69 4 
10-12yrs education 2225 (15) 24 73 3 
Higher education 2237 (15) 19 78 3 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 8595 (56) 30 66 4 
<0.001 Middle income 4526 (30) 26 70 4 
High income 464 (3) 18 80 2 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 5660 (37) 31 65 4 
<0.001 Middle income 3026 (20) 30 66 4 
High income 6633 (43) 26 71 3 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
91 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING AUTONOMY:  
AGGREGATED RESULTS 
 
 
 
7.1.  Introduction 
This Chapter discusses the empirical evidence obtained through an estimation of the theoretical 
framework of analysis developed in Chapter 3. More specifically, the empirical analysis 
corresponds to the determinants of women’s autonomy in the context of aggregate economic 
decision-making from an overall perspective, as well as through urban and rural stratifications. 
The aggregate economic decision-making, alternatively called economic decision-making 
autonomy, refers to a woman’s decision-making power relative to her husband in the spheres of 
purchasing household food items, clothing and footwear, recreation and travel and medical 
treatment-related items. However, the disaggregated1 analysis in terms of each of the above sub-
dimensions of autonomy is presented in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
Consistent with the theoretical framework of analysis, the discussion in this Chapter is 
organised in two ways relating to the nature of the determinants of women’s autonomy. These 
are relevant to a woman’s potential threat utilities affecting her economic decision-making 
power in the household, as well as other categories of determinants which include individual 
embedded characteristics (education and age), the spouse’s financial status and level of 
education, family socio-economic status and geographic identifications. We also discuss if the 
Cumulative Approach of conventional ordered logit model fails to satisfy the necessary parallel 
line assumption and if the appropriate multinomial method of Adjacent Approach, consistent 
with the nature of variables used in this analysis, is required.2 Therefore, we present the results 
of ordered logit applied with both of the above approaches. Furthermore, we present different 
arguments regarding the potential endogeniety issue in the existing empirical research in this 
area.  
 
                                                            
1 The disaggregated analysis corresponds to the sub-dimensions of women’s economic autonomy 
including food, clothing and footwear, recreation and travel and medical treatment-related decision-
making relative to their partners at the household level.    
2 For details refer to Chapter 5. 
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7.2.  Threat Options and Economic Decision-making Autonomy 
Results of the economic decision-making autonomy model (Equation 5.1) estimated using the 
conventional ordered logit model, from overall as well as urban and rural regions, are illustrated 
in Table 7.1 at the end of this Chapter. The results of the ordered logit model are passed through 
a battery of statistical tests to confirm the validity of parallel line or proportionality 
assumptions. 4  Correspondingly, the proportionality test confirms that the parallel line 
assumption is not satisfied in ordered logit model settings. This implies that the results of the 
ordered logit model are imprecise and may lead to ambiguous conclusions. 5  Therefore, 
multinomial logit model specification may be a more appropriate technique for further empirical 
analysis. It is also important to note that we make additional amendments in the usual 
multinomial logit settings, by changing the reference category within each of the adjacent 
categories of the dependent variable, instead of considering the first category as the reference 
category throughout the estimations. Specifically, we attempt to estimate the multinomial logit 
settings in the categories of ‘partial’ to ‘no autonomy’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial autonomy’ to 
investigate the varying effects of each of the determinants of women’s economic decision-
making autonomy.  
Threat options, as specified in Chapter 3, encompass a woman’s earned income and the 
household composition, the latter being further segregated into two components; elderly persons 
and relatives of the husband residing at the same household, and the number of children. Table 
7.1 (Panel-I) shows the results for the first threat option, of multinomial logit settings parallel to 
the ordered logit settings for the overall sample. Results from the ordered logit model depict that 
women classified as employed (has earned income) show higher autonomy levels compared 
with women classified as unemployed (has an unearned income status). For example, employed 
women were observed with 1.47 times greater odds having higher level of autonomy compared 
with unemployed women, statistically significant at the 1 per cent level of confidence. Similarly, 
the ordered logit results for urban (Panel-II) and rural regions (Panel-III), found that employed 
women were respectively 1.63 and 1.39 more likely to have a greater level of autonomy, 
compared with unemployed women. Again, these results are also statistically significant at the 1 
per cent level of confidence. However, it is crucially important to note that the ordered logit 
model does not satisfy the proportionality assumption6 in these results, therefore affecting their 
                                                            
4 The proportionality, or the parallel line assumption, assumes that the partial effects of the relevant 
independent variables remain constant across adjacent categories of the dependent variable.  
5 For comparative purposes, however, we keep the results of the ordered logit model throughout the 
analysis and also provide a brief discussion highlighting the differences. This distinction has been seldom 
observed in previous studies on a similar topic.    
6 The approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories is:  chi2 (31) 
= 207.2 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 
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validity; earned income may not be relevant in increasing women’s autonomy within the 
categories of ‘no autonomy’, ‘partial autonomy’ and ‘strong autonomy’.  
As a result, we prefer the multinomial logit as an appropriate technique over the more 
conventional ordered logit method of estimation. Table 7.1 (Panel-I) depicting employment 
status results, shows that amongst all women respondents, those who were employed (have an 
earned income) have a 1.63 and 1.20 times greater odds of having ‘partial’ as opposed to ‘no 
autonomy’, and ‘strong’ as opposed to ‘partial autonomy’ respectively. Correspondingly, within 
the urban regions (Panel-II), employed women have 1.63 greater odds of having ‘strong 
autonomy’ as opposed to ‘partial autonomy’, however, the rates of ‘partial autonomy’ 
compared to ‘no autonomy’ are not statistically significant. In contrast, we find that employed 
women in the rural regions are 1.81 times greater odds to have ‘partial autonomy’ over ‘no 
autonomy’, but rates of ‘strong autonomy’ to ‘partial autonomy’ lack statistical significance 
(Panel-III). This implies that employed women appear to have higher levels of autonomy 
relative to unemployed women (unearned income status) in economic decision-making spheres 
within the household. Further, we learn that the regional divide plays an important role by 
increasing the rates of ‘strong autonomy’ over ‘partial autonomy’ in the urban region and 
‘partial autonomy’ over ‘no autonomy’ in the rural region. 
It is also observed through the results presented in Table 7.1 that the outcome of ordered 
logit models and the multinomial logit models have different implications. The ordered logit 
findings are consistent with the existing literature; that earned income monotonically increases 
women’s autonomy. However, multinomial logit settings confirm the varying effects of earned 
income on different levels of autonomy. Therefore, the multinomial logit model partially 
confirms the evidence that earned income has an association with women’s autonomy. This 
distinction has never been made in the current literature and can therefore be considered an 
important contribution of this thesis. These differences are further highlighted in the analysis of 
women’s autonomy from an urban and rural perspective. Therefore, we consider and discuss 
results of the multinomial logit estimations in the rest of this Chapter.  
The second threat option refers to the composition of a household in terms of the 
increasing household size7 which may significantly influence women’s autonomy. We test three 
areas of household size for the effects on women’s autonomy. Firstly, we refer to all household 
members, including elderly persons, relatives of the husband and the number of children. 
Secondly, we refer to only the presence of elderly persons and relatives of the husband. Thirdly, 
                                                            
7 The two main components of the household size are: elderly persons and relatives of husband living at 
the same household and number of children. The aggregate household size is quantified as ‘below 
average’, ‘average’, and ‘above average’. Specifically, ‘average’ is the mode for household size. It is 
important to note that the mode is recorded as almost 9 persons per household with a maximum of 55 
persons per household.  
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we test the effect of the number of children as well as the gender of the children. The overall 
results (Table 7.1, Panel-I) show that increasing the total household size (including children, 
elderly persons and relatives of the husband) significantly decreases women’s autonomy in the 
household. More precisely, an ‘average size’ household (9 persons per household) diminishes 
women’s autonomy to odds of 0.77 and 0.97 respectively for responses of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy, compared with households sized ‘below average’. 
Similarly, regarding ‘above average’ sized households, it appears autonomy is further decreased 
to 0.60 and 0.66 times lower odds respectively of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ responses and ‘strong’ to 
‘partial’ responses, compared with households sized ‘below average’. These results are 
statistically significant at the 1 precent level of confidence. Results from urban regions (Panel-II) 
are consistent with the overall evidence we have already observed, apart from the statistically 
insignificant association of ‘average’ size to responses of ‘strong’ compared to ‘partial’ 
autonomy. Interestingly, the results from the rural regions (Panel-III) are consistent with results 
from the urban regions regarding all formulations of household size.  
Along similar lines, household size which excludes the component of children (elderly 
persons and relatives of husband only) appears to have an inverse effect on women’s autonomy 
in the household. Table 7.1.1 (Panel-I) shows that even the ‘average’ sized household decreases 
by 0.61 and 0.83 times lower odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy, and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ 
autonomy of women, in the overall sample. Similarly, the size ‘above average’ further lowers 
the odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy by 0.51 and 0.63 times 
respectively in the overall sample. These results are highly significant statistically. Similar 
trends are found in the urban regions (Panel-II) apart from the ‘average’ size households which 
appear statistically insignificant in the ‘strong’ to the ‘partial’ categories. However, the results 
from the rural regions (Panel-III) are consistent with the findings from the overall sample. 
The above results clearly indicate that household size plays a role in determining the 
level of women’s autonomy in the household. The increasing number of people in a household, 
in terms of elderly parents or the relatives of husband, substantially decreases women’s 
autonomy in the household. Conversely, it does not imply that a woman with less autonomy has 
relatively less household responsibilities. On the contrary, a woman may be expected to serve 
the household or all members of the household with the best of intentions and demonstrate the 
utmost loyalty towards the family and relatives of her husband. This appears consistent with the 
existing traditions and cultural norms of society. These findings encourage further investigation 
into the role of the family system with regards to women’s autonomy in the household. 
Accordingly, we classify the data into nuclear and extended family systems to capture this effect. 
These formulations are not clearly presented in the theoretical framework of analysis in Chapter 
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3, yet we consider this aspect relevant to the overall analysis and therefore include it in the set 
of threat options of women. 
Therefore, we attempt to examine the effect of extended family systems relative to the 
nuclear family system on women’s autonomy in the household. Table 7.1 (Panel-I) illustrates 
within the overall sample, that households with extended family systems have 0.70 times lower 
odds to have ‘partial’ as opposed to ‘no’ autonomy responses, a statistically significant result at 
the 1 per cent level of confidence. However, the comparative odds regarding ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ 
autonomy are not statistically significant. Similarly, results for extended family households in 
the urban regions (Panel-II) show lower odds of 0.60 in the ‘partial’ to ‘no’ categories. 
Interestingly, the extended family systems relative to nuclear family systems does not appear to 
have an influence on women’s autonomy in rural regions (Panel-III). It implies that within rural 
regions, family formation, whether nuclear or extended, does not have an effect on any level of 
women’s autonomy. This observation corresponds with the more conventional way of living in 
rural regions where women are generally observed to hold lower levels of decision-making 
power in the household. Relevant to this discussion is the evaluation of the effect a mother-in-
law may have on the decision-making power of a woman in the household. The results (Panel-I 
through Panel-III) show that the presence of a woman’s mother-in-law appears with 0.17, 0.10 
and 0.20 times lower odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy respectively from all samples; overall, 
urban and rural. In summary, we witness that increasing the size of a household, having an 
extended family system and the presence of a woman’s mother-in-law all substantially decrease 
women’s autonomy, particularly from levels of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy. However, results 
from the rural regions show that the extended family system may not affect women’s autonomy 
in the household. These results indicate the prevalence of cultural or more traditional behaviours 
of society in the context of women’s inclusion in economic decision-making spheres in the 
household. 
The third aspect of household size, and another threat option, is used to explain 
women’s autonomy in the household, namely, the number of children present. For this purpose 
we devise various formulations of the number of children, and investigate the relevance to 
women’s autonomy. These formulations consist of different combinations of the children’s 
gender and numbers of each gender, tested against women’s autonomy. These formulations are: 
i) one child (boy/girl) as a reference category versus no child and children of both genders; ii) 
no child as a reference category versus only boy, girl and both genders; iii) no child as a 
reference category versus only boys, only girls, equal number of boys and girls, number of girls 
greater than boys and boys greater than girls and iv) equal number of boys and girls as a 
reference category versus only boys, only girls, girls greater than boys and boys greater than 
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girls. Using these different formulations we illustrate the results respectively in Table 7.1.1 
through to Appendix Table 7.1.59 for the overall as well as urban and rural regions. 
Table 7.1.1(panel-I) shows that in the overall sample, having ‘no child’ relative to ‘one 
child’ (any gender) gives 0.82 times lower odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy. Conversely, 
‘children’ (both genders) relative to ‘one child’ has no impact on increasing levels of autonomy 
in the household from the overall sample. In the urban regions, however, we witness that ‘no 
child’ relative to ‘one child’ shows 0.75 times lower odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy but 
insignificant results regarding ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy. Similarly, we find ‘no child’ has 
0.75 times lower odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy, however, ‘children’ (both genders) has 
1.29 times greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy in urban regions (Panel-II). Interestingly, 
we fail to observe any significance between ‘no children’ or ‘children’ (both genders) relative to 
‘no children’ in association with any level of autonomy from rural regions (Panel-III). 
Table 7.1.2 corresponds to the specification where ‘no child’ is the reference category 
in order to investigate whether ‘only boys’, ‘only girls’ and ‘children’ (both genders) are 
indicative of autonomy levels. Results from the overall sample (Panel-I) show that ‘only boys’, 
‘only girls’ and ‘children’ (both genders) relative to ‘no child’ correspondingly result in 1.21, 
1.24 and 1.30 times greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy in the household. However, these 
results are not found to be consistent with the evidence from the ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy 
in the overall sample. Furthermore, results from the urban regions (panel-II) only support the 
finding that ‘children’ (both genders) increases the odds by 1.71 times greater of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy. However, results from the rural region do not support any of these findings 
indicating a significant influence on women’s autonomy (Panel-III). 
Similarly, Table 7.1.3 presents results of further specifications where having ‘only boys’, 
‘only girls’, ‘equal number of boys and girls’ or having ‘greater numbers of one gender over the 
other’ relative to ‘no child’ in association with women’s autonomy in the household. The results 
from the overall sample (Panel-I) show that ‘only boys’, ‘only girls’, ‘equal number of boys and 
girls’ or having ‘greater numbers of one gender over the other’ relative to ‘no child’ increases 
the odds by 1.22, 1.25, 1.22, 1.38, 1.35 of having ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy in the household. 
Similarly, having ‘equal number of boys and girls’ or having ‘greater numbers of one gender 
over the other’ relative to ‘no child’ show respectively 1.56, 1.81 and 1.85 times greater odds of 
‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy in the household from urban regions (Panel-II). However, results 
from the rural regions indicate these specifications are statistically insignificant on any level of 
women’s autonomy in the (panel-III). 
                                                            
9 Appendix Table 7.1.2 to Appendix Table 7.1.5 are presented in Appendix-II: Determinants of women’s 
autonomy in aggregate economic decision-making. 
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Table 7.1.4 presents the last specification in which ‘equal number of boys and girls’ is 
considered as the reference category, in comparison with ‘no child’, ‘only boys’, ‘only girls’ and 
‘greater numbers of one gender over the other’. The results from the overall sample show that 
having ‘no child’ compared with the reference category lowers the odds to 0.82 times for 
‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy, however, all other categories show statistical insignificant effects on 
any level of autonomy. These results are consistent with the evidence from the urban regions 
(Panel-II). Furthermore, consistent with earlier specifications, evidence from the rural regions 
does not support the number or gender of children as having an influence on women’s 
autonomy in the household. In a further specification presented in Table 7.1.5 where ‘girls 
greater than boys’ is considered as the reference category relative to ‘no child’, lower odds of 
0.75 and 0.55 times respectively were found for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from the overall and 
urban regions respectively. The specification also confirms that number or the gender of 
children does not support evidence of increasing levels of women’s autonomy in rural regions.  
In conclusion, we find that increasing numbers of children regardless of their gender, 
increases the odds of women’s ‘partial’ autonomy but lacks relevancy on levels of ‘strong’ 
autonomy in the overall sample as well as the urban regions. Further, we find that having an 
equal number of boys and girls also appear significant to increasing women’s autonomy in the 
household. However, the number of children or their gender does not appear relevant in 
influencing women’s autonomy in rural regions. This may imply the existence of strong cultural 
or traditional traits of constrained women’s autonomy in these areas, also evidenced by the 
common practice of males having multiple wives at the same time, regardless of the number of 
children from a previous wife. 
 
7.3. Individual Characteristics and Autonomy in Economic Decision-making 
A woman’s individual characteristics require investigation into the level of her education, her 
age, as well as her male partner’s level of education and income. We observe the effect of a 
woman’s education using four main classifications: i) ‘no education’ as the reference category 
versus ‘5-years’, ‘10-years’, ‘12-years’ and ‘higher levels of education’; ii) ‘no education’ 
(never attended school) as a reference category to ‘education’ (one year school or above); iii) 
education considered as a continuous variable ranging from ‘no school’ to the maximum 
number of years attending the school and finally, iv) ‘no education’ as a reference category and 
‘5-years’ of schooling, ‘5-years’ versus ‘10 years’ of schooling, ‘10-years’ versus ‘12-years’ of 
schooling and ‘12-years’ versus ‘higher levels of schooling’. It is appropriate to note that we 
present results of the first specification only but discuss results of all of the above categories.10 
                                                            
10 We are unable to fit all information into the single table for comparative purposes, however, the results 
are available on request. 
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Again we refer to Table 7.1 which presents results of the first category of specification 
for the effect of ‘5-years’ schooling through to ‘higher levels of education’ compared with the 
reference category of ‘no education’. Results show that ‘5-years’ of schooling relative to ‘no 
education’ generates greater odds of 1.24 and 1.35 times that of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy and 
‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy respectively in the overall sample. Similarly, education of ‘8-
years’ through to ‘higher levels of education’ compared with ‘no education’ depict respectively 
1.74, 1.42 and 1.88 times greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from the overall sample. 
Results from urban regions (Panel-II) show that only ‘8-years’ of schooling and ‘higher levels 
of education’ correspondingly reflect 1.50 and 1.59 times greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy in the household. However, we witness that each of the education categories, 
including ‘5-years’ through to ‘higher levels of education’ respectively appear with 1.26, 1.69, 
1.45 and 1.65 times greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from rural regions (panel-III). 
Further, we also observe that ‘5-years’ schooling and ‘12-years’ schooling show 1.57 and 1.60 
times greater odds of ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in rural areas. 
Regarding the specification where we investigate the effect of the category ‘education’ 
relative to ‘no education’, results show that ‘education’ appears with respectively 1.44 and 1.22 
times greater odds of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ and ‘partial’ to ‘strong’ autonomy in the household from 
the overall sample. Further the results of ‘education’ versus ‘no education’ show 1.26 times 
greater odds of only ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from urban regions. Furthermore, the results of 
‘education’ relative to ‘no education’ depict 1.39 and 1.49 times greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in rural households. Similarly, in accordance with the earlier 
specification where education appears as a continuous variable, we observe that every additional 
year of education increases the odds by 1.05 and 1.02 times of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to 
‘partial’ autonomy in the overall sample. Correspondingly, results for the urban regions show 
increased odds of 1.03 of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy in the household. Further, the results show 
that for each additional year of education, there’s a corresponding increase in odds of 1.05 and 
1.05 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from the rural regions. Finally, 
we look at the fourth specification in which we investigate any variations based on increasing 
successive levels of education. Interestingly, we do not find any support for the proposition that 
for each successive level of education, there is a greater level of autonomy compared with the 
preceding level of education, the exception being when compared with ‘no education’. The 
above results show the following interesting findings: i) a woman with any level of education 
enjoys a relatively greater level of autonomy in the household compared with women with no 
education; ii) in urban regions, the effect of education only increases the ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy responses, but has an insignificant impact on ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy, however 
iii) results from the rural regions show that women’s education levels are relevant to their level 
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of autonomy with statistically significant results for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ 
autonomy responses.  
A woman’s age is another characteristic which is usually considered an important 
determinant of women’s autonomy in the household. We construct two main classifications of 
age to investigate this effect on women’s autonomy. The first specification treats the ‘15-19 
years’ age bracket as a reference category compared with six successive age brackets. The 
second specification considers age as a continuous variable from the minimum of 15 years to 
the maximum of 49 years of age. Table 7.1 shows the results of different successive age 
brackets compared with the immediately preceding age bracket as a reference category. The 
results show that all successive age categories from ‘25-29 years’ through to ‘45-49 years’ 
compared with the base category of ‘15-19 years’ demonstrate substantial increases in women’s 
autonomy of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ responses in the overall sample. The 
results also indicate that the highest two categories, ‘40-44 years’ and ‘45-49 years’ age 
brackets, compared to the age bracket of ‘15-19 years’ show greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy respectively from the urban regions. However, evidence 
from the rural regions depicts that in each of the higher age brackets, there is an increase in 
‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the household. According to the second 
specification11 we witness that for each additional age bracket, there is a corresponding increase 
in odds, namely, 1.04 and 1.03 times of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ and ‘partial’ to ‘strong’ autonomy 
from the overall sample. Similarly, from the urban regions we find each of the additional age 
brackets correspond to increased odds of 1.05 and 1.03 times for ‘no’ to ‘partial’ and ‘partial’ 
to ‘strong’ autonomy in the household. Similar results were found for the rural regions. Overall 
evidence points to the correlation between increasing age and heightened levels of women’s 
autonomy in both urban and rural regions. This may be attributable to the likelihood that as a 
woman ages, she gradually adopts and adjusts to the traditions of that family including those of 
her husband’s parents and other relatives living together in the household. Over time this may 
further assist a woman to achieve a greater degree of autonomy within the household decision-
making sphere. 
Similar to a woman’s level of education, we also investigate her husband’s level of 
education to determine what effect, if any, it has on the levels of her autonomy in the household. 
We construct the following three classifications of a husband’s education level: 12  i) ‘no 
education’ as a reference category compared with each successive category including ‘5-years’ 
schooling through to ‘higher levels of education’; ii) ‘no education’ as the reference category 
compared to any level of education and iii) the effect of every additional year of education. 
                                                            
11 Results available on request. 
12 Results available on request. 
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Table 7.1 shows that any level of a husband’s education compared with ‘no education’ does not 
appear associated with any level of a woman’s autonomy, in the overall sample as well as the 
urban and rural regions. These findings were also found during analysis of the second and third 
specifications.  
We also look at a husband’s financial health to investigate its relationship to a woman’s 
autonomy in the household. We classify a husband’s income into three main levels; ‘low’, 
‘middle’ and ‘high’. For analytical purposes we treat the ‘low’ category as a reference to 
compare it with ‘middle’ and ‘high’ income levels. Interestingly, results show that the ‘middle’ 
level of income compared with ‘low’ income has 1.33 times greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy from the overall sample. Similarly, ‘high’ levels of income compared with ‘low’ 
levels led to greater odds of 1.59 of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from the overall sample. Similar 
results are observed from the urban regions. However, in the rural regions we witness that only 
the ‘middle’ level of income in comparison to the ‘low’ income group shows 1.21 times greater 
odds of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy of women in the household.  
 
7.4. Family Income Status and Economic Decision-making Autonomy     
Family income status consists of the level of household consumption based on the household’s 
joint financial resources.13 This indicator also reflects a household’s socioeconomic status and 
may play some role in determining women’s autonomy in the household. Family income is 
classified into three groups, ‘low’, ‘middle’ and ‘high’. We investigate if the ‘middle’ and/or 
‘high’ groups, relative to the ‘low’ group results in greater autonomy for women in the 
household. Table 7.1 shows that families grouped in the ‘high’ income status compared with 
those in the ‘low’ group result in 1.09 and 1.10 times greater odds, respectively of ‘partial’ to 
‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the overall sample. Similarly, we observe that ‘high’ 
family income levels compared with ‘low’ family income levels have greater odds of 1.11 and 
1.26 times of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the urban regions. 
However, variations between the ‘middle’ income group and ‘low’ income group are 
statistically insignificant regarding any level of autonomy. Likewise, within the rural regions, 
family income status is not significantly linked to women’s levels of autonomy.  
 
7.5. States/Provincial Effects and Autonomy in Economic Decision-making 
It has been generally noticed that women from different states/provinces of Pakistan display 
different degrees of autonomy, dependent perhaps on the strong cultural, traditional and 
historical backgrounds of each province. Furthermore, these differences may also be linked with 
urbanisation and economic opportunities available in each of the provinces. The province of 
                                                            
13 For a further description see Chapter 4. 
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Punjab is generally considered multiethnic, economically developed, with a relatively high 
literacy rate and greater prosperity compared with the other three provinces. Therefore, we 
consider Punjab as a reference category and compare the other three provinces individually to 
observe any variations in women’s autonomy. Table 7.1 shows that the province of Sindh 
compared with Punjab reflects 0.80 and 0.34 times lower odds, respectively, of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
and ‘strong’ to ‘partial autonomy in the household from the overall sample. Within these areas, 
the results also show 0.48 times lower odds of ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from the urban 
regions. However, results from the rural regions show 0.60 and 0.16 times lower odds, 
respectively, of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy of Sindh compared with the 
province of Punjab. Accordingly, the comparison of NWFP with the province of Punjab shows 
0.73 and 0.37 times lower odds, respectively, of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy and ‘strong’ to 
‘partial’ autonomy from the overall sample. Within these areas, however, the urban regions 
show 0.25 times lower odds of ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy. Conversely, results for the rural 
regions of Sindh, compared with Punjab, show 0.65 and 0.41 times lower odds of ‘partial’ to 
‘no’ autonomy and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy. Regarding the third province of Baluchistan, 
results show 0.11 and 0.28 times lower odds, respectively, of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to 
‘partial’ autonomy from the overall sample. Similarly, from the urban regions we find 0.20 and 
0.12 lower odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy. Likewise the rural 
region depicts 0.09 and 0.35 lower odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy. 
 
7.6.  A Note on Endogeneity 
There is always suspicion of endogeniety existing in research areas similar to this study. Some 
prominent studies such as Pollak (2005), Basu (2006), Anderson and Eswaran (2009) and 
Eswaran and Malhotra (2011) on similar areas of research indicate the possibility of a two-way 
causality between women’s autonomy and corresponding determinants. This requires 
investigation of proper instruments to overcome the issue of endogeniety. Therefore, in this 
thesis, we address the issue by providing three arguments within the context of women’s 
autonomy in Pakistan. 
The first argument refers to the fact that all determinants are considered to be 
exogenous variables in the empirical settings. As observed, the determinants include the threat 
options of employment status, size of the household, and gender and number of children as a 
sub-component of the household size. The other common determinants include individual 
specific characteristics, for example age, educational level, family socio-economic health and 
geographic locations. It is crucially important to note that the sample includes only married 
women in the empirical analysis. It implies that the threat options or the individual 
characteristics which might be subject to subject to the problem of potential simultaneity are 
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usually decided before to marriage. Therefore, women may have little chance to improve their 
threat options or embedded characteristics after marriage. This is also confirmed from the 
available data utilised in this study. We could not find a single instance where a woman altered 
her level of threat option or the capacity of her individual characteristics, a feature also common 
in the larger context of conventional society. Contrarily, if we believe that a woman may 
acquire skills to earn an independent income, and receive further education after her marriage, 
then the issue of autonomy issue probably would not exist. According to this rationale there 
would therefore exist cooperation and a balance of power between men and women within all 
aspects of decision-making spheres in the household.  
The second argument refers to the construction of a new variable for women, ‘intrinsic 
autonomy’, and investigates whether this could lead to women’s increased decision-making 
power by receiving further education or working outside of the household for an independent 
income. The variable of ‘intrinsic autonomy’ refers to women with ‘strong’ autonomy status 
from the given sample of married women. We consider that women with ‘strong’ autonomy 
display greater degrees of association with their specific characteristics of education and 
employment. In this study, however, we observed an insignificant correlation between women’s 
intrinsic autonomy and their individual characteristics.  
The third argument draws our attention towards all alternative specifications of 
autonomy models discussed earlier. As shown, we produced estimations of each of the above 
five dimensions of autonomy, subject to different formulations of one of the threat options 
regarding the number and gender of children. Interestingly, we observed that the results of threat 
options and individual characteristics remain consistent throughout all of the five different 
specifications corresponding to each dimension of autonomy. This provides the impression that 
the above identified determinants are exogenous in nature in the specific context of a traditional 
society. In addition to the above arguments we plan to further investigate the issue of 
endogeniety as a separate research project by acquiring sufficient data information on various 
relevant aspects. The relevant aspects could be acquiring information on more than one such 
like surveys used in this thesis and if possible to capture some relevant information on women 
regarding their pre-marital characteristics.     
7.7. Concluding Remarks 
We discussed the evidence of threat options, individual characteristics, family socio-economic 
status and state/province to explain the multilevel concept of women’s autonomy in economic 
decision- making aspects in the household for the overall, urban and rural region samples. We 
also compared results obtained through the conventional ordered logit model and the extended 
multinomial logit model to observe the differences. We found that the multinomial logit model 
is a more appropriate model for this analysis given the conventional ordered logit model failed 
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to satisfy the fundamental assumption of proportionality. Therefore, the results based on the 
multinomial logit methodology suggest varying effects of determinants on the multilevel 
measures of autonomy.  
In relation to threat options, we find that employed (earned income) woman relative to 
unemployed woman are more likely to have greater levels of autonomy in the household from 
both the urban and rural regions. More specifically, results indicate that an earned income 
increases levels of ‘partial’ to ‘strong’ autonomy in the urban regions, and ‘no’ to ‘partial’ 
autonomy in the rural regions. The results are consistent with findings in existing literature that 
link women’s employment to increased autonomy. However, existing literature ignores the 
relative change among different levels of autonomy corresponding to the effects of an earned 
income. This study, however, differentiates the relevancy of an earned income in association 
with ‘no’, ‘partial’ and ‘strong’ autonomy. We also find that an ‘above average’ household size 
substantially decreases women’s autonomy in both the urban and rural regions. Furthermore, 
disaggregation of the household size (refers to family composition) suggests that the other 
component of size (consisting of elderly persons and relatives of a husband) decreases women’s 
autonomy in the household. We find that increasing the number of children increases ‘no’ to 
‘partial’ autonomy but appears irrelevant to ‘strong’ autonomy in both the overall and the urban 
regions. Interestingly, we find that the gender of children does not appear to influence any level 
of women’s autonomy across both regions. Obviously, these conclusions can be linked with the 
dominant cultural norms of this society. 
Finally, regarding individual characteristics, we find that some level of education does 
provide greater autonomy to women in the household compared with relatively less education or 
none at all. We also observed education to be more sensitive in determining women’s autonomy 
in the rural regions. Similarly, we find that a woman’s increasing age also increases her 
autonomy. We were unable to find supporting evidence linking a woman’s levels of autonomy 
to her husband’s level of education, in both the urban and rural regions. A husband’s income 
status, however, appears positively associated with his wife’s level of autonomy. The socio-
economic status (high income group) of a family appears to also have a positive impact on a 
woman’s autonomy compared with low income groups from urban as well as rural regions. The 
results also suggest that women from the provinces of Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan show 
relatively less autonomy in comparison with women from the province of Punjab during this 
period of time. 
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Table 7.1: Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Economic Decision-making 
 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-II: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment Status Unemployed 1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.47 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.20 0.09 1.63 0.00 1.17 0.50 1.63 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.81 0.00 1.02 0.87 
Household Size 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.84 0.02 0.77 0.00 0.97 0.03 0.84 0.02 0.76 0.01 0.91 0.57 0.84 0.07 0.77 0.02 1.01 0.95 
Above Average 0.56 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.79 0.04 0.56 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.60 0.00 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 0.74 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.86 0.17 0.76 0.01 0.60 0.01 0.91 0.45 0.71 0.00 0.73 0.11 0.80 0.15 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.20 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.93 0.90 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.49 0.58 0.27 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.37 0.63 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.30 0.12 1.24 0.18 1.20 0.39 1.18 0.41 1.08 0.78 1.15 0.70 1.38 0.02 1.33 0.14 1.26 0.40 
25-29 years 1.91 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.71 0.12 1.98 0.00 1.95 0.11 1.39 0.36 1.91 0.00 1.54 0.10 1.95 0.02 
30-34 years 2.47 0.00 1.85 0.00 2.26 0.00 2.79 0.00 2.04 0.16 2.16 0.12 2.31 0.00 1.78 0.00 2.24 0.01 
35-39 years 3.16 0.00 2.60 0.00 2.43 0.00 2.95 0.00 2.90 0.00 1.88 0.18 3.26 0.00 2.47 0.00 2.77 0.00 
40-44 years 3.72 0.00 2.84 0.00 2.84 0.00 3.62 0.00 3.02 0.00 2.38 0.02 3.64 0.00 2.69 0.00 3.02 0.00 
45-49 years 3.44 0.00 3.02 0.00 2.49 0.00 3.49 0.00 3.03 0.00 2.26 0.03 3.36 0.00 3.01 0.00 2.46 0.00 
Women’s Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
5-years education 1.38 0.00 1.24 0.02 1.35 0.00 0.99 0.91 1.11 0.51 0.95 0.69 1.55 0.00 1.26 0.06 1.57 0.00 
8-years education 1.24 0.05 1.74 0.00 0.92 0.62 0.84 0.26 1.50 0.05 0.61 0.03 1.53 0.01 1.69 0.01 1.21 0.35 
10-12years education 1.41 0.00 1.42 0.01 1.28 0.07 0.96 0.78 1.14 0.48 0.89 0.53 1.66 0.01 1.45 0.08 1.60 0.03 
Higher education 1.51 0.00 1.88 0.00 1.18 0.24 0.99 0.94 1.59 0.05 0.77 0.14 1.74 0.03 1.65 0.11 1.48 0.27 
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Table 7.1(…continued): Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Economic Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 0.94 0.34 0.96 0.58 0.94 0.46 1.04 0.74 1.00 1.00 1.04 0.79 0.91 0.21 0.96 0.64 0.88 0.24 
8-years education 0.99 0.88 0.94 0.53 1.03 0.79 1.03 0.85 1.06 0.73 0.97 0.88 0.93 0.50 0.88 0.31 1.01 0.97 
10-12years education 0.94 0.39 0.91 0.33 0.98 0.86 1.02 0.90 1.16 0.35 0.90 0.53 0.89 0.26 0.82 0.10 1.01 0.92 
Higher education 0.98 0.82 0.92 0.49 1.05 0.67 1.06 0.66 0.98 0.89 1.11 0.55 0.94 0.59 0.94 0.65 0.96 0.84 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.29 0.00 1.33 0.00 1.15 0.17 1.31 0.00 1.39 0.01 1.15 0.21 1.20 0.01 1.21 0.02 1.10 0.36 
High income 1.62 0.00 1.33 0.19 1.59 0.01 1.73 0.00 1.16 0.62 1.81 0.00 1.54 0.08 1.58 0.18 1.25 0.50 
Family Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.06 0.07 1.04 0.68 1.05 0.61 1.23 0.06 1.12 0.54 1.18 0.32 0.99 0.87 1.01 0.93 0.97 0.83 
High income 1.13 0.09 1.09 0.09 1.10 0.06 1.28 0.07 1.11 0.08 1.26 0.08 0.99 0.86 1.03 0.80 0.96 0.72 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 0.45 0.00 0.80 0.03 0.34 0.00 0.65 0.00 1.35 0.11 0.48 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.16 0.00 
NWFP 0.45 0.00 0.73 0.03 0.37 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.19 0.48 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.65 0.01 0.41 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.35 0.00 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Sub-pop No. obs. = 13522; LR chi2 (26) = 3828.22; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -12065.335; 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1369. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 202.01 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; 
Sub-pop No. obs. = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (52, 1050) = 14.43; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of the urban regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(26, 502)=13.04, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1369. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 202.01 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of 
obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(52, 476) = 7.35; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs. = 8204; Design df = 527, F(26, 549) = 21.34, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1369. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 202.01 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of 
obs. = 8204; Design df = 574; F (52,523) = 10.15; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 7.1.1: Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Economic Decision-making  
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.43 0.00 1.57 0.00 1.18 0.13 1.60 0.00 1.12 0.64 1.61 0.00 1.34 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.67 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.83 0.04 0.70 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.92 0.51 0.66 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.77 0.05 
Above Average 0.50 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.72 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.57 0.00 
Household Size: 
Children 
Boy/Girl 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
No child 0.85 0.05 0.82 0.03 0.98 0.84 0.74 0.04 0.75 0.09 0.80 0.30 0.95 0.59 0.86 0.20 1.14 0.39 
Boys/Girls (both) 1.11 0.07 1.06 0.38 1.13 0.14 1.25 0.03 1.29 0.06 1.08 0.53 1.04 0.63 0.99 0.88 1.13 0.25 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 0.83 0.01 0.80 0.04 0.90 0.25 0.80 0.07 0.70 0.07 0.93 0.61 0.82 0.04 0.83 0.16 0.87 0.25 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.23 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.06 0.92 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.50 0.58 0.32 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.66 0.42 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.11 0.35 1.07 0.58 1.07 0.74 0.95 0.80 0.86 0.60 1.02 0.96 1.25 0.10 1.20 0.19 1.17 0.59 
25-29 years 1.44 0.00 1.26 0.09 1.41 0.13 1.32 0.20 1.28 0.37 1.11 0.76 1.57 0.00 1.29 0.10 1.68 0.08 
30-34 years 1.68 0.00 1.28 0.11 1.74 0.02 1.64 0.04 1.14 0.67 1.64 0.17 1.74 0.00 1.37 0.08 1.79 0.06 
35-39 years 2.16 0.00 1.80 0.00 1.87 0.01 1.80 0.01 1.69 0.08 1.44 0.31 2.43 0.00 1.90 0.00 2.18 0.01 
40-44 years 2.88 0.00 2.22 0.00 2.38 0.00 2.53 0.00 2.07 0.04 1.98 0.06 3.06 0.00 2.29 0.00 2.63 0.00 
45-49 years 2.90 0.00 2.53 0.00 2.22 0.00 2.65 0.00 2.21 0.02 1.95 0.07 3.09 0.00 2.74 0.00 2.34 0.01 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
5-years education 1.40 0.00 1.25 0.02 1.38 0.00 1.01 0.91 1.16 0.35 0.97 0.80 1.56 0.00 1.26 0.06 1.59 0.00 
8-years education 1.27 0.03 1.75 0.00 0.94 0.72 0.86 0.33 1.54 0.05 0.62 0.03 1.56 0.00 1.72 0.01 1.25 0.28 
10-12years education 1.46 0.00 1.48 0.00 1.31 0.05 0.99 0.96 1.21 0.31 0.90 0.56 1.75 0.00 1.51 0.05 1.66 0.02 
Higher education 1.60 0.00 2.01 0.00 1.24 0.14 1.07 0.66 1.80 0.01 0.79 0.21 1.82 0.02 1.72 0.09 1.59 0.19 
   continue … 
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Table 7.1.1(…continued): Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Economic Decision-making  
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-II: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 0.95 0.43 0.97 0.71 0.95 0.57 1.04 0.76 0.98 0.90 1.05 0.74 0.93 0.30 0.98 0.83 0.89 0.31 
8-years education 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.61 1.05 0.70 1.04 0.78 1.07 0.71 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.58 0.89 0.36 1.03 0.84 
10-12years education 0.96 0.57 0.93 0.47 1.00 0.98 1.06 0.64 1.21 0.25 0.92 0.62 0.91 0.34 0.83 0.14 1.03 0.83 
Higher education 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.66 1.08 0.56 1.12 0.43 1.04 0.83 1.15 0.42 0.94 0.63 0.95 0.73 0.96 0.83 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.19 0.00 1.22 0.00 1.09 0.22 1.16 0.09 1.21 0.09 1.09 0.46 1.13 0.07 1.14 0.10 1.05 0.61 
High income 1.56 0.00 1.26 0.30 1.56 0.01 1.57 0.02 1.05 0.89 1.70 0.01 1.54 0.09 1.52 0.22 1.30 0.43 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.16 0.04 1.12 0.19 1.12 0.25 1.35 0.03 1.26 0.23 1.24 0.19 1.07 0.40 1.07 0.47 1.04 0.72 
High income 1.33 0.00 1.27 0.01 1.24 0.02 1.55 0.00 1.40 0.05 1.37 0.03 1.14 0.12 1.15 0.17 1.07 0.56 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 0.44 0.00 0.79 0.02 0.34 0.00 0.63 0.00 1.30 0.11 0.47 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.16 0.00 
NWFP 0.43 0.00 0.71 0.02 0.36 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.10 0.69 0.24 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.63 0.01 0.40 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.35 0.00 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Sub-pop No. obs. = 13522; LR chi2 (29) = 3876.63; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -12041.13; Pseudo 
R2 = 0.1389. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 200.67 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Sub-pop No. obs. 
= 13522; Design df = 1101; F (56, 1040) = 14.16; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of the urban regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(28, 500)=13.53, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1389. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 200.67 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs = 
5318; Design df = 527; F(56, 472) = 7.45; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs. = 8204; Design df = 574, F(28, 547) = 19.78, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1389. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 200.67 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs. = 8204; 
Design df = 574; F(56,519) = 9.53; Prob > F = 0.00 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING AUTONOMY:  
DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
This Chapter presents the analysis of various determinants of economic decision-making from 
the perspective of different sub-dimensions of autonomy. The sub-dimensions as specified in 
Chapter 4 include women’s decision-making in purchases of daily food items, clothing and 
footwear, recreational and independent travel and medical treatment. It is appropriate to note 
that we replicate estimations of each of the sub-dimensions of autonomy along similar lines as 
results presented in Chapter 7. Therefore, this Chapter is divided into four sections 
corresponding to results for each of the sub-dimensions of women’s autonomy. We present 
results of the ordered logit and multinomial logit settings for the overall sample as well as the 
urban and rural regions. 
 
8.2. Food-related Decision-making Autonomy  
Women’s food-related decision-making autonomy is one of the key components of the 
aggregate economic autonomy index in the household and refers in particular to the purchase of 
food-related items for herself and the family. It may be relevant to note that we first apply a 
conventional ordered logit model which was previously rejected based on reasons pointed out in 
Chapter 7. Therefore, we attempt to estimate the multinomial logit settings in the perspective of 
‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy’ and ‘partial’ to ‘strong’ autonomy’ to investigate the varying effects 
of each of the determinants of sub-dimensions in this sphere. 
Table 8.1 (Panel-I) at the end of this Chapter shows that in the overall sample, women 
with an earned income have 1.45 and 1.36 times greater odds of having ‘partial’ over ‘no’ 
autonomy and ‘strong’ over ‘partial’ autonomy. Similarly, we find that employed women have 
1.64 and 1.49 times greater odds of having ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy and ‘partial’ to ‘strong’ 
autonomy in the rural regions (Panel-III). However, the results from the urban regions reveal 
there is a statistically insignificant association between earned income and food-related 
autonomy. The above results indicate a regional divide which modifies the overall effect of 
increasing ‘no’ to ‘partial’ and ‘partial’ to ‘strong’.  
Table 8.1 (Panel-I) shows that increasing household size in any combination 
significantly decreases women’s food-related decision-making autonomy in the household, 
evident from the overall sample as well as urban and rural regions. Further, household size 
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which includes elderly persons and relatives of the husband (which includes elderly persons and 
relatives of the husband but excludes children) appears to be inversely associated with women’s 
autonomy. Table 8.1.1 (Panel-I) shows that the ‘average’ sized household decreases the odds 
by 0.61 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy in the overall sample. Similarly, being a household 
of ‘above average’ further decreases the odds by 0.37 and 0.73 times for of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and 
‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the overall sample. These results are statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level of confidence. Within the urban regions (Panel-II), results demonstrate a 
similar inverse association between increasing a household size and the level of women’s 
autonomy. Similarly, the extended family system lowers the odds by 0.68 times for ‘partial’ to 
‘no’ autonomy from the overall sample, statistically significant at the 1 per cent level of 
confidence (Panel-I). Extended family systems within the urban areas also lower the odds by 
0.60 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy (Panel-II). Interestingly, within the rural areas, the 
extended family system relative to the nuclear family system does not appear to influence 
women’s autonomy (Panel-III). Furthermore, the results (Table 8.1 Panel-I through Panel-III) 
reveal that the presence of a mother-in-law lowers the odds by 0.64, 0.70 and 0.51 times 
respectively for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy for the overall, urban and rural samples. Generally 
the findings consistently show that an increasing household size, an extended family system and 
the presence of a mother-in-law all substantially decrease women’s autonomy, particularly from 
‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy. Results from the rural regions, however, show that the extended 
family system has little effect.  
Regarding the number of children and the level of autonomy regarding decisions of 
food-related purchasing, we reproduce results along similar lines as observed in the aggregate 
economic decision-making aspects of women in Chapter 7. Therefore, Table 8.1.2 through 
Appendix Table 8.1.51 presents results of different formulations2 of children in association with 
the above measure of women’s autonomy from an overall as well as urban and rural perspective. 
Table 8.1.1(Panel-I) at the end of this chapter, shows that ‘no child’ relative to only 
‘one child’ (any gender) depicts 0.78 times lower odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from the 
overall sample. On the other hand ‘children’ (both genders) relative to ‘one child’ reveals there 
is no impact on increasing the level of women’s autonomy in the overall sample. From the 
urban regions (Panel-II), however, we witness that ‘no child’ relative to ‘one child’ lowers the 
odds by 0.68 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy but is insignificant regarding ‘strong’ to 
‘‘partial’’ autonomy. Conversely, we fail to observe any significant impact in the rural areas of 
                                                            
1 Appendix-III: Economic Decision-making Autonomy: Disaggregated Analysis includes Appendix Table 
8.1.2 to Appendix Table 8.1.5. 
2 Formulations of children are: i) one child (boy/girl) as a reference category versus no child and children 
of both genders; ii) no child as a reference category versus only boy, girl and both genders; iii) no child as 
a reference category versus only boys, only girls, equal number of boys and girls, number of girls greater 
than boys and boys greater than girls, and iv) equal number of boys and girls as a reference category 
versus only boys, only girls, girls greater than boys and boys greater than girls. 
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‘no child’ or ‘children’ (both genders) relative to ‘no child’ in association with any level of 
autonomy (Panel-III). Appendix Table 8.1.2 shows results for the specification where ‘no child’ 
appears as the reference category to investigate if ‘boys’, ‘girls’ or ‘children’ (both gender) are 
associated with household autonomy. Results from the overall sample (Panel-I) show that the 
‘girls’ and ‘children’ (both genders) relative to ‘no child’ respectively increases the odds by 
1.38 and 1.43 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy in the household. However, these results are 
inconsistent with the odds of ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from evidence of the overall sample. 
Further, we find similar results from the urban regions (Panel-II) that ‘girls’ and ‘children’ 
(both genders) increase the odds by 1.59 and 1.67 times for ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy. 
However the results do not support a significant association between these effects and women’s 
autonomy except in the category of ‘children’ (both genders) which depicts 1.28 times greater 
odds of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the rural regions (Panel-III). 
Similarly, Appendix Table 8.1.3 (Panel-I) shows that ‘girls’, =, and ‘greater numbers of 
one gender over the other’ relative to ‘no child’ depict correspondingly 1.39, 1.32, 1.57, and 
1.51 times greater odds of having ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy in the household from the overall 
sample. We find almost identical results from the urban regions (Panel-II). However, ‘girls’ as 
well as ‘boys’ show respectively 1.41 and 1.30 times greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy 
from the rural regions (Panel-III). 
Appendix Table 8.1.4 (Panel-I) shows that ‘no child’ compared with ‘equal number of 
boys and girls’ depict 0.76 times lower odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy. Interestingly we find 
that all other categories of children as ‘boys only’, ‘girls only’, ‘greater numbers of one gender 
over the other’ show 0.80, 0.78, 0.87 and 0.86 times lower odds respectively for ‘strong’ to 
‘partial’ autonomy from the urban regions (Panel-II). We find similar results for the rural 
regions. In conclusion, we find that an increasing number of children, regardless of their gender, 
increases women’s ‘partial’ autonomy but is irrelevant to the ‘strong’ autonomy in the overall 
as well as urban samples. Further, we find that ‘equal numbers of boys and girls’ also appear to 
significantly increase women’s autonomy in the household. Similarly, the number of children or 
their gender appears irrelevant to women’s autonomy in the rural regions. This may imply the 
existence of strong cultural or traditional traits of constrained women’s autonomy in these areas. 
We also investigate these sub-dimensions of economic decision-making through 
different classifications of a woman’s level of education. Table 8.1 presents results of this 
category as ‘5-years’ schooling through to ‘higher levels of education’ compared with the base 
category of ‘no education’. Results show that ‘5-years’ of schooling relative to ‘no education’ 
appears to have greater odds of 1.22 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from the overall 
sample. Similarly, ‘10-12 years’ through ‘higher levels of education’ compared with ‘no 
education’ depicts respectively 1.55 and 1.29 times greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy 
and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ from the overall sample. Results from the urban regions (Panel-II) 
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show that only ‘10-12 years’ of schooling reflect greater odds of 1.28 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy in the household. However, we witness that ‘5-years’ education increases odds by 
1.25 times for ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from the rural regions (Panel-III). Further, we 
observe that ‘10-12 years’ schooling produces greater odds of 1.69 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy in the rural regions. Regarding age, results (Table 8.1) show that all successive age 
categories from ‘25-29 years’ through to ‘45-49 years’ compared with the base category of ‘15-
19 years’ substantially increases women’s autonomy of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ 
autonomy in the household from the overall sample. The results also indicate that the highest 
two age brackets, respectively ‘40-44 years’ and ‘45-49 years’ compared to the youngest of ‘15-
19 years’ respectively shows greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from the urban regions. 
Similarly, we find that each of the higher age brackets of women increases a ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
response and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ response from the rural regions. In general the results show 
that with increasing age comes greater autonomy in the household in both urban and rural 
regions.  
Similar to a woman’s level of education, we also investigate her husband’s level of 
education to determine the role, if any, it plays on the level of women’s autonomy. We construct 
the following three classifications of a husband’s education level: 3  i) ‘no education’ as a 
reference category compared with each successive category including ‘5-years’ schooling 
through to ‘higher levels of education’; ii) ‘no education’ as the reference category compared to 
any level of education and iii) the effect of every additional year of education. Table 8.1 shows 
that ‘5-years’ through to ‘10-12 years’ of education decreases women’s autonomy in the 
household from the overall as well as urban samples. However, from the rural regions we do not 
find a husband’s education associated with any level of autonomy in this particular sub-
dimension of economic decision-making.  
Another potentially important characteristic relating to the husband is his level of 
income. Results show that the ‘middle’ level of income compared with the ‘low’ level income 
depicts 1.33 times greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from the overall sample. Similarly, 
the ‘high’ level of income compared with the ‘low’ income group reflects 1.91 times greater 
odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy of women in the household from the overall sample. Similar 
results are observed from the urban regions. However, from the rural regions we do not witness 
any significant effect of a husband’s income on autonomy in the household.  
On another sub-dimension, we find that family socio-economic status increases ‘strong’ 
to ‘partial’ autonomy in the overall sample as well as for the urban and rural regions.  Further, 
we find that the province of Sindh (in the overall sample, as well as in the urban and rural 
regions) relative to the province of Punjab shows substantially lower levels of autonomy in the 
                                                            
3 Results available on request. 
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overall sample. Similar results are observed regarding the other two provinces relative to Punjab 
from an overall sample as well as from the urban and rural regions. 
  
8.3. Clothing and Footwear-related Decision-making Autonomy 
In this section we present results of another dimension of women’s autonomy regarding 
purchasing of clothing and footwear for themselves and family members in the household. We 
replicate results along similar lines discussed in reference to the food-related decision-making of 
women in the household. Therefore, the results correspond to evidence from the overall as well 
as urban and rural regions.  
Table 8.2 at the end of this Chapter presents results for the model applied to clothing 
and footwear-related decision-making autonomy (Equation 5.3) estimated by the conventional 
ordered logit and multinomial logit approaches.4 Therefore, we estimate the multinomial logit 
settings from the perspective of ‘‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy’ and ‘‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy’ 
to investigate the varying effects of each of the determinants of sub-dimensions relating to 
decision-making autonomy around food.   
Table 8.2 (Panel-I) depicts employment status results, revealing women with ‘earned 
income’ have 1.44 and 1.36 times greater odds of having ‘partial’ over ‘no’ autonomy and 
‘strong’ over ‘partial’ autonomy respectively from the overall sample. Within the urban regions, 
however, (Panel-II) employment status does not appear significantly related to food purchasing 
autonomy in the household. In contrast, we find that having an ‘earned income’ generates 
greater odds of 1.42 and 1.49 times of having ‘partial’ autonomy to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ 
autonomy in the rural regions (Panel-III). These results clearly indicate the presence of a 
regional variation modifying the overall effect in increasing ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to 
‘partial’ autonomy.  
Table 8.2 (Panel-I through Panel-III) shows that increasing the household size (in all 
formations) significantly decreases women’s autonomy in clothing and footwear-related 
decision-making from an overall perspective as well as from the urban and rural regions. The 
household size which includes elderly persons and relatives of a husband, but which excludes 
children, appears inversely associated with women’s autonomy in the household. Table 8.2.1 
(Panel-I) at the end of this Chapter further shows that the average size of the household 
decreases odds by 0.61 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy in the household from the overall 
sample. Similarly, the size ‘above average’ decreases odds by 0.45 and 0.73 times for ‘partial’ 
to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the household from the overall sample. These 
                                                            
4 Similar to the food-related autonomy, the results of the ordered logit model corresponding to clothing 
and footwear are not in line with the results of multinomial logit model which indicates violating the 
parallel line assumption: Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response 
categories:  chi2 (26) = 499.85 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. See Chapter 5 for further discussion on the parallel 
lines assumption and its remedy.  
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results are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level of confidence. From the urban regions, 
Table 8.2.1 (Panel-II) shows similar trends of a negative association between increasing the 
household size to the levels of women’s autonomy. However, the results from the rural regions 
(Panel-III) are consistent with the findings from the overall sample.  
Consistent with the household size, Table 8.2.1 shows that the extended family system 
lowers odds by 0.82 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from the overall sample, which is 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level of confidence. From the urban regions (Panel-II) 
the extended family system shows 0.60 times lower odds of the ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy. 
Interestingly, the extended family system relative to a nuclear family system does not appear to 
influence women’s autonomy in the rural regions (Panel-III). Similarly the results (Table 8.2.1 
Panel-I through Panel-III) show that the presence of a mother-in-law appears to lower the odds 
by 0.08, 0.88 and 0.12 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy respectively from the overall, urban 
and rural samples. Results in general appear consistent with a substantial decrease in women’s 
autonomy when the household size is increased, when the family system is extended, and where 
a mother-in-law is present, particularly from ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy categories. However, 
results from the rural regions show that the extended family system may not affect women’s 
autonomy in the household.  
Table 8.2.1 through Appendix Table 8.2.5 5  presents results of the household 
composition in terms of different formulations of children from the overall as well as urban and 
rural samples. 7 Table 8.2.1(Panel-I), shows that ‘no child’ with reference to ‘one child’ (any 
gender) lowers odds by 0.80 for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from the overall sample. On the 
other hand, ‘children’ (both genders) relative to ‘one child’ depicts 1.19 times higher odds of 
‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from the overall sample. From the urban regions (Panel-II), however, 
we witness that ‘no child’ relative to ‘one child’ lowers odds by 0.69 of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy but proves insignificant regarding ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy. Further, we witness 
that ‘children’ (both genders) show 1.34 times greater odds of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from 
the urban regions. In the rural regions, however, we fail to observe any significance of ‘no child’ 
or ‘children’ (both genders) relative to ‘no child’ regarding autonomy levels (Panel-III). Table 
8.2.2 presents the specification where ‘no child’ appears as the reference category to investigate 
if ‘boys’, ‘girls’ or ‘children’ (both genders) are associated with autonomy in the household. 
Results from evidence in the overall sample (Panel-I) show that ‘boys’, ‘girls’ and also 
‘children’ (both genders) relative to ‘no child’ respectively increases odds of 1.25, 1.26 and 
1.49 times of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the household. However, these results were 
inconsistent with the ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from the overall sample. Nevertheless, we 
                                                            
5 All other tables from Appendix Table 8.2.2 to Appendix Table 8.2.5 are presented in Appendix-III: 
Economic Decision-making Autonomy: Disaggregated Analysis. 
7 See footnote 3 for classifications of children and their gender. 
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find ‘children’ (both genders) with relative to ‘no child’ increases odds by 1.30 times of ‘no’ to 
‘partial’ autonomy from the rural regions.  
Table 8.2.3 (Panel-I) shows all other specified categories of children with reference to 
‘no child’ elicit greater odds of having ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy in the household from the 
overall sample. Further, the category of ‘equal number of boys and girls’ relative to ‘no child’ 
increases the odds by 1.25 times of ‘partial’ to ‘strong’ autonomy from the overall sample. We 
find identical results within the urban regions (Panel-II). However, the categories of ‘equal 
number of boys and girls’ and ‘greater numbers of one gender over the other’ respectively show 
1.26, 1.31 and 1.35 times greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from the rural regions 
(Panel-III). 
Appendix Table 8.2.4 (Panel-I) shows that within the overall sample, ‘no child’ or any 
other formulation of children compared with ‘equal number of boys and girls’ lowers the 
‘partial’ as well as ‘strong’ autonomy of women in this particular dimension of women’s 
autonomy. This is consistent with the evidence of the urban and rural regions. Finally we find 
that ‘equal numbers of boys and girls’ appears to significantly increase women’s autonomy in 
the household. Interestingly, the number of children or their gender does not appear relevant in 
influencing women’s autonomy from the rural regions. This may imply the existence of strong 
cultural or traditional traits of constrained women’s autonomy in these areas. 
The results using different specifications of a woman’s education level is presented in 
Table 8.2 and show that education substantially increases women’s ‘partial’ autonomy from the 
overall sample. Similar results are witnessed in the rural regions. Interestingly we do not find 
supporting evidence in the urban regions, that a level of education increases women’s autonomy 
regarding clothing and footwear purchasing. As for age, results (Table 8.2) show that all 
successive age categories from ‘25-29 years’ through to ‘45-49 years’ compared with the base 
category of ‘15-19 years’ substantially increases women’s autonomy from ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and 
‘strong’ to ‘partial’ levels in the overall and rural samples. However, only the two top age 
categories have been observed to significantly increase women’s autonomy within the urban 
regions.  
Further, we observed there was a lack of significant association between a husband’s 
level of education and a woman’s autonomy in clothing and footwear-related decision-making 
in the household. Interestingly however, we find that a husband’s ‘average’ income level 
relative to the ‘low’ income group is significantly associated with increasing ‘partial’ to ‘strong’ 
autonomy. Similarly, we find that family socio-economic status increases levels of autonomy 
from ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ in the overall as well as urban and rural samples.  Furthermore, we 
find that the province of Sindh relative to the province of Punjab shows substantially lower 
levels of autonomy in the overall sample as well as in the urban and rural Sindh regions. Similar 
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results were found when comparing the other two provinces with Punjab from the overall as 
well as urban and rural samples. 
8.4. Recreation and Travel-related Decision-making Autonomy 
The third dimension of autonomy relates to women’s activities outside of the household. This is 
also an important component of the aggregate economic autonomy of women at the household 
level. More specifically, recreation and travel autonomy infers independent decision-making in 
selecting and planning external activities for herself and the family. Similar to the previous 
analysis, we present results of each determinant in association with recreation and travel.  
Table 8.3 at the end of this Chapter presents the results of the recreation and travel-
related decision-making autonomy model (Equation 5.4) estimated by the conventional ordered 
logit and multinomial logit approaches from the overall as well as urban and rural samples. 
Similar to food-related autonomy, the results of the ordered logit model here are not consistent 
with the results of the multinomial logit model, which indicates violation of the parallel line 
assumption. 8  Therefore, we attempt to estimate the multinomial logit settings from the 
perspective of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy to investigate the 
varying effects of each of the determinants of the sub-dimension regarding food-related 
decisions.   
Table 8.3 (Panel-I) shows that women from the urban regions with an ‘earned income’ 
were 1.61 more likely to have ‘partial’ over ‘no’ autonomy, however, an ‘employed’ status 
appears no different from an ‘unemployed’ status in the overall sample and the rural regions. 
Table 8.3 (Panel-I) also shows that an increasing household size (all formulations) significantly 
decreases women’s autonomy in the household in the overall as well as urban and rural samples. 
Similarly, household size (including elderly persons and relatives of husband, but excluding 
children) appears inversely related to women’s autonomy in the household. Table 8.3.1 (Panel-I) 
at the end of this Chapter shows that the ‘average’ sized household lowered odds by 0.56 times 
of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy in the overall sample. Similarly, the size ‘above average’ lowered 
odds by 0.45 and 0.80 times of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the overall 
sample. These results are statistically significant at the 1 per level of confidence. Further, we 
find similar results for the urban and rural regions regarding increasing household size. Results 
(Table 8.3.1) show the extended family system lowers odds by 0.84 times of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy from the overall sample, statistically significant at the 5 per cent level of confidence. 
Similarly, within the rural regions (Panel-III) the extended family system shows 0.81 times 
lower odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy. Interestingly, the extended family system relative to 
the nuclear family system does not appear to influence women’s autonomy in the urban regions 
                                                            
8 Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 
539.01 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. See Chapter 5 for further discussion on parallel lines assumption and its 
remedy  
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(Panel-II). Similarly the results (Table 8.3.1 Panel-I through Panel-III) show that the presence 
of a mother-in-law lowers odds by 0.18, 0.11 and 0.19 times respectively, of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy in all samples. Results consistently observe that increasing the household size, having 
an extended family system and the presence of a mother-in-law substantially decreases women’s 
autonomy, particularly from ‘partial’ to ‘no’ levels.  
Table 8.3.1 (Panel-I and II) shows ‘children’ (both genders) relative to ‘one child’ 
increases odds of 1.13 and 1.24 times of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the household, from both 
the overall and urban sample. Conversely, we fail to observe any significance regarding ‘no 
child’ or ‘children’ (both genders) relative to ‘one child’ in association with any level of 
autonomy from the rural regions (Panel-III). Appendix Table 8.3.29 presents the specification 
where ‘no child’ appears as the reference category to investigate if ‘boys’, ‘girls’ or ‘children’ 
(both gender) are associated with autonomy in the household. Results from the overall sample 
(Panel-I through III) confirm that ‘children’ (both genders) relative to ‘no child’ 
correspondingly depict 1.26, 1.49 and 1.49 times greater odds of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy 
from both the overall and urban samples.  
Table 8.3.3 (Panel-I) shows all other specified categories of ‘children’ relative to ‘no 
child’ depict correspondingly greater odds of having ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the 
household from the overall sample. Further the category of ‘equal numbers of boys and girls’ 
with reference to ‘no child’ depicts 1.25 greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘strong’ autonomy from the 
overall sample. We find identical results from the urban regions (Panel-II). Table 8.3.4 (Panel-I) 
shows that ‘no child’ or any other formulation of children compared with ‘equal number of boys 
and girls’ is significantly related to the ‘partial’ or ‘strong’ autonomy of women in this 
particular dimension within all samples. Finally we find that ‘equal numbers of boys and girls’ 
is also unrelated to increasing women’s autonomy in travel and recreation-related aspects of 
decision-making.  
Regarding women’s education, Table 8.3 presents the findings that the more educated 
women enjoy a higher level of ‘strong’ autonomy in travel and recreation decisions compared 
with uneducated women, in the overall and urban samples. However, this is found partial 
significant from the rural regions sample. Regarding a woman’s age, results (Table 8.3) 
consistently show that all successive age categories from ‘25-29 years’ through to ‘45-49 years’ 
relative to the base category of ‘15-19 years’ increases both ‘partial’ and ‘strong’ autonomy in 
one or more dimensions in all three  samples.  
Women’s autonomy regarding decisions relating to travel and recreation does not 
appear linked to the level of a husband’s education. These results are consistent with other 
dimensions of women’s autonomy. However, a husband’s level of income appears statistically 
                                                            
9 All table from Appendix Table 8.3.2 to Appendix Table 8.3.5 are presented in Appendix-III: Economic 
Decision-making Autonomy: Disaggregated Analysis. 
117 
 
significant in terms of increasing the odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ responses from all samples. 
Similarly, we find that family socio-economic status increases ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in 
the overall as well as urban and rural regions. We also find that the province of Sindh relative to 
the province of Punjab shows substantially lower levels of autonomy in the overall sample as 
well as the urban and rural Sindh regions. Similar results are observed relating to the two other 
provinces in comparison with Punjab, from all three samples. 
8.5. Medical Treatment-related Decision-making Autonomy 
Medical treatment autonomy refers to the ability of a woman to independently undertake 
medical-related consultations. We replicate the analysis along similar lines to other dimensions 
of women’s autonomy. We present results from the overall sample as well as the urban and rural 
regions, subject to different formulations of variables of interest.  
Table 8.4 (Panel-I) at the end of this Chapter shows women with ‘earned income’ have 
greater odds of 1.67 of ‘partial’ over ‘no’ autonomy in the urban regions, however, having an 
‘employed status’ appears no different to results for those with an ‘unemployed status’, both in 
the overall and rural samples. It is interesting to note that the above results are identical to the 
results we found regarding travel and recreation autonomy. Corresponding to the other threat 
option the overall results (Panel-I) show that increasing the household size (including children, 
elderly persons and relatives of the husband) significantly decreases women’s autonomy in the 
household overall as well as in the urban and rural regions. Similarly, where the household size 
excludes children but includes elderly persons and relatives of the husband, women’s autonomy  
appears inversely associated. Table 8.4.1 (Panel-I) at the end of this Chapter shows that the 
‘average’ size of the household decreases odds by 0.61 and 0.81 times respectively, of ‘partial’ 
to ‘no’ autonomy and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ from the overall sample.  
Similarly, the size ‘above average’ further decreases odds by 0.40 and 0.65 times 
respectively, of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the household from the 
overall sample. The above results are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level of 
confidence. Further, we find similar results of an increasing household size in the urban and the 
rural regions. An extended family system lowers the odds by 0.86 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy from the overall sample, a statistically significant result at the 10 per cent level of 
confidence. Similarly we find the extended family system reflects 0.79 times lower odds of the 
‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from the urban regions. These results are consistent with those from 
the rural regions. Similarly Table 8.4.1 (Panel-I through to Panel-III) shows that the presence of 
a mother-in-law lowers odds by 0.14, 0.11 and 0.18 times respectively of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy from the overall, urban and rural samples. Results generally indicate that increasing 
household size, an extended family system and the presence of a mother-in-law substantially 
decreases women’s autonomy, particularly from ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy in the household.  
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Regarding the number of children, we reproduce results along similar lines as observed 
in the other sub-dimensions of autonomy. Table 8.4.1 through to Appendix Table 8.4.5 present 
results of different formulations of children regarding women’s autonomy in medical treatment-
related decision-making from the overall as well as urban and rural regions.13 
Table 8.4.1 (Panel-I and II) at the end of this Chapter shows having ‘children’ (both 
genders) relative to ‘one child’ results in higher odds of 1.11 and 1.23 times of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ 
autonomy respectively from the overall and urban sample. Conversely, no significance is found 
in the categories of ‘no child’ or ‘children’ (both genders) relative to ‘one child’ regarding any 
level of autonomy from the rural regions (Panel-III). Appendix Table 8.4.214  presents the 
specification where the ‘no child’ category appears as the reference category to investigate if 
‘boys’, ‘girls’ or ‘children’ (both gender) are associated with autonomy in the household. 
Results from the overall sample (Panel-I through II) confirm that ‘children’ (both genders) 
relative to ‘no child’ heightens odds by 1.32 and 1.63 times of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the 
overall and urban regions.  
Similarly, Table 8.4.3 (Panel-I) finds all other specified categories of ‘children’ relative 
to ‘no child’ has greater odds of having ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the household from the 
overall sample. Further, the category of ‘equal numbers of boys and girls’ relative to ‘no child’ 
depicts 1.26 greater odds of ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from the overall sample. We find 
identical results from the urban regions (Panel-II). Table 8.4.4 (Panel-I) shows that ‘no child’ or 
any other formulation of children compared with ‘equal numbers of boys and girls’ is 
significantly related to the ‘partial’ or ‘strong’ autonomy of women in this particular dimension 
from all samples. Finally, we find that ‘equal numbers of boys and girls’ does not significantly 
increase women’s autonomy in medical-related decisions.  
Regarding women’s education, Table 8.4 illustrates that relatively more educated 
women enjoy higher rates of ‘strong’ autonomy in medical treatment decisions compared with 
uneducated women from the overall as well urban regions. However, this is particularly 
significant in the rural regions. Regarding age, results consistently show that each successive 
age category from ‘25-29 years’ through to ‘45-49 years’ compared with the base category of 
‘15-19 years’ increases both ‘partial’ and ‘strong’ responses in one of the decision-making 
dimensions in the household, from all samples. 
Furthermore, we find women’s medical treatment-related decision-making is particularly 
influenced by a husband’s higher education levels compared with the uneducated. This is 
consistently confirmed in all three samples. A husband’s level of income also appears 
statistically significant in increasing women’s ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy in all three samples. 
                                                            
13 See footnote 3 for classifications of children and their gender. 
14 All tables from Appendix Table 8.4.2 to Appendix Table 8.4.5 are presented in Appendix-III: 
Economic Decision-making Autonomy: Disaggregated Analysis. 
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Conversely, we do not find any supporting evidence that the family socio-economic status of 
women impacts on any level of autonomy in medical treatment-related decision-making for any 
sample. Further, we find that the province of Sindh relative to the province of Punjab shows 
substantially lower levels of autonomy in the overall sample as well as in the urban and rural 
Sindh regions, particularly in the categories of ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy. Similar results 
are observed corresponding to the other two provinces in comparison with Punjab, from an 
overall as well as urban and rural regional perspective. 
8.6. Concluding Remarks 
Overall results appear consistent with the evidence we observed in Chapter 7 of aggregate 
economic decision-making autonomy of women in the household. For instance, we observed 
that the threat options of an earned income and the size of the household influence women’s 
autonomy in the decision-making spheres of food, clothing and footwear, travel and recreation 
and medical-related decision-making, in both regions and overall. However, it may be relevant 
to note that the threat options and other determinants are related to women’s autonomy in a 
variety of ways, according to each dimension of autonomy and region. We were able to observe 
this relative variation by using the multinomial logit model. As a result, this can be considered 
an important contribution of this research.  
We observed that employed women enjoyed relatively higher degrees of ‘partial’ 
and/or ‘strong’ autonomy in the household regarding food and clothing and footwear 
purchasing decision-making, both from the overall sample and the rural regions, in contrast to 
the urban regions where correlations were statistically insignificant. Not surprisingly, we find 
that being employed increases women’s autonomy from ‘zero’ to ‘partial’ levels in the context 
of independent travel and recreation, and medical treatment-related decision-making from the 
urban regions, although correlations for the rural regions proved statistically insignificant. These 
results clearly indicate a regional variation.  
Results clearly demonstrate that an increasing size of household (excluding children) 
leads to a decrease in women’s autonomy across all dimensions of decision-making. 
Furthermore, the above results are almost identical across both the urban and the rural regions. 
Similarly, we observed that the extended family formation appears to diminish women’s 
autonomy in the household, for both the urban and rural areas, in the context of all four 
dimensions of decision-making. Results also illustrate that the presence of a mother-in-law 
corresponds to a decrease in a woman’s autonomy across all four dimensions, from the urban 
and rural regions. In summary, the household size (excluding children) that includes an 
extended family formation and a mother-in-law decreases women’s decision-making power in 
the household.  
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In contrast, however, we find that within the urban regions, an increasing number of 
children in a household increases women’s autonomy. We also observed that the gender of 
children has little impact on increasing women’s autonomy. The rural regions provide a contrast 
in that the presence of children does not appear to significantly heighten women’s autonomy. 
The regional differences regarding the effect of children on women’s autonomy can be broadly 
linked to the prevailing strong cultural backgrounds in each area. For example, we commonly 
observe that men from rural or tribal regions are more likely to have multiple wives regardless 
of the desire for more children. All other determinants appear with usual meanings in 
association with the above four dimensions of autonomy as observed with aggregated economic 
decision-making aspect of women’s autonomy. 
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Table 8.1: Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Food autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment Status Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.54 0.00 1.45 0.00 1.36 0.03 1.23 0.12 1.11 0.62 1.21 0.25 1.72 0.00 1.64 0.00 1.49 0.05 
Household Size 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.93 0.05 0.75 0.00 1.03 0.81 0.94 0.05 0.60 0.01 0.79 0.08 0.93 0.05 0.85 0.07 0.92 0.58 
Above Average 0.57 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.90 0.06 0.58 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.73 0.00 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.79 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.88 0.16 0.77 0.21 0.60 0.00 0.93 0.61 0.81 0.12 0.71 0.17 0.86 0.23 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.33 0.01 0.64 0.00 1.01 0.98 0.28 0.31 0.70 0.00 0.83 0.86 0.39 0.02 0.51 0.00 1.27 0.55 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 1.35 0.14 1.36 0.19 1.30 0.14 1.34 0.28 1.74 0.10 1.08 0.82 1.41 0.15 1.30 0.22 1.44 0.11 
25-29 years 1.72 0.00 1.67 0.16 1.63 0.01 1.86 0.34 2.25 0.02 1.52 0.22 1.72 0.00 1.56 0.34 1.69 0.02 
30-34 years 2.19 0.00 2.28 0.15 1.76 0.00 2.42 0.17 3.10 0.20 1.67 0.13 2.12 0.00 2.11 0.21 1.77 0.01 
35-39 years 2.56 0.00 2.55 0.00 2.17 0.00 2.49 0.17 3.70 0.00 1.63 0.15 2.67 0.00 2.25 0.17 2.55 0.00 
40-44 years 2.78 0.00 2.91 0.00 2.18 0.00 2.95 0.00 4.05 0.00 1.94 0.14 2.67 0.00 2.58 0.00 2.25 0.00 
45-49 years 2.43 0.00 3.14 0.00 1.83 0.01 2.64 0.00 4.04 0.00 1.86 0.12 2.36 0.00 3.00 0.00 1.75 0.04 
 continue… 
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Table 8.1(…continued): Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Food autonomy)  
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.22 0.02 1.22 0.08 1.07 0.47 0.91 0.43 1.08 0.64 0.83 0.18 1.41 0.00 1.26 0.14 1.25 0.10 
8-years education 1.10 0.48 1.16 0.42 1.05 0.77 0.85 0.26 0.94 0.79 0.91 0.66 1.42 0.10 1.24 0.44 1.29 0.34 
10-12years education 1.20 0.09 1.55 0.00 0.89 0.45 1.04 0.75 1.28 0.10 0.91 0.60 1.20 0.40 1.69 0.04 0.77 0.30 
Higher education 1.34 0.02 1.07 0.73 1.29 0.10 1.10 0.52 0.91 0.68 1.17 0.43 1.41 0.29 1.08 0.84 1.40 0.34 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 0.83 0.01 0.87 0.12 0.87 0.12 0.79 0.04 0.75 0.07 0.92 0.59 0.85 0.04 0.91 0.34 0.88 0.25 
8-years education 0.96 0.63 0.82 0.08 1.11 0.33 0.91 0.51 0.77 0.14 1.10 0.57 0.95 0.63 0.79 0.11 1.14 0.38 
10-12years education 0.86 0.14 0.73 0.00 1.01 0.96 0.77 0.04 0.63 0.01 1.02 0.92 0.93 0.52 0.79 0.14 1.02 0.87 
Higher education 0.82 0.04 0.80 0.14 0.86 0.24 0.78 0.14 0.68 0.03 0.92 0.67 0.82 0.13 0.88 0.48 0.81 0.25 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.13 0.17 1.33 0.00 1.07 0.42 1.23 0.19 1.55 0.00 1.04 0.72 1.03 0.71 1.10 0.30 1.10 0.35 
High income 1.19 0.24 1.91 0.00 0.92 0.66 1.35 0.11 1.93 0.02 1.01 0.96 1.10 0.70 2.34 0.01 0.76 0.43 
Family Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.15 0.06 0.97 0.78 1.21 0.06 1.22 0.02 0.94 0.74 1.27 0.15 1.11 0.03 0.98 0.89 1.18 0.20 
High income 1.28 0.00 0.85 0.19 1.44 0.00 1.27 0.09 0.81 0.26 1.38 0.06 1.24 0.05 0.81 0.17 1.46 0.01 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.38 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.81 0.09 0.62 0.01 0.25 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.25 0.00 
NWFP 0.13 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.50 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.61 0.14 0.12 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.47 0.03 
Baluchistan 0.07 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.01 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this Panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (26) = 4322.57; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -11386.186; Pseudo 
R2 = 0.1595. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 251.91, Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   
= 13522; Design df = 1101; F (52, 1050) = 378.95; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this Panel refers to the results of the urban regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(26, 502)=12.71, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1595. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 251.91, Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 
5318; Design df = 527; F(52, 476) = 74.76; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this Panel refers to the results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 527, F(26, 549) = 21.13, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1595. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 251.91, Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 
8204; Design df = 574; F (52,523) = 321.06; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 8.1.1: Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Food autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.49 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.34 0.05 1.20 0.18 1.07 0.75 1.18 0.33 1.66 0.00 1.55 0.00 1.46 0.05 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.74 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.89 0.21 0.70 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.77 0.01 0.60 0.00 0.98 0.87 
Above Average 0.52 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.71 0.01 0.56 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.77 0.02 
Household Size: 
Children 
Boy/Girl 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
No child 0.91 0.27 0.78 0.03 1.03 0.82 0.75 0.05 0.68 0.04 0.90 0.55 1.02 0.83 0.86 0.29 1.12 0.46 
Boys/Girls (both) 1.19 0.00 1.12 0.13 1.17 0.06 1.22 0.05 1.14 0.28 1.15 0.29 1.16 0.04 1.10 0.32 1.17 0.11 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 0.86 0.07 0.81 0.04 0.91 0.38 0.87 0.26 0.73 0.07 1.04 0.82 0.86 0.15 0.85 0.23 0.84 0.22 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.37 0.02 0.85 0.00 1.08 0.85 0.28 0.27 0.52 0.00 1.17 0.88 0.44 0.05 0.48 0.00 1.36 0.44 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.15 0.33 1.09 0.65 1.22 0.28 1.04 0.88 1.30 0.45 0.98 0.94 1.29 0.16 1.09 0.67 1.40 0.15 
25-29 years 1.28 0.10 1.13 0.53 1.42 0.07 1.20 0.54 1.37 0.39 1.23 0.55 1.42 0.06 1.13 0.57 1.58 0.06 
30-34 years 1.47 0.02 1.33 0.17 1.45 0.06 1.37 0.31 1.59 0.21 1.25 0.51 1.61 0.01 1.34 0.22 1.58 0.07 
35-39 years 1.71 0.00 1.48 0.06 1.78 0.01 1.47 0.18 1.98 0.07 1.26 0.50 1.96 0.00 1.40 0.17 2.21 0.00 
40-44 years 2.09 0.00 2.02 0.00 1.88 0.00 2.06 0.02 2.79 0.01 1.61 0.16 2.15 0.00 1.86 0.01 2.01 0.01 
45-49 years 2.00 0.00 2.46 0.00 1.65 0.04 2.04 0.04 3.13 0.00 1.61 0.24 2.06 0.00 2.44 0.00 1.63 0.10 
 continue… 
124 
 
Table 8.1.1 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Food autonomy)
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.24 0.01 1.25 0.05 1.09 0.41 0.94 0.62 1.15 0.40 0.84 0.22 1.42 0.00 1.26 0.14 1.27 0.09 
8-years education 1.13 0.38 1.18 0.36 1.07 0.71 0.87 0.36 0.97 0.89 0.92 0.68 1.45 0.10 1.28 0.39 1.31 0.31 
10-12years education 1.24 0.04 1.64 0.00 0.91 0.53 1.08 0.55 1.37 0.10 0.91 0.59 1.24 0.32 1.80 0.02 0.79 0.35 
Higher education 1.42 0.01 1.17 0.41 1.34 0.08 1.20 0.22 1.03 0.90 1.22 0.32 1.49 0.22 1.15 0.73 1.47 0.28 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 0.83 0.01 0.89 0.19 0.87 0.14 0.78 0.03 0.74 0.07 0.91 0.55 0.86 0.06 0.94 0.52 0.88 0.27 
8-years education 0.98 0.79 0.84 0.12 1.13 0.27 0.94 0.64 0.77 0.15 1.12 0.49 0.96 0.73 0.81 0.16 1.15 0.34 
10-12years education 0.88 0.15 0.76 0.01 1.02 0.86 0.80 0.08 0.66 0.01 1.05 0.78 0.94 0.56 0.81 0.14 1.02 0.87 
Higher education 0.84 0.07 0.83 0.15 0.87 0.28 0.83 0.17 0.73 0.08 0.95 0.80 0.82 0.14 0.90 0.55 0.81 0.25 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.04 0.46 1.17 0.03 1.03 0.71 1.08 0.39 1.30 0.03 0.98 0.87 0.97 0.65 1.01 0.98 1.07 0.52 
High income 1.14 0.37 1.77 0.01 0.91 0.62 1.21 0.34 1.65 0.08 0.98 0.93 1.10 0.67 2.25 0.01 0.77 0.44 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.27 0.00 1.11 0.28 1.26 0.02 1.37 0.02 1.14 0.48 1.29 0.13 1.21 0.03 1.09 0.44 1.23 0.12 
High income 1.52 0.00 1.08 0.40 1.55 0.00 1.54 0.00 1.15 0.41 1.42 0.04 1.43 0.00 0.99 0.90 1.57 0.00 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 0.37 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.74 0.08 0.62 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.24 0.00 
NWFP 0.12 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.59 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.46 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.01 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this Panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (28) = 4361.12; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -11366.914; Pseudo 
R2 = 0.1610. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 290.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 
13522; Design df = 1101; F (56, 1046) = 366.78; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this Panel refers to the results of the urban regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(28, 500)=13.06, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1610. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 290.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 
5318; Design df = 527; F(56, 472) = 7.45; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this Panel refers to the results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. no. of Obs = 8204;  Design df = 78.36, F(28, 547) = 18.85, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1610. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 290.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 
8204; Design df = 574; F(56,519) = 301.26; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 8.2: Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Clothing and footwear autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy 2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment Status Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.61 0.00 1.44 0.00 1.36 0.03 1.28 0.08 1.38 0.13 1.21 0.25 1.79 0.00 1.42 0.01 1.49 0.05 
Household Size 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.88 0.09 0.70 0.00 1.03 0.81 0.97 0.82 0.71 0.08 0.79 0.08 0.83 0.05 0.68 0.00 0.92 0.58 
Above Average 0.70 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.82 0.07 0.42 0.00 0.90 0.06 0.65 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.73 0.00 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.92 0.20 0.76 0.00 0.88 0.16 0.87 0.18 0.68 0.02 0.93 0.61 0.92 0.35 0.77 0.16 0.86 0.23 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.24 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.01 0.98 0.04 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.83 0.86 0.41 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.27 0.55 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 1.33 0.13 1.30 0.19 1.30 0.14 1.13 0.61 1.40 0.26 1.08 0.82 1.47 0.02 1.29 0.15 1.44 0.11 
25-29 years 1.56 0.00 1.54 0.23 1.63 0.01 1.49 0.16 1.98 0.24 1.52 0.22 1.59 0.01 1.41 0.15 1.69 0.02 
30-34 years 2.19 0.00 2.28 0.15 1.76 0.00 2.42 0.17 3.10 0.20 1.67 0.13 2.12 0.00 2.11 0.21 1.77 0.01 
35-39 years 2.56 0.00 2.55 0.00 2.17 0.00 2.49 0.07 3.70 0.13 1.63 0.15 2.67 0.00 2.25 0.00 2.55 0.00 
40-44 years 2.78 0.00 2.91 0.00 2.18 0.00 2.95 0.00 4.05 0.00 1.94 0.14 2.67 0.00 2.58 0.00 2.25 0.00 
45-49 years 2.43 0.00 3.14 0.00 1.83 0.01 2.64 0.00 4.04 0.00 1.86 0.12 2.36 0.00 3.00 0.00 1.75 0.04 
…continue 
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Table 8.2 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Clothing and footwear autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy 
Partial to no 
autonomy 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy 
Partial to no 
autonomy 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.36 0.00 1.19 0.10 1.07 0.47 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.76 0.83 0.18 1.48 0.00 1.28 0.08 1.25 0.10 
8-years education 1.51 0.00 1.53 0.01 1.05 0.77 1.04 0.77 1.10 0.67 0.91 0.66 1.72 0.01 1.79 0.02 1.29 0.34 
10-12years education 1.52 0.00 1.43 0.01 0.89 0.45 1.00 0.97 1.01 0.97 0.91 0.60 1.70 0.00 1.83 0.01 0.77 0.30 
Higher education 2.31 0.00 1.27 0.10 1.29 0.10 1.55 0.01 0.97 0.90 1.17 0.43 1.86 0.03 1.54 0.21 1.40 0.34 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 0.94 0.38 1.02 0.77 0.87 0.12 0.99 0.96 1.00 0.98 0.92 0.59 0.95 0.51 1.02 0.83 0.88 0.25 
8-years education 1.10 0.22 0.89 0.27 1.11 0.33 1.17 0.22 0.97 0.87 1.10 0.57 1.02 0.83 0.82 0.12 1.14 0.38 
10-12years education 0.94 0.47 0.87 0.16 1.01 0.96 1.14 0.29 0.93 0.64 1.02 0.92 0.85 0.11 0.83 0.11 1.02 0.87 
Higher education 0.97 0.73 1.12 0.31 0.86 0.24 1.05 0.72 1.04 0.84 0.92 0.67 0.94 0.61 1.20 0.20 0.81 0.25 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.22 0.00 1.47 0.00 1.07 0.42 1.22 0.02 1.54 0.00 1.04 0.72 1.13 0.15 1.36 0.00 1.10 0.35 
High income 1.33 0.15 1.39 0.12 0.92 0.66 1.36 0.12 1.35 0.32 1.01 0.96 1.31 0.27 1.54 0.19 0.76 0.43 
Family Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.10 0.06 0.92 0.31 1.21 0.06 1.28 0.07 0.85 0.38 1.27 0.15 1.00 0.98 0.92 0.41 1.18 0.20 
High income 1.36 0.00 1.24 0.17 1.44 0.00 1.51 0.00 0.81 0.25 1.38 0.06 1.18 0.05 0.75 0.13 1.46 0.01 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.40 0.00 0.77 0.01 0.40 0.00 0.76 0.05 0.94 0.71 0.62 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.72 0.01 0.25 0.00 
NWFP 0.29 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.50 0.02 0.48 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.61 0.14 0.25 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.03 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.34 0.01 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this Panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (26) = 3793.82; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -12577.636; Pseudo 
R2 = 0.1311. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 499.85 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 
13522; Design df = 1101; F (52, 1050) = 14.90; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this Panel refers to the results of the urban regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(26, 502)=11.25, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1311. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 499.85 Prob > chi2 = 0.002) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 
5318; Design df = 527; F(52, 476) = 84.63; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this Panel refers to results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(26, 549) = 23.74, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1311. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 499.85 Prob > chi2 = 0.002) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; 
Design df = 574; F(  52,523) = 12.59; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 8.2.1: Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Clothing and footwear autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.59 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.34 0.05 1.27 0.10 1.33 0.19 1.18 0.33 1.75 0.00 1.36 0.02 1.46 0.05 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.82 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.89 0.21 0.91 0.44 0.60 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.79 0.01 0.61 0.00 0.98 0.87 
Above Average 0.70 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.79 0.02 0.40 0.00 0.71 0.01 0.66 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.77 0.02 
Household Size: 
Children 
Boy/Girl 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
No child 0.86 0.09 0.80 0.02 1.03 0.82 0.76 0.06 0.69 0.03 0.90 0.55 0.97 0.79 0.86 0.23 1.12 0.46 
Boys/Girls (both) 1.13 0.04 1.19 0.02 1.17 0.06 1.08 0.41 1.34 0.03 1.15 0.29 1.15 0.07 1.12 0.21 1.17 0.11 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.92 0.28 0.82 0.05 0.91 0.38 0.86 0.23 0.72 0.08 1.04 0.82 0.93 0.44 0.84 0.13 0.84 0.22 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.08 0.85 0.04 0.00 0.88 0.00 1.17 0.88 0.45 0.03 0.12 0.00 1.36 0.44 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 1.18 0.21 1.07 0.67 1.22 0.28 1.00 1.00 1.08 0.81 0.98 0.94 1.35 0.07 1.11 0.55 1.40 0.15 
25-29 years 1.27 0.09 1.08 0.63 1.42 0.07 1.20 0.48 1.21 0.53 1.23 0.55 1.35 0.08 1.07 0.71 1.58 0.06 
30-34 years 1.45 0.01 1.19 0.31 1.45 0.06 1.52 0.13 1.06 0.85 1.25 0.51 1.43 0.05 1.32 0.17 1.58 0.07 
35-39 years 1.85 0.00 1.60 0.01 1.78 0.01 1.58 0.08 1.54 0.21 1.26 0.50 2.03 0.00 1.69 0.01 2.21 0.00 
40-44 years 2.20 0.00 2.01 0.00 1.88 0.00 1.78 0.04 1.93 0.06 1.61 0.16 2.37 0.00 2.11 0.00 2.01 0.01 
45-49 years 2.23 0.00 2.31 0.00 1.65 0.04 2.17 0.01 2.34 0.02 1.61 0.24 2.21 0.00 2.45 0.00 1.63 0.10 
…continue 
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Table 8.2.1 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Clothing and footwear autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.38 0.00 1.21 0.07 1.09 0.41 1.02 0.88 0.98 0.99 0.84 0.22 1.49 0.00 1.28 0.08 1.27 0.09 
8-years education 1.53 0.00 1.56 0.01 1.07 0.71 1.06 0.66 1.14 0.57 0.92 0.68 1.75 0.01 1.83 0.01 1.31 0.31 
10-12years education 1.56 0.00 1.50 0.01 0.91 0.53 1.02 0.89 1.07 0.75 0.91 0.59 1.76 0.00 1.94 0.00 0.79 0.35 
Higher education 2.42 0.00 1.38 0.09 1.34 0.08 1.62 0.00 1.10 0.70 1.22 0.32 1.96 0.02 1.63 0.16 1.47 0.28 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 0.95 0.42 1.04 0.64 0.87 0.14 0.99 0.91 0.98 0.92 0.91 0.55 0.96 0.58 1.05 0.64 0.88 0.27 
8-years education 1.11 0.20 0.90 0.31 1.13 0.27 1.18 0.19 0.98 0.89 1.12 0.49 1.03 0.80 0.82 0.14 1.15 0.34 
10-12years education 0.95 0.53 0.90 0.27 1.02 0.86 1.15 0.24 0.97 0.86 1.05 0.78 0.85 0.11 0.84 0.16 1.02 0.87 
Higher education 0.98 0.82 1.15 0.20 0.87 0.28 1.07 0.60 1.10 0.58 0.95 0.80 0.94 0.64 1.21 0.17 0.81 0.25 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.15 0.01 1.31 0.00 1.03 0.71 1.15 0.09 1.31 0.02 0.98 0.87 1.07 0.36 1.24 0.01 1.07 0.52 
High income 1.28 0.12 1.28 0.25 0.91 0.62 1.29 0.20 1.17 0.61 0.98 0.93 1.28 0.30 1.45 0.25 0.77 0.44 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.16 0.03 1.03 0.76 1.26 0.02 1.33 0.03 0.99 0.95 1.29 0.13 1.07 0.39 1.02 0.85 1.23 0.12 
High income 1.52 0.00 1.03 0.14 1.55 0.00 1.62 0.00 1.09 0.64 1.42 0.04 1.33 0.01 0.91 0.36 1.57 0.00 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.39 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.75 0.04 0.89 0.49 0.62 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.72 0.01 0.24 0.00 
NWFP 0.28 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.47 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.59 0.12 0.24 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.46 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.34 0.01 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this Panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (28) = 3789.29; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -12579.9; Pseudo R2 
= 0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 543.74 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 
13522; Design df = 1101; F (56, 1040) = 14.64; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this Panel refers to the results of the urban regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(28, 500)=10.69, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 543.74 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. no. of Obs = 
5318; Design df = 527; F(56, 472) = 89.83; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this Panel refers to the results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(28, 547) = 21.84, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 543.74 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 
8204; Design df = 574; F(56,519) = 11.77; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 8.3: Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Travel and recreation autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment Status Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.24 0.04 1.24 0.13 1.00 0.98 1.64 0.00 1.61 0.00 1.17 0.49 1.07 0.61 1.10 0.55 0.93 0.66 
Household Size 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.78 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.78 0.08 0.77 0.05 0.67 0.01 0.80 0.35 0.79 0.01 0.71 0.00 0.79 0.08 
Above Average 0.58 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.94 0.06 0.55 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.80 0.18 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.78 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.87 0.41 0.89 0.27 0.77 0.15 0.66 0.18 0.69 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.99 0.90 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.30 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.50 0.58 0.12 0.06 0.39 0.09 0.25 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.53 0.03 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 1.10 0.46 1.14 0.28 0.94 0.89 1.16 0.54 1.10 0.69 2.19 0.21 1.10 0.52 1.17 0.27 0.80 0.63 
25-29 years 1.67 0.00 1.64 0.12 1.27 0.60 2.21 0.00 1.89 0.18 3.42 0.04 1.50 0.17 1.56 0.12 0.96 0.94 
30-34 years 1.97 0.00 2.05 0.00 1.12 0.81 2.58 0.00 2.27 0.14 3.48 0.04 1.80 0.00 2.01 0.00 0.74 0.57 
35-39 years 2.67 0.00 2.60 0.00 1.54 0.37 2.90 0.00 2.46 0.00 4.06 0.03 2.69 0.00 2.74 0.00 1.18 0.75 
40-44 years 3.06 0.00 2.66 0.00 2.03 0.09 3.28 0.00 2.82 0.00 4.00 0.03 3.14 0.00 2.65 0.00 1.88 0.10 
45-49 years 3.27 0.00 2.97 0.00 1.97 0.10 3.14 0.00 2.50 0.00 4.72 0.01 3.59 0.00 3.41 0.00 1.60 0.35 
…continue 
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Table 8.3 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Travel and recreation autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.34 0.00 1.29 0.00 1.29 0.08 1.05 0.69 1.14 0.30 0.88 0.62 1.53 0.00 1.36 0.01 1.56 0.01 
8-years education 1.17 0.17 1.17 0.20 1.19 0.42 0.88 0.41 0.98 0.92 0.82 0.50 1.47 0.04 1.26 0.19 1.68 0.11 
10-12years education 1.21 0.09 1.01 0.96 1.93 0.00 0.94 0.65 1.36 0.04 1.93 0.01 1.65 0.01 1.58 0.02 1.52 0.12 
Higher education 1.13 0.37 0.90 0.46 2.33 0.00 0.89 0.50 0.72 0.15 1.90 0.04 1.64 0.06 1.45 0.15 1.86 0.23 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.02 0.72 1.07 0.34 0.88 0.35 1.25 0.08 1.32 0.03 0.97 0.91 0.92 0.27 0.96 0.64 0.83 0.25 
8-years education 0.92 0.32 0.81 0.12 1.34 0.10 1.02 0.88 0.91 0.51 1.29 0.41 0.86 0.16 0.77 0.13 1.31 0.21 
10-12years education 1.01 0.87 0.95 0.52 1.15 0.37 1.08 0.55 1.08 0.57 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.66 0.86 0.17 1.25 0.24 
Higher education 1.05 0.62 1.06 0.54 0.92 0.68 1.07 0.66 1.06 0.70 0.99 0.99 1.09 0.48 1.14 0.31 0.81 0.44 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.24 0.00 1.35 0.00 0.80 0.12 1.18 0.19 1.29 0.18 0.77 0.22 1.26 0.00 1.34 0.00 0.84 0.17 
High income 1.51 0.01 1.71 0.00 0.77 0.28 1.54 0.12 1.69 0.01 0.83 0.51 1.54 0.05 1.95 0.02 0.57 0.24 
Family Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 0.84 0.12 0.83 0.12 0.98 0.87 0.83 0.22 0.83 0.21 0.99 0.98 0.82 0.12 0.82 0.13 0.93 0.65 
High income 1.75 0.00 1.45 0.00 1.19 0.20 0.81 0.14 0.72 0.13 1.34 0.23 1.69 0.00 1.53 0.00 1.06 0.70 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.64 0.00 1.01 0.92 0.13 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.85 0.30 0.19 0.00 0.74 0.03 1.15 0.36 0.07 0.00 
NWFP 0.96 0.71 1.46 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.75 0.03 1.13 0.58 0.30 0.00 1.04 0.75 1.57 0.01 0.25 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.19 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.32 0.02 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this Panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (26) = 1662.41; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -11234.478; Pseudo 
R2 = 0.0689. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 539.01 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 
13522; Design df = 1101; F (52, 1050) = 13.21; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this Panel refers to the results of the urban regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(26, 502)=7.45, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.0689. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 539.01 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; 
Design df = 527; F(52, 476) = 7.32; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this Panel refers to the results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(26, 549) = 11.79, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.0689. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 539.01 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 
8204; Design df = 574; F(  52,523) = 10.42; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 8.3.1: Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Travel and recreation autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.20 0.07 1.20 0.14 1.01 0.95 1.60 0.00 1.57 0.00 1.18 0.47 1.03 0.84 1.04 0.79 0.94 0.73 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.67 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.69 0.01 0.65 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.78 0.28 0.67 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.65 0.02 
Above Average 0.53 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.80 0.08 0.53 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.63 0.02 0.50 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.95 0.74 
Household Size: 
Children 
Boy/Girl 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
No child 0.94 0.49 0.90 0.19 1.28 0.18 0.85 0.28 0.83 0.25 1.17 0.60 1.01 0.95 0.94 0.54 1.40 0.16 
Boys/Girls (both) 1.13 0.04 1.13 0.05 0.99 0.92 1.25 0.01 1.24 0.04 1.02 0.89 1.05 0.50 1.07 0.37 0.94 0.69 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.86 0.05 0.84 0.04 0.89 0.54 0.93 0.54 0.85 0.29 0.71 0.22 0.80 0.01 0.81 0.04 0.99 0.97 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.33 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.43 0.01 0.49 0.56 0.11 0.05 0.38 0.08 0.29 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.50 0.01 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 0.97 0.83 0.98 0.86 1.05 0.91 0.98 0.94 0.90 0.63 2.43 0.18 1.01 0.94 1.04 0.80 0.93 0.87 
25-29 years 1.32 0.03 1.22 0.13 1.54 0.34 1.62 0.04 1.29 0.28 4.05 0.03 1.26 0.13 1.22 0.21 1.23 0.66 
30-34 years 1.41 0.01 1.35 0.04 1.42 0.47 1.69 0.04 1.35 0.23 4.31 0.03 1.37 0.06 1.39 0.06 0.99 0.99 
35-39 years 1.92 0.00 1.73 0.00 1.91 0.18 1.98 0.01 1.54 0.08 4.90 0.02 2.02 0.00 1.91 0.00 1.52 0.41 
40-44 years 2.48 0.00 2.06 0.00 2.40 0.06 2.52 0.00 2.11 0.00 4.34 0.03 2.68 0.00 2.14 0.00 2.36 0.08 
45-49 years 2.88 0.00 2.53 0.00 2.28 0.07 2.61 0.00 2.06 0.01 4.85 0.02 3.36 0.00 3.04 0.00 2.06 0.13 
…continue 
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Table 8.3.1 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Travel and recreation autonomy)
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.36 0.00 1.31 0.00 1.29 0.07 1.08 0.55 1.19 0.18 0.87 0.57 1.54 0.00 1.36 0.01 1.59 0.01 
8-years education 1.20 0.11 1.19 0.16 1.20 0.42 0.90 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.47 1.53 0.02 1.30 0.13 1.68 0.10 
10-12years education 1.26 0.04 1.04 0.73 1.93 0.00 0.97 0.81 1.32 0.07 1.90 0.01 1.75 0.00 1.69 0.01 1.49 0.15 
Higher education 1.20 0.20 0.96 0.79 2.28 0.00 0.95 0.77 0.78 0.17 1.86 0.05 1.72 0.04 1.55 0.11 1.80 0.24 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.04 0.56 1.09 0.22 0.88 0.33 1.25 0.07 1.32 0.03 0.97 0.91 0.94 0.40 0.99 0.88 0.83 0.25 
8-years education 0.93 0.40 0.82 0.13 1.33 0.11 1.03 0.84 0.91 0.53 1.31 0.39 0.87 0.20 0.78 0.12 1.31 0.21 
10-12years education 1.04 0.61 0.98 0.83 1.13 0.43 1.12 0.39 1.13 0.37 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.84 0.89 0.29 1.24 0.26 
Higher education 1.08 0.43 1.10 0.32 0.91 0.63 1.13 0.44 1.12 0.44 0.98 0.93 1.11 0.41 1.17 0.22 0.81 0.43 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.15 0.02 1.23 0.00 0.84 0.12 1.06 0.54 1.13 0.21 0.82 0.35 1.18 0.02 1.25 0.00 0.86 0.26 
High income 1.44 0.02 1.62 0.01 0.80 0.36 1.37 0.11 1.49 0.06 0.88 0.66 1.56 0.05 1.95 0.02 0.59 0.28 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 0.91 0.20 0.91 0.22 0.95 0.75 0.93 0.60 0.95 0.72 0.91 0.76 0.89 0.15 0.89 0.19 0.94 0.70 
High income 1.87 0.08 1.21 0.02 1.13 0.37 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.71 1.15 0.59 1.79 0.02 1.33 0.00 1.04 0.78 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.63 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.13 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.81 0.17 0.20 0.00 0.74 0.03 1.16 0.33 0.07 0.00 
NWFP 0.93 0.53 1.42 0.01 0.25 0.00 0.70 0.06 1.04 0.84 0.32 0.00 1.03 0.84 1.56 0.01 0.24 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.19 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.31 0.02 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this Panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (28) = 1726.98; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -11202.191; Pseudo 
R2 = 0.0716. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 585.39 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 
13522; Design df = 1101; F (56, 1040) = 13.18; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this Panel refers to the results of the urban regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(28, 500)=6.95, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.0716. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 585.39 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; 
Design df = 527; F(56, 472) = 7.09; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this Panel refers to the results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(28, 547) = 11.44, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.0716. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 585.39 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 
8204; Design df = 574; F(56,519) = 10.21; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 8.4: Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Medical treatment autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment Status Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.22 0.06 1.18 0.20 1.10 0.40 1.68 0.00 1.67 0.00 1.23 0.24 1.02 0.88 1.03 0.87 0.99 0.92 
Household Size 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.81 0.01 0.69 0.00 0.77 0.02 0.72 0.01 0.64 0.00 0.92 0.66 0.87 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.68 0.01 
Above Average 0.57 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.92 0.03 0.56 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.66 0.01 0.57 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.90 0.44 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.85 0.02 0.76 0.00 1.20 0.19 0.96 0.71 0.73 0.03 0.64 0.02 0.76 0.00 0.75 0.01 0.98 0.91 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.20 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.83 0.04 0.50 0.58 0.12 0.06 0.39 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.51 0.01 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 1.22 0.62 1.23 0.43 1.08 0.83 1.23 0.34 1.16 0.54 1.34 0.55 1.25 0.13 1.27 0.34 1.02 0.96 
25-29 years 1.75 0.00 1.67 0.13 1.36 0.37 1.93 0.12 1.72 0.58 1.67 0.24 1.71 0.00 1.65 0.00 1.28 0.56 
30-34 years 2.08 0.00 2.09 0.00 1.26 0.51 2.39 0.00 2.04 0.16 1.93 0.14 1.97 0.00 2.14 0.00 0.94 0.89 
35-39 years 2.79 0.00 2.71 0.00 1.52 0.25 3.10 0.00 2.60 0.00 2.25 0.08 2.65 0.00 2.78 0.00 1.16 0.74 
40-44 years 3.45 0.00 2.79 0.00 2.12 0.03 3.79 0.00 2.83 0.00 2.72 0.02 3.25 0.00 2.75 0.00 1.78 0.08 
45-49 years 3.27 0.00 2.97 0.00 1.81 0.09 2.90 0.00 2.21 0.00 2.38 0.06 3.57 0.00 3.46 0.00 1.55 0.31 
…continue 
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Table 8.4 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Medical treatment autonomy)
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.28 0.00 1.16 0.07 1.32 0.02 1.05 0.65 1.09 0.47 0.96 0.83 1.37 0.00 1.16 0.18 1.48 0.02 
8-years education 1.22 0.08 1.16 0.29 1.23 0.27 0.94 0.68 1.00 0.98 0.91 0.69 1.37 0.08 1.16 0.40 1.49 0.18 
10-12years education 1.37 0.00 1.13 0.31 1.65 0.00 1.03 0.80 0.83 0.22 1.46 0.06 1.69 0.00 1.64 0.01 1.38 0.15 
Higher education 1.28 0.06 0.96 0.74 1.97 0.00 1.00 0.98 0.79 0.18 1.50 0.07 1.38 0.20 1.15 0.58 1.70 0.22 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.04 0.54 1.06 0.46 1.05 0.97 1.17 0.21 1.16 0.30 1.07 0.70 0.97 0.69 1.00 0.96 0.95 0.71 
8-years education 0.97 0.77 0.83 0.13 1.34 0.04 0.95 0.70 0.84 0.27 1.13 0.55 0.96 0.69 0.81 0.15 1.41 0.06 
10-12years education 1.00 0.97 0.87 0.12 1.26 0.07 1.01 0.94 0.98 0.87 1.04 0.84 0.96 0.68 0.79 0.14 1.42 0.03 
Higher education 1.01 0.94 1.03 0.78 0.97 0.81 0.96 0.73 0.98 0.87 0.94 0.77 1.07 0.55 1.11 0.40 0.93 0.75 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.31 0.00 1.41 0.00 0.92 0.38 1.21 0.34 1.38 0.00 0.83 0.23 1.31 0.00 1.36 0.00 0.97 0.79 
High income 1.59 0.00 1.60 0.01 1.04 0.83 1.51 0.03 1.36 0.16 1.17 0.48 1.62 0.03 2.32 0.01 0.57 0.17 
Family Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 0.89 0.10 0.86 0.14 1.03 0.82 0.91 0.50 0.90 0.45 1.02 0.92 0.85 0.16 0.84 0.16 0.97 0.81 
High income 0.82 0.81 0.76 0.34 1.14 0.25 0.94 0.60 0.85 0.24 1.18 0.38 0.72 0.00 0.70 0.22 0.98 0.92 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.74 0.00 1.15 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.79 0.10 1.05 0.75 0.60 0.01 0.66 0.00 1.21 0.17 0.11 0.00 
NWFP 0.91 0.37 1.72 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.72 0.07 1.28 0.31 0.25 0.00 0.96 0.77 1.84 0.00 0.18 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.20 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.20 0.00 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this Panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (26) = 1848.18; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -12107.477; Pseudo 
R2 = 0.0709. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 588.15 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 
13522; Design df = 1101; F (52, 1050) = 12.77; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this Panel refers to the results of the urban regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(26, 502)=8.30, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.0709. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 588.15 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; 
Design df = 527; F (52, 476) = 68.41; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this Panel refers to the results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(26, 549) = 12.30, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.0709. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 588.15 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 
8204; Design df = 574; F (52,523) = 10.30; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 8.4.1: Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Medical treatment autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.19 0.10 1.13 0.32 1.11 0.37 1.65 0.00 1.62 0.00 1.24 0.23 0.98 0.86 0.98 0.88 0.99 0.93 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.73 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.81 0.06 0.74 0.02 0.59 0.00 0.84 0.34 0.72 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.77 0.09 
Above Average 0.54 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.84 0.08 0.60 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.96 0.78 
Household Size: 
Children 
Boy/Girl 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
No child 0.86 0.08 0.84 0.04 1.11 0.50 0.73 0.03 0.75 0.07 1.17 0.60 0.98 0.82 0.90 0.29 1.39 0.11 
Boys/Girls (both) 1.11 0.08 1.11 0.11 1.01 0.94 1.25 0.01 1.23 0.07 1.02 0.89 1.02 0.78 1.06 0.50 0.94 0.67 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.91 0.09 0.86 0.09 1.16 0.29 0.92 0.46 0.79 0.08 0.74 0.06 0.88 0.06 0.88 0.07 1.06 0.75 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.22 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.84 0.04 0.49 0.56 0.11 0.05 0.38 0.08 0.32 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.48 0.00 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 1.06 0.65 1.04 0.73 1.13 0.73 1.02 0.94 0.92 0.74 2.42 0.18 1.14 0.36 1.12 0.44 1.15 0.73 
25-29 years 1.36 0.01 1.23 0.12 1.48 0.25 1.36 0.13 1.14 0.60 4.05 0.12 1.43 0.02 1.28 0.10 1.54 0.30 
30-34 years 1.47 0.00 1.36 0.03 1.41 0.33 1.53 0.05 1.16 0.54 4.32 0.16 1.51 0.01 1.48 0.03 1.16 0.72 
35-39 years 1.97 0.00 1.77 0.00 1.68 0.15 2.03 0.00 1.55 0.09 4.91 0.02 2.00 0.00 1.91 0.00 1.41 0.45 
40-44 years 2.72 0.00 2.11 0.00 2.27 0.02 2.73 0.00 2.02 0.01 4.35 0.03 2.79 0.00 2.19 0.00 2.18 0.07 
45-49 years 2.78 0.00 2.48 0.00 1.89 0.07 2.21 0.00 1.73 0.06 4.86 0.02 3.36 0.00 3.05 0.00 1.96 0.12 
…continue 
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Table 8.4.1 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Medical treatment autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Regions Panel-III: Rural Regions 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.30 0.00 1.18 0.05 1.32 0.02 1.08 0.51 1.15 0.29 0.87 0.57 1.38 0.00 1.17 0.17 1.50 0.02 
8-years education 1.25 0.07 1.18 0.23 1.23 0.26 0.97 0.85 1.03 0.89 0.81 0.47 1.42 0.07 1.20 0.31 1.49 0.18 
10-12years education 1.43 0.00 1.17 0.17 1.64 0.00 1.07 0.60 0.87 0.35 1.90 0.01 1.79 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.36 0.18 
Higher education 1.35 0.03 1.03 0.85 1.95 0.00 1.07 0.68 0.88 0.47 1.84 0.05 1.43 0.18 1.22 0.46 1.67 0.24 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.05 0.45 1.08 0.32 1.08 0.99 1.16 0.23 1.16 0.31 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.84 1.02 0.81 0.95 0.71 
8-years education 0.98 0.79 0.84 0.15 1.33 0.04 0.95 0.70 0.84 0.29 1.32 0.39 0.97 0.76 0.83 0.17 1.41 0.06 
10-12years education 1.02 0.84 0.90 0.23 1.24 0.09 1.04 0.79 1.02 0.90 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.83 0.82 0.16 1.42 0.04 
Higher education 1.03 0.75 1.06 0.52 0.96 0.76 1.00 1.00 1.04 0.81 0.97 0.93 1.09 0.49 1.14 0.32 0.92 0.73 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.21 0.00 1.27 0.00 0.95 0.60 1.09 0.37 1.20 0.07 0.82 0.36 1.23 0.00 1.25 0.00 1.01 0.95 
High income 1.50 0.01 1.51 0.02 1.07 0.72 1.33 0.15 1.19 0.44 0.88 0.68 1.65 0.03 2.29 0.01 0.61 0.23 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 0.97 0.62 0.95 0.48 1.01 0.95 1.01 0.94 1.04 0.78 0.91 0.75 0.92 0.34 0.92 0.34 0.96 0.77 
High income 0.97 0.66 0.92 0.29 1.10 0.42 1.15 0.23 1.14 0.29 1.15 0.59 0.82 0.04 0.82 0.17 0.94 0.70 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.73 0.00 1.14 0.21 0.36 0.00 0.77 0.06 0.99 0.96 0.20 0.00 0.65 0.00 1.22 0.16 0.10 0.00 
NWFP 0.87 0.22 1.66 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.67 0.03 1.17 0.50 0.32 0.00 0.94 0.67 1.82 0.00 0.18 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.20 0.00 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this Panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (28) = 1905.40; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -12078.86; Pseudo R2 
= 0.0731. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 632.41 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 
13522; Design df = 1101; F (56, 1040) = 12.07; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this Panel refers to the results of the urban regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(28, 500)=8.14, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.0731. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 632.41 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; 
Design df = 527; F(56, 472) = 71.19; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this Panel refers to the results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(28, 547) = 11.30, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.0731. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 632.41 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 
8204; Design df = 574; F(56,519) = 9.81; Prob > F = 0.00 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
FAMILY PLANNING DECISION-MAKING AUTONOMY:  
AGGREGATED RESULTS 
 
 
 
9.1. Introduction 
The family planning sphere of decision-making is another important aspect of women’s autonomy in 
the household. The family planning autonomy is an aggregated index comprising of two components, 
described as ‘having more children’ and ‘using contraceptive measures’. Similar to the economic 
decision-making autonomy as observed in Chapter 7, we extend the empirical analysis to investigate 
the role of the threat options and other determinants as they relate to women’s autonomy in family 
planning-related decisions, from the overall sample as well as the urban and rural regions. It should be 
noted that a large portion of the discussion in this Chapter may appear similar to Chapter 7 as we 
maintained consistency for purposes of empirical settings. However, we highlight those results which 
appear distinctively different within the context of family planning autonomy. The next Section 
discusses the results of correlation between the threat options and family planning autonomy. Section 
9.3 presents evidence on the role of individual characteristics, while the following two Sections look 
specifically at family income and fixed state effects. Concluding remarks are made in Section 9.6. In 
the next Chapter we discuss results of each of the sub-dimensions of family planning autonomy. 
 
9.2. Threat Options and Family Planning Decision-making  Autonomy 
Table 9.1 at the end of this Chapter presents results of the family planning decision-making autonomy 
model (Equation 5.6) calculated using the conventional ordered logit and multinomial logit 
approaches, from the overall sample as well as the urban and the rural regions.2  
Table 9.1 (Panel-I) depicts that an ‘earned income’ has 1.39 times greater odds for ‘partial’ 
over ‘no’ autonomy, however, it appears insignificant in terms of influencing ‘partial’ to ‘strong’ 
autonomy in family planning-related decisions from the overall sample. Within the urban regions 
(Panel-II), the employed status of women appears unrelated to any level of family planning autonomy. 
                                                            
2 The proportionality or the parallel line assumption assumes that the partial effects of the relevant independent 
variables remain constant across adjacent categories of the dependent variable. However, the results show that 
the above assumption is violated therefore we rely on the multinomial logit specifications in this analysis: 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 430.87 
Prob > chi2 = 0.00.  
138 
 
However, in the rural regions, having an ‘employed’ status has greater odds of 1.47 times for ‘partial’ 
over ‘no’ autonomy (Panel-III). These results are a clear contrast from the evidence we witnessed in 
women’s economic decision-making autonomy. Again we find that the regional divide exists in the 
analysis of women’s autonomy in Pakistan.  
Corresponding to the threat option of household size, Table 9.1 (Panel-I) shows that 
increasing household size (all formulations) significantly decreases women’s autonomy related to 
family planning. The ‘average’ sized household has lower odds of  0.84 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy compared with ‘below average’ sized households from the overall sample. The results from 
the urban and rural regions, however (respectively Panel-II and Panel-III), do not appear consistent 
with the overall evidence. Unlike the aggregated household size, the size (exclusive of children) 
appears inversely related to women’s autonomy in the household. Table 9.1.1 (Panel-I) at the end of 
this Chapter shows that the size ‘above average’ decreases the odds by 0.60 times of ‘strong’ to 
‘partial’ autonomy in the household from the overall sample. Results for the urban and rural regions 
(Panel-II and Panel-III) also show similar trends, where ‘above average’ sized households decrease 
autonomy from ‘strong’ to ‘partial’.  
We examine the effect of extended family systems relative to nuclear family systems in 
connection with family planning autonomy. Table 9.1 (Panel-I) shows that women from the extended 
family system have 1.26 times greater odds of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from the overall sample, a 
statistically significant result at the 1 per cent level of confidence. This is not the case for women from 
the urban regions (Panel-II). From the rural regions, however, women in extended family systems 
appear 1.35 times greater to have ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy. Results find no influence on women’s 
autonomy in the household, from any of the samples, where the household includes a mother-in-law 
(Panel-I through to Panel-III).  
Furthermore, children as a component of household composition appear relevant to enhancing 
women’s autonomy in areas of family planning-related decision-making. Using the different 
formulations, we investigate the role of an increasing number and gender bias of children in 
association with the women’s family planning autonomy. 4 Given that there may not be a direct 
relationship between various formulations of children influencing a woman’s autonomy in family 
planning decision-making aspects, they are treated as a threat option available to a woman in relation 
to her husband, which can affect her autonomy as observed in the sphere of economic decision-
making.  
                                                            
4 Formulations of children are: i) one child (boy/girl) as a reference category versus no child and children of 
both genders; ii) no child as a reference category versus only boy, girl and both genders; iii) no child as a 
reference category versus only boys, only girls, equal number of boys and girls, number of girls greater than 
boys and boys greater than girls, and iv) equal number of boys and girls as a reference category versus only boys, 
only girls, girls greater than boys and boys greater than girls. 
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Table 9.1.1 (Panel-I) at the end of this Chapter shows that ‘no child’ relative to ‘one child’ 
(any gender) lowers odds by 0.67 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from the overall sample. On the 
other hand ‘children’ (both genders) relative to ‘one child’ has no impact on increasing levels of 
autonomy in the household from the overall sample. From the urban regions, however, we witness 
that ‘no child’ relative to ‘one child’ only lowers odds by 0.66 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy, 
and has an insignificant impact regarding ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy. Similarly, we find ‘no child’ 
lowers odds by 0.67 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy, however, ‘children’ (both genders) 
increases odds by 1.26 times for ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from the urban regions (Panel-II). Within 
the rural regions, we find that ‘no child’ relative to ‘one child’ decreases ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy 
(Panel-III).  
Appendix Table 9.1.2 6  corresponds to the specification where ‘no child’ appears as the 
reference category to investigate if ‘boys’, ‘girls’ or ‘children’ (both genders) are associated with 
household autonomy. Results from the overall sample (Panel-I) show that boys’, ‘girls’ or ‘children’ 
(both genders) relative to ‘no child’ respectively show 1.51, 1.46 and 1.63 times greater odds of 
‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy in the household. However, these results are not found consistent with the 
‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from the overall sample. Further, we observe all of the formulations of 
children relative to ‘no child’ consistently significant for the overall sample, as well as the urban 
(Panel-II) and rural (Panel-III) regions.  
Similarly, Table 9.1.3 (Panel-I) presents results of the other specifications; ‘boys’, ‘girls’, 
‘equal number of boys and girls’ and having ‘greater numbers of one gender over the other’, relative 
to ‘no child’ in association with women’s autonomy in the household. Greater odds were found for 
each category, respectively 1.51, 1.46, 1.57, 1.67, 1.68 times for ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the 
household. Interestingly we find similar results from the urban (Panel-II) and rural regions (Panel-III). 
However, they were found to be inconsistent with increasing ‘partial’ to ‘strong’ autonomy from any 
of the samples. 
Table 9.1.4 presents the specification in which ‘equal number of boys and girls’ is considered 
as the reference category in comparison with having ‘no child’, boys’, ‘girls’ and having ‘greater 
numbers of one gender over the other’. The results from the overall sample show that having ‘no child’  
compared with the above reference category lowers odds 0.64 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy, 
however, all other categories had a statistically insignificant effect on any level of autonomy. These 
results are consistent with the evidence from the urban regions (Panel-II) and rural regions (Panel-III). 
In another specification presented in Table 9.1.5 where the reference category is ‘girls greater than 
boys’, having ‘no child’ lowers odds by 0.60 and 0.47 and 0.64 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy 
from the overall, urban and rural samples respectively. Finally we find that an increasing number of 
                                                            
6 All tables from Appendix Table 9.1.2 to Appendix Table 9.1.5 are presented in Appendix-IV: Determinants of 
Women’s autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making. 
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children, regardless of gender, also increases women’s ‘partial’ autonomy although remains irrelevant 
to the ‘strong’ autonomy in the overall sample as well as in the urban regions. Further, we find that 
having an ‘equal number of boys and girls’ also significantly increases women’s autonomy in the 
household.  
9.3. Individual Characteristics and Family Planning Decision-making Autonomy 
Assessing individual characteristics involves an investigation into the role of education and age in 
association with a woman’s autonomy in family planning aspects of decision-making. In addition to a 
woman’s education and age, we consider her husband’s level of education and his financial position 
as a part of her own individual characteristics. Regarding a woman’s education we attempt to observe 
its effect through four different specifications of education in association with her autonomy in the 
household.8  
Table 9.1 presents results of the specification of ‘5-years’ schooling through to ‘higher levels 
of education’ compared with the base category of ‘no education’. Results show greater odds for the 
three categories from ‘8-years’ through to ‘higher levels of education’ of 1.56, 1.59 and 2.15 times 
respectively, for ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from the overall sample. Comparative results from the 
urban regions (Panel-II) show greater odds also of 1.65, 1.55 and 1.82 times for ‘no’ to ‘partial’ 
autonomy in the household. However, within the rural regions, we observe that ‘10-12 years’ and 
‘higher levels of education’ respectively appear with 1.58 and 3.22 times greater odds of ‘partial’ to 
‘no’ autonomy (Panel-III).  
Regarding the specification which investigates the effect of a woman’s ‘education’ (one year 
or more) with reference to ‘no education’ in association with family planning autonomy, the 
corresponding results show that ‘education’ has greater odds of 1.41 times for ‘no’ to ‘partial’ 
autonomy in the household from the overall sample. Similarly within the urban regions, ‘education’ 
versus ‘no education’ shows 3.52 and 1.42 times greater odds of respectively ‘no’ to ‘partial’ and 
‘partial’ to ‘strong’ autonomy. Further,  comparative results show 1.34 times greater odds of ‘partial’ 
to ‘no’ autonomy in the household within the rural regions. With regards to the third specification in 
which education appears as a continuous variable, results show that for each additional year of 
education, the odds increase by 1.05 times for ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the household from the 
overall sample. Correspondingly, the urban regions show increased odds of 1.05 for ‘no’ to ‘partial’ 
                                                            
8 The four main classifications of education are: i) no education as the reference category versus 5-years, 10-
years, 12-years and higher levels of education; ii) no education (never attended school) as a reference category 
to education (one year school or above); iii) education considered as a continuous variable ranging from no 
school to the maximum number of years attending the school and finally, iv) no education as a reference 
category and 5-years of schooling, 5-years versus 10 years of schooling, 10-years versus 12-years of schooling 
and 12-years versus higher levels of schooling. It is appropriate to note that we present results of the first 
specification only but discuss results of all of the above categories. 
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autonomy in the household, whereas the rural results show increased odds of 1.05 times for each 
additional year of education, for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy.  
Lastly, the fourth specification of education is where we investigate any variation between 
successive levels of education compared with the preceding level. We found, however, no support for 
this proposition; each successive level of education was not found to generate greater autonomy 
compared with the preceding level of education, except when compared to the level of ‘no education’. 
In summary, these results led us to conclude: i) a woman with any level of education enjoys relatively 
greater levels of autonomy in the household compared with women without any education; ii) 
education does not improve the likelihood of having ‘partial’ to ‘strong’ autonomy, on the contrary, 
in some instances  it  decreases the likelihood from ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy. 
The age of a woman is another characteristic usually considered an important determinant of 
women’s autonomy in the household. We construct two different specifications of age to investigate 
its effect on women’s autonomy. The first specification treats the ‘15-19 years’ age bracket as a base 
category compared with six successive age brackets. The second specification considers age as a 
continuous variable from the minimum ‘15 years’ to the maximum ‘49 years’ of age. Table 9.1 shows 
the results of different successive age brackets compared with a relatively young age bracket as a 
reference category. The results show that all successive age categories from ‘20-24 years’ through to 
‘35-39 years’ compared with the base category of ‘15-19 years’ substantially increases having ‘no’ to 
‘partial’ autonomy in the household, from the overall and the urban samples. According to the second 
specification9 we observe that every additional year of age generates a corresponding 1.01 times 
greater odds of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from the overall sample.  
We also investigate the role of a husband’s characteristics, namely, his education level and 
financial strength in relation to a wife’s autonomy in family planning decision-making spheres. 
Accordingly, we construct three specifications of a husband’s level of education,10 they are: i) no 
education as a base category compared with each of the successive categories including 5-years 
schooling through to higher levels of education, ii) no education as the base category compared with 
any level of education and iii) the effect of every additional year of education. Table 9.1 shows that 
‘5-years’ through to ‘higher levels of education’ compared with ‘no education’ increases ‘no’ to 
‘partial’ autonomy but is ineffective in increasing ‘partial’ to ‘strong’ autonomy from the overall as 
well as rural samples. Within the urban regions we find only the ‘higher levels of education’ relevant 
to an increase in ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy. Consistent with these results, we find a husband with 
some level of education relative to ‘no education’ appears positively associated with an increasing 
level of women’s autonomy, in the overall as well as rural samples.  
                                                            
9 Results available on request. 
10 Results available on request. 
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A husband’s financial stability is another characteristic we investigate to determine its 
relevance to his wife’s household autonomy. We classify a husband’s income into three main levels; 
‘low’, ‘main’ and ‘high’. For analytical purposes we consider the ‘low’ income as a base category and 
compare it to the ‘middle’ and ‘high’ categories. Interestingly, results show that the ‘middle’ level of 
income relative to ‘low’ income levels increases odds by 1.25 and 1.42 times respectively for ‘no’ to 
‘partial’ and ‘partial’ to ‘strong’ autonomy within the rural regions. However, the ‘high’ income 
level does not appear to increase women’s autonomy within either the urban or rural regions.  
 
9.4. Family Income Status and Family Planning Decision-making Autonomy 
Family income refers to the joint financial resources11 of the household which determines the level of 
household consumption. Family income also represents a woman’s socio-economic status and thereby 
may play some role in determining the level of women’s autonomy in the household. We classify 
family income into three groups; ‘low’, ‘middle’ and ‘high’ level income groups. We investigate if the 
‘middle’ and/or the ‘high’ income group, compared with the ‘low’ income level, increases women’s 
autonomy in the household. Results in Table 9.1 show that a family grouped within the ‘high’ income 
bracket, relative to those in the ‘low’ group, have greater odds of 1.27, 1.32 and 1.26 times 
respectively for ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy in the household, within the overall, urban and rural 
samples. However, the ‘middle’ group relative to the ‘low’ group appears statistically irrelevant in 
terms of correlation with any level of autonomy.  
 
9.5. States/Provincial Effects and Family Planning Decision-making Autonomy  
It has been generally noted that women from different states/provinces of Pakistan show varying 
degrees of autonomy, dependent perhaps on the strong cultural, traditional and historical backgrounds 
of each of the provinces. Furthermore, these differences may also be linked to urbanisation and 
economic opportunities available in each of the provinces. The province of Punjab is usually 
considered to be multiethnic, economically developed, with relatively high literacy rates and greater 
prosperity compared with the three other provinces. Therefore, we consider Punjab as a reference 
category and compare the other three provinces individually to observe variances in women’s 
autonomy. Table 9.1 shows that the province of Sindh compared with Punjab has 1.21 times greater 
odds of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from the overall sample. The results also show 1.53 times greater 
odds of ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy within the rural regions. The province of NWFP, however, 
demonstrates greater odds of 1.94, 2.74 and 1.94 respectively for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from the 
overall, urban and rural samples. The third province of Baluchistan shows lower odds of 0.09 times 
for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ from the overall, urban and rural samples.  
 
                                                            
11 See Chapter 4 for further details on the description of this determinant. 
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9.6. Concluding Remarks   
In this Chapter we discussed the role of the threat options and other determinants on women’s 
autonomy regarding family planning decision-making. Among the threat options discussed, we 
noticed that employment status increases to ‘partial’ autonomy except from within the urban regions. 
Similarly, household size (exclusive of children) above the ‘average’ size leads to a decrease in 
autonomy from ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ within the urban as well as rural regions. Regarding the inclusion 
of children, however, results indicate that an increased number of children, irrespective of gender, can 
increase women’s autonomy. Overall, results of the threat options with respect to family planning 
decision-making autonomy appear consistent with the results observed in areas of economic decision-
making in Chapter 7. The presence of a mother-in-law does not appear to significantly influence a 
woman’s autonomy in either the urban or rural regions, however, extended family formations do 
diminish autonomy levels from ‘partial’ levels in the rural regions. 
Regarding the role of education, results show that any level of education compared with ‘no 
education’ assists women to increase their autonomy levels in family planning decision-making 
processes, in the urban as well as rural regions. Results also indicate that successive age brackets 
between ‘15-19 years’ and ‘40-49 years’ increase women’s autonomy levels in the rural regions, 
however, this was not the case for the urban areas. Interestingly, results also show that educated 
husbands compared with uneducated husbands significantly increase the level of women’s autonomy 
in family planning decision-making aspects. More precisely we find that ‘8-years’ and ‘higher levels 
of education’ increase the likelihood of a ‘partial’ response over the ‘no’ response compared with ‘no 
schooling’. Along similar lines, results show a husband’s income level (‘middle’ income) increases 
the likelihood of ‘partial’ autonomy within the rural regions, and furthermore has the effect of 
decreasing the likelihood of ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy. We also found the family socio-economic 
status to be significantly associated with increasing levels of family planning autonomy. Results 
reveal that women from richer families are more likely to have ‘partial’ over ‘no’ autonomy, and 
therefore less likely to have ‘partial’ over ‘strong’ autonomy. These results are statistically significant 
and mainly consistent with results from the urban and rural regions. We find women from the 
province of Sindh and NWFP appear to enjoy greater levels of ‘partial’ autonomy but are less likely 
to hold ‘strong’ levels compared with women from the province of Punjab. Women from the province 
of Baluchistan, however, depicted both lower ‘partial’ and ‘strong’ autonomy levels compared with 
the reference category of women from Punjab in the overall, as well as the urban and rural regions. 
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Table 9.1: Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment Status Unemployed 1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.26 0.04 1.39 0.01 0.84 0.43 1.13 0.51 1.18 0.38 0.96 0.92 1.31 0.06 1.47 0.02 0.77 0.32 
Household Size 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.87 0.15 0.84 0.08 1.06 0.78 0.93 0.65 0.81 0.23 1.41 0.25 0.84 0.11 0.84 0.16 0.86 0.57 
Above Average 0.98 0.79 0.97 0.69 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.70 0.91 0.50 1.09 0.73 0.97 0.68 0.98 0.81 0.92 0.66 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.18 0.03 1.26 0.01 0.86 0.38 1.00 0.99 1.05 0.78 0.90 0.73 1.26 0.02 1.35 0.01 0.82 0.34 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.90 1.17 0.82 4.54 0.33 1.70 0.66 3.85 0.21 0.74 0.35 0.80 0.52 0.63 0.44 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.47 0.00 1.49 0.00 1.05 0.86 1.06 0.84 1.09 0.74 0.75 0.54 1.61 0.00 1.64 0.00 1.13 0.68 
25-29 years 1.71 0.00 1.81 0.00 0.95 0.82 1.51 0.12 1.62 0.07 0.79 0.53 1.76 0.00 1.89 0.00 0.97 0.91 
30-34 years 1.55 0.00 1.70 0.14 0.76 0.09 1.70 0.15 2.07 0.21 0.57 0.20 1.46 0.23 1.58 0.21 0.81 0.52 
35-39 years 1.73 0.00 1.88 0.00 0.85 0.54 1.90 0.14 2.08 0.17 0.87 0.77 1.61 0.15 1.79 0.00 0.76 0.10 
40-44 years 1.59 0.21 1.70 0.20 0.88 0.61 1.43 0.24 1.50 0.16 0.82 0.65 1.64 0.21 1.79 0.12 0.85 0.61 
45-49 years 1.51 0.31 1.59 0.31 0.90 0.74 1.42 0.27 1.45 0.21 0.83 0.72 1.51 0.18 1.64 0.17 0.82 0.59 
Continue… 
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Table 9.1 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making  
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.08 0.42 1.18 0.12 0.71 0.11 1.14 0.37 1.13 0.43 1.07 0.81 1.04 0.75 1.21 0.19 0.48 0.11 
8-years education 1.33 0.01 1.56 0.00 0.72 0.31 1.49 0.02 1.65 0.01 0.94 0.88 1.13 0.44 1.35 0.14 0.38 0.16 
10-12years education 1.31 0.01 1.59 0.00 0.63 0.19 1.31 0.08 1.55 0.02 0.62 0.21 1.34 0.07 1.58 0.05 0.72 0.44 
Higher education 1.63 0.00 2.15 0.00 1.05 0.91 1.58 0.02 1.82 0.01 1.00 0.99 1.94 0.01 3.22 0.01 1.31 0.75 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.24 0.01 1.23 0.02 1.10 0.56 1.07 0.65 1.15 0.40 0.85 0.59 1.25 0.03 1.21 0.06 1.20 0.36 
8-years education 1.11 0.28 1.17 0.13 0.79 0.21 0.89 0.50 0.90 0.56 0.89 0.70 1.18 0.13 1.28 0.05 0.71 0.16 
10-12years education 1.21 0.03 1.35 0.00 0.67 0.03 1.03 0.84 1.12 0.53 0.75 0.33 1.24 0.04 1.43 0.00 0.60 0.02 
Higher education 1.23 0.04 1.55 0.00 0.50 0.01 1.15 0.42 1.46 0.05 0.58 0.16 1.13 0.31 1.42 0.03 0.41 0.01 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.17 0.01 1.17 0.14 1.16 0.28 0.96 0.63 1.00 0.98 0.85 0.45 1.29 0.00 1.25 0.01 1.42 0.04 
High income 1.17 0.25 1.41 0.13 0.57 0.21 1.12 0.49 1.82 0.11 0.39 0.08 0.91 0.75 0.88 0.72 0.81 0.79 
Family Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.03 0.78 1.05 0.62 0.90 0.55 1.19 0.32 1.09 0.59 1.35 0.34 0.98 0.87 1.04 0.70 0.77 0.22 
High income 1.14 0.08 1.27 0.01 0.70 0.03 1.28 0.10 1.32 0.08 1.02 0.94 1.11 0.25 1.26 0.03 0.59 0.01 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.23 0.05 1.21 0.10 1.18 0.38 0.84 0.30 0.79 0.20 1.12 0.68 1.53 0.00 1.53 0.01 1.17 0.53 
NWFP 1.52 0.00 1.94 0.00 0.55 0.00 1.70 0.00 2.74 0.01 0.54 0.07 1.54 0.00 1.94 0.00 0.55 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.56 0.20 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.00 5.25 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.37 0.06 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop no. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (26) = 2500.72; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -8794.144; Pseudo R2 
= 0.1245. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 430.87 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop no. obs. = 
13348; Design df = 1101; F (52, 1050) = 5.63; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of the urban regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Population size = 5389649.7; Sub-pop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(26, 502)=4.48, P > 
F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1245. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 430.87 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; 
Sub-pop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F (52, 476) = 3.90; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to the results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(26, 549) = 5.37, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1245. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 430.87 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs = 8096; 
Design df = 574; F (52, 523) = 4.50; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 9.1.1: Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.24 0.06 1.38 0.02 0.80 0.33 1.10 0.61 1.15 0.47 0.94 0.88 1.29 0.08 1.47 0.02 0.72 0.22 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.86 0.09 0.90 0.23 0.79 0.19 0.78 0.09 0.77 0.10 0.84 0.57 0.88 0.22 0.93 0.52 0.75 0.21 
Above Average 0.86 0.05 0.95 0.56 0.60 0.00 0.75 0.02 0.80 0.11 0.63 0.08 0.88 0.19 1.00 0.99 0.56 0.01 
Household Size: 
Children 
Boy/Girl 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
No child 0.68 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.82 0.40 0.65 0.01 0.66 0.02 0.67 0.35 0.68 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.92 0.75 
Boys/Girls (both) 1.03 0.69 1.10 0.23 0.81 0.13 1.09 0.47 1.26 0.09 0.68 0.12 1.01 0.95 1.03 0.71 0.91 0.54 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.19 0.04 1.17 0.10 1.18 0.37 1.05 0.70 0.99 0.97 1.34 0.36 1.26 0.04 1.25 0.06 1.09 0.71 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 1.01 0.99 0.96 0.91 1.27 0.72 4.56 0.32 1.73 0.64 3.88 0.25 0.75 0.38 0.79 0.51 0.73 0.60 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.26 0.08 1.26 0.08 0.96 0.87 0.88 0.67 0.90 0.70 0.68 0.42 1.38 0.03 1.40 0.03 1.05 0.87 
25-29 years 1.33 0.03 1.40 0.01 0.81 0.40 1.09 0.76 1.14 0.65 0.68 0.35 1.40 0.03 1.51 0.01 0.81 0.48 
30-34 years 1.14 0.34 1.25 0.13 0.61 0.07 1.14 0.67 1.32 0.35 0.48 0.13 1.10 0.53 1.23 0.23 0.62 0.14 
35-39 years 1.27 0.09 1.38 0.04 0.71 0.21 1.27 0.48 1.32 0.42 0.76 0.58 1.23 0.19 1.39 0.06 0.60 0.10 
40-44 years 1.21 0.23 1.24 0.19 0.84 0.52 1.02 0.95 0.99 0.98 0.82 0.71 1.27 0.18 1.37 0.11 0.75 0.39 
45-49 years 1.16 0.35 1.16 0.37 0.93 0.82 1.04 0.92 0.97 0.93 0.88 0.85 1.19 0.36 1.25 0.25 0.80 0.52 
continue… 
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Table 9.1.1 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making  
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.08 0.40 1.18 0.11 0.71 0.11 1.17 0.30 1.15 0.35 1.08 0.80 1.04 0.76 1.21 0.18 0.48 0.12 
8-years education 1.34 0.01 1.57 0.00 0.72 0.30 1.52 0.02 1.71 0.01 0.94 0.87 1.12 0.46 1.35 0.15 0.38 0.16 
10-12years education 1.31 0.01 1.59 0.00 0.63 0.18 1.32 0.08 1.59 0.01 0.61 0.19 1.36 0.06 1.58 0.05 0.76 0.51 
Higher education 1.68 0.00 2.23 0.00 1.04 0.92 1.67 0.01 1.98 0.00 0.99 0.98 1.94 0.00 3.26 0.01 1.32 0.75 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.25 0.01 1.23 0.02 1.12 0.50 1.07 0.69 1.13 0.43 0.85 0.58 1.25 0.02 1.21 0.06 1.22 0.32 
8-years education 1.12 0.22 1.17 0.12 0.82 0.30 0.91 0.61 0.92 0.64 0.91 0.77 1.18 0.11 1.28 0.05 0.74 0.21 
10-12years education 1.23 0.02 1.36 0.00 0.71 0.05 1.06 0.71 1.15 0.44 0.76 0.37 1.25 0.03 1.42 0.00 0.63 0.03 
Higher education 1.25 0.03 1.56 0.00 0.53 0.02 1.20 0.31 1.52 0.04 0.60 0.19 1.14 0.29 1.41 0.03 0.43 0.02 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.12 0.06 1.11 0.13 1.13 0.35 0.88 0.19 0.91 0.38 0.81 0.35 1.26 0.00 1.21 0.03 1.40 0.05 
High income 1.12 0.41 1.34 0.20 0.58 0.22 1.04 0.83 1.65 0.10 0.39 0.08 0.89 0.67 0.84 0.63 0.88 0.87 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.04 0.63 1.07 0.44 0.89 0.52 1.22 0.25 1.14 0.44 1.30 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.06 0.57 0.77 0.24 
High income 1.20 0.02 1.35 0.00 0.69 0.02 1.34 0.04 1.44 0.02 0.95 0.85 1.17 0.08 1.34 0.01 0.60 0.01 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.24 0.04 1.22 0.10 1.20 0.34 0.84 0.28 0.78 0.19 1.12 0.70 1.56 0.00 1.55 0.00 1.21 0.45 
NWFP 1.51 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.57 0.01 1.68 0.01 2.70 0.01 0.55 0.08 1.54 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.58 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.57 0.19 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.00 5.48 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.38 0.07 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (28) = 2534.60; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -8777.20; Pseudo R2 
= 0.1262. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 441.61 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop No. obs. = 
13348; Design df = 1101; F (56, 1046) = 6.09; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of the urban regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Population size = 5389649.7; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(28, 500) = 5.10, P > 
F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1262. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 441.61 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.  2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; 
Population size = 5389649.7; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F(56, 472) = 4.40; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to the results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. no. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(28, 547) = 5.31, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1262. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 441.61 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design 
df = 574; F (56, 519) = 4.72; Prob > F = 0.00
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CHAPTER 10 
 
 
FAMILY PLANNING AUTONOMY:  
DISAGGREGATED RESULTS 
 
 
 
10.1. Introduction 
This Chapter presents the disaggregated results of women’s autonomy in family planning 
decision-making spheres. The disaggregated analysis corresponds to the sub-dimensions of 
family planning autonomy, involving aspects of ‘having more children’ (to have a child or 
additional children) and ‘using contraceptive measures’. We replicate the analysis along similar 
lines discussed in Chapter 9, investigating the role of the threat options including other common 
determinants of family planning autonomy. We reproduce this analysis for the overall sample as 
well as the urban and rural regions. The Chapter is therefore comprised of two main Sections 
analysing women’s decision-making autonomy in relation to having more children and using 
contraceptive measures.  
 
10.2. Women’s Autonomy Related to Having More Children  
This sub-dimension of family planning related decision-making refers to whether a woman has 
any power, relative to her husband or other family members, to make the decision to have one 
or more children. It is relevant to note that the data used in this research allows us to identify 
who makes this decision, for example, a husband or wife or a husband and wife jointly. A 
further response option provided for the situation where no decision was made, because having 
children was considered a natural process.1  
Table 10.1 at the end of this Chapter presents results of the above sub-dimension of 
family planning estimated by the conventional ordered logit and multinomial logit approaches 
from the overall sample as well as the urban and rural regions.2 We investigate the varying 
                                                            
1 It is associated with a strong belief that having an additional child is ultimately in the hands of God.  
2 Results of the ordered logit model are not consistent with results of the multinomial logit which 
indicates violation of the parallel line assumption. Therefore we rely on the multinomial logit 
specifications for analysis: approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response 
categories:  chi2 (26) = 621.83 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. See Chapter 5 for further discussion on parallel line 
assumption and its remedy.  
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effects of each of the determinants on relative levels of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy responses and 
‘‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy responses.  
Table 10.1 shows that women who are ‘employed’ are 1.37 and 1.41 times more likely 
to respond with ‘no’ than ‘partial’ autonomy compared with ‘unemployed’ women, both in the 
overall sample (Panel-I) and the rural regions (Panel-III). However, we do not find having an 
‘employed’ status significantly relevant in determining women’s autonomy within the urban 
regions (Panel-I). Similarly we find ‘average’ sized households exert a downward pressure on 
this dimension of autonomy and reflect lower odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy compared with 
women from relatively smaller sized households. These results are statistically significant 
within the overall and rural samples but not in the urban regions. This evidence is further 
supported by results for ‘above average’ sized households where the odds for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
responses are lower, both within the overall and urban regions. Corresponding to the household 
size (exclusive of children), results show that the ‘above average’ sized household decreases 
responses from ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy from all samples. 
Interestingly women from extended family systems show higher odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy from the overall as well as the rural regions. Furthermore, results do not support the 
existence of any influence by a mother-in-law regarding this sub-dimension of women’s 
autonomy. 
Table 10.1.1 at the end of this Chapter presents component of the household size 
regarding the number and gender of children. Overall results show that women with ‘no child’ 
have lower odds of 0.69, 0.68 and 0.70 for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy relative to those with 
‘children’ (both genders) from the overall, urban and rural regions respectively. Similarly, 
Appendix Table 10.1.24 shows that an increasing number of children (of both genders) increases 
women’s autonomy in the household. Results from the overall sample show 1.55 times greater 
odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy compared with having ‘no child’. We find corresponding 
results for the urban and rural regions, showing 1.63 and 1.52 greater odds of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy. However, with regards to levels of ‘strong’ autonomy, the results are insignificant 
within all three samples. Similarly, Appendix Table 10.1.3 presents the results of another 
specification, illustrating the effect on women’s autonomy of having ‘greater numbers of one 
gender over the other’, and an ‘equal number of boys and girls’. We observe that ‘only boys and 
no girl’ relative to ‘no child’ increases odds by 1.50 times for ‘partial’ autonomy from the 
overall sample. Similar results were observed within the urban and the rural samples with 1.53 
and 1.50 times greater odds respectively for ‘partial’ autonomy. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
                                                            
4 All tables from Appendix Table 10.1.2 to Appendix Table 10.1.5 are presented in Appendix-V: 
Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making: Disaggregated Analysis. 
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similar trends are observed within the category of ‘girls only and no boys’ from all three 
samples. An ‘equal number of boys and girls’ is also observed to have increasing likelihood of 
‘partial’ over ‘no’ autonomy in the overall and urban regions. We also observe that ‘greater 
numbers of one gender over the other’ show increased odds for ‘partial’ over ‘no’ autonomy 
from the overall and urban regions.  
We look at another specification regarding children in Appendix Table 10.1.4. This 
specification investigates the gender of children and the impact on autonomy of having an 
increasing number of either boys or girls relative to having an ‘equal number of boys and girls’. 
As postulated, results show that a child’s gender has an insignificant effect on any level of 
autonomy from the overall as well as regional samples, along with having greater numbers of 
‘only boys’ or ‘only girls’ relative to having an  ‘equal number of boys and girls’. Further 
combinations of children, relative to the category greater numbers of one gender over the other’ 
are illustrated in Appendix Table 10.1.5. Again, we find no significant effect on women’s 
autonomy except having ‘no child’ which has an inverse association with levels of autonomy 
within all samples. Essentially, we find that increasing the number of children in a household, 
regardless of their gender enhances levels of ‘partial’ autonomy of women relative to ‘no child’ 
from the overall as well as the regional samples.  
Analysis of a woman’s individual characteristics shows that the age bracket of ‘25-29 
years’ compared with ‘15-19 years’ increases women’s autonomy to ‘partial’ levels from an 
overall as well as the rural samples (Table 10.1). However, results for the urban sample do not 
reflect any positive association of increasing age in connection with any level of autonomy. We 
observe that women in the age bracket of ‘30-34 years’ show a decrease in ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ 
autonomy compared with women from the younger age brackets within the overall sample. 
Similar results were observed within the urban and rural regions.  Results generally show that 
with increasing age comes increased levels of autonomy within this specific dimension of 
family planning in the household. Regarding a woman’s level of education, we find that the 
minimum level (‘5-years’ schooling) does not increase levels of autonomy relative to having 
‘no education’ within the overall and urban samples, however, within the rural regions it does 
decrease levels from ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy. However, each level above the minimum 
level of education plays a significant role in enhancing family planning autonomy in the overall 
as well as urban and rural samples. For instance ‘8-years’ of schooling increases odds by 1.58 
and 1.99 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy compared with ‘no education’ respondents within 
the overall and urban samples but turning out statistically insignificant, however, in the rural 
regions. Similarly the next higher bracket of ‘10-12 years’ of education is shown to significantly 
increase women’s autonomy in the overall sample as well as within the urban and rural regions. 
Women with this level of education depict greater ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy compared with 
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women with ‘no education’ in the overall, urban and rural regions. However, this does not 
appear to significantly increase levels of autonomy from ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ in any of the three 
samples. In general, we observe that with each level of education comes an increase in women’s 
autonomy across all levels of autonomy.   
Looking now at male spouses’ level of education, we find that having ‘5-years’ and ‘8-
years’ of education substantively increases a woman’s autonomy within the overall and rural 
regions, although within the urban regions it has little effect. Furthermore, ‘10-12 years’ and 
‘higher levels of education’ significantly enhance the ‘partial’ from ‘no’ autonomy levels 
compared with ‘no education’ within the overall and rural regions. Interestingly, the ‘10-12 
years’ and higher categories appear to decrease the levels of ‘partial’ autonomy from ‘strong’ 
autonomy in the overall and rural regions. Analysis of a husband’s income level found those 
belonging to the ‘middle’ income group increases levels of ‘partial’ over ‘no’ and ‘strong’ over 
‘partial’ autonomy as compared with the ‘low’ income group from the rural regions. However, 
these results were not evident within the overall and urban samples. Conversely, those from the 
‘high’ level income group tended to diminish responses of ‘strong’ levels of autonomy to 
‘partial’ autonomy for all three samples. 
In addition to the individual characteristics, we expect that the household socio-
economic status is also associated with this dimension of family planning autonomy. Therefore, 
we attempt to investigate if there is any evidence of a significant relationship between the 
family income and the autonomy of a woman at the household level. Results depict that families 
with ‘middle’ income status (relative to the ‘low’ income status family) does not appear 
significant in terms of increasing autonomy within the overall as well as regional samples. 
However, families with ‘high’ income status (relative to the ‘low’ income status family) were 
observed to increase the levels of ‘partial’ autonomy over ‘no’ autonomy in all three samples. 
Furthermore, ‘high’ income status appeared to decrease levels of ‘partial’ autonomy from 
‘strong’ autonomy in the overall and rural regions.  
We conducted a geographical inquiry to help understand the variations between rural 
and urban regions. Results for the province of Sindh appear unrelated with this dimension of 
autonomy when compared with the reference category of the Punjab province. Women from the 
province of NWFP, however, were more likely to respond with ‘partial’ autonomy compared 
with the women of Punjab, yet they recorded lower levels of ‘strong’ versus ‘partial’ autonomy, 
both within the urban and rural regions. With regards to the province of Baluchistan, we find 
women’s autonomy levels decreased from ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy when compared with the 
women from Punjab, both within the urban and rural regions. Unlike the results for ‘partial’ 
autonomy, far greater levels of ‘strong’ autonomy were recorded in Baluchistan compared with 
those recorded in Punjab.  
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10.3. Birth Control-Related (The Use of Contraceptive Measures)  Decision-making 
Autonomy  
This sub-dimension of family planning decision-making autonomy investigates if a woman 
makes independent decisions regarding birth control measures in the household. Broadly 
speaking, data from the urban sample shows that almost 25 per cent, 71 per cent and 4 per cent 
of women appear respectively with ‘no’ autonomy, ‘partial’ autonomy and ‘strong’ autonomy. 
However, the comparative rural sample depicts statistics of 35 per cent, 62 per cent and 4 per 
cent respectively. The results clearly indicate a significant variation in the decision-making 
power of women within and across the regions. We attempt to explain the role of women’s 
threat options along with other common determinants of this sub-dimension of family planning.  
Table 10.2 presents results of the above sub-dimension of family planning analysed 
using the conventional ordered logit and multinomial logit approaches within the overall sample 
and the urban rural regions.5 We assess the multinomial logit settings against the dimensions of 
‘‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy’ and ‘‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy’ to investigate the varying 
effects of each of the determinants.  
Table 10.2 shows that women who are ‘employed’ have 1.46 and 1.53 times greater 
odds of having birth control autonomy compared with women who are ‘unemployed’, within 
both regions. These results relate to the likelihood of having ‘partial’ over ‘no’ autonomy, 
however, levels of ‘strong’ autonomy do not appear significantly related. On the other side, 
above results do not support employed status to be significant in determining women’s 
autonomy from the urban region. In terms of the household size (exclusive of children), we find 
that increases in size lead to a decrease in a woman’s autonomy across both the urban and rural 
regions. In particular, the ‘above average’ sized household appears to significantly decrease 
levels from ‘partial’ to ‘no’ and from ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy compared with ‘below 
average’ sized households within the overall and regional samples. Additionally, results from 
the rural regions show that women from an extended family system record relatively lower 
autonomy levels compared with women from a nuclear family system.  
Regarding different formulations of children, overall results from Table 10.2.1 show 
that women with ‘no child’ has lower odds of 0.62, 0.59 and 0.62 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy compared with having ‘children’ from the overall, urban and rural regions 
respectively. However, results also show that with an increasing number of children (including 
                                                            
5 Results of the ordered logit model are not consistent with results of the multinomial logit which 
indicates violation of the parallel line assumption. Therefore we rely on the multinomial logit 
specifications for analysis: approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response 
categories:  chi2 (26) = 561.56 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. See chapter 5 for further discussion on parallel line 
assumption and its remedy.  
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boys and girls) the odds increase 1.20, 1.31 and 1.16 times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from 
the overall, urban and rural regions respectively. Alternatively Appendix Table 10.2.26 reflects 
an increasing number of children relative to ‘no child’ increases odds by 1.96, 2.21 and 1.86 
times for ‘partial’ to ‘no’ autonomy from the overall, urban and rural regions respectively. 
Similarly, Appendix Table 10.2.3 presents results of another specification of children, including 
different combinations relative to the category of ‘no child’. We observe that ‘only boys and no 
girl’ relative to ‘no child’ increases odds by 1.71 times for ‘partial’ autonomy from the overall 
sample. Identical results were observed with 1.86 and 1.65 times greater odds for ‘partial’ 
autonomy from the urban and rural regions respectively. Interestingly, similar trends have been 
observed corresponding to ‘girls only and no boys’ within the overall and regional samples. The 
‘equal number of boys and girls’ category also increases the likelihood of ‘partial’ autonomy 
within the overall and urban samples. We find that ‘greater numbers of one gender over the 
other’ increases the likelihood of ‘partial’ autonomy from both the overall and urban samples. 
However, no significant effect was observed for either of these specifications influencing the 
‘strong’ over ‘partial’ autonomy from the overall and regional samples.  
Further  specifications of children are analysed with results presented in Appendix 
Table 10.2.4. The reference category of ‘equal number of boys and girls’ is used to evaluate 
these variations. Interestingly, results show none of the various specifications can be linked to 
an increase in women’s autonomy when compared with ‘equal number of boys and girls’. 
Furthermore, Appendix Table 10.2.5 demonstrates the effect of a child’s gender on women’s 
autonomy compared with the category ‘girls greater than boys’. Corresponding results show 
that none of the combinations of children compared with the reference category appear 
statistically related to women’s autonomy. This implies that the gender of children plays an 
insignificant role in enhancing women’s autonomy, however, the number of children or 
increasing number of both boys and girls increases women’s autonomy, within both the urban 
and rural regions.  
 Analysis of an individual’s age and education level is shown in Table 10.2. It shows 
that the age bracket of ‘20-24 years’ compared with the age category of ‘15-19 years’  increases 
women’s autonomy to ‘partial’ from the rural regions. Similarly, we observe that women in the 
age bracket of ‘25-29 years’ reflect increasing levels of ‘partial’ autonomy compared with 
women from relatively younger age bracket from the overall and rural samples. However, other 
specified age brackets do not appear relevant to increasing women’s autonomy in this aspect of 
decision-making. Regarding a woman’s level of education, we find that all levels (‘5-years’ 
through to the ‘higher levels of education’) increase women’s autonomy compared with ‘no 
                                                            
6 All tables from Appendix Table 10.2.2 to Appendix Table 10.2.5 are presented in Appendix-V: 
Determinants of Women’s autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making: Disaggregated Analysis. 
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education’ within the overall and regional samples. Correspondingly, all levels of a husband’s 
education from ‘5-years’ through to the ‘higher levels of education’ lead to an increase in 
women’s autonomy, relative to the category of ‘no education’, within the overall and rural 
regions. Interestingly, we find that the last two categories of education, however, tend to 
decrease ‘strong’ autonomy to ‘partial’ autonomy from the overall and rural regions. These 
results, however, appear inconsistent with the results from the urban regions. We find relatively 
affluent husbands appear to be linked to an increase in women’s autonomy within the rural 
regions, yet this is not evident within the urban regions.   
During analysis of geographic locations, we find that women from the province of 
Sindh appear no different in this dimension of autonomy compared with the reference category 
of the Punjab province, both from within the overall and urban regions. However, rural evidence 
shows that women from the Sindh depict relatively higher levels of ‘partial’ autonomy. Women 
from the province of NWFP depict relatively greater levels of ‘partial’ autonomy relative to 
Punjab but lower levels of ‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy, within both regions. Women from 
Baluchistan have declining levels of autonomy from ‘partial’ to ‘no’ responses compared with 
women from Punjab, within both regions. 
 
10.4. Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, the disaggregated results for the threat options and other common determinants 
appear consistent with the aggregated results for the two sub-dimensions of family planning 
autonomy (‘having more children’ and ‘using contraceptive measures’). In the following we 
present results identical across two alternative sub-dimensions of women’s autonomy in family 
related decision-making autonomy. 
Results show that having an employed status increases the likelihood of ‘partial’ to ‘no’ 
autonomy in both sub-dimensions of family planning decision-making autonomy within the 
rural regions, however, it lacks relevancy within the urban regions. Similarly, an ‘above average’ 
household size (exclusive of children) implies an inverse relationship with all of the discussed 
dimensions of autonomy, within both the urban and rural regions. Additionally, we found that 
women in the rural regions from an extended family formation will hold relatively lower levels 
of autonomy compared with women from a nuclear family formation. With respect to the 
gender and number of children in a household, we observed that increasing numbers of children 
enhance women’s ‘partial’ autonomy levels across both regions, although it lacks relevancy to 
any of the aspects of family planning-related decision-making autonomy. Regarding education, 
results show that any level of education compared to ‘no education’ increases women’s 
household autonomy in all three samples. Similarly, a husband’s level of education also appears 
to increase his female partner’s level of autonomy within both dimensions of family planning-
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related decisions. Likewise, women from more affluent families recorded relatively higher 
levels of ‘partial’ autonomy compared with women from ‘low’ income families.  
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Table 10.1: Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Family Planning (More Children) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment Status Unemployed 1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.26 0.03 1.37 0.01 0.79 0.32 1.23 0.19 1.29 0.12 0.96 0.92 1.27 0.10 1.41 0.03 0.70 0.21 
Household Size 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.85 0.06 0.83 0.04 1.01 0.96 0.91 0.53 0.83 0.24 1.31 0.38 0.82 0.05 0.83 0.09 0.83 0.45 
Above Average 0.88 0.06 0.86 0.04 1.02 0.91 0.85 0.14 0.79 0.06 1.16 0.58 0.88 0.12 0.89 0.17 0.91 0.61 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.24 0.01 1.30 0.00 0.88 0.49 1.19 0.15 1.24 0.14 1.08 0.83 1.24 0.03 1.32 0.01 0.79 0.24 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.85 0.66 0.81 0.53 1.28 0.71 2.35 0.60 0.89 0.89 4.86 0.16 0.72 0.36 0.77 0.48 0.67 0.50 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.32 0.12 1.37 0.13 0.92 0.73 0.99 0.96 1.07 0.79 0.62 0.32 1.42 0.13 1.45 0.13 1.01 0.97 
25-29 years 1.50 0.00 1.61 0.00 0.82 0.39 1.33 0.23 1.43 0.15 0.77 0.51 1.52 0.00 1.65 0.00 0.78 0.41 
30-34 years 1.42 0.01 1.59 0.16 0.62 0.08 1.48 0.10 1.85 0.14 0.41 0.08 1.33 0.06 1.46 0.15 0.69 0.28 
35-39 years 1.41 0.01 1.48 0.17 0.83 0.48 1.38 0.23 1.41 0.21 0.89 0.80 1.34 0.04 1.46 0.19 0.73 0.33 
40-44 years 1.46 0.01 1.56 0.20 0.82 0.41 1.24 0.43 1.28 0.36 0.86 0.75 1.50 0.01 1.65 0.21 0.74 0.30 
45-49 years 1.48 0.01 1.60 0.18 0.78 0.41 1.36 0.26 1.50 0.14 0.64 0.43 1.44 0.04 1.57 0.17 0.76 0.45 
continue… 
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Table 10.1(…continued): Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Family Planning (Having More Children) Decision-Making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.03 0.77 1.09 0.37 0.72 0.13 1.07 0.62 1.05 0.74 1.08 0.80 0.99 0.91 1.10 0.46 0.51 0.02 
8-years education 1.41 0.00 1.58 0.00 0.79 0.48 1.81 0.00 1.99 0.00 1.03 0.94 1.01 0.97 1.12 0.50 0.41 0.09 
10-12years education 1.39 0.00 1.65 0.00 0.56 0.10 1.45 0.01 1.67 0.00 0.61 0.31 1.25 0.15 1.44 0.07 0.51 0.17 
Higher education 1.73 0.00 2.10 0.00 0.98 0.96 1.68 0.00 1.89 0.00 0.91 0.86 1.80 0.01 2.31 0.02 1.42 0.69 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.25 0.01 1.22 0.01 1.19 0.29 1.11 0.46 1.09 0.53 1.11 0.72 1.27 0.02 1.23 0.03 1.21 0.36 
8-years education 1.22 0.03 1.29 0.01 0.80 0.25 0.95 0.73 0.95 0.74 0.94 0.86 1.33 0.01 1.45 0.00 0.72 0.19 
10-12years education 1.33 0.00 1.48 0.00 0.65 0.02 1.13 0.38 1.21 0.24 0.79 0.46 1.38 0.00 1.59 0.00 0.54 0.01 
Higher education 1.25 0.02 1.43 0.00 0.59 0.05 1.14 0.40 1.26 0.18 0.78 0.53 1.19 0.15 1.40 0.02 0.44 0.02 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.13 0.03 1.14 0.14 1.10 0.50 0.92 0.35 0.98 0.81 0.76 0.20 1.24 0.00 1.19 0.03 1.43 0.05 
High income 0.94 0.64 1.03 0.87 0.31 0.04 0.87 0.45 1.05 0.84 0.30 0.05 0.77 0.25 0.80 0.43 0.47 0.00 
Family Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.06 0.43 1.08 0.32 0.90 0.55 1.31 0.09 1.26 0.04 1.16 0.64 0.99 0.93 1.03 0.74 0.81 0.29 
High income 1.19 0.02 1.31 0.00 0.69 0.02 1.44 0.01 1.52 0.01 0.91 0.76 1.10 0.27 1.22 0.05 0.60 0.01 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.07 0.46 1.04 0.74 1.23 0.29 0.91 0.55 0.89 0.48 1.05 0.87 1.15 0.28 1.09 0.52 1.33 0.24 
NWFP 1.77 0.00 2.28 0.00 0.53 0.00 2.20 0.00 3.74 0.00 0.48 0.04 1.73 0.00 2.17 0.00 0.56 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 3.18 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.10 0.00 8.20 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.15 0.80 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (26) = 2532.24; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -9405.07; Pseudo 
R2 = 0.1189. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 621.83 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop No. obs. 
= 13348; Design df = 1101; F (52, 1050) = 7.35; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of the urban regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(26, 502)=5.05, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1189. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 621.83 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Population size = 5389649.7; 
Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F (52, 476) = 4.86; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to the results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(26, 549) = 6.56, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1189. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 621.83 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; 
Design df = 574; F (52, 523) = 310.34; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 10.1.1: Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Family Planning (More Children) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.24 0.04 1.36 0.02 0.75 0.24 1.21 0.23 1.27 0.15 0.93 0.85 1.25 0.10 1.40 0.04 0.66 0.15 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.88 0.13 0.92 0.32 0.78 0.18 0.84 0.21 0.85 0.27 0.84 0.58 0.90 0.28 0.95 0.62 0.73 0.19 
Above Average 0.81 0.00 0.88 0.09 0.61 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.75 0.02 0.66 0.10 0.84 0.06 0.93 0.46 0.55 0.00 
Household Size: 
Children 
Boy/Girl 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
No child 0.70 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.86 0.50 0.68 0.01 0.68 0.02 0.71 0.43 0.70 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.95 0.85 
Boys/Girls (both) 1.01 0.87 1.07 0.31 0.78 0.08 1.02 0.87 1.11 0.42 0.73 0.22 1.01 0.92 1.06 0.52 0.82 0.24 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.25 0.01 1.22 0.03 1.23 0.26 1.27 0.08 1.21 0.23 1.58 0.19 1.23 0.05 1.22 0.09 1.08 0.74 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.87 0.70 0.82 0.55 1.40 0.62 2.29 0.61 0.89 0.90 4.86 0.20 0.74 0.40 0.77 0.49 0.78 0.68 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.14 0.32 1.17 0.25 0.86 0.56 0.84 0.51 0.91 0.71 0.56 0.25 1.22 0.18 1.24 0.16 0.97 0.92 
25-29 years 1.19 0.19 1.26 0.09 0.73 0.21 1.01 0.97 1.07 0.79 0.66 0.38 1.22 0.20 1.32 0.08 0.70 0.23 
30-34 years 1.07 0.63 1.20 0.22 0.52 0.03 1.06 0.84 1.30 0.34 0.34 0.06 1.02 0.91 1.13 0.48 0.57 0.09 
35-39 years 1.06 0.69 1.10 0.51 0.73 0.26 0.98 0.95 0.99 0.97 0.75 0.60 1.02 0.88 1.11 0.52 0.62 0.14 
40-44 years 1.14 0.38 1.17 0.31 0.82 0.47 0.96 0.88 0.95 0.87 0.84 0.75 1.17 0.36 1.25 0.22 0.71 0.29 
45-49 years 1.18 0.29 1.22 0.23 0.84 0.60 1.08 0.80 1.14 0.66 0.66 0.56 1.15 0.45 1.20 0.33 0.82 0.56 
continue… 
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Table 10.1.1(…continued): Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Family Planning (Having More Children) Decision-Making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.03 0.71 1.09 0.34 0.73 0.14 1.09 0.52 1.07 0.62 1.08 0.79 0.99 0.93 1.10 0.43 0.51 0.02 
8-years education 1.42 0.00 1.60 0.00 0.79 0.46 1.85 0.00 2.05 0.00 1.04 0.92 1.01 0.97 1.12 0.50 0.42 0.09 
10-12years education 1.39 0.00 1.66 0.00 0.56 0.10 1.46 0.01 1.71 0.00 0.60 0.29 1.27 0.12 1.46 0.06 0.54 0.21 
Higher education 1.78 0.00 2.19 0.00 0.97 0.94 1.76 0.00 2.01 0.00 0.90 0.85 1.82 0.01 2.36 0.01 1.40 0.70 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.26 0.01 1.22 0.01 1.21 0.25 1.11 0.48 1.09 0.55 1.11 0.73 1.27 0.02 1.23 0.03 1.23 0.31 
8-years education 1.23 0.02 1.29 0.01 0.83 0.35 0.97 0.83 0.96 0.79 0.98 0.95 1.34 0.00 1.45 0.00 0.75 0.25 
10-12years education 1.34 0.00 1.49 0.00 0.68 0.04 1.16 0.32 1.23 0.21 0.81 0.52 1.39 0.00 1.59 0.00 0.57 0.01 
Higher education 1.27 0.01 1.45 0.00 0.62 0.08 1.18 0.30 1.31 0.13 0.81 0.59 1.20 0.14 1.39 0.02 0.46 0.03 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.08 0.18 1.08 0.23 1.08 0.57 0.85 0.09 0.90 0.32 0.73 0.14 1.19 0.01 1.15 0.09 1.42 0.05 
High income 0.90 0.41 0.98 0.90 0.32 0.05 0.81 0.25 0.97 0.90 0.30 0.05 0.74 0.19 0.76 0.34 0.76 0.00 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.09 0.24 1.12 0.14 0.89 0.50 1.36 0.05 1.33 0.07 1.11 0.75 1.02 0.82 1.06 0.50 0.81 0.30 
High income 1.28 0.00 1.43 0.00 0.68 0.02 1.54 0.00 1.69 0.00 0.83 0.58 1.19 0.05 1.32 0.01 0.61 0.01 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.08 0.44 1.04 0.73 1.24 0.25 0.90 0.49 0.87 0.42 1.06 0.85 1.16 0.24 1.10 0.49 1.36 0.19 
NWFP 1.76 0.00 2.23 0.00 0.55 0.00 2.16 0.00 3.64 0.00 0.50 0.05 1.72 0.00 2.13 0.00 0.59 0.03 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 3.21 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.00 8.66 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.16 0.80 
      Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (28) = 2566.28; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -9388.05; Pseudo R2 
= 0.1202. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 638.48 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop No. obs. = 
13348; Design df = 1101; F (56, 1046) = 7.40; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of the urban regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(28, 500) = 5.42, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1202. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 638.48 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; 
Design df = 527; F(56, 472) = 5.26; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to the results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(28, 547) = 6.42, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1202. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 638.48 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; 
Design df = 574; F (56, 519) = 289.19; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 10.2: Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Family Planning (Use of Contraceptives) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment Status Unemployed 1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.32 0.01 1.46 0.00 0.85 0.44 1.16 0.35 1.26 0.20 0.88 0.73 1.37 0.02 1.53 0.01 0.82 0.42 
Household Size 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.87 0.13 0.85 0.11 1.00 0.99 0.93 0.66 0.84 0.32 1.30 0.38 0.84 0.10 0.85 0.18 0.83 0.46 
Above Average 0.98 0.77 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.46 0.94 0.63 0.90 0.44 1.11 0.66 0.98 0.78 1.03 0.76 0.79 0.19 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.24 0.01 1.33 0.00 0.85 0.35 1.10 0.49 1.21 0.23 0.83 0.54 1.29 0.01 1.36 0.00 0.83 0.39 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 1.09 0.81 1.07 0.84 1.20 0.77 4.65 0.29 1.94 0.58 3.69 0.25 0.83 0.55 0.91 0.79 0.70 0.52 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.48 0.15 1.46 0.21 1.20 0.48 1.15 0.59 1.11 0.67 0.94 0.99 1.60 0.00 1.60 0.00 1.22 0.51 
25-29 years 1.78 0.00 1.78 0.00 1.21 0.44 1.71 0.03 1.72 0.14 1.05 0.91 1.79 0.00 1.82 0.00 1.21 0.55 
30-34 years 1.58 0.00 1.67 0.16 0.91 0.73 1.81 0.01 2.09 0.16 0.67 0.40 1.48 0.01 1.55 0.19 0.98 0.95 
35-39 years 1.82 0.00 1.92 0.18 1.00 1.00 2.04 0.01 2.09 0.19 1.08 0.87 1.70 0.00 1.86 0.20 0.88 0.69 
40-44 years 1.63 0.00 1.71 0.19 0.98 0.95 1.56 0.11 1.61 0.16 0.90 0.82 1.64 0.00 1.75 0.13 0.97 0.93 
45-49 years 1.55 0.00 1.61 0.21 0.96 0.90 1.53 0.14 1.52 0.14 0.95 0.93 1.53 0.01 1.66 0.16 0.84 0.64 
continue… 
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Table 10.2 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Family Planning (Use of Contraceptives) Decision-Making  
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.08 0.37 1.18 0.10 0.72 0.11 1.06 0.69 1.05 0.75 1.04 0.88 1.08 0.48 1.25 0.10 0.51 0.01 
8-years education 1.32 0.01 1.50 0.00 0.73 0.31 1.32 0.10 1.46 0.05 0.87 0.72 1.18 0.27 1.37 0.10 0.50 0.15 
10-12years education 1.37 0.01 1.64 0.00 0.65 0.09 1.21 0.23 1.39 0.08 0.66 0.22 1.53 0.01 1.92 0.01 0.69 0.37 
Higher education 1.60 0.00 2.16 0.00 0.76 0.53 1.39 0.07 1.72 0.01 0.69 0.48 1.90 0.01 2.83 0.01 1.15 0.87 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.17 0.05 1.16 0.07 1.06 0.71 1.04 0.78 1.09 0.58 0.90 0.72 1.17 0.10 1.15 0.15 1.12 0.55 
8-years education 1.10 0.27 1.19 0.09 0.74 0.11 0.93 0.66 0.96 0.81 0.85 0.61 1.15 0.18 1.28 0.05 0.65 0.07 
10-12years education 1.18 0.05 1.32 0.01 0.70 0.04 1.09 0.55 1.19 0.32 0.76 0.33 1.17 0.12 1.33 0.02 0.64 0.03 
Higher education 1.18 0.11 1.44 0.00 0.54 0.02 1.16 0.38 1.43 0.06 0.61 0.19 1.06 0.65 1.29 0.10 0.45 0.02 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.18 0.00 1.18 0.01 1.15 0.30 0.99 0.90 1.04 0.73 0.85 0.44 1.29 0.00 1.24 0.01 1.43 0.04 
High income 1.28 0.08 1.46 0.19 0.95 0.90 1.32 0.12 1.90 0.03 0.82 0.69 0.91 0.74 0.88 0.72 0.78 0.75 
Family Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.04 0.69 1.04 0.69 0.97 0.88 1.21 0.27 1.06 0.71 1.61 0.12 0.99 0.93 1.04 0.73 0.80 0.27 
High income 1.13 0.10 1.23 0.01 0.74 0.06 1.32 0.04 1.32 0.07 1.20 0.54 1.06 0.48 1.19 0.09 0.60 0.01 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.17 0.15 1.10 0.44 1.34 0.11 0.85 0.31 0.78 0.17 1.22 0.46 1.39 0.03 1.31 0.09 1.38 0.19 
NWFP 1.56 0.00 2.06 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.74 0.00 3.15 0.00 0.39 0.01 1.59 0.00 2.04 0.00 0.51 0.01 
Baluchistan 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00 2.63 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.00 6.80 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.08 0.86 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (26) = 2689.48; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -9083.63; Pseudo 
R2 = 0.1290. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 561.56 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. 
= 13348; Design df = 1101; F (52, 1050) = 5.83; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of the urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(26, 502)=4.51, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1290. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 561.56 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; 
Design df = 527; F(52, 476) = 3.92; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(26, 549) = 5.46, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1290. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (26) = 561.56 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; 
Design df = 574; F (52, 523) = 4.25; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 10.2.1: Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Family Planning (Use of Contraceptives) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.30 0.02 1.44 0.01 0.82 0.34 1.13 0.46 1.23 0.26 0.84 0.65 1.35 0.04 1.51 0.01 0.79 0.33 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.87 0.08 0.88 0.14 0.85 0.37 0.79 0.09 0.78 0.10 0.82 0.49 0.88 0.21 0.91 0.35 0.85 0.48 
Above Average 0.87 0.06 0.97 0.67 0.60 0.00 0.78 0.04 0.85 0.23 0.60 0.05 0.88 0.19 0.95 0.96 0.57 0.01 
Household Size: 
Children 
Boy/Girl 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
No child 0.64 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.97 0.89 0.62 0.01 0.59 0.00 0.92 0.85 0.64 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.99 0.97 
Boys/Girls (both) 1.11 0.13 1.20 0.01 0.80 0.08 1.18 0.13 1.31 0.04 0.83 0.44 1.08 0.37 1.16 0.10 0.79 0.11 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.21 0.02 1.19 0.05 1.14 0.47 1.10 0.48 1.08 0.64 1.24 0.48 1.25 0.03 1.24 0.05 1.06 0.80 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 1.11 0.78 1.07 0.84 1.31 0.67 4.64 0.28 1.99 0.56 3.75 0.28 0.84 0.59 0.90 0.77 0.80 0.69 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.22 0.10 1.17 0.21 1.18 0.53 0.94 0.81 0.89 0.65 0.93 0.90 1.31 0.05 1.29 0.08 1.22 0.51 
25-29 years 1.30 0.03 1.26 0.08 1.15 0.57 1.20 0.49 1.15 0.61 0.94 0.88 1.32 0.05 1.31 0.07 1.18 0.59 
30-34 years 1.08 0.56 1.11 0.46 0.83 0.51 1.16 0.58 1.28 0.39 0.57 0.28 1.03 0.86 1.05 0.76 0.91 0.79 
35-39 years 1.24 0.12 1.26 0.12 0.94 0.81 1.30 0.39 1.27 0.47 0.94 0.91 1.19 0.27 1.26 0.17 0.83 0.57 
40-44 years 1.13 0.41 1.11 0.52 1.03 0.90 1.04 0.89 0.99 0.99 0.89 0.84 1.16 0.40 1.17 0.42 1.02 0.95 
45-49 years 1.09 0.59 1.04 0.81 1.10 0.78 1.04 0.90 0.94 0.84 1.02 0.97 1.09 0.64 1.10 0.63 0.97 0.94 
continue… 
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Table 10.2.1 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Family Planning (Use of Contraceptives) Decision-Making  
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.09 0.34 1.18 0.10 0.72 0.11 1.09 0.58 1.07 0.63 1.05 0.85 1.08 0.48 1.25 0.10 0.51 0.01 
8-years education 1.32 0.01 1.52 0.00 0.73 0.30 1.36 0.07 1.52 0.03 0.86 0.68 1.17 0.28 1.37 0.10 0.51 0.15 
10-12years education 1.37 0.01 1.65 0.00 0.65 0.09 1.22 0.21 1.43 0.06 0.65 0.21 1.55 0.01 1.93 0.01 0.72 0.43 
Higher education 1.66 0.00 2.29 0.00 0.75 0.51 1.49 0.03 1.89 0.00 0.69 0.48 1.93 0.00 2.93 0.00 1.12 0.89 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.17 0.05 1.16 0.07 1.08 0.63 1.03 0.84 1.07 0.65 0.90 0.72 1.17 0.09 1.15 0.15 1.14 0.49 
8-years education 1.12 0.21 1.19 0.08 0.76 0.16 0.96 0.79 0.98 0.89 0.89 0.72 1.16 0.16 1.28 0.05 0.66 0.08 
10-12years education 1.20 0.04 1.32 0.01 0.73 0.06 1.12 0.44 1.22 0.26 0.79 0.42 1.18 0.10 1.32 0.02 0.67 0.05 
Higher education 1.20 0.07 1.46 0.00 0.56 0.03 1.21 0.26 1.49 0.04 0.64 0.23 1.07 0.61 1.29 0.10 0.47 0.02 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.12 0.05 1.11 0.11 1.13 0.36 0.90 0.27 0.94 0.53 0.81 0.31 1.24 0.00 1.19 0.04 1.40 0.05 
High income 1.21 0.18 1.36 0.16 0.97 0.94 1.21 0.29 1.70 0.07 0.81 0.67 0.88 0.63 0.84 0.61 0.83 0.81 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.06 0.52 1.06 0.49 0.98 0.90 1.24 0.19 1.11 0.51 1.56 0.14 1.01 0.92 1.06 0.59 0.82 0.31 
High income 1.20 0.01 1.33 0.00 0.74 0.06 1.41 0.01 1.47 0.01 1.11 0.72 1.14 0.13 1.29 0.02 0.62 0.02 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.18 0.12 1.11 0.38 1.35 0.10 0.85 0.30 0.77 0.16 1.23 0.45 1.43 0.02 1.35 0.07 1.39 0.18 
NWFP 1.56 0.00 2.03 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.72 0.00 3.06 0.00 0.41 0.01 1.59 0.00 2.02 0.00 0.52 0.01 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00 2.64 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.00 7.24 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.07 0.87 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (28) = 2742.96; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -9056.88; Pseudo R2 
= 0.1315. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 582.75 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 
13348; Design df = 1101; F (56, 1046) = 6.56; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of the urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(28, 500) = 5.09, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1315. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 582.75 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; 
Design df = 527; F(56, 472) = 4.49; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to results of the rural regions, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(28, 547) = 5.73, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1315. 
Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (28) = 582.75 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; 
Design df = 574; F (56, 519) = 4.76; Prob > F = 0.00 
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CHAPTER 11 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS, DISTINCTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND  
SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 
 
11.1. Introduction 
This thesis carries out thorough research on the multidimensional concept of women’s 
autonomy by introducing a wide framework of inquiry. The thesis provides an in-depth 
discussion on the construction of variables and data information, empirical strategy and 
corresponding empirical results from the overall sample, as well as from within the urban and 
rural regions of Pakistan. This Chapter aims to summarize the discussion and analysis of this 
research with concluding remarks. It highlights the contribution of this study to the existing 
literature, and presents further avenues for extending this research. 
 
11.2. Summary and Concluding Remarks  
Chapter 1 details the main objective of this thesis as an investigation into the appropriate 
determinants of women’s autonomy in the household. Chapter 2 provides a review of the wide 
range of theoretical and empirical studies on the subject, and identifies potential gaps in the 
existing literature. It is observed that the current literature lacks consensus on what constitutes 
the common determinants of women’s autonomy in the household. This thesis fills this gap by 
identifying the proper channels based on household composition in determining women’s 
autonomy in the household. Correspondingly in Chapter 3, we attempt to fill the gap by 
formulating an all-encompassing framework of analysis based on the standard methods of 
Family Economics. More specifically, the framework of analysis identifies the appropriate threat 
options of women that support an increase in their levels of bargaining power. The threat 
options include women with an earned income and different formulations of household size 
within a variety of household decision-making processes. Additionally, we applied the empirical 
model to determinants identified within other disciplines, for example, within the fields of 
sociology, anthropology and demography. 
In this thesis, we utilise the ‘Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey’ 
(PSLM) which provides us with detailed micro-level data from 15,453 households in Pakistan. 
This data allows us to investigate the multilevel dimensions of women’s autonomy not 
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previously explored in the existing literature. Further details on variable constructions and data 
information are included in Chapter 4 following the descriptive evidence presented in Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 6 we discuss possible methods of estimation in detail by arguing why multinomial 
logistic models are a more appropriate model, subject to the violation of the parallel line 
assumption of ordered logit models. Furthermore we also explain the implications of using the 
multinomial logit models of estimation compared with conventional logit models which are 
frequently used in analysing the multilevels of women’s autonomy. In the later Chapters 
(Chapter 7 to Chapter 10) we present the empirical results of both aggregated and disaggregated 
economic and family aspects of women’s autonomy in the household. We replicate the above 
results for the overall sample as well as for the urban and rural regions of Pakistan. The 
concluding remarks for each are presented in the following Section. 
Chapter 7 presents results of the threat options (earned income and household size), 
individual characteristics, family socio-economic status and state/province fixed effects to 
explain the multilayered concept of aggregated economic decision-making power in the 
household within the overall, urban and rural region samples. In general, results appear 
consistent with the proposed theoretical framework of study in Chapter 3. Furthermore, the 
multinomial logit settings also prove to be the most appropriate specification for empirical 
analysis.  
Results show that an employed status (earned income) as a threat option compared with 
an unemployed status increases a woman’s bargaining power in household economic decision-
making, within both the urban and rural regions. More specifically, results show earned income 
increases the likelihood of ‘partial’ to ‘strong’ autonomy of women from the urban regions, 
however from ‘no’ to ‘partial’ autonomy of women from the rural regions. It is important to 
note that the existing literature considers whether the earned income status of women increases 
their autonomy without making the distinction of the multilevel aspect of autonomy. Regarding 
the other threat option, we observe that household size above the ‘average’ size substantially 
decreases women’s autonomy in the urban as well as rural regions. Furthermore, we find that 
household size in terms of elderly persons and the relatives of a husband apparently depreciate 
women’s autonomy in the household. In addition to this we find that an increasing number of 
children increases women’s ‘partial’ autonomy but is not relevant to the ‘strong’ autonomy in 
the overall as well as urban regions. We also note that proportionally increasing the number of 
children (‘equal number of boys and girls’) increases women’s autonomy in the household. 
Interestingly, the number of children or the gender does not appear relevant in influencing 
women’s autonomy for those in the rural regions. Obviously the above conclusion may be 
traced back to the prevailing male dominant culture commonly found in rural society.  
We find that women’s education plays an important role in enhancing their autonomy in 
the household. Results confirm that relatively educated women from the urban or the rural 
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regions enjoy greater levels of autonomy compared with women with no education or relatively 
lower levels of education. More interestingly, education has a greater impact in the rural regions 
on enhancing women’s autonomy, particularly noticeable given the low level of autonomy 
within these areas. We also observe that with increasing age women are likely to gain more 
autonomy in the household, within both urban and rural regions. Regarding a husband’s level of 
education, we fail to observe any effects on a wife’s level of autonomy in the household from 
any of the regions. However, his income does appear positively linked to his wife’s autonomy. 
Along similar lines we find ‘high’ levels of joint family income (family socio-economic status) 
are significantly related to increased levels of autonomy compared with the ‘low’ income group, 
both within the urban and rural regions. Furthermore, we find that women from the provinces of 
Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan hold relatively less autonomy compared with women from the 
province of Punjab. 
Regarding the disaggregated analysis of economic decision-making autonomy in 
Chapter 8, overall results appear consistent with the evidence we observed within the 
aggregated economic autonomy. We observe that determinants of the threat options (earned 
income and the size of the household) influence women’s autonomy in food, clothing and 
footwear, travel and recreation and medical-related decision-making aspects within all three 
sample groups. More specifically, we note that women with an employed status reflect 
relatively higher degrees of ‘partial’ and/or ‘strong’ autonomy in purchasing decisions 
concerning food, clothing and footwear, within the overall and rural samples. However, the 
above results do not appear relevant to those within the urban regions where similar results 
lacked statistical significance. Interestingly, we find the employed status of women led to 
increased levels of ‘partial’ autonomy in travel and recreation and medical treatment-related 
decision-making for women from the urban regions but not for those from the rural region. 
Therefore, we clearly find that the regions play a discriminatory role in the current levels of 
women’s household-related decision-making autonomy.  
The household size, which excludes the calculation of children, appears negatively 
related to women’s autonomy in all aspects across both regions. We also observe that the 
extended family formation appears to diminish women’s autonomy within both urban and rural 
settings. An increasing number of children, however, correlate with an increasing level of 
women’s autonomy, although only within the urban regions. We also find that the gender of 
children is not related to increasing women’s autonomy, contrary to several studies which find 
the presence of boys in a household does increase women’s autonomy. However, this study 
shows that both boys and girls appear equally important for increasing women’s autonomy in 
the household. As observed within the aggregated economic decision-making results, all other 
determinants appear with similar levels of association with all four dimensions of autonomy.  
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Regarding the sphere of family planning decisions, results show that an employed status 
increases levels to ‘partial’ autonomy except within the urban regions. A household size 
(excluding children) above the ‘average’ size decreases the levels of ‘strong’ towards ‘partial’ 
autonomy within both urban and rural regions. Analysis of children shows that an increasing 
number of boys and girls may increase women’s autonomy. However the gender of children 
does not appear relevant to women’s autonomy in the household. Overall, results for the 
different threat options within the sphere of family planning autonomy appear consistent with 
results observed in the sphere of economic decision-making autonomy in Chapter 7. 
Within the area of family planning decisions, we observe that women’s education plays 
a positive role in enhancing women’s autonomy. More specifically, results show that relatively 
educated women display greater levels of autonomy compared with women with ‘no’ or low 
levels of education. Results also indicate that women aged between 15-19 years and 40-49 years 
record higher levels of autonomy within each successive age bracket, though only within the 
rural regions. Interestingly, results show that educated husbands appear to significantly increase 
women’s autonomy in family planning decision-making aspects. We find that ‘8-years’ and all 
higher levels of education increase the likelihood a woman has ‘partial’ autonomy over ‘no’ 
autonomy. Further results show that the husband’s income level (‘middle’ income) increases the 
likelihood of a woman having ‘partial’ autonomy, although it decreases the likelihood for 
‘strong’ to ‘partial’ autonomy within the rural regions. Furthermore, the family socio-economic 
status appears to significantly increase women’s autonomy in family planning-related decisions. 
Additionally, we find women from the province of Sindh and NWFP have greater ‘partial’ 
autonomy but lower levels of ‘strong’ autonomy compared with women from the province of 
Punjab. Women from the province of Baluchistan record lower levels of ‘partial’ and ‘strong’ 
autonomy compared with women from the province of Punjab, within all sample groups. 
The results of the disaggregated analysis of family planning autonomy are consistent 
with the aggregated measures. For instance, the employed status increases the likelihood of ‘no’ 
to ‘partial’ levels of autonomy in both sub-dimensions of family planning decision-making 
within the rural regions, but not the urban regions. The average household size (excluding 
children) is inversely related to both sub-dimensions of autonomy within both regions. In 
addition, results show that women from the extended family formation record relatively lower 
autonomy levels compared with women from nuclear family formations within the rural regions. 
Regarding the gender and number of children we observed that increasing numbers of children 
evidently enhance women’s ‘partial’ autonomy across both regions. Further, results do not 
support the positive impact of one gender over the other, in terms of influencing women’s 
autonomy in any of the aspects of family planning-related decision-making autonomy. However, 
a woman’s level of education significantly increases her levels of autonomy in the 
disaggregated analysis of family planning decision-making. Similarly, her husband’s level of 
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education also increases his wife’s autonomy in all relevant sub-dimensions of family planning -
related decision-making autonomy. 
 
11.3. Distinctions and Implications of the Study 
Various important distinctions on the subject of women’s autonomy may be attributed to this 
research study. The one aspect of these can be recognized to the existing stream of literature on 
similar line of research. The second aspect relates to the country specific experience under 
observation, here specifically for the case of Pakistan. 
This study has attempted to formulate a framework of analysis based on standard 
methods of microeconomics theory of household decision-making, along with considerations of 
the cultural aspects relevant in determining women’s autonomy. As a result, this study has 
successfully bridged the approaches of different disciplines into one encompassing analytical 
model of women’s autonomy. The approach adopted in the current study was intended to 
answer several questions which arose out of the existing literature regarding the determinants of 
women’s autonomy. This study represents a step forward by adding findings to the existing 
literature; it identifies a valid set of threat options associated with the bargaining power of 
women relative to men in the household. Correspondingly, the simulation exercise presented in 
Chapter 3 confirms the validity of those threat utilities playing an important role in the non-
cooperative model settings of household decision-making. Further, the empirical exercise 
presented throughout this study confirms the validity of those threat options with varying 
degrees across alternative dimensions of women’s autonomy relating to both economic and 
family planning aspects of household decision-making. 
Obviously this study has an advantage over several previous studies as it analyses a 
relatively large data set based on stratified sampling, representative of the entire population of 
Pakistan. Further, the current study also enhances its contribution by adopting the most 
appropriate technique of estimation called the multinomial logit model which explains the 
varying ‘partial’ effects of determinants across different levels of autonomy. Usually, this 
important variation has been ignored in the past which led to narrow, if not, misleading results. 
To clarify, this study clearly differentiates between different levels of women’s autonomy, from 
‘no’ autonomy, to ‘partial’ autonomy and ‘strong’ autonomy. These differences definitely exist 
as has been substantiated through the empirical evidence where we observed the varying effects 
of separate determinants on different levels of autonomy. Another important distinction of this 
thesis is that it provides parallel results for different sample groups; the overall as well as urban 
and rural regions, thus quieting debate surrounding the aggregated versus disaggregated results 
of determinants of women’s autonomy. 
As this is a country specific thesis, we may claim its status as a first ever study of its 
nature, analysing almost all of the PSLM data of country wide information on socio-economic 
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indicators relevant to women’s decision-making power in the household. It is important to note 
that women constitute almost 52 per cent of the total population of Pakistan. Given the 
constrained freedom of women in general, and in the household in particular, data shows almost 
70 per cent of women never attended school, only 9 per cent are employed and 87 per cent 
belong to an extended family formation. Furthermore, 44 per cent of women from the urban 
regions and 54 per cent from the rural regions have no say in household decision-making 
activities. This information confirms in other words the inferior position of women in Pakistani 
society hence linked with the existence of separate sphere model implications.  
Further, we may highlight some important implications drawn from this research. Given 
the lack of women’s education, clearly a country wide educational program focusing on women 
should be extended to enable them to build on their education levels. Results recommend that 
educational facilities should be extended at as low a cost as possible, given women from 
relatively poorer families were those least likely to access education. Regarding employment, 
results recommend policy interventions which increase a woman’s independence, leading to less 
dependence on herr male counterpart. This may be possible by creating reserved seats for 
women to gain representation in different sectors of the economy. In addition to the above, 
additional measures such as small credit schemes should be extended towards women interested 
in starting small scale businesses or small home trades. It is not satisfactory to provide such 
resources as women need, both the agencies involved and a supportive environment are required 
to fully capitalise on these measures. This can only be achieved through society becoming more 
gender balanced in its values. Equally, women must also be encouraged to participate in 
different activities in order to achieve the level of autonomy in relevant decision-making 
processes that is their due.  
In keeping with these recommendations, results indicate that women with an employed 
status show relatively higher levels of autonomy compared with unemployed women. By 
encouraging women to participate in the labour market, their levels of bargaining power in the 
household should increase. However, this is not so straightforward as women who are able to 
find independent jobs were observed as unwilling to participate in the labour market. There 
could be two possibilities for non-participation. Firstly, the head of the household may restrict a 
woman to household duties and forbid her joining the labour market with a chance to earn an 
independent income. This is an example of a cultural barrier within a male-dominated society, 
where men work outside of the home and women remain inside it. Given this example, we can 
see that rigorous policy planning is required through which society can be educated on the 
importance of women’s participation in the socio-economic development of a household.  
Just as significant, we observe household composition is strongly related to women’s 
autonomy in the household. As mentioned, 87 per cent of women are from an extended family 
system with relatively lower levels of autonomy compared with women from a nuclear family 
170 
 
system. There is possibly a link to an increasing household size thus requiring a greater input of 
women’s time in preparing the household public goods. This is further supported by the 
observation that where there are elderly persons and a husband’s relatives present in the 
household, we see decreasing levels of women’s autonomy. Conversely, we find that increasing 
the household size in terms of having more children (irrespective of gender) increases women’s 
autonomy in the household. As mentioned in Chapter 7, women’s intentions after marriage are 
to have children to secure her place within the household. This intention may be linked to the 
possibility that a husband may seek out another marriage to secure the presence of children. 
Subsequently a wife may also face divorce from her husband, which further depreciates the 
respect and value of women in society. Therefore, women perceive having children with 
financial stability and some level of power in the household. These results give us a cautious 
understanding of this complex matter and further analysis should be addressed in different 
stages by social scientists and policymakers, through highlighting the important role women 
must play in developing society.  
The above observations reflect deeper implications for the analysis of women’s 
autonomy on the socio-economic fabric of society. The analysis illustrates the need to focus on 
household composition along with the conventional determinants of women’s autonomy. 
Certainly the list of individual characteristics, including level of education, control of assets, a 
husband’s level of education and income, family socio-economic status, all play an important 
role in shaping women’s autonomy. Household composition is broadly associated with strong 
cultural norms which usually contradict with modern time requirement of the family evolutions. 
We believe that a long-term social policy based on a general awareness of women’s role in 
family welfare and particularly the children’s well-being should be emphasised through a mega-
campaign to society. This may allow Pakistani society to slowly adapt to the realisation that 
women have an important role to play in developing  the country. 
 
11.4. Limitations of the Study 
Given the distinctions and contributions of this study to the existing literature on this subject, 
we also point out a few limitations which are mainly associated with the questionnaire and data 
used in this thesis. The questions posed in the PSLM survey to the respondents are often 
ambiguous, lack clarity or carry dual meanings. For instance, the question, ‘Who in your 
household decides whether you should have more children?’ does not differentiate among 
women who have no children from those with children, or those with a large number of children. 
Further, the coding system adopted in the questionnaire also appears unclear in terms of making 
purchasing or consumption-related decisions, and shows repetitions which may become a 
source of bias in the responses. The PSLM is the largest and widest data set available for 
Pakistan, yet it appears to be missing a lot of important information necessary for a 
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comprehensive analysis of women’s autonomy in the household. Among various aspects we 
could not find information relevant to the DOWRY or co-residence of married women’s relatives 
like a husband’s relatives living in the same household. We were also unable to track down any 
information on married women’s parents or siblings, significant people because of the important 
role they provide by giving moral or financial support to their daughter, and therefore also as a 
source of increasing her autonomy levels within the household. These limitations must be kept 
in mind when interpreting the analysis.  
Regardless of the fact that we tried to discuss the potential problem of simultaneity in 
the empirical analysis, we were left short of the necessary information to fully investigate the 
issue of endogeniety. There are a few studies that have considered crop yield and the body mass 
index of women as instruments while investigating women’s autonomy from the selected 
provinces of Bangladesh and India. The current study however demonstrates a broader scope of 
analysis including urban and rural stratifications, and thus requires effective information 
regarding a woman’s parents. of a woman married to the other household. This may have 
provided sufficient information viewing as absolutely exogenous to the set of above 
determinants of women’s autonomy in the household. Essentially, we lack necessary 
information on married women prior to their marriage which may prove relevant to deeper 
analysis.  
 
11.5. Scope for Further Research  
A logical step forward from the current study requires a greater interdisciplinary formulation of 
an analysis framework for studying women’s autonomy. It implies that the current settings of 
the framework of analysis, based on analytical methods of microeconomics, should be extended 
by including proper measures of cultural norms and traditions for the comprehensive analysis of 
women’s autonomy. Secondly, it requires more data points or longitudinal analysis to observe 
any changes occurring within family systems over time. Further work is anticipated by the 
author along these lines. Therefore a synthetic cohort analysis and comparison of different 
assimilated characteristics of women in the more recent surveys of PSLM will be undertaken to 
investigate the changes over time, if any, of women’s bargaining power in the household. In 
addition, the role of women’s autonomy within the household, her children’s health and 
educational wellbeing, will also be included in this subsequent project. 
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APPENDIX-I: Descriptive Evidence 
Appendix Table 6.4.1: Food-related Autonomy and Determinants ( 2  results) 
Determinants Observations (%) 
Levels of Autonomy 
Significance 
(P-value) No (%) 
Partial 
(%) 
Strong 
(%) 
Employment Status 
Unemployed 13879 (91) 57 17 26 
<0.001 
Employed 1440 (9) 33 25 42 
Household Size 
Below Average 5503 (36) 41 23 36 
<0.001 Average 1908 (12) 49 20 31 
Above Average 7908 (52) 66 14 20 
Household Size 
Excluding Children 
Below Average 5823 (38) 41 24 35 
<0.001 Average 2229 (15) 52 20 28 
Above Average 7267 (47) 67 13 21 
Number of Sons 
No son 3796 (25) 61 15 24 
<0.001 1 son 3727 (24) 56 17 27 
2 & more sons 7796 (51) 52 20 28 
Number of 
Daughters 
No daughter 4226 (28) 62 15 23 
<0.001 1 daughter 4087 (27) 54 17 29 
2 & more daughters 7006 (46) 51 20 28 
Family Formation 
Nuclear 1981 (13) 38 24 39 
<0.001 
Extended 13338 (87) 57 17 25 
Mother-in-Law 
Present 15168 (99) 55 18 27 
<0.001 
Not Present 151 (1) 78 1 21 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 781 (5) 75 11 14 
<0.001 
20-24 years 2504 (16) 67 14 19 
25-29 years 3184 (21) 58 16 26 
30-34 years 2655 (17) 52 20 28 
35-39 years 2642 (17) 46 21 33 
40-44 years 2086 (14) 46 21 33 
45-49 years 1467 (10) 49 21 30 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 10792 (70) 60 17 23 
<0.001 
5-years education 1649 (11) 43 21 36 
8-years education 741 (5) 42 18 40 
10-12yrs education 1095 (7) 41 21 38 
Higher education 1007 (7) 42 19 39 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 5113 (33) 56 20 24 
<0.001 
5-years education 2234 (15) 54 21 25 
8-years education 1566 (10) 52 18 30 
10-12yrs education 2225 (15) 54 18 28 
Higher education 2237 (15) 53 19 28 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 8595 (56) 58 19 24 
<0.001 Middle income 4526 (30) 51 20 29 
High income 464 (3) 41 23 35 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 5660 (37) 59 19 22 
<0.001 Middle income 3026 (20) 56 17 27 
High income 6633 (43) 51 18 32 
Source: Author's calculations 
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Appendix Table 6.4.2: Clothing & footwear-related Autonomy and Determinants ( 2  results) 
Determinants Observations (%) 
Levels of Autonomy 
Significance 
(P-value) No (%) 
Partial 
(%) 
Strong 
(%) 
Employment Status 
Unemployed 13879 (91) 47 24 30 
<0.001 
Employed 1440 (9) 25 30 46 
Household Size 
Below Average 5503 (36) 33 28 39 
<0.001 Average 1908 (12) 40 26 34 
Above Average 7908 (52) 54 21 25 
Household Size 
Excluding Children 
Below Average 5823 (38) 34 30 36 
<0.001 Average 2229 (15) 43 24 32 
Above Average 7267 (47) 54 19 27 
Number of Sons 
No son 3796 (25) 51 20 28 
<0.001 1 son 3727 (24) 45 22 33 
2 & more sons 7796 (51) 41 27 32 
Number of 
Daughters 
No daughter 4226 (28) 51 21 28 
<0.001 1 daughter 4087 (27) 45 23 32 
2 & more daughters 7006 (46) 41 27 33 
Family Formation 
Nuclear 1981 (13) 33 28 39 
<0.001 
Extended 13338 (87) 47 24 30 
Mother-in-Law 
Present 15168 (99) 44 24 31 
<0.001 
Not Present 151 (1) 71 5 24 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 781 (5) 65 18 18 
<0.001 
20-24 years 2504 (16) 56 20 24 
25-29 years 3184 (21) 48 22 30 
30-34 years 2655 (17) 43 26 31 
35-39 years 2642 (17) 36 28 36 
40-44 years 2086 (14) 36 26 38 
45-49 years 1467 (10) 38 25 37 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 10792 (70) 51 25 24 
<0.001 
5-years education 1649 (11) 33 25 42 
8-years education 741 (5) 27 24 49 
10-12yrs education 1095 (7) 28 23 50 
Higher education 1007 (7) 24 20 55 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 5113 (33) 49 27 24 
<0.001 
5-years education 2234 (15) 45 28 27 
8-years education 1566 (10) 42 23 35 
10-12yrs education 2225 (15) 44 23 33 
Higher education 2237 (15) 37 25 38 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 8595 (56) 49 25 26 
<0.001 Middle income 4526 (30) 39 27 34 
High income 464 (3) 27 22 51 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 5660 (37) 50 26 24 
<0.001 Middle income 3026 (20) 47 24 28 
High income 6633 (43) 39 23 38 
Source: Author's calculations 
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Appendix Table 6.4.3: Recreation & Traveling-related Autonomy and Determinants ( 2  results) 
Determinants Observations (%) 
Levels of Autonomy 
Significance 
(P-value) No (%) 
Partial 
(%) 
Strong 
(%) 
Employment Status 
Unemployed 13879 (91) 53 39 8 
<0.001 
Employed 1440 (9) 39 47 14 
Household Size 
Below Average 5503 (36) 43 45 12 
<0.001 Average 1908 (12) 48 40 11 
Above Average 7908 (52) 59 36 5 
Household Size 
Excluding Children 
Below Average 5823 (38) 41 48 11 
<0.001 Average 2229 (15) 54 37 9 
Above Average 7267 (47) 60 34 6 
Number of Sons 
No son 3796 (25) 59 33 7 
<0.001 1 son 3727 (24) 55 37 8 
2 & more sons 7796 (51) 47 44 9 
Number of 
Daughters 
No daughter 4226 (28) 60 33 6 
<0.001 1 daughter 4087 (27) 52 39 9 
2 & more daughters 7006 (46) 47 43 10 
Family Formation 
Nuclear 1981 (13) 43 45 13 
<0.001 
Extended 13338 (87) 53 39 8 
Mother-in-Law 
Present 15168 (99) 52 40 9 
<0.001 
Not Present 151 (1) 74 17 9 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 781 (5) 68 29 3 
<0.001 
20-24 years 2504 (16) 65 31 4 
25-29 years 3184 (21) 56 37 8 
30-34 years 2655 (17) 51 41 8 
35-39 years 2642 (17) 43 46 11 
40-44 years 2086 (14) 44 44 12 
45-49 years 1467 (10) 43 45 12 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 10792 (70) 54 39 6 
<0.001 
5-years education 1649 (11) 46 42 13 
8-years education 741 (5) 48 38 15 
10-12yrs education 1095 (7) 49 37 14 
Higher education 1007 (7) 46 41 13 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 5113 (33) 52 41 6 
<0.001 
5-years education 2234 (15) 50 43 6 
8-years education 1566 (10) 54 38 8 
10-12yrs education 2225 (15) 52 40 8 
Higher education 2237 (15) 49 43 8 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 8595 (56) 54 39 6 
<0.001 Middle income 4526 (30) 48 44 7 
High income 464 (3) 41 48 12 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 5660 (37) 53 40 7 
<0.001 Middle income 3026 (20) 53 39 8 
High income 6633 (43) 50 39 11 
Source: Author's calculations 
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Appendix Table 6.4.4: Medical Treatment-related Autonomy and Determinants ( 2  results) 
Determinants Observations (%) 
Levels of Autonomy 
Significance 
(P-value) No (%) 
Partial 
(%) 
Strong 
(%) 
Employment Status 
Unemployed 13879 (91) 49 39 12 
<0.001 
Employed 1440 (9) 35 43 21 
Household Size 
Below Average 5503 (36) 39 44 17 
<0.001 Average 1908 (12) 45 41 15 
Above Average 7908 (52) 55 36 9 
Household Size 
Excluding Children 
Below Average 5823 (38) 37 47 16 
<0.001 Average 2229 (15) 48 39 13 
Above Average 7267 (47) 56 34 10 
Number of Sons 
No son 3796 (25) 56 33 11 
<0.001 1 son 3727 (24) 50 37 13 
2 & more sons 7796 (51) 43 43 14 
Number of 
Daughters 
No daughter 4226 (28) 56 34 10 
<0.001 1 daughter 4087 (27) 48 39 13 
2 & more daughters 7006 (46) 43 43 14 
Family Formation 
Nuclear 1981 (13) 39 44 17 
<0.001 
Extended 13338 (87) 49 39 12 
Mother-in-Law 
Present 15168 (99) 48 39 13 
<0.001 
Not Present 151 (1) 71 18 11 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 781 (5) 65 30 5 
<0.001 
20-24 years 2504 (16) 60 33 7 
25-29 years 3184 (21) 52 36 11 
30-34 years 2655 (17) 47 41 12 
35-39 years 2642 (17) 39 45 16 
40-44 years 2086 (14) 39 43 18 
45-49 years 1467 (10) 40 43 17 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 10792 (70) 50 40 10 
<0.001 
5-years education 1649 (11) 43 39 18 
8-years education 741 (5) 43 37 21 
10-12yrs education 1095 (7) 43 36 21 
Higher education 1007 (7) 40 38 22 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 5113 (33) 49 42 9 
<0.001 
5-years education 2234 (15) 47 42 11 
8-years education 1566 (10) 49 38 13 
10-12yrs education 2225 (15) 49 38 13 
Higher education 2237 (15) 44 42 13 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 8595 (56) 51 39 10 
<0.001 Middle income 4526 (30) 44 44 13 
High income 464 (3) 34 44 22 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 5660 (37) 50 40 10 
<0.001 Middle income 3026 (20) 50 39 11 
High income 6633 (43) 46 39 16 
Source: Author's calculations 
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Appendix Table 6.5.1: Family Planning (use of contraceptive) Autonomy and Determinants ( 2  
results) 
Determinants Observations (%) 
Levels of Autonomy 
Significance 
(P-value) No (%) 
Partial 
(%) 
Strong 
(%) 
Employment Status 
Unemployed 13879 (91) 32 64 4 
<0.001 
Employed 1440 (9) 23 73 4 
Household Size 
Below Average 5503 (36) 30 66 5 
<0.001 Average 1908 (12) 31 66 4 
Above Average 7908 (52) 32 64 4 
Household Size 
Excluding Children 
Below Average 5823 (38) 30 65 5 
<0.001 Average 2229 (15) 33 63 4 
Above Average 7267 (47) 31 66 3 
Number of Sons 
No son 3796 (25) 36 61 4 
<0.001 1 son 3727 (24) 31 65 4 
2 & more sons 7796 (51) 29 67 4 
Number of 
Daughters 
No daughter 4226 (28) 36 61 4 
<0.001 1 daughter 4087 (27) 29 67 4 
2 & more daughters 7006 (46) 29 66 4 
Family Formation 
Nuclear 1981 (13) 33 62 4 
<0.001 
Extended 13338 (87) 31 65 4 
Mother-in-Law 
Present 15168 (99) 31 65 4 
0.666 
Not Present 151 (1) 29 66 5 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 781 (5) 38 59 4 
<0.001 
20-24 years 2504 (16) 33 63 4 
25-29 years 3184 (21) 30 66 4 
30-34 years 2655 (17) 31 66 4 
35-39 years 2642 (17) 29 67 4 
40-44 years 2086 (14) 31 65 5 
45-49 years 1467 (10) 33 64 4 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 10792 (70) 36 60 5 
<0.001 
5-years education 1649 (11) 23 74 3 
8-years education 741 (5) 21 77 3 
10-12yrs education 1095 (7) 20 77 3 
Higher education 1007 (7) 14 84 2 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 5113 (33) 38 57 5 
<0.001 
5-years education 2234 (15) 31 64 5 
8-years education 1566 (10) 29 67 4 
10-12yrs education 2225 (15) 27 70 3 
Higher education 2237 (15) 22 75 3 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 8595 (56) 33 63 4 
<0.001 Middle income 4526 (30) 29 67 4 
High income 464 (3) 19 79 2 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 5660 (37) 33 62 5 
<0.001 Middle income 3026 (20) 32 63 4 
High income 6633 (43) 29 68 3 
Source: Author's calculations 
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Appendix Table 6.5.2: Family Planning (more children) Autonomy and Determinants ( 2  results) 
Determinants Observations (%) 
Levels of Autonomy 
Significance 
(P-value) No (%) 
Partial 
(%) 
Strong 
(%) 
Employment Status 
Unemployed 13879 (91) 36 61 4 
<0.001 
Employed 1440 (9) 28 69 3 
Household Size 
Below Average 5503 (36) 32 63 4 
<0.001 Average 1908 (12) 34 63 3 
Above Average 7908 (52) 37 60 4 
Household Size 
Excluding Children 
Below Average 5823 (38) 33 62 5 
<0.001 Average 2229 (15) 36 60 4 
Above Average 7267 (47) 36 61 3 
Number of Sons 
No son 3796 (25) 38 58 4 
<0.001 1 son 3727 (24) 34 62 3 
2 & more sons 7796 (51) 34 62 4 
Number of 
Daughters 
No daughter 4226 (28) 38 58 3 
<0.001 1 daughter 4087 (27) 32 64 3 
2 & more daughters 7006 (46) 34 61 4 
Family Formation 
Nuclear 1981 (13) 35 61 4 
0.831 
Extended 13338 (87) 35 61 4 
Mother-in-Law 
Present 15168 (99) 35 61 4 
0.604 
Not Present 151 (1) 34 60 5 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 781 (5) 40 56 5 
<0.001 
20-24 years 2504 (16) 37 60 4 
25-29 years 3184 (21) 34 63 3 
30-34 years 2655 (17) 34 63 3 
35-39 years 2642 (17) 34 62 4 
40-44 years 2086 (14) 34 61 5 
45-49 years 1467 (10) 36 60 4 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 10792 (70) 40 56 4 
<0.001 
5-years education 1649 (11) 27 70 3 
8-years education 741 (5) 23 75 2 
10-12yrs education 1095 (7) 24 74 2 
Higher education 1007 (7) 16 82 2 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 5113 (33) 43 52 4 
<0.001 
5-years education 2234 (15) 35 60 6 
8-years education 1566 (10) 32 64 4 
10-12yrs education 2225 (15) 29 68 3 
Higher education 2237 (15) 26 71 3 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 8595 (56) 37 58 4 
<0.001 Middle income 4526 (30) 33 64 4 
High income 464 (3) 26 73 1 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 5660 (37) 38 57 4 
<0.001 Middle income 3026 (20) 36 60 4 
High income 6633 (43) 31 66 3 
Source: Author's calculations 
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APPENDIX-II: Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Economic Decision-making  
Appendix Table 7.1.2: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making  
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment Status Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.43 0.00 1.57 0.00 1.18 0.13 1.61 0.00 1.12 0.64 1.62 0.00 1.34 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Household Size: 
Excluding Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.67 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.82 0.04 0.70 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.92 0.51 0.66 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.77 0.05 
Above Average 0.50 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.72 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.57 0.00 
Household Size: No. 
of children 
No child 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Boy no girl 1.10 0.29 1.21 0.07 0.93 0.60 1.22 0.22 1.32 0.15 1.10 0.69 1.01 0.91 1.15 0.28 0.82 0.25 
Girl no boy 1.26 0.01 1.24 0.04 1.14 0.33 1.50 0.01 1.33 0.14 1.41 0.13 1.11 0.37 1.16 0.24 0.95 0.76 
Boys/Girls (both) 1.30 0.00 1.30 0.01 1.15 0.28 1.68 0.00 1.71 0.01 1.33 0.17 1.09 0.42 1.14 0.27 0.99 0.95 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 0.83 0.01 0.80 0.04 0.90 0.25 0.80 0.07 0.70 0.06 0.93 0.62 0.82 0.04 0.83 0.16 0.87 0.24 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.23 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.07 0.91 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.50 0.59 0.32 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.67 0.42 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.11 0.35 1.07 0.58 1.08 0.74 0.94 0.77 0.86 0.60 1.00 0.99 1.26 0.10 1.20 0.19 1.17 0.58 
25-29 years 1.44 0.00 1.26 0.09 1.41 0.13 1.31 0.22 1.28 0.37 1.10 0.78 1.58 0.00 1.29 0.10 1.69 0.08 
30-34 years 1.68 0.00 1.28 0.11 1.75 0.02 1.64 0.05 1.14 0.67 1.63 0.18 1.75 0.00 1.37 0.08 1.81 0.06 
35-39 years 2.17 0.00 1.81 0.00 1.88 0.01 1.79 0.01 1.69 0.08 1.43 0.32 2.45 0.00 1.90 0.00 2.20 0.01 
40-44 years 2.89 0.00 2.22 0.00 2.40 0.00 2.52 0.00 2.07 0.04 1.96 0.06 3.08 0.00 2.29 0.00 2.66 0.00 
45-49 years 2.92 0.00 2.54 0.00 2.25 0.00 2.64 0.00 2.21 0.02 1.95 0.08 3.11 0.00 2.74 0.00 2.37 0.01 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
5-years education 1.40 0.00 1.25 0.02 1.38 0.00 1.01 0.91 1.16 0.35 0.97 0.81 1.56 0.00 1.26 0.06 1.59 0.00 
8-years education 1.27 0.03 1.75 0.00 0.95 0.72 0.86 0.32 1.53 0.05 0.62 0.03 1.57 0.00 1.72 0.01 1.25 0.28 
10-12years education 1.46 0.00 1.48 0.00 1.31 0.05 0.99 0.97 1.21 0.31 0.90 0.57 1.75 0.00 1.51 0.05 1.65 0.02 
Higher education 1.59 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.23 0.16 1.05 0.73 1.79 0.01 0.79 0.19 1.81 0.02 1.72 0.09 1.57 0.19 
continue … 
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Appendix Table 7.1.2 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Economic Decision-making  
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 0.95 0.42 0.97 0.71 0.95 0.56 1.04 0.77 0.98 0.89 1.05 0.74 0.93 0.30 0.98 0.82 0.89 0.31 
8-years education 1.00 0.96 0.95 0.61 1.05 0.70 1.04 0.78 1.07 0.71 0.99 0.95 0.94 0.58 0.89 0.36 1.03 0.85 
10-12years education 0.96 0.56 0.93 0.47 1.00 0.98 1.06 0.64 1.21 0.25 0.92 0.62 0.90 0.33 0.83 0.14 1.03 0.84 
Higher education 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.66 1.07 0.56 1.12 0.43 1.04 0.84 1.15 0.43 0.94 0.63 0.95 0.74 0.96 0.84 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.19 0.00 1.22 0.00 1.09 0.22 1.17 0.08 1.21 0.09 1.09 0.44 1.13 0.08 1.14 0.08 1.05 0.62 
High income 1.57 0.00 1.26 0.30 1.57 0.01 1.59 0.02 1.05 0.88 1.72 0.01 1.54 0.09 1.52 0.22 1.30 0.43 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.16 0.04 1.12 0.19 1.12 0.24 1.35 0.03 1.26 0.23 1.23 0.19 1.07 0.39 1.07 0.47 1.05 0.71 
High income 1.33 0.00 1.27 0.01 1.24 0.02 1.55 0.00 1.40 0.05 1.37 0.03 1.14 0.12 1.15 0.17 1.07 0.55 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 0.44 0.00 0.79 0.02 0.34 0.00 0.63 0.00 1.30 0.11 0.46 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.16 0.00 
NWFP 0.43 0.00 0.71 0.02 0.36 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.10 0.69 0.24 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.63 0.01 0.40 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.35 0.00 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Sub-pop No. obs. = 13522; LR chi2 (29) = 3876.63; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
12041.13; Pseudo R2 = 0.1387. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 206.67 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; Sub-pop No. obs. = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (58, 1044) = 13.67; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(29, 499)=13.12, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo 
R2 = 0.1387. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 206.67 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-
pop. No. of obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(58, 472) = 7.17; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs. = 8204; Design df = 574, F(29, 546) = 19.39, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1387. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 206.67 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. 
No. of obs. = 8204; Design df = 574; F(58,517) = 9.31; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 7.1.3: Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Economic Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.43 0.00 1.58 0.00 1.18 0.13 1.61 0.00 1.13 0.62 1.62 0.00 1.34 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Household 
Size: Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.67 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.82 0.04 0.71 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.92 0.50 0.66 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.77 0.05 
Above Average 0.51 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.73 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.57 0.00 
Household 
Size: No. of 
children 
No Child 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Boys no Girl 1.11 0.27 1.22 0.06 0.93 0.61 1.24 0.19 1.33 0.13 1.11 0.65 1.01 0.92 1.15 0.26 0.81 0.23 
Girls no boy 1.26 0.01 1.25 0.04 1.14 0.33 1.52 0.01 1.34 0.13 1.43 0.12 1.11 0.37 1.17 0.23 0.94 0.74 
Boys = Girls 1.26 0.02 1.22 0.07 1.15 0.32 1.52 0.01 1.56 0.03 1.25 0.30 1.09 0.44 1.08 0.55 1.04 0.83 
Girls > Boys 1.35 0.00 1.38 0.00 1.16 0.32 1.87 0.00 1.81 0.01 1.47 0.11 1.08 0.53 1.21 0.15 0.93 0.70 
Boys > Girls 1.34 0.00 1.35 0.01 1.15 0.30 1.82 0.00 1.85 0.01 1.37 0.16 1.10 0.45 1.18 0.23 0.97 0.87 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 0.81 0.01 0.79 0.03 0.90 0.24 0.76 0.03 0.68 0.05 0.90 0.48 0.82 0.05 0.82 0.13 0.89 0.33 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.23 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.07 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.49 0.58 0.32 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.65 0.43 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.11 0.35 1.07 0.58 1.08 0.74 0.93 0.75 0.86 0.59 1.00 1.00 1.26 0.10 1.20 0.19 1.17 0.58 
25-29 years 1.44 0.00 1.25 0.09 1.41 0.13 1.30 0.23 1.27 0.38 1.10 0.80 1.58 0.00 1.29 0.11 1.69 0.08 
30-34 years 1.68 0.00 1.26 0.12 1.75 0.02 1.60 0.05 1.12 0.71 1.61 0.19 1.75 0.00 1.36 0.08 1.82 0.05 
35-39 years 2.16 0.00 1.78 0.00 1.88 0.01 1.75 0.02 1.65 0.10 1.41 0.34 2.45 0.00 1.88 0.00 2.22 0.01 
40-44 years 2.86 0.00 2.18 0.00 2.40 0.00 2.43 0.00 2.00 0.05 1.91 0.07 3.08 0.00 2.25 0.00 2.69 0.00 
45-49 years 2.88 0.00 2.48 0.00 2.24 0.00 2.55 0.00 2.14 0.02 1.90 0.09 3.12 0.00 2.68 0.00 2.41 0.01 
continue … 
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Appendix Table 7.1.3 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Economic Decision-making  
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.41 0.00 1.26 0.02 1.38 0.00 1.02 0.85 1.17 0.34 0.97 0.85 1.56 0.00 1.26 0.06 1.58 0.00 
8-years education 1.27 0.03 1.76 0.00 0.95 0.73 0.87 0.35 1.55 0.04 0.63 0.04 1.57 0.00 1.72 0.01 1.25 0.27 
10-12years education 1.46 0.00 1.48 0.00 1.31 0.05 1.00 1.00 1.21 0.30 0.91 0.58 1.75 0.00 1.52 0.05 1.65 0.02 
Higher education 1.59 0.00 2.01 0.00 1.23 0.16 1.06 0.70 1.80 0.01 0.79 0.20 1.81 0.02 1.72 0.08 1.57 0.19 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 0.95 0.42 0.97 0.71 0.95 0.56 1.04 0.75 0.98 0.90 1.05 0.74 0.93 0.30 0.98 0.82 0.89 0.30 
8-years education 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.61 1.05 0.70 1.04 0.77 1.07 0.71 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.58 0.89 0.36 1.03 0.85 
10-12years education 0.96 0.56 0.93 0.47 1.00 0.97 1.06 0.60 1.21 0.24 0.92 0.63 0.90 0.33 0.83 0.14 1.03 0.83 
Higher education 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.66 1.08 0.56 1.12 0.42 1.04 0.83 1.15 0.43 0.94 0.63 0.95 0.73 0.96 0.83 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.18 0.00 1.21 0.00 1.09 0.22 1.16 0.10 1.21 0.09 1.08 0.47 1.13 0.08 1.14 0.08 1.05 0.59 
High income 1.56 0.00 1.25 0.31 1.57 0.01 1.56 0.03 1.03 0.92 1.70 0.01 1.54 0.08 1.51 0.23 1.31 0.42 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.16 0.03 1.13 0.18 1.12 0.24 1.35 0.03 1.26 0.23 1.24 0.18 1.07 0.40 1.08 0.45 1.04 0.74 
High income 1.34 0.00 1.27 0.01 1.24 0.02 1.56 0.00 1.41 0.05 1.38 0.03 1.14 0.12 1.16 0.16 1.07 0.59 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 0.44 0.00 0.79 0.02 0.34 0.00 0.63 0.00 1.30 0.11 0.46 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.16 0.00 
NWFP 0.43 0.00 0.71 0.02 0.36 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.10 0.69 0.24 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.63 0.01 0.40 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.00 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Sub-pop No. obs. = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 3877.18; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
12040.86; Pseudo R2 = 0.1387. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 207.2 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; Sub-pop No. obs. = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 13.08; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=12.76, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo 
R2 = 0.1387. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 207.2 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-
pop. No. of obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(32, 466) = 6.90; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs. = 8204; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 18.72, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1387. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 207.2 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. 
of obs. = 8204; Design df = 574; F(62,513) = 8.88; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 7.1.4: Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Economic Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.43 0.00 1.58 0.00 1.18 0.13 1.61 0.00 1.13 0.62 1.62 0.00 1.34 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.67 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.82 0.04 0.71 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.92 0.50 0.66 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.77 0.05 
Above Average 0.51 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.73 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.57 0.00 
Household Size: 
No. of Children 
Boys = Girls  1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
No Child 0.80 0.02 0.82 0.07 0.87 0.32 0.66 0.01 0.64 0.03 0.80 0.30 0.92 0.44 0.93 0.55 0.96 0.83 
Boys no girl 0.88 0.11 1.00 0.96 0.81 0.16 0.82 0.11 0.86 0.31 0.89 0.49 0.93 0.46 1.07 0.53 0.78 0.11 
Girls no boy 1.01 0.93 1.02 0.83 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.86 0.44 1.14 0.44 1.01 0.91 1.08 0.51 0.91 0.53 
Girls > Boys 1.07 0.32 1.13 0.17 1.01 0.91 1.23 0.08 1.16 0.40 1.17 0.21 0.99 0.89 1.12 0.27 0.90 0.40 
Boys > Girls 1.07 0.39 1.11 0.25 1.01 0.94 1.19 0.17 1.19 0.35 1.10 0.51 1.00 0.97 1.09 0.39 0.94 0.61 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 0.81 0.01 0.79 0.03 0.90 0.24 0.76 0.03 0.68 0.05 0.90 0.48 0.82 0.05 0.82 0.13 0.89 0.33 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.23 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.07 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.49 0.58 0.32 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.65 0.43 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.11 0.35 1.07 0.58 1.08 0.74 0.93 0.75 0.86 0.59 1.00 1.00 1.26 0.10 1.20 0.19 1.17 0.58 
25-29 years 1.44 0.00 1.25 0.09 1.41 0.13 1.30 0.23 1.27 0.38 1.10 0.80 1.58 0.00 1.29 0.11 1.69 0.08 
30-34 years 1.68 0.00 1.26 0.12 1.75 0.02 1.60 0.05 1.12 0.71 1.61 0.19 1.75 0.00 1.36 0.08 1.82 0.05 
35-39 years 2.16 0.00 1.78 0.00 1.88 0.01 1.75 0.02 1.65 0.10 1.41 0.34 2.45 0.00 1.88 0.00 2.22 0.01 
40-44 years 2.86 0.00 2.18 0.00 2.40 0.00 2.43 0.00 2.00 0.05 1.91 0.07 3.08 0.00 2.25 0.00 2.69 0.00 
45-49 years 2.88 0.00 2.48 0.00 2.24 0.00 2.55 0.00 2.14 0.02 1.90 0.09 3.12 0.00 2.68 0.00 2.41 0.01 
continue … 
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Appendix Table 7.1.4 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Economic Decision-making  
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.41 0.00 1.26 0.02 1.38 0.00 1.02 0.85 1.17 0.34 0.97 0.85 1.56 0.00 1.26 0.06 1.58 0.00 
8-years education 1.27 0.03 1.76 0.00 0.95 0.73 0.87 0.35 1.55 0.04 0.63 0.04 1.57 0.00 1.72 0.01 1.25 0.27 
10-12years education 1.46 0.00 1.48 0.00 1.31 0.05 1.00 1.00 1.21 0.30 0.91 0.58 1.75 0.00 1.52 0.05 1.65 0.02 
Higher education 1.59 0.00 2.01 0.00 1.23 0.16 1.06 0.70 1.80 0.01 0.79 0.20 1.81 0.02 1.72 0.08 1.57 0.19 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 0.95 0.42 0.97 0.71 0.95 0.56 1.04 0.75 0.98 0.90 1.05 0.74 0.93 0.30 0.98 0.82 0.89 0.30 
8-years education 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.61 1.05 0.70 1.04 0.77 1.07 0.71 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.58 0.89 0.36 1.03 0.85 
10-12years education 0.96 0.56 0.93 0.47 1.00 0.97 1.06 0.60 1.21 0.24 0.92 0.63 0.90 0.33 0.83 0.14 1.03 0.83 
Higher education 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.66 1.08 0.56 1.12 0.42 1.04 0.83 1.15 0.43 0.94 0.63 0.95 0.73 0.96 0.83 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.18 0.00 1.21 0.00 1.09 0.22 1.16 0.10 1.21 0.09 1.08 0.47 1.13 0.08 1.14 0.08 1.05 0.59 
High income 1.56 0.00 1.25 0.31 1.57 0.01 1.56 0.03 1.03 0.92 1.70 0.01 1.54 0.08 1.51 0.23 1.31 0.42 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.16 0.03 1.13 0.18 1.12 0.24 1.35 0.03 1.26 0.23 1.24 0.18 1.07 0.40 1.08 0.45 1.04 0.74 
High income 1.34 0.00 1.27 0.01 1.24 0.02 1.56 0.00 1.41 0.05 1.38 0.03 1.14 0.12 1.16 0.16 1.07 0.59 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 0.44 0.00 0.79 0.02 0.34 0.00 0.63 0.00 1.30 0.11 0.46 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.16 0.00 
NWFP 0.43 0.00 0.71 0.02 0.36 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.10 0.69 0.24 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.63 0.01 0.40 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.00 
Notes:  
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Sub-pop No. obs. = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 3877.18; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
12040.86; Pseudo R2 = 0.1387. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 207.2 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; Sub-pop No. obs. = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 13.08; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=12.76, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo 
R2 = 0.1387. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 207.2 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-
pop. No. of obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(32, 466) = 6.90; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs. = 8204; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 18.72, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1387. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 207.2 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. 
of obs. = 8204; Design df = 574; F(62,513) = 8.88; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 7.1.5: Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Economic Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.43 0.00 1.58 0.00 1.18 0.13 1.61 0.00 1.13 0.62 1.62 0.00 1.34 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.67 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.82 0.04 0.71 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.92 0.50 0.66 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.77 0.05 
Above Average 0.51 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.73 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.57 0.00 
Household Size: 
No. of Children 
Girls > Boys 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
No Child 0.74 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.86 0.32 0.54 0.00 0.55 0.01 0.68 0.11 0.93 0.53 0.82 0.15 1.08 0.70 
Boys no girl 0.82 0.02 0.88 0.20 0.80 0.15 0.67 0.00 0.74 0.12 0.76 0.12 0.94 0.54 0.95 0.68 0.88 0.39 
Girls no boy 0.94 0.46 0.90 0.33 0.99 0.92 0.82 0.17 0.74 0.16 0.97 0.88 1.02 0.83 0.96 0.77 1.02 0.93 
Boys = Girls 0.93 0.32 0.88 0.17 0.99 0.91 0.81 0.08 0.86 0.40 0.85 0.21 1.01 0.89 0.89 0.27 1.12 0.40 
Boys > girls 0.99 0.90 0.98 0.80 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.80 1.02 0.89 0.94 0.64 1.02 0.84 0.97 0.75 1.04 0.70 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 0.81 0.01 0.79 0.03 0.90 0.24 0.76 0.03 0.68 0.05 0.90 0.48 0.82 0.05 0.82 0.13 0.89 0.33 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.23 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.07 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.49 0.58 0.32 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.65 0.43 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.11 0.35 1.07 0.58 1.08 0.74 0.93 0.75 0.86 0.59 1.00 1.00 1.26 0.10 1.20 0.19 1.17 0.58 
25-29 years 1.44 0.00 1.25 0.09 1.41 0.13 1.30 0.23 1.27 0.38 1.10 0.80 1.58 0.00 1.29 0.11 1.69 0.08 
30-34 years 1.68 0.00 1.26 0.12 1.75 0.02 1.60 0.05 1.12 0.71 1.61 0.19 1.75 0.00 1.36 0.08 1.82 0.05 
35-39 years 2.16 0.00 1.78 0.00 1.88 0.01 1.75 0.02 1.65 0.10 1.41 0.34 2.45 0.00 1.88 0.00 2.22 0.01 
40-44 years 2.86 0.00 2.18 0.00 2.40 0.00 2.43 0.00 2.00 0.05 1.91 0.07 3.08 0.00 2.25 0.00 2.69 0.00 
45-49 years 2.88 0.00 2.48 0.00 2.24 0.00 2.55 0.00 2.14 0.02 1.90 0.09 3.12 0.00 2.68 0.00 2.41 0.01 
continue … 
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Appendix Table 7.1.5 (…continued): Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Economic Decision-making  
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.41 0.00 1.26 0.02 1.38 0.00 1.02 0.85 1.17 0.34 0.97 0.85 1.56 0.00 1.26 0.06 1.58 0.00 
8-years education 1.27 0.03 1.76 0.00 0.95 0.73 0.87 0.35 1.55 0.04 0.63 0.04 1.57 0.00 1.72 0.01 1.25 0.27 
10-12years education 1.46 0.00 1.48 0.00 1.31 0.05 1.00 1.00 1.21 0.30 0.91 0.58 1.75 0.00 1.52 0.05 1.65 0.02 
Higher education 1.59 0.00 2.01 0.00 1.23 0.16 1.06 0.70 1.80 0.01 0.79 0.20 1.81 0.02 1.72 0.08 1.57 0.19 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 0.95 0.42 0.97 0.71 0.95 0.56 1.04 0.75 0.98 0.90 1.05 0.74 0.93 0.30 0.98 0.82 0.89 0.30 
8-years education 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.61 1.05 0.70 1.04 0.77 1.07 0.71 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.58 0.89 0.36 1.03 0.85 
10-12years education 0.96 0.56 0.93 0.47 1.00 0.97 1.06 0.60 1.21 0.24 0.92 0.63 0.90 0.33 0.83 0.14 1.03 0.83 
Higher education 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.66 1.08 0.56 1.12 0.42 1.04 0.83 1.15 0.43 0.94 0.63 0.95 0.73 0.96 0.83 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.18 0.00 1.21 0.00 1.09 0.22 1.16 0.10 1.21 0.09 1.08 0.47 1.13 0.08 1.14 0.08 1.05 0.59 
High income 1.56 0.00 1.25 0.31 1.57 0.01 1.56 0.03 1.03 0.92 1.70 0.01 1.54 0.08 1.51 0.23 1.31 0.42 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.16 0.03 1.13 0.18 1.12 0.24 1.35 0.03 1.26 0.23 1.24 0.18 1.07 0.40 1.08 0.45 1.04 0.74 
High income 1.34 0.00 1.27 0.01 1.24 0.02 1.56 0.00 1.41 0.05 1.38 0.03 1.14 0.12 1.16 0.16 1.07 0.59 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 0.44 0.00 0.79 0.02 0.34 0.00 0.63 0.00 1.30 0.11 0.46 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.16 0.00 
NWFP 0.43 0.00 0.71 0.02 0.36 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.10 0.69 0.24 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.63 0.01 0.40 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.00 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Sub-pop No. obs. = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 3877.18; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
12040.86; Pseudo R2 = 0.1387. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 207.2 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; Sub-pop No. obs. = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 13.08; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=12.76, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo 
R2 = 0.1387. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 207.2 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-
pop. No. of obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(32, 466) = 6.90; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. of obs. = 8204; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 18.72, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1387. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 207.2 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Sub-pop. No. 
of obs. = 8204; Design df = 574; F(62,513) = 8.88; Prob > F = 0.00. 
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APPENDIX-III: Economic Decision-making Autonomy: Disaggregated Analysis. 
 
Appendix Table 8.1.2: Determinants of Women’s Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Food autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.49 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.34 0.05 1.20 0.18 1.07 0.74 1.17 0.33 1.66 0.00 1.55 0.00 1.46 0.05 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.74 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.89 0.21 0.70 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.77 0.01 0.60 0.00 0.98 0.88 
Above Average 0.52 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.71 0.01 0.56 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.77 0.02 
Household Size: 
No. of children 
No child 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Boy no girl 1.08 0.47 1.20 0.16 0.99 0.93 1.31 0.12 1.35 0.18 1.13 0.57 0.97 0.80 1.12 0.47 0.92 0.61 
Girl no boy 1.14 0.19 1.38 0.01 0.96 0.75 1.36 0.04 1.59 0.02 1.09 0.64 0.99 0.91 1.22 0.25 0.87 0.43 
Boys/Girls 1.31 0.01 1.43 0.00 1.14 0.28 1.62 0.00 1.67 0.01 1.28 0.17 1.14 0.29 1.28 0.07 1.05 0.76 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 0.86 0.07 0.81 0.04 0.91 0.38 0.87 0.26 0.73 0.07 1.04 0.82 0.86 0.15 0.85 0.23 0.84 0.22 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.37 0.02 0.85 0.00 1.08 0.86 0.28 0.27 0.52 0.00 0.85 0.88 0.45 0.05 0.80 0.00 1.36 0.45 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.15 0.33 1.09 0.65 1.22 0.28 1.04 0.89 1.29 0.47 0.98 0.95 1.29 0.15 1.10 0.67 1.40 0.15 
25-29 years 1.28 0.10 1.13 0.53 1.42 0.07 1.20 0.54 1.36 0.40 1.23 0.55 1.42 0.06 1.13 0.57 1.58 0.06 
30-34 years 1.47 0.01 1.33 0.16 1.45 0.06 1.37 0.31 1.58 0.22 1.26 0.51 1.61 0.01 1.35 0.22 1.57 0.07 
35-39 years 1.72 0.00 1.49 0.06 1.78 0.01 1.47 0.18 1.97 0.07 1.26 0.50 1.97 0.00 1.41 0.16 2.20 0.00 
40-44 years 2.10 0.00 2.03 0.00 1.88 0.00 2.06 0.02 2.78 0.01 1.61 0.15 2.15 0.00 1.87 0.01 2.00 0.01 
45-49 years 2.00 0.00 2.48 0.00 1.65 0.04 2.04 0.04 3.12 0.00 1.62 0.24 2.06 0.00 2.45 0.00 1.63 0.10 
continue… 
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Appendix Table 8.1.2 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Food autonomy)
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.24 0.01 1.25 0.05 1.09 0.41 0.94 0.62 1.16 0.40 0.84 0.22 1.42 0.00 1.26 0.14 1.27 0.09 
8-years education 1.13 0.37 1.18 0.36 1.07 0.71 0.87 0.36 0.97 0.89 0.92 0.68 1.45 0.10 1.28 0.39 1.31 0.31 
10-12years education 1.24 0.04 1.64 0.00 0.91 0.53 1.08 0.54 1.38 0.10 0.91 0.59 1.24 0.32 1.80 0.02 0.79 0.35 
Higher education 1.42 0.01 1.16 0.43 1.34 0.07 1.20 0.22 1.02 0.93 1.22 0.32 1.49 0.22 1.14 0.74 1.47 0.27 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 0.83 0.01 0.89 0.19 0.87 0.14 0.78 0.03 0.74 0.07 0.91 0.55 0.86 0.06 0.94 0.52 0.88 0.27 
8-years education 0.98 0.79 0.83 0.12 1.13 0.27 0.94 0.64 0.77 0.15 1.12 0.49 0.96 0.72 0.81 0.16 1.15 0.34 
10-12years education 0.88 0.14 0.76 0.01 1.02 0.86 0.80 0.08 0.66 0.01 1.05 0.78 0.94 0.56 0.81 0.14 1.02 0.86 
Higher education 0.84 0.07 0.83 0.15 0.87 0.29 0.83 0.17 0.73 0.08 0.95 0.80 0.82 0.14 0.90 0.55 0.81 0.25 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.04 0.47 1.17 0.03 1.03 0.71 1.08 0.39 1.30 0.03 0.98 0.86 0.97 0.65 1.01 0.98 1.07 0.52 
High income 1.14 0.37 1.78 0.01 0.91 0.62 1.22 0.34 1.66 0.08 0.98 0.92 1.10 0.67 2.26 0.01 0.77 0.44 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.27 0.00 1.11 0.27 1.26 0.02 1.37 0.02 1.14 0.49 1.29 0.13 1.21 0.03 1.09 0.43 1.23 0.12 
High income 1.52 0.00 1.08 0.40 1.55 0.00 1.54 0.00 1.15 0.41 1.42 0.04 1.43 0.00 0.99 0.90 1.57 0.00 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 0.37 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.74 0.07 0.62 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.24 0.00 
NWFP 0.12 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.59 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.46 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.01 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (29) = 4361.63; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
11366.658; Pseudo R2 = 0.1610. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 291.27 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number 
of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (58, 1044) = 352.67; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(29, 499)=12.64, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.1610. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 291.27 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(58, 470) = 75.53; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. no. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(29, 546) = 18.23, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1610. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 291.27 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574; F (58,517) = 302.83; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 8.1.3: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Food autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.49 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.33 0.05 1.20 0.17 1.07 0.73 1.17 0.33 1.66 0.00 1.55 0.00 1.46 0.05 
Household 
Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.74 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.88 0.18 0.70 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.76 0.01 0.61 0.00 0.97 0.80 
Above Average 0.51 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.70 0.01 0.56 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.76 0.01 
Household 
Size: No. of 
children 
No Child 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Boys no Girl 1.07 0.49 1.22 0.14 0.98 0.85 1.30 0.12 1.38 0.16 1.11 0.61 0.96 0.76 1.13 0.44 0.91 0.56 
Girls no boy 1.13 0.20 1.39 0.01 0.95 0.69 1.36 0.04 1.61 0.02 1.08 0.68 0.98 0.88 1.23 0.23 0.86 0.40 
Boys = Girls 1.35 0.00 1.32 0.03 1.25 0.07 1.63 0.00 1.49 0.05 1.38 0.08 1.20 0.16 1.20 0.24 1.17 0.34 
Girls > Boys 1.28 0.02 1.57 0.00 1.04 0.78 1.60 0.01 1.79 0.01 1.21 0.36 1.08 0.54 1.41 0.03 0.93 0.66 
Boys > Girls 1.27 0.03 1.51 0.00 1.06 0.69 1.63 0.00 1.88 0.01 1.18 0.42 1.09 0.53 1.30 0.08 0.99 0.94 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 0.88 0.10 0.78 0.02 0.95 0.65 0.87 0.27 0.69 0.04 1.08 0.65 0.88 0.25 0.82 0.16 0.88 0.39 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.37 0.02 0.85 0.00 1.08 0.85 0.29 0.27 0.51 0.00 0.87 0.90 0.44 0.05 0.49 0.00 1.34 0.46 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.15 0.33 1.09 0.66 1.22 0.27 1.04 0.89 1.28 0.49 0.98 0.96 1.29 0.16 1.10 0.67 1.39 0.15 
25-29 years 1.29 0.10 1.12 0.54 1.43 0.06 1.20 0.54 1.34 0.42 1.24 0.53 1.42 0.05 1.13 0.58 1.58 0.06 
30-34 years 1.48 0.01 1.31 0.18 1.47 0.05 1.37 0.30 1.54 0.24 1.28 0.47 1.62 0.01 1.33 0.23 1.59 0.06 
35-39 years 1.73 0.00 1.47 0.07 1.81 0.00 1.47 0.18 1.91 0.09 1.29 0.46 1.99 0.00 1.39 0.17 2.24 0.00 
40-44 years 2.12 0.00 1.98 0.00 1.93 0.00 2.06 0.02 2.67 0.01 1.66 0.13 2.19 0.00 1.84 0.02 2.07 0.01 
45-49 years 2.03 0.00 2.40 0.00 1.71 0.02 2.04 0.04 2.99 0.01 1.67 0.21 2.11 0.00 2.39 0.00 1.70 0.08 
continue… 
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Appendix Table 8.1.3 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Food autonomy)
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.23 0.02 1.26 0.04 1.08 0.46 0.94 0.61 1.17 0.36 0.83 0.20 1.42 0.00 1.27 0.13 1.26 0.10 
8-years education 1.12 0.38 1.19 0.35 1.06 0.74 0.87 0.36 0.98 0.94 0.91 0.65 1.45 0.10 1.28 0.39 1.31 0.31 
10-12years education 1.24 0.05 1.65 0.00 0.90 0.50 1.08 0.54 1.39 0.10 0.90 0.57 1.23 0.34 1.81 0.02 0.78 0.33 
Higher education 1.42 0.01 1.17 0.42 1.33 0.08 1.20 0.22 1.03 0.89 1.21 0.33 1.48 0.23 1.14 0.74 1.47 0.27 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 0.83 0.01 0.89 0.19 0.87 0.13 0.78 0.03 0.74 0.07 0.91 0.55 0.86 0.06 0.93 0.52 0.88 0.26 
8-years education 0.98 0.79 0.83 0.11 1.13 0.27 0.94 0.64 0.77 0.16 1.12 0.49 0.96 0.72 0.81 0.15 1.15 0.35 
10-12years education 0.88 0.14 0.76 0.01 1.02 0.87 0.80 0.08 0.67 0.01 1.04 0.80 0.94 0.56 0.81 0.13 1.03 0.86 
Higher education 0.84 0.07 0.83 0.15 0.87 0.28 0.83 0.17 0.73 0.08 0.95 0.80 0.82 0.14 0.90 0.55 0.80 0.24 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.05 0.45 1.16 0.04 1.04 0.66 1.08 0.39 1.29 0.04 0.99 0.90 0.97 0.67 1.01 0.99 1.08 0.48 
High income 1.15 0.35 1.76 0.01 0.92 0.66 1.22 0.34 1.63 0.09 0.99 0.97 1.11 0.66 2.23 0.01 0.78 0.46 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.27 0.00 1.12 0.25 1.25 0.03 1.37 0.02 1.14 0.49 1.29 0.13 1.20 0.04 1.10 0.40 1.22 0.12 
High income 1.52 0.00 1.09 0.36 1.53 0.00 1.54 0.00 1.16 0.40 1.42 0.04 1.43 0.00 0.99 0.95 1.56 0.00 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 0.37 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.74 0.08 0.61 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.24 0.00 
NWFP 0.12 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.59 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.46 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.01 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 4364.15; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -11365.4; 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1611. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 294.68 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 
1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 366.02; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=11.78, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.1611. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 294.68 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 73.79; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. no. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 17.16, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1611. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 294.68 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574; F (62,513) = 281.73; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 8.1.4: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Food autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-II: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.49 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.33 0.05 1.20 0.17 1.07 0.73 1.17 0.33 1.66 0.00 1.55 0.00 1.46 0.05 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.74 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.88 0.18 0.70 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.76 0.01 0.61 0.00 0.97 0.80 
Above Average 0.51 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.70 0.01 0.56 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.76 0.01 
Household Size: 
No. of Children 
Boys = Girls  1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
No Child 0.74 0.00 0.76 0.03 0.80 0.07 0.62 0.00 0.67 0.05 0.72 0.08 0.83 0.16 0.83 0.24 0.85 0.34 
Boys no girl 0.80 0.01 0.92 0.45 0.78 0.02 0.80 0.10 0.92 0.66 0.80 0.20 0.80 0.04 0.94 0.64 0.77 0.07 
Girls no boy 0.84 0.05 1.06 0.64 0.76 0.02 0.84 0.20 1.08 0.68 0.78 0.16 0.82 0.08 1.03 0.87 0.73 0.05 
Girls > Boys 0.95 0.50 1.19 0.08 0.83 0.06 0.99 0.90 1.20 0.27 0.87 0.34 0.90 0.29 1.18 0.22 0.79 0.09 
Boys > Girls 0.94 0.44 1.15 0.16 0.84 0.10 1.00 1.00 1.26 0.17 0.86 0.31 0.91 0.31 1.09 0.50 0.84 0.20 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 0.88 0.10 0.78 0.02 0.95 0.65 0.87 0.27 0.69 0.04 1.08 0.65 0.88 0.25 0.82 0.16 0.88 0.39 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.37 0.02 0.85 0.00 1.08 0.85 0.29 0.27 0.51 0.00 0.87 0.90 0.44 0.05 0.49 0.00 1.34 0.46 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.15 0.33 1.09 0.66 1.22 0.27 1.04 0.89 1.28 0.49 0.98 0.96 1.29 0.16 1.10 0.67 1.39 0.15 
25-29 years 1.29 0.10 1.12 0.54 1.43 0.06 1.20 0.54 1.34 0.42 1.24 0.53 1.42 0.05 1.13 0.58 1.58 0.06 
30-34 years 1.48 0.01 1.31 0.18 1.47 0.05 1.37 0.30 1.54 0.24 1.28 0.47 1.62 0.01 1.33 0.23 1.59 0.06 
35-39 years 1.73 0.00 1.47 0.07 1.81 0.00 1.47 0.18 1.91 0.09 1.29 0.46 1.99 0.00 1.39 0.17 2.24 0.00 
40-44 years 2.12 0.00 1.98 0.00 1.93 0.00 2.06 0.02 2.67 0.01 1.66 0.13 2.19 0.00 1.84 0.02 2.07 0.01 
45-49 years 2.03 0.00 2.40 0.00 1.71 0.02 2.04 0.04 2.99 0.01 1.67 0.21 2.11 0.00 2.39 0.00 1.70 0.08 
continue… 
203 
 
Appendix Table 8.1.4 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Food autonomy)
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.23 0.02 1.26 0.04 1.08 0.46 0.94 0.61 1.17 0.36 0.83 0.20 1.42 0.00 1.27 0.13 1.26 0.10 
8-years education 1.12 0.38 1.19 0.35 1.06 0.74 0.87 0.36 0.98 0.94 0.91 0.65 1.45 0.10 1.28 0.39 1.31 0.31 
10-12years education 1.24 0.05 1.65 0.00 0.90 0.50 1.08 0.54 1.39 0.10 0.90 0.57 1.23 0.34 1.81 0.02 0.78 0.33 
Higher education 1.42 0.01 1.17 0.42 1.33 0.08 1.20 0.22 1.03 0.89 1.21 0.33 1.48 0.23 1.14 0.74 1.47 0.27 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 0.83 0.01 0.89 0.19 0.87 0.13 0.78 0.03 0.74 0.07 0.91 0.55 0.86 0.06 0.93 0.52 0.88 0.26 
8-years education 0.98 0.79 0.83 0.11 1.13 0.27 0.94 0.64 0.77 0.16 1.12 0.49 0.96 0.72 0.81 0.15 1.15 0.35 
10-12years education 0.88 0.14 0.76 0.01 1.02 0.87 0.80 0.08 0.67 0.01 1.04 0.80 0.94 0.56 0.81 0.13 1.03 0.86 
Higher education 0.84 0.07 0.83 0.15 0.87 0.28 0.83 0.17 0.73 0.08 0.95 0.80 0.82 0.14 0.90 0.55 0.80 0.24 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.05 0.45 1.16 0.04 1.04 0.66 1.08 0.39 1.29 0.04 0.99 0.90 0.97 0.67 1.01 0.99 1.08 0.48 
High income 1.15 0.35 1.76 0.01 0.92 0.66 1.22 0.34 1.63 0.09 0.99 0.97 1.11 0.66 2.23 0.01 0.78 0.46 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.27 0.00 1.12 0.25 1.25 0.03 1.37 0.02 1.14 0.49 1.29 0.13 1.20 0.04 1.10 0.40 1.22 0.12 
High income 1.52 0.00 1.09 0.36 1.53 0.00 1.54 0.00 1.16 0.40 1.42 0.04 1.43 0.00 0.99 0.95 1.56 0.00 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 0.37 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.74 0.08 0.61 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.24 0.00 
NWFP 0.12 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.59 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.46 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.01 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 4364.15; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -11365.4; 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1611. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 294.68 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 
1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 336.02; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design DF=527; F (31, 497) =11.78, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo 
R2 = 0.1611. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 294.68 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; 
Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 73.79; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 17.16, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1611. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 294.68 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574; F (62,513) = 281.73; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 8.1.5: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Food autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.49 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.33 0.05 1.20 0.17 1.07 0.73 1.17 0.33 1.66 0.00 1.55 0.00 1.46 0.05 
Household 
Size: Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.74 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.88 0.18 0.70 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.76 0.01 0.61 0.00 0.97 0.80 
Above Average 0.51 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.70 0.01 0.56 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.76 0.01 
Household 
Size: No. of 
Children 
Girls > Boys 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
No Child 0.78 0.02 0.64 0.00 0.96 0.78 0.62 0.01 0.56 0.01 0.83 0.36 0.92 0.54 0.71 0.03 1.08 0.66 
Boys no girl 0.84 0.03 0.77 0.02 0.94 0.60 0.81 0.15 0.77 0.16 0.92 0.67 0.89 0.25 0.80 0.10 0.98 0.87 
Girls no boy 0.88 0.15 0.89 0.31 0.92 0.47 0.85 0.23 0.90 0.55 0.90 0.57 0.91 0.37 0.87 0.39 0.93 0.64 
Boys = Girls 1.05 0.50 0.84 0.08 1.21 0.06 1.01 0.90 0.84 0.27 1.15 0.34 1.11 0.29 0.85 0.22 1.27 0.09 
Boys > girls 0.99 0.87 0.96 0.67 1.02 0.84 1.01 0.88 1.05 0.74 0.98 0.90 1.01 0.94 0.92 0.46 1.06 0.61 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 0.88 0.10 0.78 0.02 0.95 0.65 0.87 0.27 0.69 0.04 1.08 0.65 0.88 0.25 0.82 0.16 0.88 0.39 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.37 0.02 0.85 0.00 1.08 0.85 0.29 0.27 0.51 0.00 0.87 0.90 0.44 0.05 0.49 0.00 1.34 0.46 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.15 0.33 1.09 0.66 1.22 0.27 1.04 0.89 1.28 0.49 0.98 0.96 1.29 0.16 1.10 0.67 1.39 0.15 
25-29 years 1.29 0.10 1.12 0.54 1.43 0.06 1.20 0.54 1.34 0.42 1.24 0.53 1.42 0.05 1.13 0.58 1.58 0.06 
30-34 years 1.48 0.01 1.31 0.18 1.47 0.05 1.37 0.30 1.54 0.24 1.28 0.47 1.62 0.01 1.33 0.23 1.59 0.06 
35-39 years 1.73 0.00 1.47 0.07 1.81 0.00 1.47 0.18 1.91 0.09 1.29 0.46 1.99 0.00 1.39 0.17 2.24 0.00 
40-44 years 2.12 0.00 1.98 0.00 1.93 0.00 2.06 0.02 2.67 0.01 1.66 0.13 2.19 0.00 1.84 0.02 2.07 0.01 
45-49 years 2.03 0.00 2.40 0.00 1.71 0.02 2.04 0.04 2.99 0.01 1.67 0.21 2.11 0.00 2.39 0.00 1.70 0.08 
continue… 
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Appendix Table 8.1.5(…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Food autonomy)
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy 
Partial to no 
autonomy 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy 
Partial to no 
autonomy 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.23 0.02 1.26 0.04 1.08 0.46 0.94 0.61 1.17 0.36 0.83 0.20 1.42 0.00 1.27 0.13 1.26 0.10 
8-years education 1.12 0.38 1.19 0.35 1.06 0.74 0.87 0.36 0.98 0.94 0.91 0.65 1.45 0.10 1.28 0.39 1.31 0.31 
10-12years education 1.24 0.05 1.65 0.00 0.90 0.50 1.08 0.54 1.39 0.10 0.90 0.57 1.23 0.34 1.81 0.02 0.78 0.33 
Higher education 1.42 0.01 1.17 0.42 1.33 0.08 1.20 0.22 1.03 0.89 1.21 0.33 1.48 0.23 1.14 0.74 1.47 0.27 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 0.83 0.01 0.89 0.19 0.87 0.13 0.78 0.03 0.74 0.07 0.91 0.55 0.86 0.06 0.93 0.52 0.88 0.26 
8-years education 0.98 0.79 0.83 0.11 1.13 0.27 0.94 0.64 0.77 0.16 1.12 0.49 0.96 0.72 0.81 0.15 1.15 0.35 
10-12years education 0.88 0.14 0.76 0.01 1.02 0.87 0.80 0.08 0.67 0.01 1.04 0.80 0.94 0.56 0.81 0.13 1.03 0.86 
Higher education 0.84 0.07 0.83 0.15 0.87 0.28 0.83 0.17 0.73 0.08 0.95 0.80 0.82 0.14 0.90 0.55 0.80 0.24 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.05 0.45 1.16 0.04 1.04 0.66 1.08 0.39 1.29 0.04 0.99 0.90 0.97 0.67 1.01 0.99 1.08 0.48 
High income 1.15 0.35 1.76 0.01 0.92 0.66 1.22 0.34 1.63 0.09 0.99 0.97 1.11 0.66 2.23 0.01 0.78 0.46 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.27 0.00 1.12 0.25 1.25 0.03 1.37 0.02 1.14 0.49 1.29 0.13 1.20 0.04 1.10 0.40 1.22 0.12 
High income 1.52 0.00 1.09 0.36 1.53 0.00 1.54 0.00 1.16 0.40 1.42 0.04 1.43 0.00 0.99 0.95 1.56 0.00 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.37 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.74 0.08 0.61 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.24 0.00 
NWFP 0.12 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.59 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.46 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.34 0.01 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 4364.15; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -11365.4; 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1611. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 294.68 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 
1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 336.02; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design DF=527; F (31, 497) =11.78, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo 
R2 = 0.1611. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 294.68 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; 
Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 73.79; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F (31, 544) = 17.16, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1611. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 294.68 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574; F (62,513) = 281.73; Prob > F = 0.00 
continue… 
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Appendix Table 8.2.2: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Clothing and footwear autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.59 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.34 0.05 1.27 0.10 1.32 0.19 1.17 0.33 1.75 0.00 1.36 0.02 1.46 0.05 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.82 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.89 0.21 0.91 0.44 0.60 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.80 0.01 0.61 0.00 0.98 0.88 
Above Average 0.70 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.79 0.02 0.40 0.00 0.71 0.01 0.66 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.77 0.02 
Household Size: 
No. of children 
No child 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Boy no girl 1.17 0.12 1.25 0.06 0.99 0.93 1.29 0.13 1.53 0.04 1.13 0.57 1.07 0.59 1.12 0.42 0.92 0.61 
Girl no boy 1.15 0.12 1.26 0.05 0.96 0.75 1.36 0.05 1.35 0.12 1.09 0.64 0.99 0.91 1.21 0.20 0.87 0.43 
Boys/Girls 1.31 0.00 1.49 0.00 1.14 0.28 1.43 0.02 1.93 0.00 1.28 0.17 1.19 0.12 1.30 0.04 1.05 0.76 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.92 0.28 0.82 0.05 0.91 0.38 0.86 0.23 0.72 0.08 1.04 0.82 0.93 0.44 0.84 0.13 0.84 0.22 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.08 0.86 0.04 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.85 0.88 0.45 0.03 0.12 0.00 1.36 0.45 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 1.18 0.21 1.07 0.67 1.22 0.28 1.00 0.99 1.08 0.79 0.98 0.95 1.35 0.07 1.12 0.54 1.40 0.15 
25-29 years 1.27 0.09 1.08 0.63 1.42 0.07 1.20 0.49 1.22 0.52 1.23 0.55 1.35 0.09 1.08 0.70 1.58 0.06 
30-34 years 1.45 0.01 1.19 0.30 1.45 0.06 1.52 0.13 1.07 0.84 1.26 0.51 1.42 0.05 1.33 0.16 1.57 0.07 
35-39 years 1.85 0.00 1.60 0.01 1.78 0.01 1.57 0.09 1.54 0.21 1.26 0.50 2.02 0.00 1.70 0.01 2.20 0.00 
40-44 years 2.20 0.00 2.01 0.00 1.88 0.00 1.78 0.04 1.94 0.06 1.61 0.15 2.35 0.00 2.12 0.00 2.00 0.01 
45-49 years 2.23 0.00 2.31 0.00 1.65 0.04 2.17 0.01 2.34 0.02 1.62 0.24 2.20 0.00 2.46 0.00 1.63 0.10 
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Appendix Table 8.2.2 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Clothing and footwear autonomy)
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.38 0.00 1.21 0.07 1.09 0.41 1.02 0.87 0.99 0.98 0.84 0.22 1.49 0.00 1.28 0.08 1.27 0.09 
8-years education 1.53 0.00 1.56 0.01 1.07 0.71 1.06 0.66 1.14 0.57 0.92 0.68 1.75 0.01 1.84 0.01 1.31 0.31 
10-12years education 1.56 0.00 1.50 0.01 0.91 0.53 1.02 0.89 1.07 0.76 0.91 0.59 1.76 0.00 1.94 0.00 0.79 0.35 
Higher education 2.42 0.00 1.38 0.09 1.34 0.07 1.61 0.00 1.10 0.69 1.22 0.32 1.97 0.02 1.63 0.16 1.47 0.27 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 0.95 0.42 1.04 0.64 0.87 0.14 0.99 0.91 0.98 0.92 0.91 0.55 0.96 0.59 1.05 0.64 0.88 0.27 
8-years education 1.11 0.20 0.90 0.32 1.13 0.27 1.19 0.19 0.97 0.89 1.12 0.49 1.03 0.79 0.82 0.14 1.15 0.34 
10-12years education 0.95 0.53 0.90 0.27 1.02 0.86 1.15 0.24 0.97 0.86 1.05 0.78 0.85 0.12 0.84 0.16 1.02 0.86 
Higher education 0.98 0.82 1.15 0.21 0.87 0.29 1.07 0.61 1.10 0.58 0.95 0.80 0.94 0.64 1.21 0.17 0.81 0.25 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.15 0.01 1.31 0.00 1.03 0.71 1.15 0.09 1.31 0.03 0.98 0.86 1.07 0.35 1.24 0.01 1.07 0.52 
High income 1.28 0.12 1.28 0.25 0.91 0.62 1.29 0.20 1.16 0.63 0.98 0.92 1.28 0.30 1.45 0.24 0.77 0.44 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.16 0.03 1.03 0.75 1.26 0.02 1.32 0.03 0.99 0.95 1.29 0.13 1.07 0.40 1.02 0.84 1.23 0.12 
High income 1.52 0.00 1.03 0.14 1.55 0.00 1.62 0.00 1.09 0.64 1.42 0.04 1.33 0.01 0.91 0.36 1.57 0.00 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.39 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.75 0.04 0.90 0.50 0.62 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.72 0.01 0.24 0.00 
NWFP 0.28 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.47 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.59 0.12 0.24 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.46 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.34 0.01 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (29) = 3789.29; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
12579.89; Pseudo R2 = 0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 543.32 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (58, 1044) = 14.21; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(29, 499)=10.33, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 543.32 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(58, 470) = 88.29; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(29, 546) = 21.05, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 543.32 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574; F(58,517) = 11.34; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 8.2.3: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Clothing and footwear autonomy) 
    Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Rural Region 
  
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
  
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
    
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.59 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.33 0.05 1.27 0.10 1.33 0.18 1.17 0.33 1.75 0.00 1.36 0.02 1.46 0.05 
Household 
Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.82 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.88 0.18 0.91 0.44 0.60 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.79 0.01 0.61 0.00 0.97 0.80 
Above Average 0.70 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.80 0.03 0.40 0.00 0.70 0.01 0.65 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.76 0.01 
Household 
Size: No. of 
children 
No Child 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Boys no Girl 1.17 0.12 1.26 0.05 0.98 0.85 1.31 0.11 1.54 0.04 1.11 0.61 1.06 0.63 1.13 0.41 0.91 0.56 
Girls no boy 1.15 0.12 1.27 0.05 0.95 0.69 1.38 0.05 1.36 0.11 1.08 0.68 0.98 0.87 1.22 0.19 0.86 0.40 
Boys = Girls 1.31 0.01 1.43 0.00 1.25 0.07 1.30 0.11 1.78 0.01 1.38 0.08 1.25 0.06 1.26 0.09 1.17 0.34 
Girls > Boys 1.36 0.00 1.49 0.00 1.04 0.78 1.65 0.00 1.93 0.00 1.21 0.36 1.14 0.31 1.31 0.07 0.93 0.66 
Boys > Girls 1.28 0.02 1.59 0.00 1.06 0.69 1.49 0.02 2.19 0.00 1.18 0.42 1.13 0.32 1.35 0.03 0.99 0.94 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.92 0.28 0.81 0.04 0.95 0.65 0.82 0.11 0.70 0.06 1.08 0.65 0.95 0.62 0.82 0.12 0.88 0.39 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.08 0.85 0.04 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.87 0.90 0.45 0.03 0.12 0.00 1.34 0.46 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 1.18 0.21 1.07 0.67 1.22 0.27 1.00 0.98 1.08 0.81 0.98 0.96 1.35 0.07 1.12 0.54 1.39 0.15 
25-29 years 1.27 0.09 1.08 0.64 1.43 0.06 1.18 0.51 1.21 0.54 1.24 0.53 1.35 0.08 1.07 0.71 1.58 0.06 
30-34 years 1.45 0.01 1.19 0.33 1.47 0.05 1.49 0.14 1.05 0.89 1.28 0.47 1.43 0.05 1.32 0.17 1.59 0.06 
35-39 years 1.85 0.00 1.58 0.01 1.81 0.00 1.54 0.10 1.51 0.23 1.29 0.46 2.04 0.00 1.69 0.01 2.24 0.00 
40-44 years 2.20 0.00 1.99 0.00 1.93 0.00 1.72 0.05 1.89 0.07 1.66 0.13 2.40 0.00 2.10 0.00 2.07 0.01 
45-49 years 2.23 0.00 2.27 0.00 1.71 0.02 2.09 0.01 2.27 0.02 1.67 0.21 2.24 0.00 2.43 0.00 1.70 0.08 
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Appendix Table 8.2.3 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Clothing and footwear autonomy) 
    Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
  
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
  
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
    
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.38 0.00 1.22 0.07 1.08 0.46 1.03 0.80 1.01 0.99 0.83 0.20 1.48 0.00 1.28 0.08 1.26 0.10 
8-years education 1.53 0.00 1.56 0.01 1.06 0.74 1.07 0.60 1.15 0.53 0.91 0.65 1.76 0.01 1.83 0.01 1.31 0.31 
10-12years education 1.56 0.00 1.50 0.01 0.90 0.50 1.02 0.86 1.07 0.74 0.90 0.57 1.75 0.00 1.95 0.00 0.78 0.33 
Higher education 2.42 0.00 1.39 0.09 1.33 0.08 1.62 0.00 1.11 0.67 1.21 0.33 1.96 0.02 1.63 0.16 1.47 0.27 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 0.95 0.42 1.04 0.63 0.87 0.13 0.99 0.94 0.99 0.94 0.91 0.55 0.96 0.59 1.05 0.64 0.88 0.26 
8-years education 1.11 0.20 0.90 0.32 1.13 0.27 1.19 0.19 0.98 0.90 1.12 0.49 1.03 0.80 0.82 0.14 1.15 0.35 
10-12years education 0.95 0.53 0.90 0.27 1.02 0.87 1.16 0.23 0.98 0.88 1.04 0.80 0.85 0.12 0.84 0.16 1.03 0.86 
Higher education 0.98 0.83 1.15 0.20 0.87 0.28 1.07 0.58 1.11 0.57 0.95 0.80 0.94 0.64 1.21 0.17 0.80 0.24 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.15 0.01 1.31 0.00 1.04 0.66 1.14 0.10 1.30 0.03 0.99 0.90 1.07 0.34 1.24 0.01 1.08 0.48 
High income 1.27 0.12 1.27 0.26 0.92 0.66 1.27 0.23 1.14 0.66 0.99 0.97 1.28 0.30 1.45 0.25 0.78 0.46 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.16 0.03 1.03 0.74 1.25 0.03 1.33 0.03 0.98 0.92 1.29 0.13 1.07 0.43 1.02 0.82 1.22 0.12 
High income 1.53 0.00 1.03 0.14 1.53 0.00 1.64 0.00 1.09 0.63 1.42 0.04 1.32 0.01 0.91 0.38 1.56 0.00 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.39 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.75 0.04 0.90 0.52 0.61 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.72 0.01 0.24 0.00 
NWFP 0.28 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.47 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.59 0.12 0.24 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.46 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.34 0.01 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 3789.81; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
12579.64; Pseudo R2 = 0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 544.84Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 13.49; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318;  Design df=527; F(31, 497)=9.66, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 544.84Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 81.90; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204;; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 19.91, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 544.84Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. 
of Obs = 8204; Design df = 578; F(62,513) = 10.66; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 8.2.4: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Clothing and footwear autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.59 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.33 0.05 1.27 0.10 1.33 0.18 1.17 0.33 1.75 0.00 1.36 0.02 1.46 0.05 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.82 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.88 0.18 0.91 0.44 0.60 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.79 0.01 0.61 0.00 0.97 0.80 
Above Average 0.70 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.80 0.03 0.40 0.00 0.70 0.01 0.65 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.76 0.01 
Household Size: 
No. of Children 
Boys = Girls  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
No Child 0.77 0.01 0.70 0.00 0.80 0.07 0.77 0.11 0.56 0.01 0.72 0.08 0.80 0.06 0.79 0.09 0.85 0.34 
Boys no girl 0.89 0.15 0.88 0.19 0.78 0.02 1.00 0.97 0.87 0.47 0.80 0.20 0.85 0.12 0.89 0.34 0.77 0.07 
Girls no boy 0.88 0.15 0.88 0.28 0.76 0.02 1.06 0.70 0.76 0.17 0.78 0.16 0.78 0.03 0.97 0.80 0.73 0.05 
Girls > Boys 1.04 0.60 1.04 0.66 0.83 0.06 1.27 0.03 1.08 0.61 0.87 0.34 0.91 0.30 1.04 0.74 0.79 0.09 
Boys > Girls 0.98 0.75 1.11 0.26 0.84 0.10 1.15 0.25 1.23 0.24 0.86 0.31 0.90 0.24 1.07 0.52 0.84 0.20 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.92 0.28 0.81 0.04 0.95 0.65 0.82 0.11 0.70 0.06 1.08 0.65 0.95 0.62 0.82 0.12 0.88 0.39 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.08 0.85 0.04 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.87 0.90 0.45 0.03 0.12 0.00 1.34 0.46 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 1.18 0.21 1.07 0.67 1.22 0.27 1.00 0.98 1.08 0.81 0.98 0.96 1.35 0.07 1.12 0.54 1.39 0.15 
25-29 years 1.27 0.09 1.08 0.64 1.43 0.06 1.18 0.51 1.21 0.54 1.24 0.53 1.35 0.08 1.07 0.71 1.58 0.06 
30-34 years 1.45 0.01 1.19 0.33 1.47 0.05 1.49 0.14 1.05 0.89 1.28 0.47 1.43 0.05 1.32 0.17 1.59 0.06 
35-39 years 1.85 0.00 1.58 0.01 1.81 0.00 1.54 0.10 1.51 0.23 1.29 0.46 2.04 0.00 1.69 0.01 2.24 0.00 
40-44 years 2.20 0.00 1.99 0.00 1.93 0.00 1.72 0.05 1.89 0.07 1.66 0.13 2.40 0.00 2.10 0.00 2.07 0.01 
45-49 years 2.23 0.00 2.27 0.00 1.71 0.02 2.09 0.01 2.27 0.02 1.67 0.21 2.24 0.00 2.43 0.00 1.70 0.08 
continue… 
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Appendix Table 8.2.4 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Cloth and footwear autonomy)
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.38 0.00 1.22 0.07 1.08 0.46 1.03 0.80 1.01 0.99 0.83 0.20 1.48 0.00 1.28 0.08 1.26 0.10 
8-years education 1.53 0.00 1.56 0.01 1.06 0.74 1.07 0.60 1.15 0.53 0.91 0.65 1.76 0.01 1.83 0.01 1.31 0.31 
10-12years education 1.56 0.00 1.50 0.01 0.90 0.50 1.02 0.86 1.07 0.74 0.90 0.57 1.75 0.00 1.95 0.00 0.78 0.33 
Higher education 2.42 0.00 1.39 0.09 1.33 0.08 1.62 0.00 1.11 0.67 1.21 0.33 1.96 0.02 1.63 0.16 1.47 0.27 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 0.95 0.42 1.04 0.63 0.87 0.13 0.99 0.94 0.99 0.94 0.91 0.55 0.96 0.59 1.05 0.64 0.88 0.26 
8-years education 1.11 0.20 0.90 0.32 1.13 0.27 1.19 0.19 0.98 0.90 1.12 0.49 1.03 0.80 0.82 0.14 1.15 0.35 
10-12years education 0.95 0.53 0.90 0.27 1.02 0.87 1.16 0.23 0.98 0.88 1.04 0.80 0.85 0.12 0.84 0.16 1.03 0.86 
Higher education 0.98 0.83 1.15 0.20 0.87 0.28 1.07 0.58 1.11 0.57 0.95 0.80 0.94 0.64 1.21 0.17 0.80 0.24 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.15 0.01 1.31 0.00 1.04 0.66 1.14 0.10 1.30 0.03 0.99 0.90 1.07 0.34 1.24 0.01 1.08 0.48 
High income 1.27 0.12 1.27 0.26 0.92 0.66 1.27 0.23 1.14 0.66 0.99 0.97 1.28 0.30 1.45 0.25 0.78 0.46 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.16 0.03 1.03 0.74 1.25 0.03 1.33 0.03 0.98 0.92 1.29 0.13 1.07 0.43 1.02 0.82 1.22 0.12 
High income 1.53 0.00 1.03 0.14 1.53 0.00 1.64 0.00 1.09 0.63 1.42 0.04 1.32 0.01 0.91 0.38 1.56 0.00 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.39 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.75 0.04 0.90 0.52 0.61 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.72 0.01 0.24 0.00 
NWFP 0.28 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.47 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.59 0.12 0.24 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.46 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.34 0.01 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 3789.81; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
12579.64; Pseudo R2 = 0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 544.84 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 13.49; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=9.66, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 544.84 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 81.90; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 19.91, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 544.84 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574; F(62,513) = 10.66; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 8.2.5: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Clothing and footwear autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.59 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.33 0.05 1.27 0.10 1.33 0.18 1.17 0.33 1.75 0.00 1.36 0.02 1.46 0.05 
Household 
Size: Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.82 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.88 0.18 0.91 0.44 0.60 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.79 0.01 0.61 0.00 0.97 0.80 
Above Average 0.70 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.80 0.03 0.40 0.00 0.70 0.01 0.65 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.76 0.01 
Household 
Size: No. of 
Children 
Girls > Boys 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
No Child 0.74 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.96 0.78 0.61 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.83 0.36 0.88 0.31 0.76 0.07 1.08 0.66 
Boys no girl 0.86 0.07 0.84 0.11 0.94 0.60 0.79 0.08 0.80 0.24 0.92 0.67 0.93 0.52 0.86 0.25 0.98 0.87 
Girls no boy 0.85 0.05 0.85 0.14 0.92 0.47 0.83 0.21 0.70 0.06 0.90 0.57 0.86 0.18 0.93 0.60 0.93 0.64 
Boys = Girls 0.96 0.60 0.96 0.66 1.21 0.06 0.79 0.03 0.92 0.61 1.15 0.34 1.10 0.30 0.96 0.74 1.27 0.09 
Boys > girls 0.94 0.30 1.06 0.44 1.02 0.84 0.90 0.27 1.13 0.41 0.98 0.90 0.99 0.92 1.03 0.73 1.06 0.61 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.92 0.28 0.81 0.04 0.95 0.65 0.82 0.11 0.70 0.06 1.08 0.65 0.95 0.62 0.82 0.12 0.88 0.39 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.08 0.85 0.04 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.87 0.90 0.45 0.03 0.12 0.00 1.34 0.46 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 1.18 0.21 1.07 0.67 1.22 0.27 1.00 0.98 1.08 0.81 0.98 0.96 1.35 0.07 1.12 0.54 1.39 0.15 
25-29 years 1.27 0.09 1.08 0.64 1.43 0.06 1.18 0.51 1.21 0.54 1.24 0.53 1.35 0.08 1.07 0.71 1.58 0.06 
30-34 years 1.45 0.01 1.19 0.33 1.47 0.05 1.49 0.14 1.05 0.89 1.28 0.47 1.43 0.05 1.32 0.17 1.59 0.06 
35-39 years 1.85 0.00 1.58 0.01 1.81 0.00 1.54 0.10 1.51 0.23 1.29 0.46 2.04 0.00 1.69 0.01 2.24 0.00 
40-44 years 2.20 0.00 1.99 0.00 1.93 0.00 1.72 0.05 1.89 0.07 1.66 0.13 2.40 0.00 2.10 0.00 2.07 0.01 
45-49 years 2.23 0.00 2.27 0.00 1.71 0.02 2.09 0.01 2.27 0.02 1.67 0.21 2.24 0.00 2.43 0.00 1.70 0.08 
continue… 
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Appendix Table 8.2.5(…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Clothing and footwear autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.38 0.00 1.22 0.07 1.08 0.46 1.03 0.80 1.01 0.99 0.83 0.20 1.48 0.00 1.28 0.08 1.26 0.10 
8-years education 1.53 0.00 1.56 0.01 1.06 0.74 1.07 0.60 1.15 0.53 0.91 0.65 1.76 0.01 1.83 0.01 1.31 0.31 
10-12years education 1.56 0.00 1.50 0.01 0.90 0.50 1.02 0.86 1.07 0.74 0.90 0.57 1.75 0.00 1.95 0.00 0.78 0.33 
Higher education 2.42 0.00 1.39 0.09 1.33 0.08 1.62 0.00 1.11 0.67 1.21 0.33 1.96 0.02 1.63 0.16 1.47 0.27 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 0.95 0.42 1.04 0.63 0.87 0.13 0.99 0.94 0.99 0.94 0.91 0.55 0.96 0.59 1.05 0.64 0.88 0.26 
8-years education 1.11 0.20 0.90 0.32 1.13 0.27 1.19 0.19 0.98 0.90 1.12 0.49 1.03 0.80 0.82 0.14 1.15 0.35 
10-12years education 0.95 0.53 0.90 0.27 1.02 0.87 1.16 0.23 0.98 0.88 1.04 0.80 0.85 0.12 0.84 0.16 1.03 0.86 
Higher education 0.98 0.83 1.15 0.20 0.87 0.28 1.07 0.58 1.11 0.57 0.95 0.80 0.94 0.64 1.21 0.17 0.80 0.24 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.15 0.01 1.31 0.00 1.04 0.66 1.14 0.10 1.30 0.03 0.99 0.90 1.07 0.34 1.24 0.01 1.08 0.48 
High income 1.27 0.12 1.27 0.26 0.92 0.66 1.27 0.23 1.14 0.66 0.99 0.97 1.28 0.30 1.45 0.25 0.78 0.46 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.16 0.03 1.03 0.74 1.25 0.03 1.33 0.03 0.98 0.92 1.29 0.13 1.07 0.43 1.02 0.82 1.22 0.12 
High income 1.53 0.00 1.03 0.14 1.53 0.00 1.64 0.00 1.09 0.63 1.42 0.04 1.32 0.01 0.91 0.38 1.56 0.00 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.39 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.75 0.04 0.90 0.52 0.61 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.72 0.01 0.24 0.00 
NWFP 0.28 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.47 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.59 0.12 0.24 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.46 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.34 0.01 
Notes:  
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 3789.81; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -1259.64; 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 544.84 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 
1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 13.49; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=9.66, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 544.84 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.  2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 81.90; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 19.91, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1309. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 544.84 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574; F (62,513) = 10.66; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 8.3.2: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Traveling and recreation autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy1 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.20 0.07 1.20 0.13 1.01 0.95 1.61 0.00 1.58 0.00 1.18 0.46 1.02 0.85 1.04 0.79 0.94 0.73 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.67 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.69 0.01 0.65 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.78 0.29 0.67 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.66 0.02 
Above Average 0.52 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.81 0.09 0.53 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.62 0.02 0.50 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.95 0.76 
Household Size: 
No. of children 
No child 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Boy no girl 0.96 0.72 1.04 0.70 0.70 0.11 1.05 0.75 1.09 0.62 0.80 0.50 0.90 0.41 0.99 0.97 0.62 0.11 
Girl no boy 1.18 0.07 1.21 0.05 0.88 0.52 1.31 0.09 1.33 0.11 0.93 0.82 1.11 0.33 1.14 0.24 0.83 0.44 
Boys/Girls 1.19 0.05 1.26 0.01 0.77 0.13 1.46 0.02 1.49 0.02 0.87 0.64 1.04 0.71 1.14 0.23 0.67 0.06 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.86 0.05 0.84 0.04 0.90 0.56 0.93 0.55 0.85 0.29 0.71 0.22 0.80 0.01 0.81 0.04 0.98 0.94 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.33 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.43 0.01 0.49 0.56 0.12 0.05 0.38 0.08 0.29 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.49 0.01 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 0.98 0.85 0.98 0.87 1.05 0.91 0.97 0.90 0.89 0.60 2.42 0.18 1.02 0.90 1.04 0.78 0.93 0.88 
25-29 years 1.33 0.03 1.23 0.12 1.54 0.34 1.60 0.04 1.28 0.30 4.05 0.03 1.27 0.12 1.22 0.20 1.23 0.65 
30-34 years 1.43 0.01 1.35 0.03 1.43 0.45 1.68 0.04 1.34 0.24 4.32 0.03 1.39 0.05 1.40 0.06 1.01 0.99 
35-39 years 1.94 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.93 0.17 1.97 0.01 1.53 0.08 4.91 0.02 2.06 0.00 1.93 0.00 1.55 0.39 
40-44 years 2.50 0.00 2.08 0.00 2.42 0.06 2.51 0.00 2.10 0.00 4.35 0.03 2.72 0.00 2.16 0.00 2.41 0.07 
45-49 years 2.91 0.00 2.56 0.00 2.31 0.07 2.60 0.00 2.05 0.01 4.86 0.02 3.42 0.00 3.07 0.00 2.10 0.12 
continue… 
215 
 
Appendix Table 8.3.2 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Traveling and recreation autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.36 0.00 1.31 0.00 1.29 0.07 1.08 0.54 1.19 0.18 0.87 0.57 1.54 0.00 1.36 0.01 1.59 0.01 
8-years education 1.20 0.11 1.19 0.16 1.20 0.41 0.90 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.47 1.53 0.02 1.30 0.13 1.69 0.10 
10-12years education 1.26 0.04 1.04 0.73 1.94 0.00 0.97 0.82 1.31 0.08 1.90 0.01 1.74 0.00 1.69 0.01 1.48 0.15 
Higher education 1.18 0.23 0.95 0.75 2.26 0.00 0.94 0.73 0.78 0.15 1.84 0.05 1.71 0.04 1.54 0.11 1.77 0.25 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.04 0.58 1.09 0.22 0.88 0.34 1.25 0.08 1.32 0.03 0.98 0.93 0.94 0.38 0.99 0.87 0.83 0.26 
8-years education 0.93 0.39 0.82 0.13 1.34 0.11 1.03 0.84 0.91 0.53 1.32 0.39 0.87 0.19 0.78 0.13 1.31 0.21 
10-12years education 1.04 0.62 0.98 0.82 1.13 0.43 1.13 0.38 1.13 0.37 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.82 0.89 0.28 1.23 0.27 
Higher education 1.08 0.43 1.10 0.32 0.91 0.63 1.13 0.44 1.12 0.45 0.97 0.93 1.11 0.40 1.17 0.22 0.81 0.43 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.15 0.02 1.23 0.00 0.84 0.12 1.06 0.53 1.13 0.20 0.82 0.36 1.18 0.02 1.25 0.00 0.86 0.25 
High income 1.45 0.01 1.63 0.00 0.80 0.37 1.38 0.10 1.51 0.06 0.88 0.68 1.56 0.05 1.95 0.02 0.59 0.28 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 0.91 0.21 0.91 0.23 0.95 0.74 0.92 0.59 0.94 0.71 0.91 0.75 0.89 0.17 0.89 0.20 0.94 0.70 
High income 1.87 0.08 1.21 0.02 1.13 0.37 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.70 1.15 0.59 1.79 0.02 1.33 0.00 1.04 0.78 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.63 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.13 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.80 0.16 0.20 0.00 0.74 0.03 1.16 0.33 0.07 0.00 
NWFP 0.93 0.53 1.43 0.01 0.25 0.00 0.71 0.06 1.05 0.84 0.32 0.00 1.03 0.83 1.57 0.01 0.24 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.19 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.31 0.02 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (29) = 1730.78; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
11200.291; Pseudo R2 = 0.0717. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 585.16 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number 
of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (58, 1044) = 12.80; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(29, 499)=6.92, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.0717. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 585.16 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(58, 470) = 6.88; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(29, 546) = 11.04, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.0717. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 585.16 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574; F(58,517) = 9.83; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 8.3.3: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Traveling and recreation autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.21 0.07 1.20 0.12 1.01 0.95 1.63 0.00 1.59 0.00 1.18 0.47 1.02 0.85 1.04 0.78 0.94 0.71 
Household 
Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.68 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.69 0.01 0.65 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.78 0.27 0.67 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.66 0.02 
Above Average 0.53 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.80 0.08 0.55 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.62 0.01 0.50 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.96 0.78 
Household 
Size: No. of 
children 
No Child 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Boys no Girl 0.97 0.78 1.05 0.63 0.70 0.12 1.08 0.65 1.11 0.55 0.81 0.53 0.90 0.43 1.00 1.00 0.62 0.11 
Girls no boy 1.18 0.06 1.21 0.04 0.88 0.53 1.34 0.07 1.35 0.09 0.94 0.85 1.11 0.33 1.15 0.23 0.83 0.44 
Boys = Girls 1.11 0.27 1.17 0.10 0.75 0.13 1.27 0.16 1.32 0.12 0.78 0.46 1.01 0.90 1.08 0.49 0.70 0.13 
Girls > Boys 1.21 0.06 1.25 0.03 0.82 0.29 1.57 0.01 1.54 0.02 0.95 0.88 1.03 0.79 1.11 0.38 0.69 0.12 
Boys > Girls 1.32 0.01 1.41 0.00 0.76 0.15 1.76 0.00 1.76 0.00 0.93 0.83 1.09 0.48 1.24 0.07 0.61 0.04 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.83 0.02 0.81 0.02 0.91 0.60 0.86 0.23 0.80 0.16 0.74 0.30 0.79 0.01 0.79 0.03 1.00 1.00 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.33 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.43 0.01 0.47 0.54 0.11 0.05 0.40 0.08 0.29 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.50 0.01 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 0.97 0.84 0.98 0.86 1.06 0.90 0.96 0.86 0.88 0.57 2.42 0.18 1.02 0.90 1.04 0.77 0.93 0.87 
25-29 years 1.32 0.03 1.22 0.13 1.54 0.34 1.58 0.05 1.27 0.32 4.01 0.03 1.27 0.12 1.22 0.21 1.23 0.65 
30-34 years 1.41 0.01 1.34 0.04 1.43 0.45 1.62 0.05 1.31 0.28 4.22 0.03 1.38 0.06 1.39 0.06 1.01 0.98 
35-39 years 1.91 0.00 1.71 0.00 1.94 0.17 1.89 0.01 1.48 0.10 4.81 0.02 2.04 0.00 1.91 0.00 1.57 0.37 
40-44 years 2.45 0.00 2.03 0.00 2.41 0.06 2.38 0.00 2.01 0.01 4.20 0.03 2.70 0.00 2.13 0.00 2.43 0.07 
45-49 years 2.83 0.00 2.49 0.00 2.30 0.07 2.45 0.00 1.96 0.02 4.70 0.02 3.38 0.00 3.01 0.00 2.14 0.11 
…continue 
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Appendix Table 8.3.3 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Traveling and recreation autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.37 0.00 1.32 0.00 1.30 0.07 1.09 0.47 1.21 0.15 0.88 0.60 1.54 0.00 1.36 0.01 1.59 0.01 
8-years education 1.21 0.10 1.20 0.15 1.20 0.41 0.92 0.57 1.02 0.92 0.83 0.52 1.53 0.02 1.29 0.14 1.68 0.10 
10-12years education 1.27 0.04 1.05 0.70 1.94 0.00 0.98 0.88 1.30 0.09 1.91 0.01 1.75 0.00 1.70 0.01 1.47 0.16 
Higher education 1.19 0.21 0.96 0.78 2.26 0.00 0.95 0.78 0.79 0.17 1.86 0.05 1.71 0.04 1.54 0.11 1.76 0.25 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.04 0.57 1.09 0.22 0.88 0.35 1.26 0.07 1.32 0.03 0.98 0.92 0.94 0.38 0.99 0.88 0.83 0.25 
8-years education 0.93 0.39 0.82 0.13 1.34 0.11 1.03 0.84 0.91 0.53 1.32 0.39 0.87 0.19 0.78 0.12 1.31 0.21 
10-12years education 1.04 0.60 0.98 0.84 1.13 0.44 1.14 0.34 1.14 0.33 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.82 0.89 0.28 1.23 0.27 
Higher education 1.08 0.43 1.10 0.32 0.91 0.63 1.13 0.43 1.12 0.43 0.97 0.92 1.11 0.40 1.17 0.22 0.81 0.42 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.15 0.02 1.22 0.00 0.83 0.11 1.05 0.60 1.12 0.23 0.81 0.34 1.18 0.02 1.25 0.00 0.86 0.25 
High income 1.44 0.02 1.62 0.01 0.80 0.36 1.34 0.13 1.48 0.07 0.87 0.63 1.57 0.05 1.97 0.02 0.59 0.28 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 0.92 0.22 0.91 0.24 0.96 0.76 0.92 0.57 0.94 0.68 0.91 0.76 0.89 0.18 0.89 0.21 0.93 0.69 
High income 1.88 0.09 1.21 0.02 1.13 0.35 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.72 1.15 0.57 1.79 0.02 1.32 0.01 1.04 0.78 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.63 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.13 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.81 0.17 0.20 0.00 0.74 0.03 1.16 0.34 0.07 0.00 
NWFP 0.93 0.55 1.43 0.01 0.25 0.00 0.71 0.07 1.05 0.81 0.32 0.00 1.03 0.83 1.57 0.01 0.24 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.19 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.31 0.02 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 1740.08; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
11195.639; Pseudo R2 = 0.0721. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 586.62 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number 
of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 12.25; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318;  Design df=527; F(31, 497)=6.70, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.0721. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 586.62 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 6.76; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 10.63, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.0721. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 586.62 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 8204;; Design df = 574; F(62,513) = 9.52; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 8.3.4: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Traveling and recreation autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.21 0.07 1.20 0.12 1.01 0.95 1.63 0.00 1.59 0.00 1.18 0.47 1.02 0.85 1.04 0.78 0.94 0.71 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.68 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.69 0.01 0.65 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.78 0.27 0.67 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.66 0.02 
Above Average 0.53 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.80 0.08 0.55 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.62 0.01 0.50 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.96 0.78 
Household Size: 
No. of Children 
Boys = Girls  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
No Child 0.90 0.27 0.85 0.10 1.34 0.13 0.79 0.16 0.76 0.12 1.28 0.46 0.99 0.90 0.92 0.49 1.43 0.13 
Boys no girl 0.88 0.12 0.89 0.21 0.94 0.71 0.85 0.21 0.84 0.22 1.04 0.87 0.89 0.30 0.92 0.48 0.88 0.62 
Girls no boy 1.07 0.41 1.04 0.69 1.18 0.35 1.06 0.69 1.02 0.89 1.20 0.54 1.10 0.38 1.06 0.61 1.18 0.45 
Girls > Boys 1.09 0.21 1.07 0.39 1.09 0.58 1.24 0.07 1.17 0.24 1.22 0.36 1.02 0.83 1.03 0.77 0.98 0.93 
Boys > Girls 1.19 0.02 1.21 0.01 1.01 0.93 1.39 0.01 1.33 0.03 1.20 0.48 1.08 0.41 1.14 0.15 0.87 0.46 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.83 0.02 0.81 0.02 0.91 0.60 0.86 0.23 0.80 0.16 0.74 0.30 0.79 0.01 0.79 0.03 0.98 1.00 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.33 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.43 0.01 0.47 0.54 0.11 0.05 0.40 0.08 0.29 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.50 0.01 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 0.97 0.84 0.98 0.86 1.06 0.90 0.96 0.86 0.88 0.57 2.42 0.18 1.02 0.90 1.04 0.77 0.93 0.87 
25-29 years 1.32 0.03 1.22 0.13 1.54 0.34 1.58 0.05 1.27 0.32 4.01 0.03 1.27 0.12 1.22 0.21 1.23 0.65 
30-34 years 1.41 0.01 1.34 0.04 1.43 0.45 1.62 0.05 1.31 0.28 4.22 0.03 1.38 0.06 1.39 0.06 1.01 0.98 
35-39 years 1.91 0.00 1.71 0.00 1.94 0.17 1.89 0.01 1.48 0.10 4.81 0.02 2.04 0.00 1.91 0.00 1.57 0.37 
40-44 years 2.45 0.00 2.03 0.00 2.41 0.06 2.38 0.00 2.01 0.01 4.20 0.03 2.70 0.00 2.13 0.00 2.43 0.07 
45-49 years 2.83 0.00 2.49 0.00 2.30 0.07 2.45 0.00 1.96 0.02 4.70 0.02 3.38 0.00 3.01 0.00 2.14 0.11 
continue… 
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Appendix Table 8.3.4 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Traveling and recreation autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.37 0.00 1.32 0.00 1.30 0.07 1.09 0.47 1.21 0.15 0.88 0.60 1.54 0.00 1.36 0.01 1.59 0.01 
8-years education 1.21 0.10 1.20 0.15 1.20 0.41 0.92 0.57 1.02 0.92 0.83 0.52 1.53 0.02 1.29 0.14 1.68 0.10 
10-12years education 1.27 0.04 1.05 0.70 1.94 0.00 0.98 0.88 1.30 0.09 1.91 0.01 1.75 0.00 1.70 0.01 1.47 0.16 
Higher education 1.19 0.21 0.96 0.78 2.26 0.00 0.95 0.78 0.79 0.17 1.86 0.05 1.71 0.04 1.54 0.11 1.76 0.25 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.04 0.57 1.09 0.22 0.88 0.35 1.26 0.07 1.32 0.03 0.98 0.92 0.94 0.38 0.99 0.88 0.83 0.25 
8-years education 0.93 0.40 0.82 0.13 1.34 0.11 1.04 0.82 0.91 0.55 1.30 0.40 0.87 0.20 0.78 0.12 1.31 0.21 
10-12years education 1.04 0.60 0.98 0.84 1.13 0.44 1.14 0.34 1.14 0.33 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.82 0.89 0.28 1.23 0.27 
Higher education 1.08 0.43 1.10 0.32 0.91 0.63 1.13 0.43 1.12 0.43 0.97 0.92 1.11 0.40 1.17 0.22 0.81 0.42 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.15 0.02 1.22 0.00 0.83 0.11 1.05 0.60 1.12 0.23 0.81 0.34 1.18 0.02 1.25 0.00 0.86 0.25 
High income 1.44 0.02 1.62 0.01 0.80 0.36 1.34 0.13 1.48 0.07 0.87 0.63 1.57 0.05 1.97 0.02 0.59 0.28 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 0.92 0.22 0.91 0.24 0.96 0.76 0.92 0.57 0.94 0.68 0.91 0.76 0.89 0.18 0.89 0.21 0.93 0.69 
High income 1.88 0.09 1.21 0.02 1.13 0.35 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.72 1.15 0.57 1.79 0.02 1.32 0.01 1.04 0.78 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.63 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.13 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.81 0.17 0.20 0.00 0.74 0.03 1.16 0.34 0.07 0.00 
NWFP 0.93 0.55 1.43 0.01 0.25 0.00 0.71 0.07 1.05 0.81 0.32 0.00 1.03 0.83 1.57 0.01 0.24 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.19 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.31 0.02 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 1740.08; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
11195.639; Pseudo R2 = 0.0721. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 586.62 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number 
of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 12.25; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=6.70, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.0721. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 586.62 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 6.76; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 10.63, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.0721. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 586.62 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574; F(62,513) = 9.52; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 8.3.5: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Traveling and recreation autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.21 0.07 1.20 0.12 1.01 0.95 1.63 0.00 1.59 0.00 1.18 0.47 1.02 0.85 1.04 0.78 0.94 0.71 
Household 
Size: Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.68 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.69 0.01 0.65 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.78 0.27 0.67 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.66 0.02 
Above Average 0.53 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.80 0.08 0.55 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.62 0.01 0.50 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.96 0.78 
Household 
Size: No. of 
Children 
Girls > Boys 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
No Child 0.83 0.06 0.80 0.03 1.23 0.29 0.64 0.01 0.65 0.02 1.05 0.88 0.97 0.79 0.90 0.38 1.46 0.12 
Boys no girl 0.81 0.01 0.84 0.05 0.86 0.36 0.69 0.01 0.72 0.04 0.85 0.50 0.87 0.24 0.90 0.33 0.90 0.65 
Girls no boy 0.98 0.82 0.97 0.74 1.08 0.63 0.85 0.23 0.87 0.38 0.99 0.96 1.08 0.47 1.03 0.81 1.21 0.36 
Boys = Girls 0.92 0.21 0.94 0.39 0.92 0.58 0.81 0.07 0.86 0.24 0.82 0.36 0.98 0.83 0.97 0.77 1.02 0.93 
Boys > girls 1.09 0.17 1.13 0.09 0.93 0.59 1.12 0.30 1.14 0.30 0.98 0.93 1.06 0.48 1.11 0.22 0.88 0.45 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.83 0.02 0.81 0.02 0.91 0.60 0.86 0.23 0.80 0.16 0.74 0.30 0.79 0.01 0.79 0.03 0.98 1.00 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.33 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.43 0.01 0.47 0.54 0.11 0.05 0.40 0.08 0.29 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.50 0.01 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 0.97 0.84 0.98 0.86 1.06 0.90 0.96 0.86 0.88 0.57 2.42 0.18 1.02 0.90 1.04 0.77 0.93 0.87 
25-29 years 1.32 0.03 1.22 0.13 1.54 0.34 1.58 0.05 1.27 0.32 4.01 0.03 1.27 0.12 1.22 0.21 1.23 0.65 
30-34 years 1.41 0.01 1.34 0.04 1.43 0.45 1.62 0.05 1.31 0.28 4.22 0.03 1.38 0.06 1.39 0.06 1.01 0.98 
35-39 years 1.91 0.00 1.71 0.00 1.94 0.17 1.89 0.01 1.48 0.10 4.81 0.02 2.04 0.00 1.91 0.00 1.57 0.37 
40-44 years 2.45 0.00 2.03 0.00 2.41 0.06 2.38 0.00 2.01 0.01 4.20 0.03 2.70 0.00 2.13 0.00 2.43 0.07 
45-49 years 2.83 0.00 2.49 0.00 2.30 0.07 2.45 0.00 1.96 0.02 4.70 0.02 3.38 0.00 3.01 0.00 2.14 0.11 
continue… 
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Appendix Table 8.3.5 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Traveling and recreation autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.37 0.00 1.32 0.00 1.30 0.07 1.09 0.47 1.21 0.15 0.88 0.60 1.54 0.00 1.36 0.01 1.59 0.01 
8-years education 1.21 0.10 1.20 0.15 1.20 0.41 0.92 0.57 1.02 0.92 0.83 0.52 1.53 0.02 1.29 0.14 1.68 0.10 
10-12years education 1.27 0.04 1.05 0.70 1.94 0.00 0.98 0.88 1.30 0.09 1.91 0.01 1.75 0.00 1.70 0.01 1.47 0.16 
Higher education 1.19 0.21 0.96 0.78 2.26 0.00 0.95 0.78 0.79 0.17 1.86 0.05 1.71 0.04 1.54 0.11 1.76 0.25 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.04 0.57 1.09 0.22 0.88 0.35 1.26 0.07 1.32 0.03 0.98 0.92 0.94 0.38 0.99 0.88 0.83 0.25 
8-years education 0.93 0.40 0.82 0.13 1.34 0.11 1.04 0.82 0.91 0.55 1.30 0.40 0.87 0.20 0.78 0.12 1.31 0.21 
10-12years education 1.04 0.60 0.98 0.84 1.13 0.44 1.14 0.34 1.14 0.33 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.82 0.89 0.28 1.23 0.27 
Higher education 1.08 0.43 1.10 0.32 0.91 0.63 1.13 0.43 1.12 0.43 0.97 0.92 1.11 0.40 1.17 0.22 0.81 0.42 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.15 0.02 1.22 0.00 0.83 0.11 1.05 0.60 1.12 0.23 0.81 0.34 1.18 0.02 1.25 0.00 0.86 0.25 
High income 1.44 0.02 1.62 0.01 0.80 0.36 1.34 0.13 1.48 0.07 0.87 0.63 1.57 0.05 1.97 0.02 0.59 0.28 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 0.92 0.22 0.91 0.24 0.96 0.76 0.92 0.57 0.94 0.68 0.91 0.76 0.89 0.18 0.89 0.21 0.93 0.69 
High income 1.88 0.09 1.21 0.02 1.13 0.35 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.72 1.15 0.57 1.79 0.02 1.32 0.01 1.04 0.78 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.63 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.13 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.81 0.17 0.20 0.00 0.74 0.03 1.16 0.34 0.07 0.00 
NWFP 0.93 0.55 1.43 0.01 0.25 0.00 0.71 0.07 1.05 0.81 0.32 0.00 1.03 0.83 1.57 0.01 0.24 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.19 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.31 0.02 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 1740.08; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
11195.63; Pseudo R2 = 0.0721. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 586.62 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 12.25; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=6.70, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.0721. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 586.62 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 6.76; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 10.63, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.0721. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 586.62 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574; F (62,513) = 9.52; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 8.4.2: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Medical treatment autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.19 0.10 1.13 0.32 1.11 0.37 1.65 0.00 1.62 0.00 1.24 0.23 0.98 0.86 0.98 0.88 0.99 0.93 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.73 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.81 0.07 0.74 0.02 0.59 0.00 0.84 0.34 0.72 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.78 0.10 
Above Average 0.54 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.84 0.08 0.60 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.96 0.76 
Household Size: 
No. of children 
No child 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Boy no girl 1.10 0.36 1.17 0.10 0.80 0.22 1.32 0.08 1.35 0.09 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.71 1.07 0.54 0.64 0.08 
Girl no boy 1.24 0.02 1.21 0.05 1.02 0.89 1.42 0.03 1.30 0.13 1.25 0.41 1.11 0.35 1.16 0.22 0.82 0.33 
Boys/Girls 1.28 0.01 1.32 0.00 0.90 0.50 1.70 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.14 0.57 1.04 0.70 1.17 0.12 0.68 0.05 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.91 0.09 0.86 0.09 1.16 0.29 0.92 0.46 0.79 0.08 0.74 0.06 0.88 0.06 0.88 0.07 1.06 0.75 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.23 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.83 0.03 0.49 0.56 0.12 0.05 0.38 0.08 0.32 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.47 0.00 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 1.06 0.64 1.04 0.73 1.13 0.72 1.01 0.96 0.93 0.75 1.33 0.56 1.15 0.34 1.12 0.43 1.16 0.72 
25-29 years 1.36 0.01 1.23 0.12 1.48 0.25 1.36 0.14 1.14 0.60 1.71 0.24 1.44 0.02 1.29 0.10 1.54 0.30 
30-34 years 1.48 0.00 1.36 0.03 1.42 0.32 1.53 0.05 1.17 0.53 2.05 0.12 1.52 0.01 1.49 0.02 1.18 0.70 
35-39 years 1.98 0.00 1.77 0.00 1.70 0.15 2.02 0.00 1.55 0.09 2.31 0.08 2.03 0.00 1.93 0.00 1.43 0.42 
40-44 years 2.74 0.00 2.11 0.00 2.29 0.02 2.72 0.00 2.02 0.01 2.55 0.04 2.82 0.00 2.20 0.00 2.21 0.06 
45-49 years 2.80 0.00 2.49 0.00 1.92 0.07 2.21 0.00 1.73 0.06 2.11 0.03 3.39 0.00 3.06 0.00 1.99 0.11 
continue… 
223 
 
Appendix Table 8.4.2 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Medical treatment autonomy)
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.30 0.00 1.18 0.05 1.32 0.02 1.08 0.51 1.15 0.29 0.96 0.79 1.38 0.00 1.17 0.17 1.50 0.02 
8-years education 1.25 0.06 1.18 0.23 1.23 0.26 0.97 0.85 1.03 0.89 0.91 0.70 1.42 0.07 1.20 0.31 1.49 0.17 
10-12years education 1.43 0.00 1.17 0.17 1.64 0.00 1.07 0.60 0.87 0.35 1.45 0.07 1.78 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.35 0.18 
Higher education 1.34 0.03 1.02 0.87 1.93 0.00 1.07 0.70 0.88 0.47 1.47 0.09 1.42 0.18 1.22 0.47 1.64 0.25 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.05 0.47 1.08 0.32 1.01 0.99 1.16 0.23 1.16 0.31 1.07 0.70 0.98 0.83 1.02 0.82 0.95 0.71 
8-years education 0.98 0.79 0.84 0.15 1.33 0.04 0.95 0.71 0.84 0.29 1.15 0.53 0.97 0.75 0.83 0.17 1.42 0.06 
10-12years education 1.01 0.85 0.90 0.23 1.24 0.09 1.04 0.79 1.02 0.90 1.03 0.89 0.98 0.82 0.81 0.16 1.42 0.04 
Higher education 1.03 0.76 1.06 0.52 0.95 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.04 0.81 0.93 0.72 1.09 0.50 1.14 0.32 0.93 0.74 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.21 0.00 1.27 0.00 0.95 0.59 1.09 0.36 1.20 0.07 0.87 0.35 1.23 0.01 1.25 0.00 1.00 0.97 
High income 1.50 0.01 1.51 0.02 1.08 0.70 1.33 0.14 1.19 0.44 1.22 0.39 1.65 0.02 2.29 0.01 0.61 0.24 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 0.97 0.63 0.95 0.49 1.01 0.95 1.01 0.95 1.04 0.78 0.96 0.85 0.93 0.35 0.92 0.35 0.96 0.77 
High income 0.97 0.66 0.92 0.29 1.10 0.42 1.15 0.23 1.14 0.29 1.06 0.74 0.82 0.04 0.82 0.17 0.95 0.70 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.73 0.00 1.14 0.21 0.36 0.00 0.77 0.06 0.99 0.97 0.62 0.01 0.65 0.00 1.22 0.16 0.10 0.00 
NWFP 0.88 0.22 1.66 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.67 0.03 1.17 0.50 0.26 0.00 0.95 0.68 1.83 0.00 0.18 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.20 0.00 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (29) = 1906.67; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
12078.233; Pseudo R2 = 0.0732. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 632.08 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number 
of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (58, 1044) = 11.83; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(29, 499)=7.95, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.0732. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 632.08 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(58, 470) = 75.12; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(29, 546) = 10.90, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.0732. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 632.08 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574; F(58,517) = 9.46; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 8.4.3: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Medical treatment autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.19 0.09 1.14 0.31 1.10 0.38 1.66 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.24 0.23 0.98 0.86 0.98 0.88 0.98 0.92 
Household 
Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.74 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.81 0.07 0.74 0.02 0.60 0.00 0.85 0.35 0.72 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.78 0.10 
Above Average 0.55 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.83 0.07 0.61 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.96 0.78 
Household 
Size: No. of 
children 
No Child 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Boys no Girl 1.10 0.32 1.17 0.09 0.80 0.23 1.34 0.06 1.37 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.72 1.08 0.53 0.64 0.08 
Girls no boy 1.24 0.02 1.21 0.05 1.03 0.87 1.45 0.02 1.32 0.11 1.26 0.39 1.11 0.34 1.16 0.22 0.82 0.34 
Boys = Girls 1.21 0.04 1.26 0.02 0.86 0.38 1.50 0.01 1.45 0.04 1.08 0.76 1.02 0.84 1.15 0.22 0.67 0.06 
Girls > Boys 1.35 0.00 1.33 0.01 0.99 0.93 1.94 0.00 1.73 0.00 1.28 0.34 1.06 0.67 1.16 0.22 0.71 0.13 
Boys > Girls 1.35 0.00 1.42 0.00 0.89 0.48 1.90 0.00 1.86 0.00 1.12 0.65 1.06 0.60 1.22 0.08 0.66 0.06 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.91 0.09 0.86 0.09 1.16 0.29 0.92 0.46 0.79 0.08 0.74 0.06 0.88 0.06 0.88 0.07 1.06 0.75 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.23 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.82 0.04 0.47 0.54 0.11 0.05 0.40 0.08 0.33 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.47 0.00 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 1.06 0.64 1.04 0.73 1.13 0.72 1.01 0.98 0.92 0.73 1.33 0.56 1.15 0.34 1.12 0.43 1.16 0.72 
25-29 years 1.36 0.02 1.23 0.12 1.48 0.25 1.34 0.16 1.12 0.63 1.69 0.25 1.44 0.02 1.29 0.10 1.54 0.29 
30-34 years 1.47 0.00 1.35 0.04 1.42 0.32 1.49 0.07 1.14 0.60 2.03 0.13 1.52 0.01 1.48 0.02 1.18 0.70 
35-39 years 1.95 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.69 0.15 1.96 0.00 1.50 0.08 2.29 0.09 2.02 0.00 1.91 0.00 1.43 0.42 
40-44 years 2.68 0.00 2.08 0.00 2.27 0.02 2.60 0.00 1.94 0.01 2.50 0.05 2.80 0.00 2.18 0.00 2.21 0.07 
45-49 years 2.73 0.00 2.44 0.00 1.89 0.07 2.10 0.00 1.66 0.08 2.07 0.06 3.37 0.00 3.04 0.00 1.99 0.11 
continue… 
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Appendix Table 8.4.3 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Medical treatment autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.31 0.00 1.19 0.05 1.33 0.02 1.09 0.44 1.16 0.26 0.96 0.82 1.38 0.00 1.17 0.17 1.50 0.02 
8-years education 1.26 0.06 1.18 0.22 1.24 0.26 0.98 0.92 1.04 0.83 0.92 0.72 1.42 0.07 1.20 0.31 1.49 0.17 
10-12years education 1.43 0.00 1.18 0.16 1.64 0.00 1.08 0.57 0.87 0.38 1.45 0.07 1.79 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.35 0.18 
Higher education 1.35 0.03 1.03 0.85 1.93 0.00 1.08 0.66 0.89 0.51 1.47 0.09 1.42 0.18 1.22 0.46 1.64 0.25 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.05 0.46 1.08 0.32 1.06 1.00 1.16 0.22 1.16 0.30 1.07 0.70 0.98 0.83 1.02 0.81 0.95 0.71 
8-years education 0.98 0.79 0.84 0.15 1.33 0.04 0.95 0.71 0.84 0.30 1.14 0.54 0.97 0.75 0.83 0.17 1.42 0.06 
10-12years education 1.02 0.84 0.90 0.23 1.24 0.09 1.05 0.73 1.03 0.86 1.02 0.90 0.98 0.82 0.81 0.16 1.42 0.04 
Higher education 1.03 0.74 1.06 0.52 0.96 0.76 1.01 0.97 1.04 0.79 0.93 0.72 1.09 0.49 1.14 0.32 0.93 0.74 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.21 0.00 1.27 0.00 0.95 0.56 1.08 0.43 1.19 0.09 0.86 0.32 1.23 0.01 1.25 0.00 1.00 0.99 
High income 1.49 0.01 1.50 0.02 1.07 0.73 1.30 0.18 1.17 0.50 1.21 0.40 1.65 0.03 2.29 0.01 0.60 0.23 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 0.97 0.67 0.95 0.50 1.01 0.92 1.01 0.95 1.04 0.80 0.97 0.87 0.93 0.36 0.92 0.36 0.96 0.78 
High income 0.97 0.70 0.92 0.31 1.10 0.38 1.16 0.20 1.15 0.28 1.07 0.70 0.82 0.04 0.82 0.17 0.95 0.72 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.73 0.00 1.14 0.21 0.36 0.00 0.77 0.07 1.00 0.99 0.61 0.01 0.65 0.00 1.22 0.17 0.10 0.00 
NWFP 0.88 0.22 1.66 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.67 0.03 1.18 0.49 0.26 0.00 0.95 0.68 1.83 0.00 0.18 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.20 0.00 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 1908.19; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
12077.474; Pseudo R2 = 0.0732. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 636.36 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number 
of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 11.26; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=7.38, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.0732. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 636.36 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 64.01; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 10.33, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.0732. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 636.36 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. 
of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574; F (62,513) = 8.90; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 8.4.4: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Medical treatment autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.19 0.09 1.14 0.31 1.10 0.38 1.66 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.24 0.23 0.98 0.86 0.98 0.88 0.98 0.92 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.74 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.81 0.07 0.74 0.02 0.60 0.00 0.84 0.34 0.72 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.78 0.10 
Above Average 0.55 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.83 0.07 0.61 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.96 0.78 
Household Size: 
No. of Children 
Boys = Girls  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
No Child 0.83 0.04 0.80 0.02 1.16 0.38 0.67 0.01 0.69 0.04 1.28 0.46 0.98 0.84 0.87 0.22 1.49 0.06 
Boys no girl 0.92 0.27 0.93 0.44 0.93 0.60 0.89 0.31 0.95 0.70 1.04 0.87 0.93 0.54 0.94 0.55 0.96 0.86 
Girls no boy 1.03 0.71 0.97 0.71 1.19 0.23 0.96 0.77 0.91 0.53 1.20 0.54 1.09 0.45 1.01 0.94 1.22 0.31 
Girls > Boys 1.12 0.11 1.06 0.48 1.14 0.31 1.29 0.03 1.19 0.18 1.22 0.36 1.03 0.71 1.01 0.94 1.06 0.75 
Boys > Girls 1.12 0.10 1.13 0.12 1.03 0.83 1.26 0.04 1.28 0.07 1.20 0.48 1.04 0.63 1.06 0.51 0.99 0.93 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.91 0.09 0.86 0.09 1.16 0.29 0.92 0.46 0.79 0.08 0.74 0.06 0.88 0.06 0.88 0.07 1.06 0.75 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.23 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.82 0.04 0.47 0.54 0.11 0.05 0.40 0.08 0.33 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.47 0.00 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 1.06 0.64 1.04 0.73 1.13 0.72 1.01 0.98 0.92 0.73 2.42 0.18 1.15 0.34 1.12 0.43 1.16 0.72 
25-29 years 1.36 0.02 1.23 0.12 1.48 0.25 1.34 0.16 1.12 0.63 4.05 0.03 1.44 0.02 1.29 0.10 1.54 0.29 
30-34 years 1.47 0.00 1.35 0.04 1.42 0.32 1.49 0.07 1.14 0.60 4.32 0.16 1.52 0.01 1.48 0.02 1.18 0.70 
35-39 years 1.95 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.69 0.15 1.96 0.00 1.50 0.08 4.91 0.02 2.02 0.00 1.91 0.00 1.43 0.42 
40-44 years 2.68 0.00 2.08 0.00 2.27 0.02 2.60 0.00 1.94 0.01 4.35 0.03 2.80 0.00 2.18 0.00 2.21 0.07 
45-49 years 2.73 0.00 2.44 0.00 1.89 0.07 2.10 0.00 1.66 0.08 4.86 0.02 3.37 0.00 3.04 0.00 1.99 0.11 
continue… 
227 
 
Appendix Table 8.4.4 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Medical treatment autonomy)
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.31 0.00 1.19 0.05 1.33 0.02 1.09 0.44 1.16 0.26 0.87 0.57 1.38 0.00 1.17 0.17 1.50 0.02 
8-years education 1.26 0.06 1.18 0.22 1.24 0.26 0.98 0.92 1.04 0.83 0.81 0.47 1.42 0.07 1.20 0.31 1.49 0.17 
10-12years education 1.43 0.00 1.18 0.16 1.64 0.00 1.08 0.57 0.87 0.38 1.90 0.01 1.79 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.35 0.18 
Higher education 1.35 0.03 1.03 0.85 1.93 0.00 1.08 0.66 0.89 0.51 1.84 0.05 1.42 0.18 1.22 0.46 1.64 0.25 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.05 0.46 1.08 0.32 1.06 1.00 1.16 0.22 1.16 0.30 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.83 1.02 0.81 0.95 0.71 
8-years education 0.98 0.79 0.84 0.15 1.33 0.04 0.95 0.71 0.84 0.30 1.32 0.39 0.97 0.75 0.83 0.17 1.42 0.06 
10-12years education 1.02 0.84 0.90 0.23 1.24 0.09 1.05 0.73 1.03 0.86 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.82 0.81 0.16 1.42 0.04 
Higher education 1.03 0.74 1.06 0.52 0.96 0.76 1.01 0.97 1.04 0.79 0.97 0.93 1.09 0.49 1.14 0.32 0.93 0.74 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.21 0.00 1.27 0.00 0.95 0.56 1.08 0.43 1.19 0.09 0.82 0.36 1.23 0.01 1.25 0.00 1.00 0.99 
High income 1.49 0.01 1.50 0.02 1.07 0.73 1.30 0.18 1.17 0.50 0.88 0.68 1.65 0.03 2.29 0.01 0.60 0.23 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 0.97 0.67 0.95 0.50 1.01 0.92 1.01 0.95 1.04 0.80 0.91 0.75 0.93 0.36 0.92 0.36 0.96 0.78 
High income 0.97 0.70 0.92 0.31 1.10 0.38 1.16 0.20 1.15 0.28 1.15 0.59 0.82 0.04 0.82 0.17 0.95 0.72 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.73 0.00 1.14 0.21 0.36 0.00 0.77 0.07 1.00 0.99 0.20 0.00 0.65 0.00 1.22 0.17 0.10 0.00 
NWFP 0.88 0.22 1.66 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.67 0.03 1.18 0.49 0.32 0.00 0.95 0.68 1.83 0.00 0.18 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.20 0.00 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 1908.19; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
12077.47; Pseudo R2 = 0.0732. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 636.36 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 11.26; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=7.38, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.0732. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 636.36 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 5318; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 64.01; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 10.33, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.0732. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 636.36 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574; F(62,513) = 8.90; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 8.4.5: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Medical treatment autonomy) 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Employed 1.19 0.09 1.14 0.31 1.10 0.38 1.66 0.00 1.63 0.00 1.24 0.23 0.98 0.86 0.98 0.88 0.98 0.92 
Household 
Size: Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Average 0.74 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.81 0.07 0.74 0.02 0.60 0.00 0.85 0.35 0.72 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.78 0.10 
Above Average 0.55 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.83 0.07 0.61 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.96 0.78 
Household 
Size: No. of 
Children 
Girls > Boys 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
No Child 0.74 0.00 0.75 0.01 1.01 0.93 0.52 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.78 0.34 0.95 0.67 0.86 0.22 1.40 0.13 
Boys no girl 0.82 0.02 0.88 0.18 0.81 0.12 0.69 0.00 0.79 0.16 0.78 0.17 0.91 0.38 0.93 0.50 0.91 0.62 
Girls no boy 0.92 0.36 0.91 0.36 1.04 0.76 0.75 0.03 0.76 0.10 0.99 0.94 1.06 0.63 1.00 1.00 1.15 0.48 
Boys = Girls 0.90 0.11 0.95 0.48 0.88 0.31 0.78 0.03 0.84 0.18 0.84 0.31 0.97 0.71 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.75 
Boys > girls 1.00 0.94 1.07 0.39 0.90 0.32 0.98 0.83 1.07 0.60 0.87 0.40 1.01 0.91 1.05 0.55 0.93 0.60 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Extended 0.91 0.09 0.86 0.09 1.16 0.29 0.92 0.46 0.79 0.08 0.74 0.06 0.88 0.06 0.88 0.07 1.06 0.75 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Present 0.23 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.82 0.04 0.47 0.54 0.11 0.05 0.40 0.08 0.33 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.47 0.00 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
20-24 years 1.06 0.64 1.04 0.73 1.13 0.72 1.01 0.98 0.92 0.73 1.33 0.56 1.15 0.34 1.12 0.43 1.16 0.72 
25-29 years 1.36 0.02 1.23 0.12 1.48 0.25 1.34 0.16 1.12 0.63 1.69 0.25 1.44 0.02 1.29 0.10 1.54 0.29 
30-34 years 1.47 0.00 1.35 0.04 1.42 0.32 1.49 0.07 1.14 0.60 2.03 0.13 1.52 0.01 1.48 0.02 1.18 0.70 
35-39 years 1.95 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.69 0.15 1.96 0.00 1.50 0.08 2.29 0.09 2.02 0.00 1.91 0.00 1.43 0.42 
40-44 years 2.68 0.00 2.08 0.00 2.27 0.02 2.60 0.00 1.94 0.01 2.50 0.05 2.80 0.00 2.18 0.00 2.21 0.07 
45-49 years 2.73 0.00 2.44 0.00 1.89 0.07 2.10 0.00 1.66 0.08 2.07 0.06 3.37 0.00 3.04 0.00 1.99 0.11 
continue… 
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Appendix Table 8.4.5 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Economic Decision-making (Medical treatment autonomy)
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.31 0.00 1.19 0.05 1.33 0.02 1.09 0.44 1.16 0.26 0.96 0.82 1.38 0.00 1.17 0.17 1.50 0.02 
8-years education 1.26 0.06 1.18 0.22 1.24 0.26 0.98 0.92 1.04 0.83 0.92 0.72 1.42 0.07 1.20 0.31 1.49 0.17 
10-12years education 1.43 0.00 1.18 0.16 1.64 0.00 1.08 0.57 0.87 0.38 1.45 0.07 1.79 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.35 0.18 
Higher education 1.35 0.03 1.03 0.85 1.93 0.00 1.08 0.66 0.89 0.51 1.47 0.09 1.42 0.18 1.22 0.46 1.64 0.25 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
5-years education 1.05 0.46 1.08 0.32 1.06 1.00 1.16 0.22 1.16 0.30 1.07 0.70 0.98 0.83 1.02 0.81 0.95 0.71 
8-years education 0.98 0.79 0.84 0.15 1.33 0.04 0.95 0.71 0.84 0.30 1.14 0.54 0.97 0.75 0.83 0.17 1.42 0.06 
10-12years education 1.02 0.84 0.90 0.23 1.24 0.09 1.05 0.73 1.03 0.86 1.02 0.90 0.98 0.82 0.81 0.16 1.42 0.04 
Higher education 1.03 0.74 1.06 0.52 0.96 0.76 1.01 0.97 1.04 0.79 0.93 0.72 1.09 0.49 1.14 0.32 0.93 0.74 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 1.21 0.00 1.27 0.00 0.95 0.56 1.08 0.43 1.19 0.09 0.86 0.32 1.23 0.01 1.25 0.00 1.00 0.99 
High income 1.49 0.01 1.50 0.02 1.07 0.73 1.30 0.18 1.17 0.50 1.21 0.40 1.65 0.03 2.29 0.01 0.60 0.23 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Middle income 0.97 0.67 0.95 0.50 1.01 0.92 1.01 0.95 1.04 0.80 0.97 0.87 0.93 0.36 0.92 0.36 0.96 0.78 
High income 0.97 0.70 0.92 0.31 1.10 0.38 1.16 0.20 1.15 0.28 1.07 0.70 0.82 0.04 0.82 0.17 0.95 0.72 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00   1.00 1.00   1.00 
Sindh 0.73 0.00 1.14 0.21 0.36 0.00 0.77 0.07 1.00 0.99 0.61 0.01 0.65 0.00 1.22 0.17 0.10 0.00 
NWFP 0.88 0.22 1.66 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.67 0.03 1.18 0.49 0.26 0.00 0.95 0.68 1.83 0.00 0.18 0.00 
Baluchistan 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.20 0.00 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; LR chi2 (31) = 1908.19; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
12077.474; Pseudo R2 = 0.0732. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 636.36 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number 
of PSUs = 1109; Number of obs   = 13522; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 11.26; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of Obs = 5318; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=7.38, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.0732. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 636.36 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 5318;; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 64.01; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 10.33, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.0732. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 636.36 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of Obs = 8204; Design df = 574; F(62,513) = 8.90; Prob > F = 0.00 
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APPENDIX-IV: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making 
 
Appendix Table 9.1.2: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment Status Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.24 0.06 1.38 0.02 0.80 0.33 1.09 0.62 1.14 0.49 0.94 0.88 1.29 0.08 1.47 0.02 0.72 0.22 
Household Size: 
Excluding Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.86 0.09 0.90 0.24 0.78 0.19 0.78 0.10 0.77 0.10 0.84 0.56 0.88 0.22 0.93 0.52 0.75 0.21 
Above Average 0.86 0.05 0.95 0.56 0.60 0.00 0.75 0.02 0.80 0.11 0.63 0.08 0.88 0.19 1.00 0.99 0.56 0.01 
Household Size: No. 
of children 
No child 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Boy no girl 1.47 0.00 1.51 0.00 1.16 0.57 1.62 0.01 1.62 0.01 1.44 0.43 1.43 0.01 1.47 0.00 1.03 0.91 
Girl no boy 1.48 0.00 1.46 0.00 1.28 0.33 1.48 0.05 1.39 0.11 1.58 0.34 1.50 0.00 1.51 0.00 1.14 0.64 
Boys/Girls (both) 1.52 0.00 1.63 0.00 0.98 0.94 1.69 0.00 1.91 0.00 1.02 0.97 1.47 0.00 1.54 0.00 0.98 0.94 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.19 0.04 1.17 0.10 1.18 0.37 1.05 0.70 0.99 0.97 1.34 0.36 1.26 0.04 1.25 0.06 1.09 0.71 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 1.01 0.99 0.96 0.90 1.28 0.71 4.54 0.33 1.71 0.65 3.91 0.24 0.75 0.38 0.79 0.51 0.74 0.61 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.26 0.08 1.26 0.08 0.96 0.87 0.89 0.68 0.91 0.73 0.67 0.41 1.38 0.03 1.40 0.03 1.05 0.86 
25-29 years 1.33 0.03 1.40 0.01 0.81 0.40 1.10 0.75 1.15 0.64 0.68 0.34 1.40 0.02 1.51 0.01 0.81 0.49 
30-34 years 1.14 0.34 1.25 0.13 0.61 0.07 1.14 0.66 1.33 0.35 0.48 0.13 1.11 0.52 1.23 0.22 0.62 0.14 
35-39 years 1.27 0.09 1.38 0.04 0.71 0.22 1.27 0.48 1.33 0.42 0.75 0.57 1.23 0.18 1.39 0.06 0.61 0.10 
40-44 years 1.21 0.23 1.24 0.19 0.84 0.53 1.02 0.95 1.00 0.99 0.82 0.70 1.28 0.18 1.37 0.11 0.76 0.40 
45-49 years 1.16 0.35 1.16 0.38 0.93 0.83 1.04 0.91 0.97 0.94 0.88 0.85 1.19 0.35 1.26 0.24 0.80 0.53 
continue… 
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Appendix Table 9.1.2 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.08 0.40 1.18 0.11 0.71 0.11 1.17 0.31 1.15 0.35 1.08 0.80 1.04 0.76 1.21 0.18 0.48 0.12 
8-years education 1.34 0.01 1.57 0.00 0.72 0.30 1.52 0.02 1.71 0.01 0.94 0.87 1.12 0.46 1.35 0.15 0.38 0.16 
10-12yrs education 1.31 0.01 1.59 0.00 0.63 0.18 1.32 0.08 1.58 0.01 0.61 0.19 1.36 0.06 1.58 0.05 0.76 0.51 
Higher education 1.68 0.00 2.23 0.00 1.04 0.93 1.68 0.01 2.00 0.00 0.98 0.97 1.94 0.00 3.25 0.01 1.31 0.75 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.25 0.01 1.23 0.02 1.12 0.50 1.07 0.69 1.14 0.43 0.85 0.57 1.25 0.02 1.21 0.06 1.22 0.32 
8-years education 1.12 0.22 1.17 0.12 0.82 0.30 0.91 0.61 0.92 0.64 0.92 0.77 1.18 0.11 1.28 0.05 0.74 0.21 
10-12yrs education 1.23 0.02 1.36 0.00 0.71 0.05 1.06 0.72 1.15 0.45 0.76 0.37 1.25 0.03 1.42 0.00 0.63 0.03 
Higher education 1.25 0.03 1.57 0.00 0.53 0.02 1.20 0.31 1.52 0.04 0.60 0.19 1.14 0.29 1.41 0.03 0.43 0.02 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.12 0.06 1.11 0.13 1.13 0.36 0.87 0.19 0.91 0.38 0.82 0.35 1.26 0.00 1.21 0.03 1.40 0.05 
High income 1.12 0.41 1.34 0.20 0.58 0.22 1.03 0.85 1.64 0.11 0.39 0.08 0.89 0.67 0.84 0.63 0.88 0.87 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.04 0.63 1.07 0.44 0.89 0.53 1.22 0.25 1.14 0.43 1.30 0.40 1.00 0.99 1.06 0.57 0.77 0.24 
High income 1.20 0.02 1.35 0.00 0.69 0.02 1.34 0.04 1.44 0.02 0.95 0.85 1.17 0.08 1.34 0.01 0.60 0.01 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.24 0.04 1.22 0.10 1.20 0.34 0.84 0.29 0.79 0.19 1.12 0.70 1.56 0.00 1.55 0.00 1.21 0.45 
NWFP 1.51 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.57 0.01 1.68 0.01 2.70 0.01 0.55 0.08 1.54 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.58 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.57 0.19 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.00 5.49 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.38 0.07 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (29) = 2534.61; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -
8777.20; Pseudo R2 = 0.1262. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 441.57 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; Design df = 1101; F (58, 1044) = 5.90; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Population size = 5389649.7; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(29, 
499)=4.92, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1262. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 441.57 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 
4; Number of PSUs = 531; Population size = 5389649.7; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F(58, 470) = 4.27; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. no. of obs = 8096;  Design df = 574, F(29, 546) =5.14, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1262. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 441.57 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. 
of obs = 8096; Design df = 574; F (58, 517) = 4.55; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 9.1.3: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.24 0.06 1.38 0.02 0.80 0.32 1.09 0.64 1.14 0.49 0.94 0.88 1.29 0.08 1.48 0.02 0.72 0.22 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.87 0.10 0.90 0.25 0.79 0.21 0.77 0.09 0.76 0.09 0.82 0.53 0.88 0.25 0.94 0.55 0.76 0.24 
Above Average 0.87 0.07 0.96 0.61 0.62 0.00 0.76 0.03 0.80 0.11 0.64 0.08 0.89 0.23 1.00 0.97 0.57 0.01 
Household Size: 
No. of children 
No Child 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Boys no Girl 1.48 0.00 1.51 0.00 1.17 0.53 1.64 0.01 1.63 0.01 1.46 0.41 1.44 0.01 1.47 0.00 1.05 0.87 
Girls no boy 1.49 0.00 1.46 0.00 1.29 0.30 1.49 0.04 1.40 0.10 1.60 0.32 1.51 0.00 1.52 0.00 1.16 0.61 
Boys = Girls 1.43 0.00 1.57 0.00 0.83 0.50 1.61 0.01 1.84 0.00 0.88 0.82 1.38 0.01 1.48 0.01 0.82 0.51 
Girls > Boys 1.65 0.00 1.67 0.00 1.26 0.39 2.02 0.00 2.11 0.00 1.39 0.52 1.55 0.00 1.56 0.00 1.21 0.51 
Boys > Girls 1.55 0.00 1.68 0.00 0.96 0.87 1.59 0.01 1.85 0.00 0.91 0.85 1.54 0.00 1.62 0.00 1.02 0.95 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.16 0.08 1.15 0.14 1.11 0.58 1.03 0.84 0.98 0.92 1.28 0.43 1.22 0.07 1.23 0.08 1.01 0.95 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 1.01 0.99 0.96 0.91 1.27 0.71 4.26 0.34 1.66 0.67 3.42 0.29 0.76 0.39 0.79 0.51 0.75 0.63 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.26 0.08 1.26 0.08 0.96 0.87 0.89 0.68 0.91 0.73 0.68 0.41 1.38 0.03 1.40 0.03 1.05 0.87 
25-29 years 1.33 0.03 1.40 0.02 0.81 0.38 1.09 0.77 1.14 0.65 0.67 0.33 1.39 0.03 1.51 0.01 0.81 0.48 
30-34 years 1.13 0.38 1.24 0.14 0.60 0.06 1.13 0.68 1.32 0.36 0.47 0.12 1.10 0.56 1.22 0.23 0.61 0.12 
35-39 years 1.26 0.11 1.36 0.05 0.70 0.19 1.27 0.49 1.32 0.43 0.74 0.55 1.22 0.22 1.38 0.07 0.59 0.10 
40-44 years 1.18 0.29 1.23 0.22 0.80 0.43 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.78 0.64 1.25 0.22 1.36 0.12 0.72 0.33 
45-49 years 1.14 0.43 1.14 0.42 0.89 0.72 1.02 0.97 0.96 0.91 0.84 0.79 1.16 0.43 1.24 0.28 0.76 0.44 
continue… 
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Appendix Table 9.1.3 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making  
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.09 0.37 1.19 0.11 0.72 0.11 1.18 0.28 1.16 0.34 1.08 0.78 1.04 0.73 1.21 0.17 0.48 0.12 
8-years education 1.34 0.01 1.57 0.00 0.72 0.31 1.53 0.02 1.72 0.01 0.94 0.88 1.12 0.47 1.34 0.15 0.38 0.16 
10-12years education 1.31 0.01 1.60 0.00 0.63 0.18 1.32 0.08 1.58 0.01 0.60 0.18 1.36 0.06 1.59 0.04 0.77 0.54 
Higher education 1.68 0.00 2.24 0.00 1.04 0.93 1.68 0.01 2.00 0.00 0.98 0.97 1.94 0.00 3.26 0.01 1.31 0.76 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.25 0.01 1.23 0.01 1.12 0.50 1.07 0.68 1.14 0.43 0.84 0.56 1.25 0.02 1.21 0.05 1.22 0.32 
8-years education 1.12 0.23 1.17 0.12 0.82 0.30 0.91 0.60 0.92 0.63 0.91 0.76 1.18 0.11 1.28 0.05 0.74 0.21 
10-12years education 1.23 0.02 1.36 0.00 0.71 0.05 1.06 0.72 1.15 0.45 0.77 0.37 1.25 0.03 1.42 0.00 0.63 0.03 
Higher education 1.25 0.03 1.57 0.00 0.53 0.02 1.20 0.30 1.52 0.04 0.60 0.18 1.14 0.28 1.41 0.03 0.43 0.02 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.12 0.07 1.11 0.13 1.12 0.41 0.87 0.17 0.90 0.36 0.80 0.32 1.25 0.00 1.21 0.03 1.38 0.06 
High income 1.11 0.44 1.33 0.21 0.57 0.20 1.03 0.87 1.63 0.11 0.38 0.08 0.88 0.65 0.84 0.63 0.84 0.83 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.05 0.60 1.07 0.43 0.90 0.57 1.22 0.24 1.14 0.42 1.32 0.36 1.01 0.95 1.06 0.55 0.78 0.26 
High income 1.21 0.02 1.36 0.00 0.70 0.03 1.35 0.04 1.45 0.02 0.97 0.91 1.18 0.07 1.35 0.01 0.61 0.01 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.24 0.04 1.22 0.10 1.20 0.34 0.84 0.27 0.78 0.19 1.11 0.73 1.56 0.00 1.55 0.00 1.21 0.44 
NWFP 1.51 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.57 0.01 1.66 0.01 2.69 0.01 0.53 0.07 1.54 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.58 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.60 0.18 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.00 5.46 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.38 0.07 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (31) = 2537.31; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -
8775.84; Pseudo R2 = 0.1263. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 447.53 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 5.68; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Population size = 5389649.7; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(31, 497) = 
4.63, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 = 0.1263. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 447.53 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; 
Number of PSUs = 531; Population size = 5389649.7; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 4.41; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 5.07, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1263. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 447.53 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574; F (62, 513) = 4.60; Prob > F = 0.00. 
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Appendix Table 9.1.4: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.24 0.06 1.38 0.02 0.80 0.32 1.09 0.64 1.14 0.49 0.94 0.88 1.29 0.08 1.48 0.02 0.72 0.22 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.87 0.10 0.90 0.25 0.79 0.21 0.77 0.09 0.76 0.09 0.82 0.53 0.88 0.25 0.94 0.55 0.76 0.24 
Above Average 0.87 0.07 0.96 0.61 0.62 0.00 0.76 0.03 0.80 0.11 0.64 0.08 0.89 0.23 1.00 0.97 0.57 0.01 
Household Size: 
No. of Children 
Boys/Girls (both) 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
No Child 0.70 0.00 0.64 0.00 1.20 0.50 0.62 0.01 0.54 0.00 1.13 0.82 0.73 0.01 0.68 0.01 1.22 0.51 
Boys no girl 1.04 0.67 0.96 0.71 1.41 0.09 1.02 0.90 0.89 0.47 1.66 0.20 1.04 0.70 1.00 0.97 1.28 0.29 
Girls no boy 1.04 0.68 0.93 0.48 1.55 0.05 0.93 0.65 0.76 0.12 1.81 0.15 1.10 0.42 1.03 0.83 1.41 0.19 
Girls > Boys 1.16 0.09 1.07 0.51 1.51 0.02 1.26 0.13 1.14 0.43 1.57 0.17 1.13 0.24 1.05 0.67 1.47 0.07 
Boys > Girls 1.08 0.31 1.07 0.45 1.15 0.45 0.99 0.95 1.00 0.98 1.03 0.93 1.12 0.26 1.09 0.44 1.24 0.34 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.16 0.08 1.15 0.14 1.11 0.58 1.03 0.84 0.98 0.92 1.28 0.43 1.22 0.07 1.23 0.08 1.01 0.95 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 1.01 0.99 0.96 0.91 1.27 0.71 4.26 0.34 1.66 0.67 3.42 0.29 0.76 0.39 0.79 0.51 0.75 0.63 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.26 0.08 1.26 0.08 0.96 0.87 0.89 0.68 0.91 0.73 0.68 0.41 1.38 0.03 1.40 0.03 1.05 0.87 
25-29 years 1.33 0.03 1.40 0.02 0.81 0.38 1.09 0.77 1.14 0.65 0.67 0.33 1.39 0.03 1.51 0.01 0.81 0.48 
30-34 years 1.13 0.38 1.24 0.14 0.60 0.06 1.13 0.68 1.32 0.36 0.47 0.12 1.10 0.56 1.22 0.23 0.61 0.12 
35-39 years 1.26 0.11 1.36 0.05 0.70 0.19 1.27 0.49 1.32 0.43 0.74 0.55 1.22 0.22 1.38 0.07 0.59 0.10 
40-44 years 1.18 0.29 1.23 0.22 0.80 0.43 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.78 0.64 1.25 0.22 1.36 0.12 0.72 0.33 
45-49 years 1.14 0.43 1.14 0.42 0.89 0.72 1.02 0.97 0.96 0.91 0.84 0.79 1.16 0.43 1.24 0.28 0.76 0.44 
continue… 
235 
 
Appendix Table 9.1.4 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.09 0.37 1.19 0.11 0.72 0.11 1.18 0.28 1.16 0.34 1.08 0.78 1.04 0.73 1.21 0.17 0.48 0.12 
8-years education 1.34 0.01 1.57 0.00 0.72 0.31 1.53 0.02 1.72 0.01 0.94 0.88 1.12 0.47 1.34 0.15 0.38 0.16 
10-12years education 1.31 0.01 1.60 0.00 0.63 0.18 1.32 0.08 1.58 0.01 0.60 0.18 1.36 0.06 1.59 0.04 0.77 0.54 
Higher education 1.68 0.00 2.24 0.00 1.04 0.93 1.68 0.01 2.00 0.00 0.98 0.97 1.94 0.00 3.26 0.01 1.31 0.76 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.25 0.01 1.23 0.01 1.12 0.50 1.07 0.68 1.14 0.43 0.84 0.56 1.25 0.02 1.21 0.05 1.22 0.32 
8-years education 1.12 0.23 1.17 0.12 0.82 0.30 0.91 0.60 0.92 0.63 0.91 0.76 1.18 0.11 1.28 0.05 0.74 0.21 
10-12years education 1.23 0.02 1.36 0.00 0.71 0.05 1.06 0.72 1.15 0.45 0.77 0.37 1.25 0.03 1.42 0.00 0.63 0.03 
Higher education 1.25 0.03 1.57 0.00 0.53 0.02 1.20 0.30 1.52 0.04 0.60 0.18 1.14 0.28 1.41 0.03 0.43 0.02 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.12 0.07 1.11 0.13 1.12 0.41 0.87 0.17 0.90 0.36 0.80 0.32 1.25 0.00 1.21 0.03 1.38 0.06 
High income 1.11 0.44 1.33 0.21 0.57 0.20 1.03 0.87 1.63 0.11 0.38 0.08 0.88 0.65 0.84 0.63 0.84 0.83 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.05 0.60 1.07 0.43 0.90 0.57 1.22 0.24 1.14 0.42 1.32 0.36 1.01 0.95 1.06 0.55 0.78 0.26 
High income 1.21 0.02 1.36 0.00 0.70 0.03 1.35 0.04 1.45 0.02 0.97 0.91 1.18 0.07 1.35 0.01 0.61 0.01 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.24 0.04 1.22 0.10 1.20 0.34 0.84 0.27 0.78 0.19 1.11 0.73 1.56 0.00 1.55 0.00 1.21 0.44 
NWFP 1.51 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.57 0.01 1.66 0.01 2.69 0.01 0.53 0.07 1.54 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.58 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.60 0.18 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.00 5.46 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.38 0.07 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (31) = 2537.31; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -
8775.85; Pseudo R2 = 0.1263. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 447.53 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 5.68; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=4.63, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.1263. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 447.53 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 4.41; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 5.07, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1263. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 447.53 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. 
of obs = 8096; Design df = 574; F (62, 513) = 4.60; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Appendix Table 9.1.5: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.24 0.06 1.38 0.02 0.80 0.32 1.09 0.64 1.14 0.49 0.94 0.88 1.29 0.08 1.48 0.02 0.72 0.22 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.87 0.10 0.90 0.25 0.79 0.21 0.77 0.09 0.76 0.09 0.82 0.53 0.88 0.25 0.94 0.55 0.76 0.24 
Above Average 0.87 0.07 0.96 0.61 0.62 0.00 0.76 0.03 0.80 0.11 0.64 0.08 0.89 0.23 1.00 0.97 0.57 0.01 
Household Size: 
No. of Children 
Girls > Boys 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
No Child 0.60 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.80 0.39 0.50 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.72 0.52 0.64 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.83 0.51 
Boys no girl 0.90 0.28 0.90 0.35 0.93 0.73 0.81 0.24 0.78 0.22 1.05 0.87 0.92 0.52 0.95 0.67 0.87 0.56 
Girls no boy 0.90 0.31 0.87 0.24 1.03 0.89 0.74 0.09 0.66 0.05 1.15 0.71 0.97 0.82 0.98 0.86 0.96 0.86 
Boys = Girls 0.86 0.09 0.94 0.51 0.66 0.02 0.80 0.13 0.87 0.43 0.64 0.17 0.89 0.24 0.95 0.67 0.68 0.07 
Boys > girls 0.94 0.39 1.01 0.93 0.76 0.07 0.79 0.07 0.88 0.39 0.65 0.11 0.99 0.93 1.04 0.70 0.84 0.35 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.16 0.08 1.15 0.14 1.11 0.58 1.03 0.84 0.98 0.92 1.28 0.43 1.22 0.07 1.23 0.08 1.01 0.95 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 1.01 0.99 0.96 0.91 1.27 0.71 4.26 0.34 1.66 0.67 3.42 0.29 0.76 0.39 0.79 0.51 0.75 0.63 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.26 0.08 1.26 0.08 0.96 0.87 0.89 0.68 0.91 0.73 0.68 0.41 1.38 0.03 1.40 0.03 1.05 0.87 
25-29 years 1.33 0.03 1.40 0.02 0.81 0.38 1.09 0.77 1.14 0.65 0.67 0.33 1.39 0.03 1.51 0.01 0.81 0.48 
30-34 years 1.13 0.38 1.24 0.14 0.60 0.06 1.13 0.68 1.32 0.36 0.47 0.12 1.10 0.56 1.22 0.23 0.61 0.12 
35-39 years 1.26 0.11 1.36 0.05 0.70 0.19 1.27 0.49 1.32 0.43 0.74 0.55 1.22 0.22 1.38 0.07 0.59 0.10 
40-44 years 1.18 0.29 1.23 0.22 0.80 0.43 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.78 0.64 1.25 0.22 1.36 0.12 0.72 0.33 
45-49 years 1.14 0.43 1.14 0.42 0.89 0.72 1.02 0.97 0.96 0.91 0.84 0.79 1.16 0.43 1.24 0.28 0.76 0.44 
continue… 
237 
 
Appendix Table 9.1.5(…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.09 0.37 1.19 0.11 0.72 0.11 1.18 0.28 1.16 0.34 1.08 0.78 1.04 0.73 1.21 0.17 0.48 0.12 
8-years education 1.34 0.01 1.57 0.00 0.72 0.31 1.53 0.02 1.72 0.01 0.94 0.88 1.12 0.47 1.34 0.15 0.38 0.16 
10-12years education 1.31 0.01 1.60 0.00 0.63 0.18 1.32 0.08 1.58 0.01 0.60 0.18 1.36 0.06 1.59 0.04 0.77 0.54 
Higher education 1.68 0.00 2.24 0.00 1.04 0.93 1.68 0.01 2.00 0.00 0.98 0.97 1.94 0.00 3.26 0.01 1.31 0.76 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.25 0.01 1.23 0.01 1.12 0.50 1.07 0.68 1.14 0.43 0.84 0.56 1.25 0.02 1.21 0.05 1.22 0.32 
8-years education 1.12 0.23 1.17 0.12 0.82 0.30 0.91 0.60 0.92 0.63 0.91 0.76 1.18 0.11 1.28 0.05 0.74 0.21 
10-12years education 1.23 0.02 1.36 0.00 0.71 0.05 1.06 0.72 1.15 0.45 0.77 0.37 1.25 0.03 1.42 0.00 0.63 0.03 
Higher education 1.25 0.03 1.57 0.00 0.53 0.02 1.20 0.30 1.52 0.04 0.60 0.18 1.14 0.28 1.41 0.03 0.43 0.02 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.12 0.07 1.11 0.13 1.12 0.41 0.87 0.17 0.90 0.36 0.80 0.32 1.25 0.00 1.21 0.03 1.38 0.06 
High income 1.11 0.44 1.33 0.21 0.57 0.20 1.03 0.87 1.63 0.11 0.38 0.08 0.88 0.65 0.84 0.63 0.84 0.83 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.05 0.60 1.07 0.43 0.90 0.57 1.22 0.24 1.14 0.42 1.32 0.36 1.01 0.95 1.06 0.55 0.78 0.26 
High income 1.21 0.02 1.36 0.00 0.70 0.03 1.35 0.04 1.45 0.02 0.97 0.91 1.18 0.07 1.35 0.01 0.61 0.01 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.24 0.04 1.22 0.10 1.20 0.34 0.84 0.27 0.78 0.19 1.11 0.73 1.56 0.00 1.55 0.00 1.21 0.44 
NWFP 1.51 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.57 0.01 1.66 0.01 2.69 0.01 0.53 0.07 1.54 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.58 0.02 
Baluchistan 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.60 0.18 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.00 5.46 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.38 0.07 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop No. obs. = 13348;LR chi2 (31) = 2537.31; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
8775.84; Pseudo R2 = 0.1263. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 447.53 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; sub-pop No. obs. = 13348; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1042) = 5.68; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=4.63, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.1263. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 447.53 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; 
Population size = 5389649.7; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 4.41; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 5.07, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1263. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 447.53 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. 
of obs = 8096; Design df = 574; F (31, 544) = 5.07; Prob > F = 0.00 
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APPENDIX-V: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning Decision-making: Disaggregated Analysis  
Table 10.1.2: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (more children) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment Status Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.24 0.04 1.36 0.02 0.75 0.24 1.21 0.23 1.27 0.16 0.93 0.86 1.25 0.10 1.40 0.04 0.66 0.14 
Household Size: 
Excluding Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.88 0.13 0.92 0.32 0.78 0.18 0.84 0.21 0.85 0.27 0.84 0.57 0.90 0.28 0.95 0.63 0.73 0.18 
Above Average 0.81 0.00 0.88 0.09 0.61 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.75 0.02 0.66 0.10 0.84 0.06 0.93 0.46 0.55 0.00 
Household Size: No. 
of children 
No child 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Boy no girl 1.46 0.00 1.49 0.00 1.10 0.72 1.50 0.02 1.51 0.02 1.35 0.52 1.44 0.00 1.49 0.00 0.97 0.92 
Girl no boy 1.41 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.24 0.38 1.46 0.04 1.42 0.08 1.48 0.41 1.39 0.01 1.38 0.01 1.15 0.63 
Boys/Girls (both) 1.45 0.00 1.55 0.00 0.91 0.70 1.51 0.01 1.63 0.01 1.03 0.96 1.43 0.00 1.52 0.00 0.86 0.57 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.25 0.01 1.22 0.03 1.23 0.27 1.27 0.08 1.21 0.23 1.59 0.19 1.23 0.05 1.22 0.09 1.07 0.75 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.86 0.70 0.81 0.55 1.41 0.61 2.29 0.61 0.89 0.89 4.90 0.19 0.74 0.40 0.77 0.49 0.79 0.69 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.14 0.32 1.17 0.25 0.86 0.56 0.84 0.51 0.91 0.73 0.56 0.24 1.22 0.18 1.24 0.17 0.97 0.93 
25-29 years 1.19 0.19 1.26 0.09 0.73 0.22 1.01 0.96 1.08 0.78 0.65 0.37 1.22 0.20 1.32 0.08 0.70 0.23 
30-34 years 1.07 0.63 1.19 0.23 0.52 0.03 1.06 0.83 1.30 0.34 0.34 0.06 1.02 0.93 1.12 0.49 0.58 0.09 
35-39 years 1.05 0.70 1.10 0.53 0.73 0.27 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.74 0.59 1.02 0.89 1.11 0.54 0.63 0.15 
40-44 years 1.13 0.39 1.17 0.32 0.82 0.48 0.96 0.88 0.95 0.87 0.83 0.75 1.17 0.37 1.25 0.23 0.72 0.30 
45-49 years 1.18 0.30 1.21 0.23 0.84 0.61 1.08 0.80 1.14 0.65 0.66 0.56 1.15 0.45 1.20 0.35 0.83 0.58 
continue… 
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Table 10.1.2 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (more children) Decision-making
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.03 0.71 1.09 0.33 0.73 0.14 1.09 0.52 1.07 0.62 1.08 0.79 0.99 0.93 1.10 0.43 0.50 0.02 
8-years education 1.42 0.00 1.60 0.00 0.79 0.46 1.85 0.00 2.05 0.00 1.04 0.92 1.01 0.97 1.12 0.50 0.42 0.09 
10-12yrs education 1.39 0.00 1.66 0.00 0.56 0.10 1.46 0.01 1.71 0.00 0.60 0.29 1.27 0.12 1.46 0.06 0.54 0.21 
Higher education 1.78 0.00 2.19 0.00 0.96 0.92 1.76 0.00 2.02 0.00 0.90 0.84 1.82 0.01 2.37 0.01 1.40 0.70 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.26 0.01 1.22 0.01 1.21 0.25 1.11 0.48 1.09 0.55 1.11 0.73 1.27 0.01 1.23 0.03 1.23 0.32 
8-years education 1.23 0.02 1.29 0.01 0.83 0.35 0.97 0.83 0.96 0.79 0.98 0.95 1.34 0.00 1.45 0.00 0.75 0.25 
10-12years education 1.34 0.00 1.49 0.00 0.68 0.04 1.16 0.32 1.23 0.21 0.81 0.52 1.39 0.00 1.59 0.00 0.57 0.01 
Higher education 1.27 0.01 1.45 0.00 0.62 0.08 1.18 0.30 1.31 0.13 0.81 0.59 1.20 0.14 1.39 0.02 0.46 0.03 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.08 0.18 1.08 0.23 1.08 0.58 0.85 0.09 0.90 0.32 0.73 0.14 1.20 0.01 1.15 0.08 1.42 0.05 
High income 0.90 0.40 0.97 0.89 0.32 0.05 0.81 0.25 0.96 0.89 0.30 0.05 0.74 0.19 0.76 0.34 0.76 0.00 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.09 0.24 1.12 0.15 0.90 0.51 1.36 0.05 1.33 0.06 1.11 0.75 1.02 0.83 1.06 0.51 0.81 0.30 
High income 1.28 0.00 1.43 0.00 0.68 0.02 1.54 0.00 1.69 0.00 0.83 0.58 1.19 0.05 1.32 0.01 0.61 0.01 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.08 0.44 1.04 0.73 1.24 0.25 0.90 0.50 0.87 0.42 1.05 0.86 1.16 0.24 1.10 0.49 1.36 0.19 
NWFP 1.76 0.00 2.23 0.00 0.55 0.00 2.16 0.00 3.64 0.00 0.50 0.05 1.72 0.00 2.13 0.00 0.59 0.03 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 3.21 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.00 8.67 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.16 0.79 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (29) = 2566.49; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
9387.20; Pseudo R2 = 0.1203. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 638.51 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; sub-pop No. obs. = 13348; Design df = 1101; F (58, 1044) = 7.21; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(29, 499)=5.22, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.1203. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 638.51 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F(58, 470) = 5.06; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(29, 546) =6.19, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1203. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 638.51 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574; F (58, 517) = 277.88; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 10.1.3: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (more children) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.24 0.04 1.36 0.01 0.75 0.23 1.20 0.25 1.26 0.16 0.92 0.84 1.26 0.10 1.41 0.04 0.66 0.14 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.89 0.15 0.93 0.36 0.79 0.19 0.83 0.19 0.84 0.25 0.82 0.52 0.91 0.32 0.96 0.68 0.75 0.21 
Above Average 0.82 0.01 0.89 0.10 0.62 0.01 0.73 0.00 0.76 0.02 0.65 0.10 0.85 0.08 0.94 0.52 0.56 0.01 
Household Size: 
No. of children 
No Child 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Boys no Girl 1.47 0.00 1.50 0.00 1.11 0.68 1.52 0.01 1.53 0.02 1.36 0.52 1.46 0.00 1.50 0.00 0.99 0.96 
Girls no boy 1.42 0.00 1.40 0.00 1.26 0.36 1.47 0.04 1.43 0.07 1.49 0.41 1.40 0.00 1.38 0.01 1.17 0.60 
Boys = Girls 1.35 0.00 1.45 0.00 0.79 0.40 1.43 0.05 1.53 0.03 0.99 0.99 1.32 0.02 1.42 0.01 0.70 0.25 
Girls > Boys 1.61 0.00 1.62 0.00 1.21 0.48 1.91 0.00 1.96 0.00 1.36 0.57 1.51 0.00 1.51 0.00 1.15 0.65 
Boys > Girls 1.50 0.00 1.65 0.00 0.81 0.44 1.37 0.06 1.55 0.02 0.79 0.66 1.56 0.00 1.69 0.00 0.84 0.55 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.21 0.03 1.19 0.07 1.17 0.40 1.24 0.11 1.18 0.29 1.58 0.19 1.19 0.12 1.19 0.05 1.00 1.00 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.86 0.69 0.81 0.54 1.40 0.61 2.11 0.63 0.83 0.83 4.33 0.23 0.74 0.40 0.77 0.48 0.81 0.72 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.14 0.32 1.17 0.25 0.86 0.56 0.84 0.51 0.91 0.72 0.56 0.25 1.22 0.18 1.24 0.16 0.97 0.92 
25-29 years 1.18 0.20 1.26 0.10 0.73 0.21 1.00 0.99 1.06 0.82 0.65 0.37 1.21 0.21 1.32 0.09 0.70 0.23 
30-34 years 1.05 0.70 1.18 0.25 0.51 0.02 1.05 0.86 1.28 0.37 0.34 0.06 1.00 0.99 1.11 0.52 0.57 0.08 
35-39 years 1.04 0.79 1.08 0.59 0.72 0.25 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.75 0.60 1.00 0.99 1.09 0.61 0.62 0.13 
40-44 years 1.11 0.50 1.14 0.39 0.79 0.41 0.93 0.81 0.93 0.81 0.82 0.73 1.13 0.47 1.22 0.28 0.68 0.24 
45-49 years 1.14 0.40 1.18 0.30 0.81 0.53 1.05 0.86 1.11 0.73 0.64 0.53 1.11 0.58 1.17 0.43 0.78 0.48 
continue… 
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Table 10.1.3 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (more children) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.04 0.66 1.10 0.31 0.73 0.14 1.10 0.48 1.08 0.58 1.09 0.78 1.00 0.98 1.11 0.41 0.51 0.02 
8-years education 1.42 0.00 1.60 0.00 0.79 0.47 1.86 0.00 2.07 0.00 1.03 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.12 0.51 0.41 0.09 
10-12years education 1.40 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.56 0.10 1.46 0.01 1.71 0.00 0.59 0.27 1.28 0.10 1.47 0.05 0.55 0.22 
Higher education 1.79 0.00 2.20 0.00 0.96 0.92 1.77 0.00 2.02 0.00 0.89 0.83 1.83 0.01 2.38 0.01 1.38 0.71 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.26 0.01 1.22 0.01 1.21 0.26 1.11 0.47 1.09 0.54 1.10 0.75 1.28 0.01 1.23 0.03 1.23 0.32 
8-years education 1.23 0.02 1.29 0.01 0.83 0.34 0.96 0.81 0.95 0.77 0.97 0.93 1.34 0.01 1.45 0.00 0.75 0.24 
10-12years education 1.34 0.00 1.49 0.00 0.68 0.04 1.16 0.32 1.23 0.21 0.81 0.50 1.39 0.00 1.59 0.00 0.57 0.01 
Higher education 1.27 0.01 1.45 0.00 0.62 0.08 1.18 0.30 1.31 0.13 0.80 0.57 1.20 0.14 1.39 0.02 0.46 0.03 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.07 0.21 1.08 0.25 1.07 0.64 0.85 0.08 0.90 0.29 0.73 0.13 1.19 0.01 1.15 0.08 1.40 0.06 
High income 0.89 0.36 0.97 0.86 0.31 0.04 0.80 0.24 0.96 0.87 0.30 0.05 0.74 0.19 0.77 0.35 0.74 0.00 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.10 0.21 1.12 0.13 0.91 0.55 1.37 0.04 1.34 0.06 1.13 0.70 1.03 0.77 1.06 0.48 0.82 0.33 
High income 1.29 0.00 1.43 0.00 0.69 0.03 1.56 0.00 1.71 0.00 0.85 0.62 1.19 0.05 1.33 0.01 0.62 0.02 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.08 0.43 1.04 0.72 1.24 0.25 0.89 0.45 0.87 0.41 1.04 0.90 1.16 0.24 1.09 0.50 1.36 0.19 
NWFP 1.76 0.00 2.23 0.00 0.55 0.00 2.13 0.00 3.61 0.00 0.49 0.04 1.72 0.00 2.13 0.00 0.59 0.03 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 3.27 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.00 8.60 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.19 0.76 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (31) = 2572.32; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
9385.03; Pseudo R2 = 0.1205. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 645.30 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2 Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 6.81; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(31, 497) = 5.00, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.1205. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 645.30 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 5.11; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 6.04, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1205. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 645.30 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574; F (62, 513) = 264.51; Prob > F = 0.00. 
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Table 10.1.4: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (more children) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.24 0.04 1.36 0.01 0.75 0.23 1.20 0.25 1.26 0.16 0.92 0.84 1.26 0.10 1.41 0.04 0.66 0.14 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.89 0.15 0.93 0.36 0.79 0.19 0.83 0.19 0.84 0.25 0.82 0.52 0.91 0.32 0.96 0.68 0.75 0.21 
Above Average 0.82 0.01 0.89 0.10 0.62 0.01 0.73 0.00 0.76 0.02 0.65 0.10 0.85 0.08 0.94 0.52 0.56 0.01 
Household Size: 
No. of Children 
Boys = Girls 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
No Child 0.74 0.00 0.69 0.00 1.27 0.40 0.70 0.05 0.66 0.03 1.01 0.99 0.76 0.02 0.70 0.01 1.43 0.25 
Boys no girl 1.09 0.30 1.03 0.74 1.41 0.11 1.06 0.68 1.00 0.99 1.37 0.39 1.11 0.34 1.05 0.66 1.41 0.18 
Girls no boy 1.06 0.56 0.96 0.66 1.60 0.04 1.03 0.87 0.94 0.70 1.50 0.32 1.07 0.58 0.97 0.80 1.67 0.06 
Girls > Boys 1.20 0.02 1.12 0.20 1.54 0.02 1.34 0.04 1.29 0.10 1.37 0.32 1.15 0.14 1.06 0.55 1.64 0.03 
Boys > Girls 1.11 0.17 1.13 0.15 1.03 0.89 0.96 0.74 1.01 0.93 0.80 0.46 1.19 0.07 1.19 0.10 1.20 0.45 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.21 0.03 1.19 0.07 1.17 0.40 1.24 0.11 1.18 0.29 1.58 0.19 1.19 0.12 1.19 0.05 1.00 1.00 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.86 0.69 0.81 0.54 1.40 0.61 2.11 0.63 0.83 0.83 4.33 0.23 0.74 0.40 0.77 0.48 0.81 0.72 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.14 0.32 1.17 0.25 0.86 0.56 0.84 0.51 0.91 0.72 0.56 0.25 1.22 0.18 1.24 0.16 0.97 0.92 
25-29 years 1.18 0.20 1.26 0.10 0.73 0.21 1.00 0.99 1.06 0.82 0.65 0.37 1.21 0.21 1.32 0.09 0.70 0.23 
30-34 years 1.05 0.70 1.18 0.25 0.51 0.02 1.05 0.86 1.28 0.37 0.34 0.06 1.00 0.99 1.11 0.52 0.57 0.08 
35-39 years 1.04 0.79 1.08 0.59 0.72 0.25 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.75 0.60 1.00 0.99 1.09 0.61 0.62 0.13 
40-44 years 1.11 0.50 1.14 0.39 0.79 0.41 0.93 0.81 0.93 0.81 0.82 0.73 1.13 0.47 1.22 0.28 0.68 0.24 
45-49 years 1.14 0.40 1.18 0.30 0.81 0.53 1.05 0.86 1.11 0.73 0.64 0.53 1.11 0.58 1.17 0.43 0.78 0.48 
continue… 
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Table 10.1.4 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (more children) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy 
Partial to no 
autonomy 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy 
Partial to no 
autonomy 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.04 0.66 1.10 0.31 0.73 0.14 1.10 0.48 1.08 0.58 1.09 0.78 1.00 0.98 1.11 0.41 0.51 0.02 
8-years education 1.42 0.00 1.60 0.00 0.79 0.47 1.86 0.00 2.07 0.00 1.03 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.12 0.51 0.41 0.09 
10-12years education 1.40 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.56 0.10 1.46 0.01 1.71 0.00 0.59 0.27 1.28 0.10 1.47 0.05 0.55 0.22 
Higher education 1.79 0.00 2.20 0.00 0.96 0.92 1.77 0.00 2.02 0.00 0.89 0.83 1.83 0.01 2.38 0.01 1.38 0.71 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.26 0.01 1.22 0.01 1.21 0.26 1.11 0.47 1.09 0.54 1.10 0.75 1.28 0.01 1.23 0.03 1.23 0.32 
8-years education 1.23 0.02 1.29 0.01 0.83 0.34 0.96 0.81 0.95 0.77 0.97 0.93 1.34 0.01 1.45 0.00 0.75 0.24 
10-12years education 1.34 0.00 1.49 0.00 0.68 0.04 1.16 0.32 1.23 0.21 0.81 0.50 1.39 0.00 1.59 0.00 0.57 0.01 
Higher education 1.27 0.01 1.45 0.00 0.62 0.08 1.18 0.30 1.31 0.13 0.80 0.57 1.20 0.14 1.39 0.02 0.46 0.03 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.07 0.21 1.08 0.25 1.07 0.64 0.85 0.08 0.90 0.29 0.73 0.13 1.19 0.01 1.15 0.08 1.40 0.06 
High income 0.89 0.36 0.97 0.86 0.31 0.04 0.80 0.24 0.96 0.87 0.30 0.05 0.74 0.19 0.77 0.35 0.74 0.00 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.10 0.21 1.12 0.13 0.91 0.55 1.37 0.04 1.34 0.06 1.13 0.70 1.03 0.77 1.06 0.48 0.82 0.33 
High income 1.29 0.00 1.43 0.00 0.69 0.03 1.56 0.00 1.71 0.00 0.85 0.62 1.19 0.05 1.33 0.01 0.62 0.02 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.08 0.43 1.04 0.72 1.24 0.25 0.89 0.45 0.87 0.41 1.04 0.90 1.16 0.24 1.09 0.50 1.36 0.19 
NWFP 1.76 0.00 2.23 0.00 0.55 0.00 2.13 0.00 3.61 0.00 0.49 0.04 1.72 0.00 2.13 0.00 0.59 0.03 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 3.27 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.00 8.60 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.19 0.76 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348;LR chi2 (31) = 2572.32; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
9385.03; Pseudo R2 = 0.1205. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 645.30 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 6.81; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=5.00, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.1205. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 645.30 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 5.11; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 6.04, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1205. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 645.30 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574; F (62, 513) = 264.51; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 10.1.5: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (more children) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.24 0.04 1.36 0.01 0.75 0.23 1.20 0.25 1.26 0.16 0.92 0.84 1.26 0.10 1.41 0.04 0.66 0.14 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.89 0.15 0.93 0.36 0.79 0.19 0.83 0.19 0.84 0.25 0.82 0.52 0.91 0.32 0.96 0.68 0.75 0.21 
Above Average 0.82 0.01 0.89 0.10 0.62 0.01 0.73 0.00 0.76 0.02 0.65 0.10 0.85 0.08 0.94 0.52 0.56 0.01 
Household Size: 
No. of Children 
Girls > Boys 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
No Child 0.62 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.83 0.48 0.52 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.74 0.57 0.66 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.87 0.65 
Boys no girl 0.91 0.32 0.92 0.43 0.92 0.65 0.79 0.15 0.78 0.18 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.75 0.99 0.92 0.86 0.54 
Girls no boy 0.88 0.20 0.86 0.15 1.04 0.86 0.77 0.12 0.73 0.09 1.10 0.82 0.93 0.54 0.91 0.48 1.02 0.95 
Boys = Girls 0.84 0.02 0.90 0.20 0.65 0.02 0.75 0.04 0.78 0.10 0.73 0.32 0.87 0.14 0.94 0.55 0.61 0.03 
Boys > girls 0.93 0.28 1.01 0.86 0.67 0.01 0.72 0.00 0.79 0.06 0.58 0.04 1.03 0.69 1.12 0.26 0.73 0.09 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.21 0.03 1.19 0.07 1.17 0.40 1.24 0.11 1.18 0.29 1.58 0.19 1.19 0.12 1.19 0.05 1.00 1.00 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 0.86 0.69 0.81 0.54 1.40 0.61 2.11 0.63 0.83 0.83 4.33 0.23 0.74 0.40 0.77 0.48 0.81 0.72 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.14 0.32 1.17 0.25 0.86 0.56 0.84 0.51 0.91 0.72 0.56 0.25 1.22 0.18 1.24 0.16 0.97 0.92 
25-29 years 1.18 0.20 1.26 0.10 0.73 0.21 1.00 0.99 1.06 0.82 0.65 0.37 1.21 0.21 1.32 0.09 0.70 0.23 
30-34 years 1.05 0.70 1.18 0.25 0.51 0.02 1.05 0.86 1.28 0.37 0.34 0.06 1.00 0.99 1.11 0.52 0.57 0.08 
35-39 years 1.04 0.79 1.08 0.59 0.72 0.25 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.75 0.60 1.00 0.99 1.09 0.61 0.62 0.13 
40-44 years 1.11 0.50 1.14 0.39 0.79 0.41 0.93 0.81 0.93 0.81 0.82 0.73 1.13 0.47 1.22 0.28 0.68 0.24 
45-49 years 1.14 0.40 1.18 0.30 0.81 0.53 1.05 0.86 1.11 0.73 0.64 0.53 1.11 0.58 1.17 0.43 0.78 0.48 
continue… 
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Table 10.1.5 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (more children) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.04 0.66 1.10 0.31 0.73 0.14 1.10 0.48 1.08 0.58 1.09 0.78 1.00 0.98 1.11 0.41 0.51 0.02 
8-years education 1.42 0.00 1.60 0.00 0.79 0.47 1.86 0.00 2.07 0.00 1.03 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.12 0.51 0.41 0.09 
10-12years education 1.40 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.56 0.10 1.46 0.01 1.71 0.00 0.59 0.27 1.28 0.10 1.47 0.05 0.55 0.22 
Higher education 1.79 0.00 2.20 0.00 0.96 0.92 1.77 0.00 2.02 0.00 0.89 0.83 1.83 0.01 2.38 0.01 1.38 0.71 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.26 0.01 1.22 0.01 1.21 0.26 1.11 0.47 1.09 0.54 1.10 0.75 1.28 0.01 1.23 0.03 1.23 0.32 
8-years education 1.23 0.02 1.29 0.01 0.83 0.34 0.96 0.81 0.95 0.77 0.97 0.93 1.34 0.01 1.45 0.00 0.75 0.24 
10-12years education 1.34 0.00 1.49 0.00 0.68 0.04 1.16 0.32 1.23 0.21 0.81 0.50 1.39 0.00 1.59 0.00 0.57 0.01 
Higher education 1.27 0.01 1.45 0.00 0.62 0.08 1.18 0.30 1.31 0.13 0.80 0.57 1.20 0.14 1.39 0.02 0.46 0.03 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.07 0.21 1.08 0.25 1.07 0.64 0.85 0.08 0.90 0.29 0.73 0.13 1.19 0.01 1.15 0.08 1.40 0.06 
High income 0.89 0.36 0.97 0.86 0.31 0.04 0.80 0.24 0.96 0.87 0.30 0.05 0.74 0.19 0.77 0.35 0.74 0.00 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.10 0.21 1.12 0.13 0.91 0.55 1.37 0.04 1.34 0.06 1.13 0.70 1.03 0.77 1.06 0.48 0.82 0.33 
High income 1.29 0.00 1.43 0.00 0.69 0.03 1.56 0.00 1.71 0.00 0.85 0.62 1.19 0.05 1.33 0.01 0.62 0.02 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.08 0.43 1.04 0.72 1.24 0.25 0.89 0.45 0.87 0.41 1.04 0.90 1.16 0.24 1.09 0.50 1.36 0.19 
NWFP 1.76 0.00 2.23 0.00 0.55 0.00 2.13 0.00 3.61 0.00 0.49 0.04 1.72 0.00 2.13 0.00 0.59 0.03 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 3.27 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.00 8.60 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.19 0.76 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (31) = 2572.32; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
9385.03; Pseudo R2 = 0.1205. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 645.30 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 6.81; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=5.00, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.1205. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 645.30 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 5.11; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 6.04, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1205. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 645.30 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574; F (62, 513) = 264.51; Prob > F = 0.00 
 
246 
 
 
Table 10.2.2: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (use of contraceptives) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment Status Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.30 0.02 1.44 0.01 0.82 0.34 1.13 0.47 1.22 0.28 0.85 0.66 1.35 0.04 1.51 0.01 0.78 0.33 
Household Size: 
Excluding Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.87 0.08 0.88 0.15 0.85 0.36 0.79 0.09 0.78 0.10 0.81 0.49 0.88 0.21 0.91 0.35 0.85 0.47 
Above Average 0.87 0.06 0.97 0.67 0.60 0.00 0.78 0.04 0.85 0.22 0.60 0.05 0.88 0.19 0.96 0.97 0.57 0.01 
Household Size: No. 
of children 
No child 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Boy no girl 1.60 0.00 1.70 0.00 0.95 0.83 1.70 0.01 1.86 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.56 0.00 1.64 0.00 0.94 0.80 
Girl no boy 1.53 0.00 1.54 0.00 1.12 0.64 1.51 0.03 1.52 0.03 1.18 0.72 1.56 0.00 1.56 0.00 1.10 0.74 
Boys/Girls (both) 1.74 0.00 1.96 0.00 0.82 0.36 1.90 0.00 2.21 0.00 0.90 0.80 1.69 0.00 1.86 0.00 0.79 0.33 
Family Formation Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.21 0.02 1.19 0.05 1.14 0.47 1.10 0.48 1.08 0.64 1.24 0.48 1.25 0.03 1.24 0.05 1.06 0.81 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 1.10 0.78 1.06 0.86 1.33 0.66 4.62 0.29 1.96 0.58 3.80 0.27 0.84 0.59 0.90 0.77 0.81 0.70 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.22 0.11 1.17 0.21 1.18 0.54 0.94 0.83 0.90 0.68 0.92 0.88 1.31 0.05 1.29 0.09 1.22 0.50 
25-29 years 1.30 0.03 1.26 0.08 1.16 0.57 1.20 0.48 1.16 0.59 0.93 0.86 1.32 0.05 1.31 0.08 1.19 0.58 
30-34 years 1.08 0.57 1.10 0.48 0.83 0.52 1.16 0.58 1.28 0.38 0.56 0.27 1.03 0.86 1.05 0.77 0.92 0.81 
35-39 years 1.24 0.13 1.26 0.13 0.94 0.83 1.30 0.38 1.28 0.46 0.93 0.89 1.19 0.28 1.26 0.18 0.84 0.59 
40-44 years 1.13 0.41 1.11 0.54 1.04 0.89 1.05 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.83 1.16 0.40 1.16 0.43 1.03 0.93 
45-49 years 1.08 0.60 1.04 0.83 1.11 0.76 1.04 0.90 0.94 0.84 1.02 0.98 1.09 0.64 1.09 0.64 0.98 0.96 
continue… 
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Table 10.2.2 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (use of contraceptives) Decision-making  
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.09 0.34 1.19 0.10 0.72 0.11 1.09 0.58 1.07 0.63 1.05 0.85 1.08 0.48 1.25 0.10 0.51 0.01 
8-years education 1.32 0.01 1.52 0.00 0.73 0.30 1.36 0.07 1.52 0.03 0.86 0.68 1.17 0.28 1.36 0.10 0.51 0.15 
10-12years education 1.37 0.01 1.65 0.00 0.65 0.09 1.22 0.21 1.42 0.06 0.65 0.21 1.56 0.01 1.94 0.00 0.72 0.42 
Higher education 1.67 0.00 2.30 0.00 0.74 0.49 1.50 0.03 1.91 0.00 0.68 0.47 1.93 0.00 2.94 0.00 1.11 0.90 
Husband's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.17 0.05 1.16 0.07 1.08 0.64 1.03 0.83 1.08 0.64 0.90 0.72 1.17 0.09 1.15 0.15 1.14 0.49 
8-years education 1.12 0.21 1.19 0.08 0.76 0.15 0.96 0.79 0.97 0.88 0.89 0.72 1.16 0.16 1.28 0.04 0.66 0.08 
10-12yrs education 1.20 0.04 1.32 0.01 0.73 0.06 1.12 0.44 1.21 0.26 0.79 0.42 1.18 0.10 1.33 0.02 0.66 0.05 
Higher education 1.20 0.07 1.47 0.00 0.56 0.03 1.21 0.26 1.49 0.04 0.64 0.23 1.07 0.61 1.29 0.10 0.46 0.02 
Husband's Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.12 0.05 1.11 0.11 1.13 0.37 0.90 0.27 0.93 0.52 0.81 0.31 1.24 0.00 1.19 0.04 1.40 0.05 
High income 1.21 0.18 1.36 0.16 0.98 0.95 1.20 0.31 1.69 0.07 0.82 0.68 0.88 0.63 0.84 0.61 0.83 0.81 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.06 0.52 1.06 0.49 0.98 0.91 1.25 0.19 1.12 0.51 1.55 0.14 1.01 0.92 1.05 0.60 0.82 0.32 
High income 1.20 0.01 1.33 0.00 0.74 0.06 1.41 0.01 1.47 0.01 1.11 0.72 1.14 0.13 1.29 0.02 0.62 0.02 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.18 0.12 1.11 0.38 1.35 0.11 0.85 0.31 0.78 0.16 1.22 0.46 1.43 0.02 1.34 0.07 1.39 0.19 
NWFP 1.56 0.00 2.03 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.71 0.00 3.06 0.00 0.41 0.01 1.59 0.00 2.02 0.00 0.52 0.01 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 2.64 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.00 7.26 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.08 0.86 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (29) = 2743.15; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -
9056.789; Pseudo R2 = 0.1315. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 582.74 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; Design df = 1101; F (58, 1044) = 6.48; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(29, 499)=4.90, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.1315. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 582.74 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F(58, 470) = 4.37; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(29, 546) =5.52, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1315. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (29) = 582.74 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. 
of obs = 8096; Design df = 574; F (58, 517) = 4.69; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 10.2.3: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (use of contraceptives) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy1 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.30 0.02 1.44 0.01 0.81 0.33 1.12 0.48 1.22 0.28 0.84 0.66 1.35 0.03 1.51 0.01 0.78 0.32 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.87 0.09 0.88 0.16 0.86 0.38 0.78 0.09 0.78 0.10 0.80 0.46 0.89 0.23 0.91 0.37 0.86 0.49 
Above Average 0.88 0.07 0.97 0.70 0.61 0.00 0.79 0.04 0.85 0.22 0.61 0.05 0.89 0.21 0.92 0.99 0.58 0.01 
Household Size: 
No. of children 
No Child 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Boys no Girl 1.60 0.00 1.71 0.00 0.96 0.86 1.70 0.01 1.86 0.00 1.02 0.97 1.57 0.00 1.65 0.00 0.94 0.82 
Girls no boy 1.54 0.00 1.54 0.00 1.13 0.61 1.51 0.03 1.52 0.03 1.19 0.70 1.56 0.00 1.56 0.00 1.10 0.72 
Boys = Girls 1.68 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.75 0.24 1.86 0.00 2.20 0.00 0.81 0.66 1.62 0.00 1.81 0.00 0.74 0.24 
Girls > Boys 1.83 0.00 1.96 0.00 0.98 0.94 2.11 0.00 2.26 0.00 1.18 0.72 1.74 0.00 1.87 0.00 0.91 0.71 
Boys > Girls 1.76 0.00 2.01 0.00 0.77 0.29 1.81 0.00 2.16 0.00 0.81 0.65 1.74 0.00 1.94 0.00 0.77 0.33 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.19 0.04 1.19 0.07 1.10 0.60 1.09 0.53 1.08 0.64 1.19 0.56 1.23 0.05 1.23 0.07 1.03 0.91 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 1.10 0.78 1.06 0.86 1.32 0.66 4.46 0.29 1.95 0.58 3.39 0.31 0.84 0.59 0.90 0.77 0.81 0.71 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.22 0.11 1.17 0.21 1.18 0.54 0.94 0.83 0.90 0.68 0.93 0.89 1.31 0.05 1.29 0.08 1.22 0.50 
25-29 years 1.30 0.04 1.26 0.08 1.15 0.58 1.20 0.49 1.16 0.59 0.92 0.85 1.32 0.05 1.31 0.08 1.18 0.59 
30-34 years 1.07 0.60 1.10 0.49 0.82 0.50 1.15 0.59 1.28 0.38 0.55 0.25 1.02 0.89 1.04 0.79 0.91 0.79 
35-39 years 1.23 0.14 1.25 0.14 0.93 0.80 1.30 0.39 1.28 0.46 0.92 0.87 1.18 0.30 1.25 0.20 0.83 0.58 
40-44 years 1.12 0.46 1.10 0.57 1.01 0.96 1.04 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.77 1.14 0.45 1.15 0.46 1.01 0.98 
45-49 years 1.07 0.66 1.03 0.87 1.08 0.83 1.03 0.93 0.94 0.84 0.98 0.97 1.07 0.71 1.08 0.68 0.96 0.91 
continued… 
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Table 10.2.3 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (use of contraceptives) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.09 0.33 1.19 0.10 0.73 0.11 1.09 0.57 1.07 0.63 1.06 0.83 1.08 0.47 1.25 0.10 0.51 0.01 
8-years education 1.32 0.01 1.52 0.00 0.73 0.30 1.36 0.07 1.52 0.03 0.86 0.68 1.17 0.29 1.36 0.10 0.50 0.15 
10-12years education 1.37 0.01 1.65 0.00 0.65 0.09 1.22 0.21 1.42 0.06 0.64 0.20 1.56 0.01 1.94 0.00 0.72 0.43 
Higher education 1.67 0.00 2.31 0.00 0.74 0.49 1.50 0.03 1.91 0.00 0.68 0.47 1.93 0.00 2.94 0.00 1.11 0.90 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.17 0.05 1.16 0.07 1.08 0.64 1.03 0.83 1.08 0.64 0.89 0.70 1.17 0.09 1.15 0.15 1.14 0.50 
8-years education 1.12 0.21 1.19 0.08 0.76 0.15 0.96 0.78 0.97 0.88 0.89 0.70 1.16 0.16 1.28 0.04 0.66 0.08 
10-12years education 1.20 0.04 1.32 0.01 0.73 0.06 1.12 0.44 1.21 0.27 0.79 0.41 1.18 0.10 1.33 0.02 0.66 0.05 
Higher education 1.20 0.07 1.47 0.00 0.56 0.03 1.21 0.26 1.49 0.04 0.64 0.22 1.07 0.61 1.29 0.10 0.46 0.02 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.12 0.06 1.11 0.11 1.12 0.40 0.90 0.25 0.93 0.52 0.80 0.28 1.24 0.00 1.19 0.04 1.39 0.05 
High income 1.20 0.19 1.35 0.17 0.96 0.92 1.20 0.31 1.69 0.07 0.81 0.67 0.88 0.63 0.84 0.61 0.81 0.79 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.06 0.50 1.06 0.49 0.99 0.95 1.25 0.18 1.12 0.50 1.58 0.12 1.01 0.90 1.06 0.58 0.83 0.33 
High income 1.21 0.01 1.33 0.00 0.75 0.07 1.42 0.01 1.47 0.01 1.13 0.67 1.15 0.13 1.29 0.02 0.62 0.02 
States/ Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.18 0.12 1.11 0.38 1.35 0.11 0.85 0.29 0.78 0.16 1.21 0.48 1.43 0.02 1.34 0.07 1.39 0.18 
NWFP 1.56 0.00 2.03 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.70 0.00 3.05 0.00 0.40 0.01 1.59 0.00 2.02 0.00 0.53 0.01 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 2.67 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.00 7.23 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.09 0.84 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (31) = 2744.08; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -
9056.32; Pseudo R2 = 0.1316. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 585.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 6.13; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(31, 497) = 4.59, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo R2 
= 0.1316. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 585.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 4.41; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 5.22, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1316. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 585.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574; F (62, 513) = 4.58; Prob > F = 0.00. 
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Table 10.2.4: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (use of contraceptives) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.30 0.02 1.44 0.01 0.81 0.33 1.12 0.48 1.22 0.28 0.84 0.66 1.35 0.03 1.51 0.01 0.78 0.32 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.87 0.09 0.88 0.16 0.86 0.38 0.78 0.09 0.78 0.10 0.80 0.46 0.89 0.23 0.91 0.37 0.86 0.49 
Above Average 0.88 0.07 0.97 0.70 0.61 0.00 0.79 0.04 0.85 0.22 0.61 0.05 0.89 0.21 0.92 0.99 0.58 0.01 
Household Size: 
No. of Children 
Boys = Girls  1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
No Child 0.60 0.00 0.52 0.00 1.34 0.24 0.54 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.24 0.66 0.62 0.00 0.55 0.00 1.36 0.24 
Boys no girl 0.95 0.59 0.89 0.24 1.28 0.20 0.91 0.53 0.84 0.30 1.26 0.53 0.97 0.76 0.91 0.43 1.28 0.26 
Girls no boy 0.92 0.34 0.80 0.02 1.51 0.05 0.81 0.21 0.69 0.03 1.48 0.31 0.96 0.73 0.86 0.19 1.50 0.08 
Girls > Boys 1.09 0.32 1.02 0.81 1.31 0.11 1.13 0.40 1.03 0.88 1.46 0.21 1.07 0.48 1.03 0.78 1.23 0.29 
Boys > Girls 1.05 0.56 1.05 0.58 1.03 0.85 0.97 0.83 0.98 0.90 1.01 0.99 1.07 0.48 1.07 0.53 1.05 0.81 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.19 0.04 1.19 0.07 1.10 0.60 1.09 0.53 1.08 0.64 1.19 0.56 1.23 0.05 1.23 0.07 1.03 0.91 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 1.10 0.78 1.06 0.86 1.32 0.66 4.46 0.29 1.95 0.58 3.39 0.31 0.84 0.59 0.90 0.77 0.81 0.71 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.22 0.11 1.17 0.21 1.18 0.54 0.94 0.83 0.90 0.68 0.93 0.89 1.31 0.05 1.29 0.08 1.22 0.50 
25-29 years 1.30 0.04 1.26 0.08 1.15 0.58 1.20 0.49 1.16 0.59 0.92 0.85 1.32 0.05 1.31 0.08 1.18 0.59 
30-34 years 1.07 0.60 1.10 0.49 0.82 0.50 1.15 0.59 1.28 0.38 0.55 0.25 1.02 0.89 1.04 0.79 0.91 0.79 
35-39 years 1.23 0.14 1.25 0.14 0.93 0.80 1.30 0.39 1.28 0.46 0.92 0.87 1.18 0.30 1.25 0.20 0.83 0.58 
40-44 years 1.12 0.46 1.10 0.57 1.01 0.96 1.04 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.77 1.14 0.45 1.15 0.46 1.01 0.98 
45-49 years 1.07 0.66 1.03 0.87 1.08 0.83 1.03 0.93 0.94 0.84 0.98 0.97 1.07 0.71 1.08 0.68 0.96 0.91 
            continued… 
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Table 10.2.4 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (use of contraceptives) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.09 0.33 1.19 0.10 0.73 0.11 1.09 0.57 1.07 0.63 1.06 0.83 1.08 0.47 1.25 0.10 0.51 0.01 
8-years education 1.32 0.01 1.52 0.00 0.73 0.30 1.36 0.07 1.52 0.03 0.86 0.68 1.17 0.29 1.36 0.10 0.50 0.15 
10-12years education 1.37 0.01 1.65 0.00 0.65 0.09 1.22 0.21 1.42 0.06 0.64 0.20 1.56 0.01 1.94 0.00 0.72 0.43 
Higher education 1.67 0.00 2.31 0.00 0.74 0.49 1.50 0.03 1.91 0.00 0.68 0.47 1.93 0.00 2.94 0.00 1.11 0.90 
Husband's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.17 0.05 1.16 0.07 1.08 0.64 1.03 0.83 1.08 0.64 0.89 0.70 1.17 0.09 1.15 0.15 1.14 0.50 
8-years education 1.12 0.21 1.19 0.08 0.76 0.15 0.96 0.78 0.97 0.88 0.89 0.70 1.16 0.16 1.28 0.04 0.66 0.08 
10-12years education 1.20 0.04 1.32 0.01 0.73 0.06 1.12 0.44 1.21 0.27 0.79 0.41 1.18 0.10 1.33 0.02 0.66 0.05 
Higher education 1.20 0.07 1.47 0.00 0.56 0.03 1.21 0.26 1.49 0.04 0.64 0.22 1.07 0.61 1.29 0.10 0.46 0.02 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.12 0.06 1.11 0.11 1.12 0.40 0.90 0.25 0.93 0.52 0.80 0.28 1.24 0.00 1.19 0.04 1.39 0.05 
High income 1.20 0.19 1.35 0.17 0.96 0.92 1.20 0.31 1.69 0.07 0.81 0.67 0.88 0.63 0.84 0.61 0.81 0.79 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.06 0.50 1.06 0.49 0.99 0.95 1.25 0.18 1.12 0.50 1.58 0.12 1.01 0.90 1.06 0.58 0.83 0.33 
High income 1.21 0.01 1.33 0.00 0.75 0.07 1.42 0.01 1.47 0.01 1.13 0.67 1.15 0.13 1.29 0.02 0.62 0.02 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.18 0.12 1.11 0.38 1.35 0.11 0.85 0.29 0.78 0.16 1.21 0.48 1.43 0.02 1.34 0.07 1.39 0.18 
NWFP 1.56 0.00 2.03 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.70 0.00 3.05 0.00 0.40 0.01 1.59 0.00 2.02 0.00 0.53 0.01 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 2.67 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.00 7.23 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.09 0.84 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (31) = 2744.08; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
9056.32; Pseudo R2 = 0.1316. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 585.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 6.13; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=4.59, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo 
R2 = 0.1316. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 585.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; 
Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 4.41; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 5.22, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1316. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 585.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574; F (62, 513) = 4.58; Prob > F = 0.00 
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Table 10.2.5: Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (use of contraceptives) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Employment 
Status 
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Employed 1.30 0.02 1.44 0.01 0.81 0.33 1.12 0.48 1.22 0.28 0.84 0.66 1.35 0.03 1.51 0.01 0.78 0.32 
Household Size: 
Excluding 
Children 
Below Average 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.87 0.09 0.88 0.16 0.86 0.38 0.78 0.09 0.78 0.10 0.80 0.46 0.89 0.23 0.91 0.37 0.86 0.49 
Above Average 0.88 0.07 0.97 0.70 0.61 0.00 0.79 0.04 0.85 0.22 0.61 0.05 0.89 0.21 0.92 0.99 0.58 0.01 
Household Size: 
No. of Children 
Girls > Boys 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
No Child 0.55 0.00 0.51 0.00 1.02 0.94 0.47 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.85 0.72 0.57 0.00 0.53 0.00 1.10 0.71 
Boys no girl 0.88 0.18 0.87 0.19 0.98 0.90 0.81 0.21 0.82 0.32 0.86 0.63 0.90 0.38 0.88 0.31 1.04 0.87 
Girls no boy 0.84 0.09 0.79 0.03 1.15 0.48 0.72 0.06 0.67 0.04 1.01 0.98 0.90 0.38 0.83 0.17 1.22 0.38 
Boys = Girls 0.92 0.32 0.98 0.81 0.76 0.11 0.88 0.40 0.97 0.88 0.68 0.21 0.93 0.48 0.97 0.78 0.81 0.29 
Boys > girls 0.96 0.59 1.03 0.75 0.79 0.11 0.86 0.22 0.96 0.76 0.69 0.13 1.00 0.96 1.04 0.71 0.85 0.40 
Family 
Formation 
Nuclear 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Extended 1.19 0.04 1.19 0.07 1.10 0.60 1.09 0.53 1.08 0.64 1.19 0.56 1.23 0.05 1.23 0.07 1.03 0.91 
Mother-in-Law Not Present 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Present 1.10 0.78 1.06 0.86 1.32 0.66 4.46 0.29 1.95 0.58 3.39 0.31 0.84 0.59 0.90 0.77 0.81 0.71 
Age Structure 
15-19 years 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
20-24 years 1.22 0.11 1.17 0.21 1.18 0.54 0.94 0.83 0.90 0.68 0.93 0.89 1.31 0.05 1.29 0.08 1.22 0.50 
25-29 years 1.30 0.04 1.26 0.08 1.15 0.58 1.20 0.49 1.16 0.59 0.92 0.85 1.32 0.05 1.31 0.08 1.18 0.59 
30-34 years 1.07 0.60 1.10 0.49 0.82 0.50 1.15 0.59 1.28 0.38 0.55 0.25 1.02 0.89 1.04 0.79 0.91 0.79 
35-39 years 1.23 0.14 1.25 0.14 0.93 0.80 1.30 0.39 1.28 0.46 0.92 0.87 1.18 0.30 1.25 0.20 0.83 0.58 
40-44 years 1.12 0.46 1.10 0.57 1.01 0.96 1.04 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.77 1.14 0.45 1.15 0.46 1.01 0.98 
45-49 years 1.07 0.66 1.03 0.87 1.08 0.83 1.03 0.93 0.94 0.84 0.98 0.97 1.07 0.71 1.08 0.68 0.96 0.91 
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Table 10.2.5 (…continued): Determinants of Women Autonomy in Family Planning (use of contraceptives) Decision-making 
Determinants 
Panel-I: Overall Panel-II: Urban Region Panel-III: Rural Region 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Ordered 
Logit1 
Multinomial Logit 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Partial to no 
autonomy2 
Strong to 
partial 
autonomy2 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Odds 
Ratio P>t 
Woman's Level 
of Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.09 0.33 1.19 0.10 0.73 0.11 1.09 0.57 1.07 0.63 1.06 0.83 1.08 0.47 1.25 0.10 0.51 0.01 
8-years education 1.32 0.01 1.52 0.00 0.73 0.30 1.36 0.07 1.52 0.03 0.86 0.68 1.17 0.29 1.36 0.10 0.50 0.15 
10-12years education 1.37 0.01 1.65 0.00 0.65 0.09 1.22 0.21 1.42 0.06 0.64 0.20 1.56 0.01 1.94 0.00 0.72 0.43 
Higher education 1.67 0.00 2.31 0.00 0.74 0.49 1.50 0.03 1.91 0.00 0.68 0.47 1.93 0.00 2.94 0.00 1.11 0.90 
Husband's 
Level of 
Education 
No education 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
5-years education 1.17 0.05 1.16 0.07 1.08 0.64 1.03 0.83 1.08 0.64 0.89 0.70 1.17 0.09 1.15 0.15 1.14 0.50 
8-years education 1.12 0.21 1.19 0.08 0.76 0.15 0.96 0.78 0.97 0.88 0.89 0.70 1.16 0.16 1.28 0.04 0.66 0.08 
10-12years education 1.20 0.04 1.32 0.01 0.73 0.06 1.12 0.44 1.21 0.27 0.79 0.41 1.18 0.10 1.33 0.02 0.66 0.05 
Higher education 1.20 0.07 1.47 0.00 0.56 0.03 1.21 0.26 1.49 0.04 0.64 0.22 1.07 0.61 1.29 0.10 0.46 0.02 
Husband's 
Income Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.12 0.06 1.11 0.11 1.12 0.40 0.90 0.25 0.93 0.52 0.80 0.28 1.24 0.00 1.19 0.04 1.39 0.05 
High income 1.20 0.19 1.35 0.17 0.96 0.92 1.20 0.31 1.69 0.07 0.81 0.67 0.88 0.63 0.84 0.61 0.81 0.79 
Family Income 
Status 
Low income 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle income 1.06 0.50 1.06 0.49 0.99 0.95 1.25 0.18 1.12 0.50 1.58 0.12 1.01 0.90 1.06 0.58 0.83 0.33 
High income 1.21 0.01 1.33 0.00 0.75 0.07 1.42 0.01 1.47 0.01 1.13 0.67 1.15 0.13 1.29 0.02 0.62 0.02 
States/ 
Provinces 
Punjab 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Sindh 1.18 0.12 1.11 0.38 1.35 0.11 0.85 0.29 0.78 0.16 1.21 0.48 1.43 0.02 1.34 0.07 1.39 0.18 
NWFP 1.56 0.00 2.03 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.70 0.00 3.05 0.00 0.40 0.01 1.59 0.00 2.02 0.00 0.53 0.01 
Baluchistan 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 2.67 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.00 7.23 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.09 0.84 
Notes: 
Panel-I: this panel refers to the overall results, 1) Number of strata = 8; Number of PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; LR chi2 (31) = 2744.08; Prob > chi2 = 0.00; Log likelihood = -
9056.32; Pseudo R2 = 0.1316. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 585.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.00. 2) Number of strata = 8; Number of 
PSUs = 1109; sub-pop. No. obs. = 13348; Design df = 1101; F (62, 1040) = 6.13; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-II: this panel refers to the results of Urban region, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df=527; F(31, 497)=4.59, P > F = 0.00. Pseudo 
R2 = 0.1316. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 585.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 531; 
Subpop. No. of obs = 5252; Design df = 527; F(62, 466) = 4.41; Prob > F = 0.00. 
Panel-III: this panel refers to rural region results, 1) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574, F(31, 544) = 5.22, P>F=0.00. Pseudo R2 = 
0.1316. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories:  chi2 (31) = 585.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.00.2) Number of strata = 4; Number of PSUs = 578; Subpop. 
No. of obs = 8096; Design df = 574; F (62, 513) = 4.58; Prob > F = 0.00. 
